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E.U. and Iran Announce Framework for Nuclear Deal

Unfortunately for us and for the world, we are witnessing a replay of the Chamberlain saga, with 'peace in our times'. We all know what happened afterwards, and post WWII we all thought that this lesson has been learned
 
If we REALLY think they're 2 or 3 months from building functioning nuclear weapons I don't think that there's anything we could do to stop them.

Could do, or would do? The U.S. could destroy every facility in Iran's nuclear weapons program, with all its ballistic missile facilities thrown in for good measure, in a few days of bombing, without too much risk to our planes or pilots. One careful analysis I have seen concluded that the heavy water facility at Arak, for example, could be destroyed by a couple planes and several well-placed bombs. And a couple B-2's with a few 30,000 lb. bombs could demolish even the centrifuge gallery buried 200 feet below ground at Fordow. But portraying an Iranian atom bomb as something the U.S. is powerless to stop does create a convenient excuse for throwing up our hands and doing nothing.
 
Any deal that makes Dick Cheney and his neocon minions sad is a good day. :)

How amazing that the Far Right will be unable to credit Obama for doing what no president, including their messiah, Ronald Reagan, since Jimmy Carter has done. But it doesn't matter, because Obama did it not because of the Far Right, but in spite of the Far Right. Their tears are delicious. :)

I will give Obama credit. He helped get tough sanctions on Iran that brought them to the bargaining table. Is it good that we are talking to them after 35 years of bad blood? Yes. The problem here is that there really is no deal yet, so celebration is a bit premature. They seem to even disagree on the details of what was tentatively agreed upon. Serious differences remain that have to be worked out by the end of June. There is no guarantee a formal deal will happen, or that that deal will be worth anything, and certainly no guarantee Iran will live up to its end of any bargain. So I am not sure what exactly to give Obama credit for at this point.
 
Yes it does



"Iran’s breakout timeline – the time that it would take for Iran to acquire enough fissile
material for one weapon – is currently assessed to be 2 to 3 months. That timeline will be
extended to at least one year, for a duration of at least ten years, under this framework. "

--going from 2-3 months to ≥ 1 year is an extension--



--At many of their facilities that the P5+1 was most concerned about, they have agreed to halt.--
"Iran has agreed to not enrich uranium at its Fordow facility"
"Iran has agreed to not conduct research and development associated with uranium enrichment at Fordow"
" Iran will not build new enrichment facilities or heavy water reactors"



OK... Glad you can count your months. Or are you seriously saying that Iran is now going to start moving forward with creating a nuclear bomb before June????


Yup. Its cuz OBAMA!


:roll:

There's no evidence they've stopped.
Zarif called Obama & Kerry a couple of liars.
Iran Accuses U.S. of Lying About New Nuke Agreement | Washington Free Beacon
Granted, normally you'd think that he's just talking s**t for his domestic consumption but he's directly contradicting them on details.
And yes, their overriding goal is to get the weapon and they've been doing it for a very long time.
There's no other reason they'd be playing this game.
Their standing changes entirely if they get the bomb.
 
It is very good news that they have come to an agreement. There is hope for the human race after all.
 
Here it is in its glory Jog. Bo says we got something.....we wont be going to war. He expressed that Congress should not take action. Looks like the Iranians are all full of grins. As this is described as informal for them.





Some in the media will call this a "deal." It's not. It's a face-saving, time-buying charade -- an implicit admission that years of repeatedly-extended negotiations have resulted in nothing concrete, with yet another deadline disappearing in the rearview mirror. Consider this tortured verbiage provided to the Associated Press:

Iran and six world powers have agreed on the outlines of an understanding to limit Iran's nuclear programs, officials told The Associated Press Thursday. Negotiations continued on a dispute over how much of it to make public. The officials spoke outside weeklong talks that have been twice extended past the March 31 deadline in an effort to formulate both a general statement of what has been accomplished and documents describing what needs to be done to meet a June 30 deadline for a final accord...The Iranians want any results from talks in the Swiss city of Lausanne described less as a deal and more of an informal understanding … Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, who left Lausanne Tuesday, said the two sides were close, the Interfax news agency reported. There are "only a few steps left to take or, in some cases, even-half steps, and some things have already been agreed upon," he said. But as the talks dragged on, one Western official said early Thursday that they were "at a tough moment and the path forward is really unclear," adding that the idea of breaking talks off over Passover and Easter and resuming them next week had been informally raised. That was confirmed by another official...By blowing through self-imposed deadlines, President Barack Obama risks further antagonizing lawmakers in both parties who are poised to take their own action to upend a deal if they determine the administration has been too conciliatory.

So we have "outlines of an understanding" that allow the parties to keep on negotiating, with the Iranians (a) stressing that the agreement is informal and non-binding at this stage, and (b) lobbying to keep as many details -- to the extent that they exist at all -- private. The Guardian reports that this "understanding" will feature "secret parameters." So far, Iranian officials seem pretty excited about this "breakthrough:".....snip~

Buying Time: Iran Talks Produce Non-Binding 'Outlines of an Understanding' With Scant Details - Guy Benson

He probably channeled telepathically with the ghost of Neville Chamberlain
 
There's no evidence they've stopped.
Zarif is called Obama & Kerry a couple of liars.
Iran Accuses U.S. of Lying About New Nuke Agreement | Washington Free Beacon
Granted, normally you'd think that he's just talking s**t for his domestic consumption but he's directly contradicting them on details.
And yes, their overriding goal is to get the weapon and they've been doing it for a very long time.
There's no other reason they'd be playing this game.
Their standing changes entirely if they get the bomb.

Greetings, bubba. :2wave:

It looks like there's lots of room for lies all around, doesn't it? I haven't heard one word from Kerry, though, and he was the one who was there! There was a split screen while the Iranian representative was reading the announcement in Farsi, and the men being interviewed had some interesting comments! Kinda like "sounds hopeful, but...."
 
Greetings, bubba. :2wave:

It looks like there's lots of room for lies all around, doesn't it? I haven't heard one word from Kerry, though, and he was the one who was there! There was a split screen while the Iranian representative was reading the announcement in Farsi, and the men being interviewed had some interesting comments! Kinda like "sounds hopeful, but...."

Hey Pol ...
Curious to see if Obama has managed to sedate his troops in Congress with this almost-deal.
As you say, there appears to be less than meets the eye.
 
For those who are interested, the factsheet released by the U.S. Department of State is below:


Below are the key parameters of a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear program that were decided in Lausanne, Switzerland. These elements form the foundation upon which the final text of the JCPOA will be written between now and June 30, and reflect the significant progress that has been made in discussions between the P5+1, the European Union, and Iran. Important implementation details are still subject to negotiation, and nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. We will work to conclude the JCPOA based on these parameters over the coming months.

Enrichment
• Iran has agreed to reduce by approximately two-thirds its installed centrifuges. Iran will go from having about 19,000 installed today to 6,104 installed under the deal, with only 5,060 of these enriching uranium for 10 years. All 6,104 centrifuges will be IR-1s, Iran’s first-generation centrifuge.

• Iran has agreed to not enrich uranium over 3.67 percent for at least 15 years.

• Iran has agreed to reduce its current stockpile of about 10,000 kg of low-enriched uranium (LEU) to 300 kg of 3.67 percent LEU for 15 years.

• All excess centrifuges and enrichment infrastructure will be placed in IAEA monitored storage and will be used only as replacements for operating centrifuges and equipment.

• Iran has agreed to not build any new facilities for the purpose of enriching uranium for 15 years.

• Iran’s breakout timeline – the time that it would take for Iran to acquire enough fissile material for one weapon – is currently assessed to be 2 to 3 months. That timeline will be extended to at least one year, for a duration of at least ten years, under this framework.

Iran will convert its facility at Fordow so that it is no longer used to enrich uranium
• Iran has agreed to not enrich uranium at its Fordow facility for at least 15 years.

• Iran has agreed to convert its Fordow facility so that it is used for peaceful purposes only – into a nuclear, physics, technology, research center.

• Iran has agreed to not conduct research and development associated with uranium enrichment at Fordow for 15 years.

• Iran will not have any fissile material at Fordow for 15 years.

• Almost two-thirds of Fordow’s centrifuges and infrastructure will be removed. The remaining centrifuges will not enrich uranium. All centrifuges and related infrastructure will be placed under IAEA monitoring.


Iran will only enrich uranium at the Natanz facility, with only 5,060 IR-1 first-generation centrifuges for ten years.
• Iran has agreed to only enrich uranium using its first generation (IR-1 models) centrifuges at Natanz for ten years, removing its more advanced centrifuges.

• Iran will remove the 1,000 IR-2M centrifuges currently installed at Natanz and place them in IAEA monitored storage for ten years.

• Iran will not use its IR-2, IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, or IR-8 models to produce enriched uranium for at least ten years. Iran will engage in limited research and development with its advanced centrifuges, according to a schedule and parameters which have been agreed to by the P5+1.

• For ten years, enrichment and enrichment research and development will be limited to ensure a breakout timeline of at least 1 year. Beyond 10 years, Iran will abide by its enrichment and enrichment R&D plan submitted to the IAEA, and pursuant to the JCPOA, under the Additional Protocol resulting in certain limitations on enrichment capacity.

Inspections and Transparency
• The IAEA will have regular access to all of Iran’s nuclear facilities, including to Iran’s enrichment facility at Natanz and its former enrichment facility at Fordow, and including the use of the most up-to-date, modern monitoring technologies.

• Inspectors will have access to the supply chain that supports Iran’s nuclear program. The new transparency and inspections mechanisms will closely monitor materials and/or components to prevent diversion to a secret program.

• Inspectors will have access to uranium mines and continuous surveillance at uranium mills, where Iran produces yellowcake, for 25 years.

• Inspectors will have continuous surveillance of Iran’s centrifuge rotors and bellows production and storage facilities for 20 years. Iran’s centrifuge manufacturing base will be frozen and under continuous surveillance.

• All centrifuges and enrichment infrastructure removed from Fordow and Natanz will be placed under continuous monitoring by the IAEA.

• A dedicated procurement channel for Iran’s nuclear program will be established to monitor and approve, on a case by case basis, the supply, sale, or transfer to Iran of certain nuclear-related and dual use materials and technology – an additional transparency measure.
 
• Iran has agreed to implement the Additional Protocol of the IAEA, providing the IAEA much greater access and information regarding Iran’s nuclear program, including both declared and undeclared facilities.

• Iran will be required to grant access to the IAEA to investigate suspicious sites or allegations of a covert enrichment facility, conversion facility, centrifuge production facility, or yellowcake production facility anywhere in the country.

• Iran has agreed to implement Modified Code 3.1 requiring early notification of construction of new facilities.

• Iran will implement an agreed set of measures to address the IAEA’s concerns regarding the Possible Military Dimensions (PMD) of its program.

Reactors and Reprocessing
• Iran has agreed to redesign and rebuild a heavy water research reactor in Arak, based on a design that is agreed to by the P5+1, which will not produce weapons grade plutonium, and which will support peaceful nuclear research and radioisotope production.

• The original core of the reactor, which would have enabled the production of significant quantities of weapons-grade plutonium, will be destroyed or removed from the country.

• Iran will ship all of its spent fuel from the reactor out of the country for the reactor’s lifetime.

• Iran has committed indefinitely to not conduct reprocessing or reprocessing research and development on spent nuclear fuel.

• Iran will not accumulate heavy water in excess of the needs of the modified Arak reactor, and will sell any remaining heavy water on the international market for 15 years.

• Iran will not build any additional heavy water reactors for 15 years.

Sanctions
• Iran will receive sanctions relief, if it verifiably abides by its commitments.

• U.S. and E.U. nuclear-related sanctions will be suspended after the IAEA has verified that Iran has taken all of its key nuclear-related steps. If at any time Iran fails to fulfill its commitments, these sanctions will snap back into place.

• The architecture of U.S. nuclear-related sanctions on Iran will be retained for much of the duration of the deal and allow for snap-back of sanctions in the event of significant non-performance.

• All past UN Security Council resolutions on the Iran nuclear issue will be lifted simultaneous with the completion, by Iran, of nuclear-related actions addressing all key concerns (enrichment, Fordow, Arak, PMD, and transparency).

• However, core provisions in the UN Security Council resolutions – those that deal with transfers of sensitive technologies and activities – will be re-established by a new UN Security Council resolution that will endorse the JCPOA and urge its full implementation. It will also create the procurement channel mentioned above, which will serve as a key transparency measure. Important restrictions on conventional arms and ballistic missiles, as well as provisions that allow for related cargo inspections and asset freezes, will also be incorporated by this new resolution.

• A dispute resolution process will be specified, which enables any JCPOA participant, to seek to resolve disagreements about the performance of JCPOA commitments.

• If an issue of significant non-performance cannot be resolved through that process, then all previous UN sanctions could be re-imposed.

• U.S. sanctions on Iran for terrorism, human rights abuses, and ballistic missiles will remain in place under the deal.

Phasing
• For ten years, Iran will limit domestic enrichment capacity and research and development – ensuring a breakout timeline of at least one year. Beyond that, Iran will be bound by its longer-term enrichment and enrichment research and development plan it shared with the P5+1.

• For fifteen years, Iran will limit additional elements of its program. For instance, Iran will not build new enrichment facilities or heavy water reactors and will limit its stockpile of enriched uranium and accept enhanced transparency procedures.

• Important inspections and transparency measures will continue well beyond 15 years. Iran’s adherence to the Additional Protocol of the IAEA is permanent, including its significant access and transparency obligations. The robust inspections of Iran’s uranium supply chain will last for 25 years.

• Even after the period of the most stringent limitations on Iran’s nuclear program, Iran will remain a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which prohibits Iran’s development or acquisition of nuclear weapons and requires IAEA safeguards on its nuclear program.


Parameters for a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran's Nuclear Program
 
It should be noted that tweets by Iran's Foreign Minister, Javad Zarif (@JZarif), question some of the provisions cited in the above factsheet. Two relevant tweets:

Iran/5+1 Statement: "US will cease the application of ALL nuclear-related secondary economic and financial sanctions." Is this gradual?

Iran/P5+1 Statement: "The EU will TERMINATE the implementation of ALL nuclear-related economic and financial sanctions". How about this?
 
I will give Obama credit. He helped get tough sanctions on Iran that brought them to the bargaining table. Is it good that we are talking to them after 35 years of bad blood? Yes. The problem here is that there really is no deal yet, so celebration is a bit premature. They seem to even disagree on the details of what was tentatively agreed upon. Serious differences remain that have to be worked out by the end of June. There is no guarantee a formal deal will happen, or that that deal will be worth anything, and certainly no guarantee Iran will live up to its end of any bargain. So I am not sure what exactly to give Obama credit for at this point.

The first halfway near-decent criticism I have seen of the deal yet. Well done.

It is my understanding that the deal, however temporal, is based on actual verifications, not blind trust. That alone changes the equation.

As does the fact that both sides were able to tell their own hardliners to go **** themselves.
 
The first halfway near-decent criticism I have seen of the deal yet. Well done.

It is my understanding that the deal, however temporal, is based on actual verifications, not blind trust. That alone changes the equation.

As does the fact that both sides were able to tell their own hardliners to go **** themselves.

That's the only way it could be with Iran's history of compliance.
 
For those who are interested, the factsheet released by the U.S. Department of State is below:


Below are the key parameters of a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear program that were decided in Lausanne, Switzerland. These elements form the foundation upon which the final text of the JCPOA will be written between now and June 30, and reflect the significant progress that has been made in discussions between the P5+1, the European Union, and Iran. Important implementation details are still subject to negotiation, and nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. We will work to conclude the JCPOA based on these parameters over the coming months.

Enrichment
• Iran has agreed to reduce by approximately two-thirds its installed centrifuges. Iran will go from having about 19,000 installed today to 6,104 installed under the deal, with only 5,060 of these enriching uranium for 10 years. All 6,104 centrifuges will be IR-1s, Iran’s first-generation centrifuge.

• Iran has agreed to not enrich uranium over 3.67 percent for at least 15 years.

• Iran has agreed to reduce its current stockpile of about 10,000 kg of low-enriched uranium (LEU) to 300 kg of 3.67 percent LEU for 15 years.

• All excess centrifuges and enrichment infrastructure will be placed in IAEA monitored storage and will be used only as replacements for operating centrifuges and equipment.

• Iran has agreed to not build any new facilities for the purpose of enriching uranium for 15 years.

• Iran’s breakout timeline – the time that it would take for Iran to acquire enough fissile material for one weapon – is currently assessed to be 2 to 3 months. That timeline will be extended to at least one year, for a duration of at least ten years, under this framework.

Iran will convert its facility at Fordow so that it is no longer used to enrich uranium
• Iran has agreed to not enrich uranium at its Fordow facility for at least 15 years.

• Iran has agreed to convert its Fordow facility so that it is used for peaceful purposes only – into a nuclear, physics, technology, research center.

• Iran has agreed to not conduct research and development associated with uranium enrichment at Fordow for 15 years.

• Iran will not have any fissile material at Fordow for 15 years.

• Almost two-thirds of Fordow’s centrifuges and infrastructure will be removed. The remaining centrifuges will not enrich uranium. All centrifuges and related infrastructure will be placed under IAEA monitoring.


Iran will only enrich uranium at the Natanz facility, with only 5,060 IR-1 first-generation centrifuges for ten years.
• Iran has agreed to only enrich uranium using its first generation (IR-1 models) centrifuges at Natanz for ten years, removing its more advanced centrifuges.

• Iran will remove the 1,000 IR-2M centrifuges currently installed at Natanz and place them in IAEA monitored storage for ten years.

• Iran will not use its IR-2, IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, or IR-8 models to produce enriched uranium for at least ten years. Iran will engage in limited research and development with its advanced centrifuges, according to a schedule and parameters which have been agreed to by the P5+1.

• For ten years, enrichment and enrichment research and development will be limited to ensure a breakout timeline of at least 1 year. Beyond 10 years, Iran will abide by its enrichment and enrichment R&D plan submitted to the IAEA, and pursuant to the JCPOA, under the Additional Protocol resulting in certain limitations on enrichment capacity.

Inspections and Transparency
• The IAEA will have regular access to all of Iran’s nuclear facilities, including to Iran’s enrichment facility at Natanz and its former enrichment facility at Fordow, and including the use of the most up-to-date, modern monitoring technologies.

• Inspectors will have access to the supply chain that supports Iran’s nuclear program. The new transparency and inspections mechanisms will closely monitor materials and/or components to prevent diversion to a secret program.

• Inspectors will have access to uranium mines and continuous surveillance at uranium mills, where Iran produces yellowcake, for 25 years.

• Inspectors will have continuous surveillance of Iran’s centrifuge rotors and bellows production and storage facilities for 20 years. Iran’s centrifuge manufacturing base will be frozen and under continuous surveillance.

• All centrifuges and enrichment infrastructure removed from Fordow and Natanz will be placed under continuous monitoring by the IAEA.

• A dedicated procurement channel for Iran’s nuclear program will be established to monitor and approve, on a case by case basis, the supply, sale, or transfer to Iran of certain nuclear-related and dual use materials and technology – an additional transparency measure.
And you think they will follow this to a T?
 
And you think they will follow this to a T?

Performance becomes an issue once an agreement is actually signed. One currently has a set of understandings, with sufficient ambiguity, to lead each side to interpret things in a different fashion. The contrast between the Iranian Foreign Minister's tweets and the U.S. factsheet highlight this issue. The understanding, which falls short of a signed credible framework agreement, offers a basis for continuing the negotiations. There remain no guarantees of a final agreement, as difficult issues remain to be resolved.

As one example, the factsheet states, "Iran has agreed to convert its Fordow facility so that it is used for peaceful purposes only – into a nuclear, physics, technology, research center." How the P5+1 define "peaceful" research and how Iran defines it could differ widely. Moreover, some civil research could, in fact, produce knowledge that is also applicable to a military dimension. UNSC Res. 1696 prohibited nuclear R&D. The understanding falls short of a full restriction. The concrete substance related to R&D has not yet been negotiated.

Finally, given that Iran has not been forthcoming with the IAEA in the past e.g., there remain two unresolved critical issues, and Iran had built a secret facility, one should be wary of Iranian compliance. Very robust verification will need to be part of any final agreement. The understandings provide some general provisions, but the actual agreement will need to be very specific.

In the end, I believe all the parties had too much to lose not to reach some kind of understanding to allow the diplomacy to proceed. I'm not surprised that the understandings were reached past the initial 3/31 deadline. Now the remaining three months will present a far more difficult challenge, as general understandings, some of which allow both sides to interpret matters differently, will need to be transformed into concrete and specific terms. Ambiguity allowed the parties to continue the talks. Specificity may blow things up if the parties' differences cannot be bridged.
 
Good.

Unlike most people it seems, I was not the slightest bit worried about Iran getting nukes (even if they had them - they were not going to ever use them anyway).

So this embargo nonsense can finally - maybe - end.

All embargoes do is hurt the poorest of the country affected...the rich/politicians usually are unaffected.
 
Here is the actual deal: http://www.armscontrol.org/files/Pa...ublic-of-Irans-Nuclear-Program-2015-04-02.pdf
I dont see how this is a bad deal. A lot of international oversight, implementing certain restrictions, reducing centrifuges, extending the "breakout time", agreeing to halt enrichment, allowing IAEA access to all nuclear facilities, inspectors to all uranium mines, redesigning Arak to ensure that its not used for weapon purposes, halting and not building any new enrichment facilities or heavy water reactors... I mean I dont see how this is a bad thing.. But then again many here would state even if Iran said, "we will blow up all our nuclear facilities" they would not accept that as a deal simply because of OBAMA!!!

Looks like a good deal to me.

Thanks, Obama!
 
The first halfway near-decent criticism I have seen of the deal yet. Well done.

It is my understanding that the deal, however temporal, is based on actual verifications, not blind trust. That alone changes the equation.

As does the fact that both sides were able to tell their own hardliners to go **** themselves.
You are kidding yourself if you think anyone inside Iran told the hardliners there to go **** themselves. If the deal is ever accepted it will be because it is what the hardliners want, not that they were somehow overruled by supposed moderates.
 
Another point from the factsheet that remains undefined, but is critical:

Iran has agreed to reduce its current stockpile of about 10,000 kg of low-enriched uranium (LEU) to 300 kg of 3.67 percent LEU for 15 years.

The issue concerns how Iran will reduce its stockpile. There is no language that the enriched uranium would be shipped out of the country. There is no language to deal with an internal reduction if the material isn't shipped out of the country. This represents another possible stumbling block during the final negotiations. Shipment outside of the country offers stronger safeguards than an internal reduction.
 
Iran needs this more than the US. Iran knows that Obama must have points clearly laid out in order to prevent further sanctions imposed by Congress.

Congress can't unilaterally impose more sanctions. The sanctions only work if they are asserted by most of the 1st world countries. If there is no deal; there will most likely be no more sanctions.
 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/03/w...lumn-region®ion=top-news&WT.nav=top-news&_r=0



Hmm, another 3 months.
Sanctions lifted as Iran complies?? Interesting - Complies to what?
What will Congress think?

After reading the media note publishing the framework of the preliminary agreement :)
I was surprised. I only read it as an interested and skeptical citizen and not in professional intent, but it does seem much, much better than I had expected.

Parameters for a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran's Nuclear Program

Of course, we must wait and see how the frame ist filled out. But at this point?
 
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