• This is a political forum that is non-biased/non-partisan and treats every person's position on topics equally. This debate forum is not aligned to any political party. In today's politics, many ideas are split between and even within all the political parties. Often we find ourselves agreeing on one platform but some topics break our mold. We are here to discuss them in a civil political debate. If this is your first visit to our political forums, be sure to check out the RULES. Registering for debate politics is necessary before posting. Register today to participate - it's free!

U.S. Says Shipping Uranium Out of Iran Is Still Part of Possible Nuclear Deal

donsutherland1

DP Veteran
Joined
Oct 17, 2007
Messages
11,862
Reaction score
10,300
Location
New York
Gender
Male
Political Leaning
Centrist
From today's edition of The New York Times:

The American officials were pushing back against public statements made on Sunday by Iran’s deputy foreign minister, Abbas Araqchi, that seemed to rule out an accord under which uranium would be sent abroad...

American officials did not criticize Mr. Araqchi’s public comments, which he made to several news organizations. But they insisted that the issue had never been decided in the closed-door talks, even tentatively.

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/31/world/europe/iran-nuclear-talks.html

That narrative has some problems and it may well be intended to mask fundamental differences in order to announce a framework deal albeit what increasingly likely appears to be a weak one. If one goes back to last year, one finds that a tentative arrangement involving the shipment of uranium to Russia had been reached. Moreover in the days and weeks that followed, none of the U.S. team had denied such an arrangement.

With regard to the tentative agreement, the November 3, 2014 issue of The New York Times reported:

Iran has tentatively agreed to ship much of its huge stockpile of uranium to Russia if it reaches a broader nuclear deal with the West, according to officials and diplomats involved in the negotiations, potentially a major breakthrough in talks that have until now been deadlocked...

The chief American negotiator, Wendy R. Sherman, alluded to this possible solution to the uranium issue in a recent speech in which she said that “we have made impressive progress on issues that originally seemed intractable.” But Ms. Sherman, who on Monday was named acting deputy secretary of state, has refused to discuss any details of the role Russia could play, saying that negotiations, like mushrooms, “do best in the dark.” As a result, the officials and diplomats would discuss the talks only on the condition of anonymity.


http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/04/w...ives-iran-nuclear-talks-a-possible-boost.html

In sum, Iran's apparent reversal is a potentially major development that undermines the possibility of a credible agreement. The absence of such a provision is a substantive setback and describing its being incorporated in a final agreement as a "possibility" doesn't materially change the nature of the setback.
 
The more we understand this deal, the more we can only conclude it is worthless.
 
Two classes of materials were to be re-processed in Russia; spent fuel rods, and a quantity of Uranium hexafloride (UF6) already enriched to 20%.

The Iranians now want to re-process the spent fuel rods themselves and locally dilute (down-blend) the 20% UF6.

They reportedly have agreed to a maximum of 6,000 centrifuges, but it is unclear what centrifuges will be allowed. Their new prototype centrifuge is 16x more efficient than their current IR-2 model. Thus, they could theoretically increase enrichment production by a factor of 16:1 even with a cap of 6,000. This is far more than necessary for internal power generation, research, medical, industry, etc.
 
From today's edition of The New York Times:



http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/31/world/europe/iran-nuclear-talks.html

That narrative has some problems and it may well be intended to mask fundamental differences in order to announce a framework deal albeit what increasingly likely appears to be a weak one. If one goes back to last year, one finds that a tentative arrangement involving the shipment of uranium to Russia had been reached. Moreover in the days and weeks that followed, none of the U.S. team had denied such an arrangement.

With regard to the tentative agreement, the November 3, 2014 issue of The New York Times reported:

Iran has tentatively agreed to ship much of its huge stockpile of uranium to Russia if it reaches a broader nuclear deal with the West, according to officials and diplomats involved in the negotiations, potentially a major breakthrough in talks that have until now been deadlocked...

The chief American negotiator, Wendy R. Sherman, alluded to this possible solution to the uranium issue in a recent speech in which she said that “we have made impressive progress on issues that originally seemed intractable.” But Ms. Sherman, who on Monday was named acting deputy secretary of state, has refused to discuss any details of the role Russia could play, saying that negotiations, like mushrooms, “do best in the dark.” As a result, the officials and diplomats would discuss the talks only on the condition of anonymity.


http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/04/w...ives-iran-nuclear-talks-a-possible-boost.html

In sum, Iran's apparent reversal is a potentially major development that undermines the possibility of a credible agreement. The absence of such a provision is a substantive setback and describing its being incorporated in a final agreement as a "possibility" doesn't materially change the nature of the setback.

We just have to be clear in our minds that Iran is trying to get the weapons and the sanctions lifted. To do this they need a deal that allows them to do as much as possible legally, so that they do not have to hide very much from the few inspectors they allow into the country later.
We saw how this haggling is done in Iraq. They will get the sanctions lowered and then play games with the UN.
 
At any rate, the administration has maintained all along that any deal agreed upon will have two basic tenants. One, Iran will be denied the construction of nuclear weapons, and two, historically rigorous inspections and monitoring to ensure number one.
 
Simpleχity;1064475654 said:
Two classes of materials were to be re-processed in Russia; spent fuel rods, and a quantity of Uranium hexafloride (UF6) already enriched to 20%.

The Iranians now want to re-process the spent fuel rods themselves and locally dilute (down-blend) the 20% UF6.

They reportedly have agreed to a maximum of 6,000 centrifuges, but it is unclear what centrifuges will be allowed. Their new prototype centrifuge is 16x more efficient than their current IR-2 model. Thus, they could theoretically increase enrichment production by a factor of 16:1 even with a cap of 6,000. This is far more than necessary for internal power generation, research, medical, industry, etc.

From what I can see, Iran has gotten most of what it wanted and can finish the work on the bomb in secret.
 
At any rate, the administration has maintained all along that any deal agreed upon will have two basic tenants. One, Iran will be denied the construction of nuclear weapons, and two, historically rigorous inspections and monitoring to ensure number one.

Oh yes! I recall those red lines, or were they drawn in the desert sand? The Administration has uttered so many, I forget the details.
 
Oh yes! I recall those red lines, or were they drawn in the desert sand? The Administration has uttered so many, I forget the details.

When the deal is done, and the ink is dry, if either of those two are absent, then I'll raise hell with you, deal?
 
When the deal is done, and the ink is dry, if either of those two are absent, then I'll raise hell with you, deal?

If I get, what I want, you can raise hell with me.


PS: We need to define, what "denied" is to mean here. As it stands right now, the IAEA membership "denies" Iran "construction of a nuclear weapon" already and the Security Council has already ordered close inspections.
 
If I get, what I want, you can raise hell with me.


PS: We need to define, what "denied" is to mean here. As it stands right now, the IAEA membership "denies" Iran "construction of a nuclear weapon" already and the Security Council has already ordered close inspections.

Not sure what you mean with that.
 
Not sure what you mean with that.

With what?
-I want it to be made impossible for Iran to build a nuke. It the treaty can guaranty that, I would get what I want and you can give me Hell.
-The two points you mentioned, are already part of existing international law. The problem is that Iran is not obeying the treaties.
 
With what?
-I want it to be made impossible for Iran to build a nuke. It the treaty can guaranty that, I would get what I want and you can give me Hell.
-The two points you mentioned, are already part of existing international law. The problem is that Iran is not obeying the treaties.

But I don't want to give you hell. What I said is that when the deal is done, and in its entirety sees the light of day, and either of the two premises the Obama administration has maintained will frame it are missing, then you and I can both raise hell about it. Obama insists that any deal will have far more rigorous monitoring than normal IAEA inspections to force IL compliance.
 
Simpleχity;1064475654 said:
Two classes of materials were to be re-processed in Russia; spent fuel rods, and a quantity of Uranium hexafloride (UF6) already enriched to 20%.

The Iranians now want to re-process the spent fuel rods themselves and locally dilute (down-blend) the 20% UF6.

They reportedly have agreed to a maximum of 6,000 centrifuges, but it is unclear what centrifuges will be allowed. Their new prototype centrifuge is 16x more efficient than their current IR-2 model. Thus, they could theoretically increase enrichment production by a factor of 16:1 even with a cap of 6,000. This is far more than necessary for internal power generation, research, medical, industry, etc.

Perhaps they desire to build reactors in other nations in the region or China or anywhere that could benefit from having non-petroleum based electricity.
 
We just have to be clear in our minds that Iran is trying to get the weapons and the sanctions lifted. To do this they need a deal that allows them to do as much as possible legally, so that they do not have to hide very much from the few inspectors they allow into the country later.
We saw how this haggling is done in Iraq. They will get the sanctions lowered and then play games with the UN.

Iran is acting in a rational interest-maximizing fashion. Iran wants to gain the maximum benefit at the lowest price. It also wants to preserve its nuclear-related strategic flexibility.

That strategic flexibility should be a deal breaker under normal circumstances given international goals, and the UN Security Council's and IAEA's requirements. However, Iran is likely gambling that even as it is worn down by the sanctions regime, the psychological fatigue is greater among the international community. Therefore, it retracted what should be a core element of a credible agreement. This may represent a tactic aimed at testing the willingness of the international community to walk away from a bad deal. If so, Iran could restore it, if it believes other provisions serve its nuclear-related interests e.g., the issue related to the number and type of centrifuges Iran would be able to continue to operate. If, however, the international community is desperate for a deal, the international community could overlook Iran's retraction, rationalize that it doesn't change much, and accept an alternative albeit a notably weaker one.

Political pressure (interest-related calculations, expediency, desire for a major foreign policy breakthrough, legacy, etc.) among the various P5+1 countries differs, as do their desire for a rapid agreement. Iran's negotiators may well be familiar with which interlocutors might be more willing to accept a weak deal than the others and play them off against one another with the idea that the P5+1 would ultimately reach consensus on weaker terms than would otherwise be the case.

In the end, this Iranian gambit probably should not be too surprising. Iran has little to lose, if it fails. A deal that gives it benefits and expires after a fixed period would represent a gain for it. The P5+1 is now confronted with a choice of accepting Iran's terms to secure an agreement (with at least some members more desperate for an agreement than others) or seeing a continuation of a status quo that sustains Iran's nuclear-related risks.
 
Last edited:
But I don't want to give you hell. What I said is that when the deal is done, and in its entirety sees the light of day, and either of the two premises the Obama administration has maintained will frame it are missing, then you and I can both raise hell about it. Obama insists that any deal will have far more rigorous monitoring than normal IAEA inspections to force IL compliance.

Good! Let's wait and see. Only a few more days, if the controlled information flow speaks true.
 
Iran is acting in a rational interest-maximizing fashion. Iran wants to gain the maximum benefit at the lowest price. It also wants to preserve its nuclear-related strategic flexibility.

That strategic flexibility should be a deal breaker under normal circumstances given international goals, and the UN Security Council's and IAEA's requirements. However, Iran is likely gambling that even as it is worn down by the sanctions regime, the psychological fatigue is greater among the international community. Therefore, it retracted what should be a core element of a credible agreement. This may represent a tactic aimed at testing the willingness of the international community to walk away from a bad deal. If so, Iran could restore it, if it believes other provisions serve its nuclear-related interests e.g., the issue related to the number and type of centrifuges Iran would be able to continue to operate. If, however, the international community is desperate for a deal, the international community could overlook Iran's retraction, rationalize that it doesn't change much, and accept an alternative albeit a notably weaker one.

Political pressure (interest-related calculations, expediency, desire for a major foreign policy breakthrough, legacy, etc.) among the various P5+1 countries differs, as do their desire for a rapid agreement. Iran's negotiators may well be familiar with which interlocutors might be more willing to accept a weak deal than the others and play them off against one another with the idea that the P5+1 would ultimately reach consensus on weaker terms than would otherwise be the case.

In the end, this Iranian gambit probably should not be too surprising. Iran has little to lose, if it fails. A deal that gives it benefits and expires after a fixed period would represent a gain for it. The P5+1 is now confronted with a choice of accepting Iran's terms to secure an agreement (with at least some members more desperate for an agreement than others) or seeing a continuation of a status quo that sustains Iran's nuclear-related risks.

I am not at all surprised by Iranian behavior and concur fully with the statement of rationality at the moment. It does, however, appear irrational to have accepted the pain from the sanctions for so long. Iran could easily have joined the rich world decades ago, if their aims are not malevolent.

In any event I will be somewhat nervous, if a deal is struck. I am not confident that we could put together enough pressure on them easily, when the do the dance around the inspectors later on. That would mean going it alone with a small coalition and the only thing we can actually afford, is realistically the use of horrendous weapons.
 
To all appearances this lays the groundwork for a nuclear Middle East. With the undeniable escalation of sectarian strife to the level of a regional war pitting Shia against Sunni, a few more nuclear armed countries in that region is a prescription for disaster. It's time to walk away from the negotiations, install more draconian sanctions, and seek to put a lid on the conflict before it blooms into something far more serious.
 
I am not at all surprised by Iranian behavior and concur fully with the statement of rationality at the moment. It does, however, appear irrational to have accepted the pain from the sanctions for so long. Iran could easily have joined the rich world decades ago, if their aims are not malevolent.

In part, the Iranian Revolution was a quest to counteract modernization. For Iran's clerics, sustaining the Revolution took precedence over access to the global economy, if access meant compromising those principles. That Iran's clerics are unelected makes it easier for them to withstand public sentiment that almost certainly would favor Iran's becoming a part of the established international system. For Iran's clerics, that system and the related existing order are a problem. Iran's aspirations to become a regional hegemon further complicate the issue. The pain imposed by the sanctions and severance from a large part of the global economy are seen as an "investment" along a path that will lead to Iranian regional dominance.

In any event I will be somewhat nervous, if a deal is struck. I am not confident that we could put together enough pressure on them easily, when the do the dance around the inspectors later on. That would mean going it alone with a small coalition and the only thing we can actually afford, is realistically the use of horrendous weapons.

One should be wary if critical safeguards and core issues are set aside just to reach agreement. A weak agreement would almost certainly drain the willingness of some parties to take tough choices should Iran's nuclear activities remain clouded by ambiguity. A weak agreement may represent more of a punt of the issue into the future than a breakthrough. The hope would be that such an agreement would be honored and Iran would moderate during the time it is in force. Those are probably more wishful assumptions than realistic ones. That Iran has made tangible progress toward its goal of regional hegemony (Iraq is increasingly a proxy, Yemen has been destabilized, Bahrain remains restive even as the Gulf Cooperation Council put down a dangerous Shia-led insurgency there, military modernization continues, etc.) will probably sustain its adherence to the principles on which the Iranian Revolution was based. After all, it sees those principles leading it toward its long-term goals, so there's little incentive to embark on a fundamentally different course.
 
I am not at all surprised by Iranian behavior and concur fully with the statement of rationality at the moment. It does, however, appear irrational to have accepted the pain from the sanctions for so long. Iran could easily have joined the rich world decades ago, if their aims are not malevolent.

In any event I will be somewhat nervous, if a deal is struck. I am not confident that we could put together enough pressure on them easily, when the do the dance around the inspectors later on. That would mean going it alone with a small coalition and the only thing we can actually afford, is realistically the use of horrendous weapons.

Don't worry about it. I'm reasonably certain that there will be a republican president next or a hawkish (Clinton) democrat that will Iraq Iran, pulling the Khomeini from a spider hole and leaving an Iran that looks about like Iraq today. But hey, they'll not have a nuke!
 
To all appearances this lays the groundwork for a nuclear Middle East. With the undeniable escalation of sectarian strife to the level of a regional war pitting Shia against Sunni, a few more nuclear armed countries in that region is a prescription for disaster. It's time to walk away from the negotiations, install more draconian sanctions, and seek to put a lid on the conflict before it blooms into something far more serious.


It appears BO is in an 11th hour crunch and is now considering to deal with Congress.....just so he wont be embarrassed or humiliated. He even tried to play hardball with Purple state Demos if they don't ride with him. Seems it isn't working like he thought. Thanks to some Demos that are tired of him putting himself before country and his own party members.



As negotiations with Iran on a nuclear deal come down to the wire, the White House is ramping up a yearlong campaign to persuade lawmakers and the public to support an agreement. In recent days, officials have tried to neutralize skeptical Democrats by arguing that opposing President Barack Obama would empower the new Republican majority, according to people familiar with the discussions.

White House officials have encouraged liberal groups to put U.S. lawmakers on the spot with the question: “Are you for solving this diplomatically or being forced…to war?” Ben Rhodes, one of Mr. Obama’s closest foreign-policy advisers, used those words at a January 2014 meeting with dozens of representatives from liberal political organizations, according to a transcript reviewed by The Wall Street Journal.....snip~

White House to Senate Dems: If you oppose us on this terrible Iran deal, the GOP wins « Hot Air
 
It appears BO is in an 11th hour crunch and is now considering to deal with Congress.....just so he wont be embarrassed or humiliated. He even tried to play hardball with Purple state Demos if they don't ride with him. Seems it isn't working like he thought. Thanks to some Demos that are tired of him putting himself before country and his own party members.



As negotiations with Iran on a nuclear deal come down to the wire, the White House is ramping up a yearlong campaign to persuade lawmakers and the public to support an agreement. In recent days, officials have tried to neutralize skeptical Democrats by arguing that opposing President Barack Obama would empower the new Republican majority, according to people familiar with the discussions.

White House officials have encouraged liberal groups to put U.S. lawmakers on the spot with the question: “Are you for solving this diplomatically or being forced…to war?” Ben Rhodes, one of Mr. Obama’s closest foreign-policy advisers, used those words at a January 2014 meeting with dozens of representatives from liberal political organizations, according to a transcript reviewed by The Wall Street Journal.....snip~

White House to Senate Dems: If you oppose us on this terrible Iran deal, the GOP wins « Hot Air

It's not an either/or proposition despite the administration's assertion that such is the case. By framing any deal with Iran in that fashion, they assure war. What the administration is essentially selling is a deal that gets the US out of any near term conflict, but increases drastically the possibility that regional nations will be deeply involved in countering the Iranian threat, and that escalation will invariably draw us into it. Furthermore, cutting the American public out of this effort is another demonstration of this administration's disdain for the public. There is no deal to be had, and the assertion that something exists that demonstrably doesn't is just another case of this administration selling a fantasy.
 
It's not an either/or proposition despite the administration's assertion that such is the case. By framing any deal with Iran in that fashion, they assure war. What the administration is essentially selling is a deal that gets the US out of any near term conflict, but increases drastically the possibility that regional nations will be deeply involved in countering the Iranian threat, and that escalation will invariably draw us into it. Furthermore, cutting the American public out of this effort is another demonstration of this administration's disdain for the public. There is no deal to be had, and the assertion that something exists that demonstrably doesn't is just another case of this administration selling a fantasy.


Mornin HB. :2wave: Lets not forget Rhoades was one of the Screw ups with Benghazi and Libya.....but now who was doing all that fear mongering? Who was leaning on Purple state Demos?
 
From today's edition of The New York Times:



http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/31/world/europe/iran-nuclear-talks.html

That narrative has some problems and it may well be intended to mask fundamental differences in order to announce a framework deal albeit what increasingly likely appears to be a weak one. If one goes back to last year, one finds that a tentative arrangement involving the shipment of uranium to Russia had been reached. Moreover in the days and weeks that followed, none of the U.S. team had denied such an arrangement.

With regard to the tentative agreement, the November 3, 2014 issue of The New York Times reported:

Iran has tentatively agreed to ship much of its huge stockpile of uranium to Russia if it reaches a broader nuclear deal with the West, according to officials and diplomats involved in the negotiations, potentially a major breakthrough in talks that have until now been deadlocked...

The chief American negotiator, Wendy R. Sherman, alluded to this possible solution to the uranium issue in a recent speech in which she said that “we have made impressive progress on issues that originally seemed intractable.” But Ms. Sherman, who on Monday was named acting deputy secretary of state, has refused to discuss any details of the role Russia could play, saying that negotiations, like mushrooms, “do best in the dark.” As a result, the officials and diplomats would discuss the talks only on the condition of anonymity.


http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/04/w...ives-iran-nuclear-talks-a-possible-boost.html

In sum, Iran's apparent reversal is a potentially major development that undermines the possibility of a credible agreement. The absence of such a provision is a substantive setback and describing its being incorporated in a final agreement as a "possibility" doesn't materially change the nature of the setback.

There was no reversal as there was never an agreement to begin with. You quoted the Times as saying

"Iran has tentatively agreed to ship much of its huge stockpile of uranium to Russia if it reaches a broader nuclear deal with the West[.]"

A "broader nuclear deal" has yet to be reached.
 
There was no reversal as there was never an agreement to begin with. You quoted the Times as saying

"Iran has tentatively agreed to ship much of its huge stockpile of uranium to Russia if it reaches a broader nuclear deal with the West[.]"

A "broader nuclear deal" has yet to be reached.

There almost certainly was a tentative agreement, an agreement in principle on the aspect of shipping the enriched uranium to Russia. That element would only be binding subject to a final agreement's being reached, as it would be one of the components of that agreement. That area of tentative agreement did not constitute a stand-alone agreement. Iran backed away from its earlier position, a position Washington did not contest at the time it was reported. Now, Washington is trying to put the best face on Iran's reversing its position, but if that position had never been credible from the start, Washington would have shot it down earlier. It didn't. Even if a final deal is reached, it appears that Iran will not be shipping the uranium to Russia.

IMO, this new Iranian position should be a deal breaker as the alternatives would be far weaker. However, political expediency, among other factors, may yet lead to a final agreement absent a provision where the enriched uranium would be shipped out of Iran.
 
There almost certainly was a tentative agreement, an agreement in principle on the aspect of shipping the enriched uranium to Russia. That element would only be binding subject to a final agreement's being reached, as it would be one of the components of that agreement. That area of tentative agreement did not constitute a stand-alone agreement. Iran backed away from its earlier position, a position Washington did not contest at the time it was reported. Now, Washington is trying to put the best face on Iran's reversing its position, but if that position had never been credible from the start, Washington would have shot it down earlier. It didn't. Even if a final deal is reached, it appears that Iran will not be shipping the uranium to Russia.

IMO, this new Iranian position should be a deal breaker as the alternatives would be far weaker. However, political expediency, among other factors, may yet lead to a final agreement absent a provision where the enriched uranium would be shipped out of Iran.

Really, we're arguing semantics to an extent, however, I personally wouldn't call it a reversal. In this world, nothing is really finalized until it's on paper and signed.

But I do hear where you are coming from.

We should still continue the talks I would argue because if we don't it will only lead to more unease and worry. Let's just settle the deal now.
 
Back
Top Bottom