RFRA Continued from post 2932.
There are differences with federal law, and some other state laws. But these differences are not directly related to the hysteria over discrimination (which is really a trojan horse for left wing hysteria over any kind of religious exemption for any reason). And they are NOT, contrary to fox, different from all 19 states and the federal RFRA
They are: (see:
Comparing the Federal RFRA and the Indiana RFRA | Josh Blackman's Blog)
- [1] It explicitly protects the exercise of religion by entities as well as individuals. Its enumeration of entities includes “a corporation”, without limiting this to closely-held companies.
- [2] The bill’s protections may be invoked when a person’s exercise of religion is “likely” to be substantially burdened by government action, not just when it has been burdened.
- [3] The bill also permits the assertion of free exercise rights as a claim or defense in judicial or administrative proceedings even if the government is not a party to the proceedings. The relevant governmental entity has a right to intervene in such cases to respond to the RFRA claim. A remedy under the bill is only available against the government; suits by employees or applicants invoking the law against private employers are precluded.
As any sane person can read, this has nothing to do with the evils of discrimination. It has to do with defining religious rights protection for more entities, permitting defensive legal action when it is likely they will be burdened (not after the fact), and the unambiguous assertion of protection of rights in any judicial proceeding, even if government is not the one suing or being counter-sued.
EVEN SO, NONE OF THIS IS CONSISTENTLY DIFFERENT FROM RFRA APPLICATION FEDERAL AND/OR SOME OTHER STATES.
First, remember that the legal dictionary act, which already applies to RFRA's. A “corporation” is treated as "a person". Seven of nine SCOTUS justices also agreed in that at least for closely held corporations, such as Hobby Lobby, that is true. Indiana's Section 7.3 portion tracks the closely held federal standard. But it also permits a broader corporation to protect its exercise of religion - for example, a Christian book publisher.
Second, Section 9 provides protections for “A person whose exercise of religion has been substantially burdened, or is likely to be substantially burdened.” While it is true that the “is likely to” language does not appear in the federal RFRA, I does not add anything of concern. It’s effectively asking if there will be a likelihood of success on the merits. In the case of Hobby Lobby a pre-enforcement challenge was brought, claiming that they were likely to have a substantial burden. No burden was ever inflicted.
Third, and most significantly, the law provides a defense in a private suit where the government is not a party. In other words, the law provides a defense against a both a government or private suit. It might, in some cases, provide an RFRA defense. If Biff and Bruce sue a photographer for failing to photograph their wedding under a local non-discrimination ordinance, the photographer than raises the state RFRA as a defense. Even though the government is not a party, RFRA can be raised as a defense in the judicial proceeding. The court would have to determine whether the application of the non-discrimination ordinance substantially burdens the photographers exercise of religion.
Mind you, this is STILL NOT consistently different that current law. Because of ambiguity in the wording of federal law, whether or not a person can use RFRA defense in private suits is split. In four circuits (CA2, CA9, CA8, CADC) they hold that RFRA can be raised as a defense in citizen suits. Other circuits (CA6, CA7) do not permit private defendants to raise RFRA as a defense in private suits.
The US Government has taken the position that the RFRA can be raised as a defense in lawsuits brought by private parties.
Finally, Indiana, as well as Arizona’s RFRAs are very similar to the Federal RFRA. In contrast, Mississippi’s RFRA, which only requires a “burden,” not a “substantial” one, deviates significantly from the federal statute.
So no, the RFRA does not provide immunity. It only allows a defendant in either a government or private suit to raise a defense which judge must consider, like any other defense under Title VII or the ADA. It is not an authorization to discriminate.
And the claim that Indiana's RFRA is different than 19 other States and the federal RFRA, and is tailored to make it easy to discriminate is obvious horse-poo.