Re: Obama: "US should take military action against Syria", seeks Congressional Ap...
He should not be embarrassed for consulting Congress for approval of a strike in a country which used chemical agents to murder over 1,000 people in the middle of a brutal civil war which has escalated into a regional war. That very sentence alone should suggest to you how difficult of a situation this is. I see no reason why he should be embarrassed for consulting Congress. Like I said, it's not like Obama was told he had to, he chose to.
I mean why should he be embarrassed over something his chose to do when he didn't really have to?
That Congressional authorization would give the President the kind of legitimacy that is only possible through such authorization is not up for question. The tactical approach was awkward, to say the least. The President had two major approaches that were possible with respect to the timing of his request for Congressional authorization and three major options overall if he wanted to pursue a military response:
1. All but decide a course of action and then seek authorization (that's the approach that was chosen): The problem is that such a tactical approach would be seen as hesitation. In the wake of very real hesitation on Egypt, the risk was especially high that such a course would create unfavorable perceptions. It did. The Assad dictatorship has already portrayed the action as an "historic retreat" by the U.S. The anti-Assad movement, eager for the U.S. to take on the kind of risks it won't take on its own with respect to strategic Syrian military targets, has minimized the support the U.S. has been providing. Domestic ideological opponents have exploited the situation as yet another opportunity to try to score ideological points. There is real risk that the President's ability to argue that a military response is legitimate would be badly undercut if the Congress fails to approve the authorization (probably not the most likely scenario) or a strong minority of either House rejects authorization.
2. Ask for authorization before deciding the final course: That would have required discipline to avoid the temptation "to do something" in the face of the chemical weapons attack. However, were the Congress to authorize a military response, one would not be dealing with the criticism currently being applied to the approach that was taken, much less the damaging perceptions that it created. Were Congress to refuse to authorize a military response, the President would not suffer the kind of PR setback as would happen were Congress to refuse his current request for authorization.
3. Undertake military action as is the President's authority under the War Powers Act and then inform Congress: Some in Congress would make the perennial argument that the President overstepped his "constitutional authority." As has been the case with past limited military responses, such arguments would not carry the day.
During a crisis, one needs a strong response. Commitments made are commitments that need to be acted upon. Ambiguity or uncertainy is not helpful.
Given that the President all but decided on a military response--and walking back what was said does not change the reality--the second and third options were most viable. The approach that was taken has introduced a large sense of uncertainty and that uncertainty was swiftly exploited by all participants to the sectarian conflict, not to mention the President's domestic ideological foes. To outsiders, it has created perceptions of hesitation and weakness. Those perceptions were avoidable had the President pursued the second or third courses of action.
Needless to say, I still believe the best course for the U.S. is to limit its commitments to those that are firmly anchored in its critical interests. That was not the case with Syria's sectarian conflict nor the "red line" that had been drawn (a narrower "red line" against large-scale use of chemical weapons, use against civilians, or large-scale use against civilians would likely have been more effective for purposes of deterrence, as the gap between the U.S. commitment and U.S. interests would have been narrower).
Looking ahead, there is risk that a U.S. effort to "degrade" Syria's strategic military capabilities (an implicit commitment to facilitate regime change) will be met by greater assistance to Assad by Russia, Iran, and/or Hezbollah. If that happens, what will the next U.S. step be? Moreover, are Congress and the President willing to embrace a growing commitment and the costs it would entail? Would such an effort be worth it as no matter who wins the sectarian conflict does not appear to offer any meaningful prospect of adopting policies that would be more consistent with U.S. interests?
Finally, Senator McCain's enthusiastic backing of the Free Syrian Army notwithstanding, the reality is that the opposition has never provided any concrete commitments to adopt policies more conducive to U.S. interests. At the same time, it has never committed to pursuing peace with Israel (a strategic U.S. ally). Domestically, it has never set forth a "constitution-in-waiting" or similar document that would entail inclusive, representative government. It has had more than two years to do so. In contrast, its actions in territory it has gained suggests an illiberal regime with a high probability of persecuting Syria's ethnic and religious minorities.