The Washington Post has called for "U.S. leadership" on Syria in a new
editorial. Although the current editorial falls short of calling for U.S. military action, it implies just that. First, it talks about the failure of the UN (no real surprise to those who have seen the UN underperform time and again in dealing with such conflicts). Second, it provides a link to an earlier
editorial in which the newspaper all but endorsed a U.S. military role.
The earlier editorial cites a general who expresses exactly the kind of overoptimistic assumption that underlay both the Afghanistan and Iraq conflicts. It states, "But Gen. Mattis said that if the Assad regime were to collapse, 'it’ll be the biggest strategic setback for Iran in 20 years.'” Quite frankly, what the U.S. needs is more realists and fewer idealists. Neither the Afghanistan nor Iraq conflicts ended happily ever after with peace, democracy, and prosperity. Had the military planners heeded both countries' history, they would have seen the high risk of civil conflict in both states. With Syria comprised of a minority Alawite dictatorship, Shia, and Sunni, regime change is not automatically assured of leading to democratic rule, much less a government that would be friendly to U.S. interests and U.S. allies such as Jordan and Israel. Given the lack of compelling U.S. interests, Congress should not be mislead by hopeless optimists such as Gen. Mattis.
The editorial also states:
But Gen. Dempsey also reported that the military mission of stopping the Assad forces could be accomplished. And the best way to ensure that extremists do not hijack the Syrian opposition is for the United States and its allies to identify and support more moderate elements.
As more than two months have passed since this op-ed, the U.S. should now have a keen understanding of who would lead Syria's new government, what principles it would stand for, and what foreign policy it would pursue. It has little more understanding of the civil conflict and the Opposition than it did at the time
The Post wrote its piece.
In the end, regardless of whether the Assad regime survives or is toppled, the historic circumstances and institutional framework that resulted in Syria's evolving into a dictatorship remains unchanged. Odds favor a destabilizing impact, possibly with Iran exploiting the resulting power vacuum to play an even more direct role in Syria (to safeguard its interests there) and in Lebanon (given its relationship to Hezbollah and hostility to Israel).
It is telling that neither Israel nor Jordan, both key U.S. allies who border Syria are banging the drums for military intervention. They well know that far from the fairy tale ending envisioned by Gen. Mattis, a perspective that has seduced the U.S. to badly underestimate the costs and challenges associated with two recent conflicts, something far less favorable is the more likely one. There's no assurance that the new regime might not prove to be more revolutionary and more destablizing than the Assad regime. Furthermore, there's little chance that Iran would stand idly by if it felt that its critical interests in Syria were exposed.
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