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U.S. Jobless Rate Unexpectedly Declines to 8.6%

I think this is what The Barbarian is referring to when he says the bubble started 30 years ago. You do see dramatic decreases in FM/FM holdings around 2003 (anyone got some color on what drove this) and a corresponding spike in Asset-Backed Security issuers. Krugman argues that this alleviates the responsibility of FM/FM in contributing to the crisis and puts the blame on the ABS issuers.

Fannie Freddie data - NYTimes.com
6a00d83451b33869e2010534d3c619970c-800wi.jpg

Also here is a fantastic report by the St. Louis Fed on the role of housing policy on the expansion of FM/FM's balance sheets. I would recommend reading through it for the people who are interested in the subject. Of course there are conflicting studies done by others that claim that housing policy initiatives and FM/FM purchases played a bigger role in subprime origination but this study attempts to refute those claims. For a truly unbiased perspective I would read those studies as they are listed and quoted in the report. The ultimate conclusions are that it did not play a major role and are listed below:

Things we know:
• Housing policy via Subprime PLS was not a major factor in Fannie/Freddie losses.
Losses mainly came from “off balance sheet” business done along traditional lines,
especially in the Alt-A market. The devil didn’t make them do it.
• Fannie and Freddie did not cause the subprime boom and bust. They did have a role in
buying senior pieces of structured deals, but these were the easy AAA parts that lots of
investors wanted. They were not involved in the crucial CDO market or other vehicles for
selling the important junior pieces of the deals.
Things we think we think we know:
• They were not the victims of housing policy. Their goals explain a small share of their
risk-taking. The ramping up of credit risk was especially in Alt-A lending, and it was
based on business decisions, most likely regarding market share.
• A very large share of their losses on Alt-A and related loans was associated with property
value declines; these loans began with smaller than average shares of high LTV loans but
wound up with much higher shares of underwater mortgages, presumably because of
their locations and origination years.
Things we don’t know:
• We know little about the importance of goals to mortgages not in PLSs, For instance
Fannie/Freddie increased purchases of high loan to value loans, especially in 2007. We
would like to know the performance of goals rich loans within this category and the
importance of mortgage insurance in controlling losses.
• How much of losses were from price declines and how much from loan quality
(especially Alt-A). This is easily doable with disaggregated data

One should note the increases in FM/FM purchases leading up to 2004 where they begin to decline. How much their balance sheet expansion leading up to 2004 played a role in the rating agencies decisions and consequently mortgage origination is hard to quantify. I have a few books on the subject that suggest it was significant but I don't have them on hand so I can't quote them. It really does confirm Kyle Bass'/Peter Thiel's thesis that in 2003 the bubble in equity markets simply shifted into the housing markets. Despite claims from both sides that federal government policy (or lack thereof) caused this bubble it seems the data doesn't clearly back this up. In reference to the bills posted by Sheik above, I would hypothesize that even if they were passed and implemented in a timely manner (unlikely) that they would have not been able to rein in FM/FM. Here are some charts/tables from the report for the lazy.

Fed data.JPG
Market Share.JPG
In order to determine how much of the above decline in market share was driven by growth in the overall market one must read the full report as the graph on it's own can be misleading.
 
For those who continue to peddle nonsense regarding the CRA:

Blah blah, the percentage of loans that were covered by CRA was low, blah blah blah.

The problem is the default rate on CRA loans was higher. Earlier, I posted that BofA had 3% of their business in CRA causing 29% of their losses. Its the risk involved in CRA not the percentage that is good, there is a certain percentage that is downright poisonous to profit and loss. Saying a certain percentage performed well is a shined up turd, the reality is that CRA did three things that were bad for financial institutions nationwide:
--wrote bad paper
--spread the risk for that paper far and wide
--lowered financial standards for home loans across the board

I keep seeing sidestepping on addressing the overall risk of CRA based loans, I see percentages of what was loaned, percentages of good loans but no discussion of how the bad overall from CRA affected bank margins and bundling procedures for CDSs and risk management.

Remedies :
Ban CDSs, mathematically they have never worked sufficiently on higher risk ventures, financial institutions always seem to need to cheat to sell them.
Make financial criteria the number one factor in loaning money, social justice based home financing is a fail of epic proportions. No money down on a home is ludicrous on the face of it. Make buyers have skin in the game again.
Ban loan based derivatives, see point one above, they just beg for the financial institution to cheat the buyer of said derivative.
Reaffirm the barriers between commercial and traditional banks. Mixing those particular coffers and debts led us into this mess.


Honesty here, I could give a rats ass whose really to blame, Id rather not see it happen again. Fix the problems. **** whose to blame--
FIX IT!
 
Blah blah, the percentage of loans that were covered by CRA was low, blah blah blah.

The problem is the default rate on CRA loans was higher.

That's a baldfaced lie that's already been busted at least three times. Why do you keep repeating it?
 
That's a baldfaced lie that's already been busted at least three times. Why do you keep repeating it?

No its a statment that you believe is refuted through using fed parsed data being presented to accomplish the desired result...covering bureaucrat ass.
The data and conclusions they reach are carefully parsed to lie within a certain data set and cherry picked to support that conclusion, they almost never look at data as a whole or try to examine the overall impact on the market.

I wonder why?
 
No its a statment that you believe is refuted through using fed parsed data being presented to accomplish the desired result...covering bureaucrat ass.
The data and conclusions they reach are carefully parsed to lie within a certain data set and cherry picked to support that conclusion, they almost never look at data as a whole or try to examine the overall impact on the market.

I wonder why?

Sorry, but the Fed is THE authoritative source on bank performance and you can't simply dismiss them on the basis of an unsupported, whacked out conspiracy theory. And in any case, their findings are mirrored by separate reports by the task force that investigated the financial crisis, the OCC, and independent analysts. And on the flip side, you have absolutely NO evidence to support your conclusions. Zero. Zip. Nada.
 
Blah blah, the percentage of loans that were covered by CRA was low, blah blah blah.

The problem is the default rate on CRA loans was higher.

I stopped reading once i got to this nonsense.

Can you show the default rate for all CRA originated loans?

Can you show the default rate for all non-CRA sub-prime loans?

The data is quite easy to find. All you need to know is where to look!:lamo
 
Read up then explain to how CRA loans changed between 1999 and 2008 when they crashed and burned.

Federal Reserve Report on "The Performance and Profitability of CRA-Related Lending"

In short, CRA loans suck. They didnt suddenly become more solid investments or more profitable EXCEPT they became a primary target for bundling into derivatives and CDSs. As a matter of fact the more the market heated artificially off the CPI, the worse CRA loans would get because they were not designed to be less risky, they were designed to spread risk through risky securitization process AND were much less concerned with the stability of the originator or the capital in question.

More reading : Yes, the CRA Is Toxic by Edward Pinto, City Journal Autumn 2009
Here is the author's google since I know youre going to look anyway : Edward Pinto - Google Search

Sorry, but the Fed is THE authoritative source on bank performance
And the Fed's primary job is banking stability. What do you suppose they would do when banking stability is in the cellar? Think about it.
 
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Read up then explain to how CRA loans changed between 1999 and 2008 when they crashed and burned.

Your ignorance on the subject was displayed many pages ago. While you continue to dig your feet in as opposed to admitting your error is beyond me.
 
Read up then explain to how CRA loans changed between 1999 and 2008 when they crashed and burned.

Federal Reserve Report on "The Performance and Profitability of CRA-Related Lending"

In short, CRA loans suck. They didnt suddenly become more solid investments or more profitable EXCEPT they became a primary target for bundling into derivatives and CDSs. As a matter of fact the more the market heated artificially off the CPI, the worse CRA loans would get because they were not designed to be less risky, they were designed to spread risk through risky securitization process AND were much less concerned with the stability of the originator or the capital in question.

More reading : Yes, the CRA Is Toxic by Edward Pinto, City Journal Autumn 2009
Here is the author's google since I know youre going to look anyway : Edward Pinto - Google Search

And the Fed's primary job is banking stability. What do you suppose they would do when banking stability is in the cellar? Think about it.

You've got to be ****ing kidding me. Your big source is guy named Pinto who is a consultant to ... the mortgage industry ... and an American Enterprise Institute (i.e. wingnut think tank) scholar? And he contradicts the Fed and OCC, and spews a bunch of different numbers, but provides absolutely no explanation as to why the Fed and OCCs numbers are wrong, or references or explanation as to where he pulled his numbers from? Why don't you just grab a crayon, scribble "CRA BAD!!!" on a knapkin, and submit that as your proof?

As far as the 2000 Fed report, I would suggest that you read the actual report and not the one page headnote summary you linked to. Forgetting for the moment that you disregard Fed data that contradicts your argument and rely on Fed data that you think supports your argument....

What the report actually says is, in pertinent part:

Profitability
Per institution analysis. Survey responses indicate that CRA-related home purchase and
refinance lending is either profitable or marginally profitable for most respondents (82 percent,
table 3a). About one-sixth of the respondents report that such lending is either marginally
unprofitable or unprofitable. This pattern holds generally across banking institutions of different
asset size, although a greater proportion of large banking institutions (assets of $30 billion or
more) report that their CRA-related home purchase and refinance lending is either marginally
unprofitable or unprofitable than medium- (assets between $5 billion and $30 billion) or smallersized
(assets between $950 million and $5 billion) institutions.

Although CRA-related home purchase and refinance lending is reported to be at least
marginally profitable for most of the survey respondents, overall home purchase and refinance
lending is reported to be at least marginally profitable for an even larger proportion of these
institutions (94 percent).

Thus it would be a gross misstatement to conclude that "CRA loans suck." In fact, 82% of the CRA loans were profitable.

And further:

Reports by individual banking institutions suggest that there is considerable variation in
experiences with affordable home lending products.13 For example, both NatWest and Bank of
America have reported that the delinquency rate was lower for loans made under their affordable
home loan programs than for loans made under their conventional lending programs.
14

Of course the report did not compare CRA loans to non-CRA subprime loans, so it's essentially irrelevant to the discussion.
 
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You've got to be ****ing kidding me. Your big source is guy named Pinto who is a consultant to ... the mortgage industry ... and an American Enterprise Institute (i.e. wingnut think tank) scholar? And he contradicts the Fed and OCC, and spews a bunch of different numbers, but provides absolutely no explanation as to why the Fed and OCCs numbers are wrong, or references or explanation as to where he pulled his numbers from? Why don't you just grab a crayon, scribble "CRA BAD!!!" on a knapkin, and submit that as your proof?

As far as the 2000 Fed report, I would suggest that you read the actual report and not the one page headnote summary you linked to. Forgetting for the moment that you disregard Fed data that contradicts your argument and rely on Fed data that you think supports your argument....

What the report actually says is, in pertinent part:



Thus it would be a gross misstatement to conclude that "CRA loans suck." In fact, 82% of the CRA loans were profitable.

And further:



Of course the report did not compare CRA loans to non-CRA subprime loans, so it's essentially irrelevant to the discussion.


Of course, it compared CRA loans to all other loans which is the exact metric that should be used.
If 82% were profitable, then 18% were not. Whats an 18% default rate look like? Looks like a housing bubble popping.
Regarding the fed report...No Im trying to point out there are conflicting information sources, so stop being so arrogantly sure of your info and think.
Also, Im a lot less interested in parsing reports for things that support my position than I am in taking the whole thing in and looking at the overall picture.

Regarding Pinto...shrug, I hold your left wing sources in similar esteem, Im just not a pain about it. He was the chief credit officer of Fannie Mae in the 80s. That entails some measure of credibility. I evaluate his info and make my own decisions.


Try this out, its a decent read and gives a lot of empirical data : http://econ.ucsd.edu/~miwhite/li-white-nber.pdf
 
Of course, it compared CRA loans to all other loans which is the exact metric that should be used.
If 82% were profitable, then 18% were not. Whats an 18% default rate look like? Looks like a housing bubble popping.
Regarding the fed report...No Im trying to point out there are conflicting information sources, so stop being so arrogantly sure of your info and think.
Also, Im a lot less interested in parsing reports for things that support my position than I am in taking the whole thing in and looking at the overall picture.

Regarding Pinto...shrug, I hold your left wing sources in similar esteem, Im just not a pain about it. He was the chief credit officer of Fannie Mae in the 80s. That entails some measure of credibility. I evaluate his info and make my own decisions.


Try this out, its a decent read and gives a lot of empirical data : http://econ.ucsd.edu/~miwhite/li-white-nber.pdf

Just because a loan isn't profitable doesn't mean that it went into default. Again, some of the biggest banks, e.g. Bank of America, had lower default rates on CRA loans than they had on non-CRA loans. Thus there was nothing inherent in CRA that caused banks to write bad loans. Don't blame the program because some banks had shoddy underwriting habits.

In other news, I believe you've mentioned several times that there were $8 or $9 trillion in CRA loans? That is obviously a BS figure, as the total of all outstanding mortgages in the entire country was $10.6 trillion at its peak in 2006. Falling Mortgage Debt Erodes Spending as Wealth Effect Fades - Bloomberg
 
[QUOTEJust because a loan isn't profitable doesn't mean that it went into default. Again, some of the biggest banks, e.g. Bank of America, had lower default rates on CRA loans than they had on non-CRA loans. Thus there was nothing inherent in CRA that caused banks to write bad loans. Don't blame the program because some banks had shoddy underwriting habits.][/QUOTE]

If that were the case they would have written them without CRA legislation.
I absolutely can blame the program because the risk is higher. If the risk were not higher, banks would have been writing the loans without legislation.
Why is that hard to understand?
Government doesnt need to force banks to do something profitable and it WERE profitable, we wouldnt be bailing out Fannie and Freddie...again.
 
If that were the case they would have written them without CRA legislation.
I absolutely can blame the program because the risk is higher. If the risk were not higher, banks would have been writing the loans without legislation.
Why is that hard to understand?
Government doesnt need to force banks to do something profitable and it WERE profitable, we wouldnt be bailing out Fannie and Freddie...again.

The whole point of CRA was to encourage loans in neighborhoods that banks generally shunned (though they did not shun accepting deposits in those neighborhoods). It's not surprising that the loans were somewhat less profitable. Still it was only a difference of 12% between CRA and non-CRA on average. Certainly not enough to precipitate the financial meltdown.

Note: I'm not saying that the CRA was a great idea, or that it was a great idea to incentivize home ownership through the tax code. I'm just saying that CRA had little or nothing to do with the real estate bubble.
 
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I think the definition of left wing is anything that disagrees with far right. ;) At least that is my understanding. :coffeepap
One should add government sources to the left wing side of the equation.
 
One should add government sources to the left wing side of the equation.

Wiki for Moody's Analytics:

Moody’s Analytics provides capital markets and risk management professionals with credit analysis, economic research, financial risk management software, and advisory services. The firm, a global organization with offices in New York City, San Francisco, London, Paris, Brazil, Canada, Japan, Hong Kong, Australia, and China, has approximately USD 600 million in annual revenue

Nothing to make you even imagine this as a "left wing" leaning company. So you will not have a problem with this report, and will base all critiques on flaws regarding their quantitative models.

Or even this report.

A long history of public policy mistakes has contributed to the financial and economic crisis. Although there will surely be more missteps, only through further aggressive and consistent government action will the U.S. avoid the first true depression since the 1930s.

In some respects, this crisis has its genesis in the long-held policy objective of promoting homeownership. Since the 1930s, federal housing policy has been geared toward increasing homeownership by heavily subsidizing home purchases. Although homeownership is a worthy goal, fostering stable and successful communities, it was carried too far, producing a bubble when millions of people became homeowners who probably should not have. These people are now losing their homes in foreclosure, undermining the viability of the financial system and precipitating the recession.

Perhaps even more important has been the lack of effective regulatory oversight. The deregulation that began during the Reagan administration fostered financial innovation and increased the flow of credit to businesses and households. But deregulatory fervor went too far during the housing boom. Mortgage lenders established corporate structures to avoid oversight, while at the Federal Reserve, the nation's most important financial regulator, there was a general distrust of regulation.

Despite all this, the panic that has roiled financial markets might have been avoided had policymakers responded more aggressively to the crisis early. Officials misjudged the severity of the situation and allowed themselves to be hung up by concerns about moral hazard and fairness. Considering the widespread loss of wealth, it is now clear they waited much too long to act, and their response to the financial failures in early September was inconsistent and ad hoc. Nationalizing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac but letting Lehman Brothers fail confused and scared global investors. The shocking initial failure of Congress to pass the TARP legislation caused credit markets to freeze and sent stock and commodity prices crashing.

Now, a new policy consensus has been forged out of collapse. It is widely held that policymakers must take aggressive and consistent action to quell the panic and mitigate the economic fallout. An unfettered Federal Reserve will pump an unprecedented amount of liquidity into the financial system to unlock money and credit markets. The TARP fund will be deployed more broadly to shore up the still-fragile financial system, and another much larger and comprehensive foreclosure mitigation program is needed to forestall some of the millions of mortgage defaults that will occur otherwise. Finally, another very sizable economic stimulus plan is vitally needed. While there will be much more discussion about the size and mix of government spending increases and tax cuts to include, the House Democratic plan is a very good starting point. This is important, for while such debate is necessary it must be resolved quickly. Unless a stimulus plan is implemented beginning this spring, its effectiveness in lifting the economy will be significantly

Below you will see the Moody's estimate of various fiscal stimulus as well as the spread between LIBOR and 3-month treasury bills during different periods of financial turmoil.
 

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I don't understand, the report you linked to supports his claim that federal home ownership programs meaningfully contributed to the housing crisis.
 
I don't understand, the report you linked to supports his claim that federal home ownership programs meaningfully contributed to the housing crisis.

In some respects, this crisis has its genesis in the long-held policy objective of promoting homeownership. Since the 1930s, federal housing policy has been geared toward increasing homeownership by heavily subsidizing home purchases. Although homeownership is a worthy goal, fostering stable and successful communities, it was carried too far, producing a bubble when millions of people became homeowners who probably should not have. These people are now losing their homes in foreclosure, undermining the viability of the financial system and precipitating the recession.


Perhaps even more important has been the lack of effective regulatory oversight. The deregulation that began during the Reagan administration fostered financial innovation and increased the flow of credit to businesses and households. But deregulatory fervor went too far during the housing boom. Mortgage lenders established corporate structures to avoid oversight, while at the Federal Reserve, the nation's most important financial regulator, there was a general distrust of regulation.

Promoting homeownership is not equivalent to "the CRA and Fannie and Feddie caused the housing crisis".
 
Promoting homeownership is not equivalent to "the CRA and Fannie and Feddie caused the housing crisis".


No, you're right, not alone anyway. Both parties tried to use Freddie, and Fannie to buy the votes of those that couldn't qualify for home ownership, coupled with an aggressive blocking of regulators in the industry allowing the banking industry to mitigate the risk by infecting the world market with these junk derivatives that was the only way that the banks were going to go along with the scheme strong armed initially by progressive demos. It backfired and what do the pols do now, point fingers and blame the victims to some extent of the governments corruption debacle that the government created.

People forget that in this day and age there is tape of events....



Now just sit back and watch the spin....


j-mac
 
No, you're right, not alone anyway. Both parties tried to use Freddie, and Fannie to buy the votes of those that couldn't qualify for home ownership, coupled with an aggressive blocking of regulators in the industry allowing the banking industry to mitigate the risk by infecting the world market with these junk derivatives that was the only way that the banks were going to go along with the scheme strong armed initially by progressive demos. It backfired and what do the pols do now, point fingers and blame the victims to some extent of the governments corruption debacle that the government created.

People forget that in this day and age there is tape of events....



Now just sit back and watch the spin....


j-mac

I know this as been stated ad-nauseum, ,buuuut ...even though there were Democrats on the wrong side of the issue too, Republicans were in charge .
 
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I know this as been stated ad-nauseum, ,buuuut ...even though there were Democrats on the wrong side of the issue too, Republicans were in charge .


Not saying that repubs couldn't have done more, but if you remember at that time, this was around 2004, these were subcommittee's talking to the regulators about what the regulators were blowing the whistle on, and repubs WERE sounding the alarm. It was demo's blocking regulators, chastising them, saying that there was no problem. Here is another one catching Frank in a blatant lie...



Now I understand that Bush played into this crap by promoting home ownership in this country as well, but if you follow the money all the way back to the reasoning that caused this type of corruption that led to the crash of the system was put into place by liberal forces that wanted everyone to have a house whether they can afford to own or not. Attacking banks on "red lining", CRA, ACORN, etc...This is all progressive policy that was at the heart of this debacle, now libs want to run from their responsibility, and blame it all on Bush.


j-mac
 
Here is some more to watch if you are interested...



And this one, just to establish what a liar Frank is...



Enjoy

j-mac
 
Just a little more on Mr. Frank and his dubious pronouncements....


The telling statistic is that Frank is the 17th House Democrat to announce he will not seek re-election, compared with six Republicans.But there may be another reason for Frank’s rather abrupt and unexpected departure. The Republicans have a better-than-even chance of capturing control of both Congress and the White House in 2012. At which point they might just be inclined to try to get to the root of what caused the 2007-2008 debacle that cripples our economy to this day.
And in so doing, they might just discover what has been painfully obvious for well over a decade: namely, that our financial savior, Barney Frank, along with his giveaway, vote-buying policies was actually one of the prime causes of the mortgage collapse and the ensuing Great Recession which, economic pronouncements to the contrary, remains with us still.
In a nutshell, the much-maligned Bush Administration recognized the Fannie-Freddie problem early on. Slowly, relentlessly, from the 1980s on, mostly Democrat-controlled Congresses pushed both quasi-governmental entities to prod banks into ever more liberal loan policies that would allow less and less qualified loan applicants to obtain mortgages and—often for the first time—purchase housing, regardless of whether they were financially able to carry their mortgages.
The problem became acute in the early 2000s as lower and lower down payments and “liar loans”—loans that required little if any substantiating documentation—became the norm. The Bush Administration—along with eventual GOP presidential candidate John McCain—tried to put an end to these practices, but to no avail. Frank, the Democrats, and a substantial number of incredibly stupid Republicans steadfastly opposed legislation geared toward heading off the already-gathering fiscal storm.

Barney Frank flees the scene of his fiscal crimes | Washington Times Communities


Just more rats jumping ship.


j-mac
 
Not saying that repubs couldn't have done more, but if you remember at that time, this was around 2004, these were subcommittee's talking to the regulators about what the regulators were blowing the whistle on, and repubs WERE sounding the alarm. It was demo's blocking regulators, chastising them, saying that there was no problem. Here is another one catching Frank in a blatant lie...
What was needed was oversight. That would have prevented the financial meltdown.

Now I understand that Bush played into this crap by promoting home ownership in this country as well, but if you follow the money all the way back to the reasoning that caused this type of corruption that led to the crash of the system was put into place by liberal forces that wanted everyone to have a house whether they can afford to own or not. Attacking banks on "red lining", CRA, ACORN, etc...This is all progressive policy that was at the heart of this debacle, now libs want to run from their responsibility, and blame it all on Bush.


j-mac
Nice. More inane tripe. CRA and ACORN had little, if anything, to do with it; and it sounds like you're under the delusion that the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act was "progressive policy." :roll:
 
No, you're right, not alone anyway. Both parties tried to use Freddie, and Fannie . . .
j-mac

That's really the point. Both parties are to blame, along with predatory lenders who had next to nothing to do with Frannie and Freddie. It is a lie to say those two agencies are only to blame. Like has been said many times, there is plenty of blame to go around.
 
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