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To Felicity:
I find that in working on my reply to Message #475, I will need to reference a big block of text first posted elsewhere. It was about a distinction between "human life" and "human person". Since I'm seeing that your definition of person attempts to make a person out of every human life, I'm going to post that particular block of text here, separately from the main reply.
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There is an argument that purports to show why it is not sensible to define "murder" as the killing of human life. It starts with the medical profession's goal of helping damaged humans to heal. The biological process of healing a wound (whether caused by accident or malice or surgery) involves regeneration, the production of new cells to replace lost cells. Certain parts of the body, like skin, naturally regenerate easily, while other parts, like the brain, regenerate poorly. Much research is being devoted to increase the abilities of body parts to regenerate and thereby become healed. There are plenty of animals in Nature with much better regenerative abilities than humans. For example, a starfish supposedly can be cut into pieces such that each piece can grow into a whole starfish. It is by studying/copying the biological processes responsible for that, that researchers expect to one day give any human the ability to, for example, regrow a lost arm. Now, what are the long-term consequences? Well, we could imagine a future day in which some accident decapitates someone, and proceed to two different scenarios. First, suppose the body is destroyed during the accident, but the head is rescued. Second, suppose the accident was such that the decapitated head died within minutes, before rescue arrived, but the body was saved. Now compare the two scenarios: In each, the surviving part of a human is very much alive, courtesy of advanced life-support equipment. And in both scenarios, regeneration science will allow the lost portion of an overall human body to be regrown. Next, the core of the argument involves considering these questions, "Will anyone object to the bodiless head being allowed to grow a new body?" and "Will anyone object to the headless body being allowed to grow a new head?" Human life is on the line in both scenarios, true, but the first scenario also features a surviving human mind, while the second does not. That is, while in the second scenario a head might indeed be grown, a complete education will also be required, and the resulting overall human being will inevitably be somewhat different from the one whose head had died. In the first scenario there is no such discontinuity in a human's existence. Human life would be saved in the second scenario, but a question remains as to whether or not there would be a moral obligation to do so.
{NOTE: Regeneration technology is not something to be found only in the far-distant future. This piece of the Future is Incoming much sooner than later! See:
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2087-1754008,00.html }
This question is, in a way, already fueling a political storm today, concerning humans who have experienced brain death. Their bodies are kept on life-support in the hope they might recover. The available evidence is that the patients cannot recover, due to so much of their brain tissue being dead, and it is only remotely likely that even advanced regeneration technology would restore the original minds whose existence depended upon those brains. As a result, even though the political storm still rages, many humans have prepared a Living Will to, in essence, ensure that they are declared entirely legally dead when their brains have been declared clinically dead. The "human life" that may still reside in each of their bodies is irrelevant to them. And the judicial system, when involved in cases where no Living Will existed, has so far tended to say essentially the same thing, that human life is not the key; the human mind is the key to defining a human being. This overall argument can fortify that conclusion by asking that a third future scenario be considered, in which the accident was so horrible that only an arm could be saved. Should it be given the chance to grow a new body and head? There is no technical difference between regrowing just a head, as in the second scenario, and regrowing most of a body along with the head, just as there would be little technical difference between the preceding and regenerating a dead brain only. Perhaps the core of the conflict is in "appearances". The brain-dead human on life-support looks fully human; the headless human is still mostly all there, appearance-wise, but an arm is just an arm, however-much it is perfectly human and perfectly alive. Yet none of the three have a living human mind, while in the first regeneration scenario the bodiless head is not just a piece of a mostly-incomplete human. Therefore the argument concludes that "murder" has to be defined in terms of killing a human-level mind. (It is also consistent with, for example, the killing of flies and other creatures never being called murder, while should we one day encounter equivalent mindful beings at/from other planets in the Universe, the definition is consistent with thinking any killing of them to be murder, too.) Therefore during most of a pregnancy, when a fetus has not developed the brainpower for a minimally human-level mind, however-muchly human its body is and appears, abortion cannot be murder, and can be morally permissible. Opponents to this view point out that there exists no consensus, morally speaking, for what constitutes a "minimally human-level mind." Certain philosophers have argued that compared to an adult human mind, newborn infants can be classified as falling below the intuitive standard, as would persons with severe, but not physically debilitating, mental retardation -- but this merely means it might be difficult to decide how much brainpower must be present before killing a human life starts to qualify as murder. It does not by one whit imply that abortion of a mostly-brainless fetus can qualify as murder.
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So, a living human arm on life-support is a person, eh?
I find that in working on my reply to Message #475, I will need to reference a big block of text first posted elsewhere. It was about a distinction between "human life" and "human person". Since I'm seeing that your definition of person attempts to make a person out of every human life, I'm going to post that particular block of text here, separately from the main reply.
=============
There is an argument that purports to show why it is not sensible to define "murder" as the killing of human life. It starts with the medical profession's goal of helping damaged humans to heal. The biological process of healing a wound (whether caused by accident or malice or surgery) involves regeneration, the production of new cells to replace lost cells. Certain parts of the body, like skin, naturally regenerate easily, while other parts, like the brain, regenerate poorly. Much research is being devoted to increase the abilities of body parts to regenerate and thereby become healed. There are plenty of animals in Nature with much better regenerative abilities than humans. For example, a starfish supposedly can be cut into pieces such that each piece can grow into a whole starfish. It is by studying/copying the biological processes responsible for that, that researchers expect to one day give any human the ability to, for example, regrow a lost arm. Now, what are the long-term consequences? Well, we could imagine a future day in which some accident decapitates someone, and proceed to two different scenarios. First, suppose the body is destroyed during the accident, but the head is rescued. Second, suppose the accident was such that the decapitated head died within minutes, before rescue arrived, but the body was saved. Now compare the two scenarios: In each, the surviving part of a human is very much alive, courtesy of advanced life-support equipment. And in both scenarios, regeneration science will allow the lost portion of an overall human body to be regrown. Next, the core of the argument involves considering these questions, "Will anyone object to the bodiless head being allowed to grow a new body?" and "Will anyone object to the headless body being allowed to grow a new head?" Human life is on the line in both scenarios, true, but the first scenario also features a surviving human mind, while the second does not. That is, while in the second scenario a head might indeed be grown, a complete education will also be required, and the resulting overall human being will inevitably be somewhat different from the one whose head had died. In the first scenario there is no such discontinuity in a human's existence. Human life would be saved in the second scenario, but a question remains as to whether or not there would be a moral obligation to do so.
{NOTE: Regeneration technology is not something to be found only in the far-distant future. This piece of the Future is Incoming much sooner than later! See:
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2087-1754008,00.html }
This question is, in a way, already fueling a political storm today, concerning humans who have experienced brain death. Their bodies are kept on life-support in the hope they might recover. The available evidence is that the patients cannot recover, due to so much of their brain tissue being dead, and it is only remotely likely that even advanced regeneration technology would restore the original minds whose existence depended upon those brains. As a result, even though the political storm still rages, many humans have prepared a Living Will to, in essence, ensure that they are declared entirely legally dead when their brains have been declared clinically dead. The "human life" that may still reside in each of their bodies is irrelevant to them. And the judicial system, when involved in cases where no Living Will existed, has so far tended to say essentially the same thing, that human life is not the key; the human mind is the key to defining a human being. This overall argument can fortify that conclusion by asking that a third future scenario be considered, in which the accident was so horrible that only an arm could be saved. Should it be given the chance to grow a new body and head? There is no technical difference between regrowing just a head, as in the second scenario, and regrowing most of a body along with the head, just as there would be little technical difference between the preceding and regenerating a dead brain only. Perhaps the core of the conflict is in "appearances". The brain-dead human on life-support looks fully human; the headless human is still mostly all there, appearance-wise, but an arm is just an arm, however-much it is perfectly human and perfectly alive. Yet none of the three have a living human mind, while in the first regeneration scenario the bodiless head is not just a piece of a mostly-incomplete human. Therefore the argument concludes that "murder" has to be defined in terms of killing a human-level mind. (It is also consistent with, for example, the killing of flies and other creatures never being called murder, while should we one day encounter equivalent mindful beings at/from other planets in the Universe, the definition is consistent with thinking any killing of them to be murder, too.) Therefore during most of a pregnancy, when a fetus has not developed the brainpower for a minimally human-level mind, however-muchly human its body is and appears, abortion cannot be murder, and can be morally permissible. Opponents to this view point out that there exists no consensus, morally speaking, for what constitutes a "minimally human-level mind." Certain philosophers have argued that compared to an adult human mind, newborn infants can be classified as falling below the intuitive standard, as would persons with severe, but not physically debilitating, mental retardation -- but this merely means it might be difficult to decide how much brainpower must be present before killing a human life starts to qualify as murder. It does not by one whit imply that abortion of a mostly-brainless fetus can qualify as murder.
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So, a living human arm on life-support is a person, eh?