A few quick thoughts:
1. Mr. Karzai may be engaging in another one of his impulsive outbursts for which he is well-known. If so, NATO operations will not be impacted.
2. Mr. Karzai means what he says.
In the second case, the U.S. will need to make a strategic judgment as to whether U.S. interests--not Mr. Karzai's--are better served from adhering to or rejecting his call. If U.S. interests are better served from ignoring Mr. Karzai's demand, the U.S. should do just that.
In any case, I am not too surprised by this outcome. I have argued before that the Kabul-centric approach is a strategic blunder. It goes against Afghanistan's decentralized structure and it depends on an impulsive, emotional, frequently unreliable partner, whom many Afghans view as illegitimate. Perhaps this latest outburst might offer an opportune time for making a strategic change. Whatever the case, the U.S. should set its direction based on its interests, not Mr. Karzai's latest whim de jour.
The following excerpts from my November 29, 2009
discussion remain applicable:
IMO, placing emphasis on working with the tribal leaders rather than the inept, corrupt, and among many Afghans, illegitimate, government in Kabul will be key. Reliance on Kabul will likely lead to unsatisfactory outcomes...
Afghanistan is not a "nation" in the true sense of the word. It is comprised of largely autonomous areas, each with its own leaders, traditions, cultures, and needs. A functional military strategy has to be built on the structure that exists in Afghanistan, not one that might be preferable but is not present. A Kabul-centric strategy will likely leave things pretty much as they currently stand, with swaths of territory held by the Taliban and Taliban attacks continuing.
Although some progress has been made since the current strategy was put in place last year, I believe the progress is less than what would have been achieved had the Karzai regime's influence been limited. At this point in time, I still believe a reasonably satisfactory outcome in Afghanistan (one that limits the Taliban's/Al Qaeda's prospects of regaining a safe haven) can be salvaged.
Doing so will require tough strategic adjustments that better reflect that country’s history and structure, namely de-emphasizing Mr. Karzai and the present Kabul-centric approach. Under such a strategic change, Afghanistan’s tribal leaders would be charged with allocating resources that would be furnished for reconstruction, economic development, education within their areas of jurisdiction. Security operations would be coordinated with the tribal leaders. Local security forces would be developed and trained. Those forces would be charged with maintaining security in areas under the jurisdiction of each tribal leader. They would be developed with attention to maintaining a careful balance of power so that no local area would be in a position to try to gain preeminence at the expense of others.
Only truly national issues--those that impact the entire country--would be financed through and coordinated with the central government. Those efforts would immediately be focused on developing an adequate legal and constitutional framework, financial system, central army that would complement local security forces when needed (including a "balancing" role), not serve as a substitute for them, and ultimately an election that would establish a government that Afghans would widely view as legitimate.