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Military Branches

Which branch and explain?


  • Total voters
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You thinking about Nasiriyah?

Not really, its was an incident, not something I feel is prevalent.
But when else is the air Force going to use an A-10, other than in XCAS missions, which is going to involve ground forces. Being an airwing Marine, we deployed to several AF bases to do joint training, or just get some desert ordinance training in between CAX. The cultures of Air Force and Marine Airwing are so far removed its ridiculous. Everything we do in the MAW is focused on the MAGTF. Its drilled into us about our mistakes on the flightline(and pilots in the cockpits) costing Marine lives on the ground. There just isn't that esprit de corps in the Air force support mentality. I think that for stand-off range fighting they are ok, air superiority they are great, but when it comes to getting down and dirty and taking a chance or maybe ignoring a ROE to save ground troops lives they are lacking. The A-10 is a tremendous XCAS weapons platform and I am sure their pilots are adequatley trained, I just think its effectiveness would be increased if charge of it were placed in the hands of those who are a part of and understand the culture of those they are supporting.
 
I still think it was the wrong strategy and not the boots on the ground that allowed the insurgency to establish themselves with the strength they had. It would have happened anyway, but more troops would not have stopped it unless used correctly. It is a trade off. I could be done with the troops we had.

Although that may have meant we lost more troops than we would have otherwise, I will point out how low our casualties were in this war.

Rumsfeld did disregard the existing plan, but that plan was a 20th century plan. A Schwartzkopf plan. Overwhelm them with troops. We didn't have em.

I totally agree with the rotations. If you were sent to the war, you are committed until it is done.

More troops would not have reduced the time needed as it is primarily a political problem and the internal politics moves at it's own pace, even now we can see this.

We should have dealt with the tribes, right off. I would suggest this is again the lack of a counterinsurgency strategy.

I emboldened the original sin. You never go in with "just enough." Did we invade Normandy with "just enough" as the wealth of our manpower sat elsewhere entirely useless? As it was, our lack of numbers facilitated the unnecessary future unrest. Not only that, but we were constantly wrapping around our own flanks because their was a lack of numbers to place as protection. It was only thanks to the professionalism of our military that Rumsfeld's "No Plan" wasn't a disaster. Army supply convoys would not have had to pretend to be soldiers (Jessica Lynch) had our numbers been what they should have been.

1) PLAN. The original plan had been developed since 1991. The living CENTCOM plan had been a working document that dealt with strategic locations, social disparities, and historical significances. It respected the invasion and the occupation. However, as General Zinni reports, the Rumsfeld coven decided to tell Congress that this military engineered plan was "old and stale." Instead, a room full of civilians with absolutely no military experience designed what was to be the "No Plan." In order to sell the invasion, troop numbers had to be lower, the price was going to be cheap, and promises of the Age of Aquarius in Baghdad as soon as the regime was toppled was delivered. In other words, the CENTCOM plan brought up to many probablilities that would make selling the war too difficult. CENTCOM planned for the worst, while Rumsfeld chose to plan for the best.

2) NUMBERS. There is no such thing as "just enough." If troops are deployed in sufficient numbers at the start of an occupation, it may be possible to draw them down in a matter of months. But stingy deployments that attempt to hold down the political costs at home guarantee that the enemy will not experience an enduring sense of defeat. It was decided by Washington that bypassing entire cities on the way to Baghdad would be best because it would save civilian lives and prevent the media their orgy of blood. However, the result of this was that great parts of the country never even saw an American tank or an American boot. They never felt defeated. The future bases for the insurgency came out of these cities and militias were formed around organized former Hussein loyalists. In the end, Washington sent more troops anyway. No enemy has ever been defeated before they felt defeated. How necessary would a surge have been if the numbers were there to begin with?

3) RULE OF LAW. This means immediate martial law. Washington politics were absolutely petrified of the prospect because martial law may have appeared inhumane and anti-civil rights. However, did anybody consider how inhumane it was to watch them slaughter each other as pockets of Iraq oppressed their own into submission where American boots were absent? Would itnot have been far more humane to gradually loosen martial law as organization appeared instead of giving the cities to terror? We lost our credibility in Baghdad almost immediately. None of them expected the greatest military in history and the greatest force for good to tolerate the looting and arson spree by criminal elements. We alienated the law-abiding citizens and spent the next 5 years gaining back respect and trust. Of course, we didn't have the numbers to stop any of it in the first place since we went in with "just enough."

4) CONTRACTORS. Our politicians were quick to point out the looting of the locals on their own cities, but absolutely criminal as they ignored the looting orgy of American contractors. Cheney lavished Iraq with innapropriate contracts. And he merely celebrated the Clinton vision of privatizing our military on every level. When people criticize Iraq because of the cost, this is where they should focus. It would have cost far less to employ Iraqis to fix the systems they knew better than anybody. It would have also employed countless youth who had nothing better to do than to join the local militia or insurgency. And how less likely is it that people will blow up whet they themselves fix or build? The local Sheikh should have been tasked to fix his water system with enough money to offer payroll to his people.

5) AUTHORITY. Instead of waiting 3 years to recognize that local leadership should have been designated instead of foregoing this important step because we were entirely focused on who the leaders were to be on the national level, we should have tapped into the Sheikhs as soon as possible. Without our recognition, they formed their own local securities (militias) that worked against our efforts. Without our immediate respect, they leaned towards those who at least pretended to offer it, Al-Queda. We would spend years developing a way to earn back their trust and as it stood it was mostly due to Al-Queda's ruthlessness to murder other Muslims that made it happen. Eventually, Al-Queda made us the good guys. Disbanding the Iraqi military was a must (as you agree) because the larger Shia population would not feel the change with the same old brutes and Al-Queda would have had a far easier time establishing themselves under a majority Sunni military. This was a necessary pain in the ass, but immediate re-forming of security forces came far too late (not enough trainers). Many of the disbanded merely sought the closest militia

6) BEAT COP. Without numbers, the Army was largely confined to bigger "cities" and all Iraqi civilian leadership was preached from within the protected Green Zone. And though the Marine Corps was strategically located throughout the Wild West all the way towards the Syrian border, there wasn't enough numbers to constantly be in every village or town. These were towns and villages used by Al-Queda and the insurgency to launch attacks that hadn't even seen an American boot until 2006 or the surge. Without the beat cops, neighborhoods were in the hands of the gangs and their law. The second Baghdad fell, we should have been in mulitple position to walk the beat, which means that they should have crossed the Kuwaiti border with or right behind the assault. Of course, this means that the assault would have had to go through the larger cities before occupiers rolled right in.

7) FIGHT. Too many times were out military actions confined to the political mood of Washington. Washington wanted us liked rather than feared and occupying a hostile foreign land must come from having defeated a people's will to fight. Resistance had to be crushed immediately. As it were, the bleeding hearts and an election year managed to convince the Bush administration that Fallujah wasn't worth it. After leaving Fallujah, the few Al-Queda agents and insurgents remaining managed to turn it into the terrorist capital of the world. IED factories were organized and the placegot flooded with our enemies from where to launch attacks. Of course, directly after the 2004 Presidential election the word was given to finish Fallujah (II). In order to beat the news cameras, the Marines rushed through and the death toll was high and the city was wrecked. It was the media, the average bleeding heart, and our politicians that facilitated the existence of Fallujah II. The toll in casualities and human rights would have been far lower in the end than what it was and we would have gained more respect.

8) DEPLOYMENT SCHEDULE. This is a lesson we had already learned via Vietnam, but refused to heed. We didn't fight the Vietcong once. We fought him 9 separate times. Everytime 12 month veterans left, they were replaced with "green" troops who had to spend months learning lessons that had already been learned. But that was a draft war. We had no excuse come 2003. In a grand display of "supporting the troop" we told him that he wouldn't have to stay in Iraq for a prolonged period of time. We appeased mothers of America and told him that instead of fighting this war fora couple or three years, that he would merely have to disrupt his family repeatedly and deploy numerously. In the mean time, every six months or fourteen months, "green" troops and even veterans had to relearn an ever changing Iraq and tactics as the enemy changed annually.

The "Lessons Learned" in the Army and Marine Corps circuit all generally agree with the basics. Former intel officers and cultural experts also come to the same basic conclusions. We did not flood Germany or Japan with American contractors. We did not send the "bare minimum" of troops to accomplish a mission. We did not fight in accordance to the mood of reporters and political idealogues. We did not toss out military plans so that non-military civilians could have a chance to prove a radical theory of new war. We facilitated much of the blood shed and the struggle before we even left Kuwait. People complain that Iraq shouldn't have happened because it was soveriegn and cost too much. And of course, Bush's WMD angle left them with narrow vision and shallow excuses. After 10 years of starving out Iraqis and bombing them under a UN mission of containment, a man named Osama Bin Laden would use it as an excuse to drop planes on our soil. This deplorable containment mission had to end. But it should not have cost as much and it should not have come with such bloodshed. This is not to suggest that friction between the Sunni and the Shia wouldn't have happened. The reason we maintained Hussein's manucured throne after the Gulf War was out of fear of sectarian violence. Which leads me to absolutely scoff at the criminality of the same individuals who disregarded this inevitability 12 years later by tossing out the CENTCOM plan for theirs. But the highlights above would have gone a long way to ease a lot of the violence. It would have saved a lot of civilian and military lives. Allowed us to maintain respect in the eyes of the world. And allowed us to put this war behind us years ago. It all goes back to a need for more numbers right from the start.

Civilian mismanagement cost us respect, treasure, and blood. Can you imagine our White House with a lesser military to carry their safety nets?
 
Not really, its was an incident, not something I feel is prevalent.
But when else is the air Force going to use an A-10, other than in XCAS missions, which is going to involve ground forces. Being an airwing Marine, we deployed to several AF bases to do joint training, or just get some desert ordinance training in between CAX. The cultures of Air Force and Marine Airwing are so far removed its ridiculous. Everything we do in the MAW is focused on the MAGTF. Its drilled into us about our mistakes on the flightline(and pilots in the cockpits) costing Marine lives on the ground. There just isn't that esprit de corps in the Air force support mentality. I think that for stand-off range fighting they are ok, air superiority they are great, but when it comes to getting down and dirty and taking a chance or maybe ignoring a ROE to save ground troops lives they are lacking. The A-10 is a tremendous XCAS weapons platform and I am sure their pilots are adequatley trained, I just think its effectiveness would be increased if charge of it were placed in the hands of those who are a part of and understand the culture of those they are supporting.

It's a good point. There is a closer tie between knowing your own needs you and how they are fighting. The A-10 is an exception to ground support. Typically the Army will get from the Army and the Marines will get from the Marines/Navy.

It makes far more sense for CAS to come from the Army and Marine Corps (and Navy). But you can't land them on carriers, so I would place them in the Army where they have a wide degree of inventory.
 
I still think it was the wrong strategy and not the boots on the ground that allowed the insurgency to establish themselves with the strength they had. It would have happened anyway, but more troops would not have stopped it unless used correctly. It is a trade off. I could be done with the troops we had.

Although that may have meant we lost more troops than we would have otherwise, I will point out how low our casualties were in this war.

Rumsfeld did disregard the existing plan, but that plan was a 20th century plan. A Schwartzkopf plan. Overwhelm them with troops. We didn't have em.

I totally agree with the rotations. If you were sent to the war, you are committed until it is done.

More troops would not have reduced the time needed as it is primarily a political problem and the internal politics moves at it's own pace, even now we can see this.

We should have dealt with the tribes, right off. I would suggest this is again the lack of a counterinsurgency strategy.
I think MSgt just said that.

Or something quite similar.

Basically, more troops would have been better (and in accordance with the "old strategy" you mention), but the wrong strategy(s) was/were employed in any case.

I don't claim to have any knowledge/skill regarding military strategy (Me, military strategist? Hah!), but his explanation made sense.
 
Not really, its was an incident, not something I feel is prevalent.
But when else is the air Force going to use an A-10, other than in XCAS missions, which is going to involve ground forces. Being an airwing Marine, we deployed to several AF bases to do joint training, or just get some desert ordinance training in between CAX. The cultures of Air Force and Marine Airwing are so far removed its ridiculous. Everything we do in the MAW is focused on the MAGTF. Its drilled into us about our mistakes on the flightline(and pilots in the cockpits) costing Marine lives on the ground. There just isn't that esprit de corps in the Air force support mentality. I think that for stand-off range fighting they are ok, air superiority they are great, but when it comes to getting down and dirty and taking a chance or maybe ignoring a ROE to save ground troops lives they are lacking. The A-10 is a tremendous XCAS weapons platform and I am sure their pilots are adequatley trained, I just think its effectiveness would be increased if charge of it were placed in the hands of those who are a part of and understand the culture of those they are supporting.

I really think the air force has a totally unique culture in the military. The navy is significantly different from the army/marines, but we fit in decently with both. The air force just kinda sits off on it's own and does not really fit in with the culture of the other branches. It's really a large, unsubtle difference too.
 
It's a good point. There is a closer tie between knowing your own needs you and how they are fighting. The A-10 is an exception to ground support. Typically the Army will get from the Army and the Marines will get from the Marines/Navy.

It makes far more sense for CAS to come from the Army and Marine Corps (and Navy). But you can't land them on carriers, so I would place them in the Army where they have a wide degree of inventory.
I don't claim much knowledge of these things, but would it be impossible to modify an A-10 for carrier operations? Or would the modifications be too extensive/expensive?

Going off a few promotional bits/documentaries I’ve seen on the plane, it is said to be capable of sustaining at least some amount of ground fire - and I understand carrier landings (for obvious reasons) put greater stresses on an airframe - but perhaps the two are not the same.
 
If we were to consolidate our overall military strength to just one branch, which branch should it be and why?

My apologies for making this a U.S. poll question - feel free to start one that outlines military branches in other countries.

the US Navy; the Army is incapable of projecting force on it's own, whereas the Navy can effectively control the coastlines; i think something like 80% of the worlds' population lives w/in 100 miles of a coastline? plus that way you keep the Marine Corps (part of the Department of the Navy); so you retain a powerful Air power (i think though i haven't looked this up that the Navy may actually have more planes than the Air Force; certainly we have our carrier groups), a Sea strike capability (to include strategic first and second strike nuclear capability), and a powerful Ground Combat capability (courtesy of the USMC). on top of this, the Navy is the one branch truly capable of independently projecting US power abroad and world-wide.
 
I still think it was the wrong strategy and not the boots on the ground that allowed the insurgency to establish themselves with the strength they had. It would have happened anyway, but more troops would not have stopped it unless used correctly. It is a trade off. I could be done with the troops we had.

Unfortunately, there are think tanks and politicians in Washington who still believe this too. They will seek to test their ideas in future wars, despite the lessons learned through history. The nature of war never changes and neither do the 101 basics. There is an old Army maxim that states "if you fail to pay the butcher up front, you will pay in compound interest in the end." Trying to win wars on the cheap will always cost us in the end. Winning wars should have nothing to do with international PR.



Rumsfeld did disregard the existing plan, but that plan was a 20th century plan. A Schwartzkopf plan. Overwhelm them with troops. We didn't have em.

It was a plan written from 1991 to 2003. This is why military plans for future possible invasions are called "living" plans. They are constantly re-shaped and re-designed by actual military tactitioners to accomodate the changing targetted society and technology. But basics are never sacrificed. It was the only sensible plan and it was trumped for a civilian's plan that took 1 month to devise. Something cold and calculated was trumped by something half ass thrown together to win a favorable vote from Congress. The result was an American military standing in Baghdad with no orders or designs for what to do next. The CENTCOM plan was not a Schwartzkopf plan. It detailed occupation and the answers to the numerous scenarios that were going to come from sectarian indifferences. In no way was Iraq ever going to be a repeat of the Gulf War. CENTCOM knew it. Cultural experts knew it. And even Rumsfeld knew it. This is why a decade of complex military planning came down to civilians in Washington needing it watered down to deliver simple deceits to those who needed the illusion of a simple war.

With an entire Marine 3rd Division and almost the 2nd sitting in front of their television sets watching the war, we had enough troops to do this right. On the west flank of the 1st Marine Division was one Army Division (3rd ID). The rest of the Army was either sitting around in Afghanistan or watching the event unfold from their television sets. At the end of the invasion, the vast majority of all Marines left. The 3rd ID left as soon as the 4th ID showed up to assume occupation. By the fall, all of the 1st Marine Division was back while the 3rd ID was beginning to start rotations with the 4th. We absolutely had the numbers to do this correctly. Instead we juggled the numbers around to accomodate a senseless display of troop rotation and a congressional sense that everything was well in hand.

There are books and books on this.

We should have dealt with the tribes, right off. I would suggest this is again the lack of a counterinsurgency strategy.

The CENTCOM plan addressed Sunni counterinsurgency. It addressed many things. These things are what was considered "old and stale" by the Rumsfeld crew. You yourself in this very post were willing to dimisss it as too "20th century." Perhaps the military knew better about warfare than Washington suits? First, suits failed at diplomacy (yet again) and defaulted to sending in the military. But in order to retain some sense of control, they alter the military plan and insist that they know better. Of course, when they finally acknowledge that their ideology on how to fight today's wars is yet another failure on their part, they tap into the military again. Only this time they use Patreaus. It's only at this time do we start seeing success in Iraq. This is the same old story told from one war to the next since WWII. The exception? - The Gulf War, where military practitioners in uniform were allowed to bring the American people "victory."

I'm not sure where you are coming from with this though. There was never going to be a diplomatic solution that was going to bring Sunni fighters to our side. No amount of COIN was ever going to trump an enemies need to feel defeated. Once they are defeated and they know it, then you organize COIN for any remnants that creep up. This is military doctrine. What we witnessed was far more than a simple insurgency. It was a continuation of war from a tribe that never felt defeated. And the reason the Sunni felt that they still had a fight was that most of them never even saw us as we headed towards Baghdad. They stashed weapons throughout the cities that we were not allowed to enter. They rallied and organized to continue defending long after we celebrated our "victory." A lack of COIN very much had to do with a lack of numbers to impliment anything. Marine and Army units were looking for ways to use locals to support us against Al-Queda. Some of Patreaus' plan came from Mattis' implimentations in 2004 in the Anbar Province. But in the end, the insurgency existed like it did because we never fought them in the first place.

The correct COIN for Iraq needed to start with a base of more numbers to carry it out. You can't agree with the need for a "beat cop" then disagree about more numbers to accomplish that.
 
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I don't claim much knowledge of these things, but would it be impossible to modify an A-10 for carrier operations? Or would the modifications be too extensive/expensive?

Going off a few promotional bits/documentaries I’ve seen on the plane, it is said to be capable of sustaining at least some amount of ground fire - and I understand carrier landings (for obvious reasons) put greater stresses on an airframe - but perhaps the two are not the same.

I know very little about aviation, but I believe the A-10 is too heavy to land or take off from a short strip. If they can be modified, they would need a large carrier.
 
I don't claim much knowledge of these things, but would it be impossible to modify an A-10 for carrier operations? Or would the modifications be too extensive/expensive?
Its a combination of it's weight(particularly loaded down as that thing can carry a ****-ton of ordinance), and generation of enough airspeed to get off a short runway that do it in. I'm not sure, but I don't believe their wings fold, making storage of them on a carrier unfeasible. I don't know if its landing gear is capable of sustaining the impact of carrier style landings or not.

It's just an awesome ground support weapons platform that ironically sits in the hands of the one branch that has next to zero clue on ground operations.
 
I know very little about aviation, but I believe the A-10 is too heavy to land or take off from a short strip. If they can be modified, they would need a large carrier.
It’s a combination of its weight (particularly loaded down as that thing can carry a ****-ton of ordinance), and generation of enough airspeed to get off a short runway that do it in. I'm not sure, but I don't believe their wings fold, making storage of them on a carrier unfeasible. I don't know if its landing gear is capable of sustaining the impact of carrier style landings or not.

It's just an awesome ground support weapons platform that ironically sits in the hands of the one branch that has next to zero clue on ground operations.
Sounds like they would either need more powerful engines (although already powerful, I gather) limitations on payload (thus limiting their usefulness), or perhaps (probably) both.

And I think modifying the wings to allow folding would be possible, as well as strengthening the landing gear.

It sounds like the main limitation is weight and engine power.

Light-weight composites could reduce weight, but might reduce ground fire resistance.

More powerful engines could improve takeoff distance, but only so far (as limited by the airframe, I would think).

Overall, it might be cheaper (although perhaps not as much as one would think, give the limitations of the current procurement process) to just build a different plane entirely.

What’s the deal with the F-35?

Wasn’t that touted as the next all-purpose military aircraft (albeit in 3+ different versions)?

Then again, didn’t they cancel it or something?
 
Sounds like they would either need more powerful engines (although already powerful, I gather) limitations on payload (thus limiting their usefulness), or perhaps (probably) both.

And I think modifying the wings to allow folding would be possible, as well as strengthening the landing gear.

It sounds like the main limitation is weight and engine power.

Light-weight composites could reduce weight, but might reduce ground fire resistance.

More powerful engines could improve takeoff distance, but only so far (as limited by the airframe, I would think).

Overall, it might be cheaper (although perhaps not as much as one would think, give the limitations of the current procurement process) to just build a different plane entirely.

What’s the deal with the F-35?

Wasn’t that touted as the next all-purpose military aircraft (albeit in 3+ different versions)?

Then again, didn’t they cancel it or something?

Don't know anything about the F-35 except that it's yet another big bill program for the Air Force. Like the F/A-22 its a toy too expensive to use in combat with the promise of great use if we ever fight another superpower on the rise or at least one pretending to be. The Defense Industry loves the threat of China or a Soviet return.

I should lobby congress for a hundred billion dollars to develop lightsabers for our troops in case the Empire invades our galaxy. You know, because "nothing is too good for our troops." And then when I accomplish in creating my new toy I willl aks for a hundred billion dollars more to maintain it and experiment with colors. And then when the American people want to save money congress can ignore my rediculous program and take it out of the military budget so that they can want for body armor and untorn NBC equipment.
 
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Don't know anything about the F-35 except that it's yet another big bill program for the Air Force. Like the F/A-22 it’s a toy too expensive to use in combat with the promise of great use if we ever fight another superpower on the rise or at least one pretending to be. The Defense Industry loves the threat of China or a Soviet return.

I should lobby congress for a hundred billion dollars to develop light sabers for our troops in case the Empire invades our galaxy. You know, because "nothing is too good for our troops." And then when I accomplish in creating my new toy I will ask for a hundred billion dollars more to maintain it and experiment with colors. And then when the American people want to save money congress can ignore my ridiculous program and take it out of the military budget so that they can want for body armor and untorn NBC equipment.
Ah.

Perhaps the promotional vids on the F-35 were...promotional?

Who knew?

:lol:

Still, according to those vids there was supposed to be a version of the F-35 for the Navy (carrier mods) and the Marines (STOL version - using lift fan - to at least partially replace Harrier).

Still, one could wish as much were spent on individual soldier equipment.

Personally, I wanna see combat/powered armor. :mrgreen:

I know it’s Sci-Fi, but still…
 
Don't know anything about the F-35 except that it's yet another big bill program for the Air Force. Like the F/A-22 its a toy too expensive to use in combat with the promise of great use if we ever fight another superpower on the rise or at least one pretending to be. The Defense Industry loves the threat of China or a Soviet return.

I should lobby congress for a hundred billion dollars to develop lightsabers for our troops in case the Empire invades our galaxy. You know, because "nothing is too good for our troops." And then when I accomplish in creating my new toy I willl aks for a hundred billion dollars more to maintain it and experiment with colors. And then when the American people want to save money congress can ignore my rediculous program and take it out of the military budget so that they can want for body armor and untorn NBC equipment.

I kinda like the idea of the F-35 though. The U.S. is attempting to make aerospace versions of TIE fighters. That's cool.
 
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I agree this is a molehill. Probably just a mistake on the website I got my info from.


That must be one old website. I was active duty Air Force in the late 80s and E-4 was senior airman and after a year you could become sergeant (buck sgt we called it)(similar to the Army E-4 rank, you have SPC and CPL, with the CPL having more responsibility but no more pay). Some time in the early 90s, IIRC, they did away with the SGT designation and E-4 was just senior airman and E-5 was staff sgt. the E-4 rank is the old E-4 SGT rank (the old E-4 SRA rank simply did not have the star colored in).
 
That must be one old website. I was active duty Air Force in the late 80s and E-4 was senior airman and after a year you could become sergeant (buck sgt we called it)(similar to the Army E-4 rank, you have SPC and CPL, with the CPL having more responsibility but no more pay). Some time in the early 90s, IIRC, they did away with the SGT designation and E-4 was just senior airman and E-5 was staff sgt. the E-4 rank is the old E-4 SGT rank (the old E-4 SRA rank simply did not have the star colored in).

I remember those days. Getting rid of the E-4 buck sgt rank made it so you had to at least take a test to become a NCO. When there was a E-4 sgt rank all you had to do is have a pulse to become a NCO.
 
ARMY it seems they do most of the main stuff .
 
Don't know about the other branch of services, but foot-slogging naval infantry (Marines) have been obsolete for a very long time. They survive on the Semper Fi Ruff-Ruff propaganda. Fold them into the Army.
 
Air force. Modern military action is not about throwing bodies into the grinder. It is about superior technology, and our air force is where the biggest difference lies. We should be destroying our enemies with as precise attacks as possible, and not putting troops in danger by using them as police for occupied countries. If we have a problem, we remove it and leave, with as few casualties and collateral damage as possible. Ideally, not a single soldier would have to go in front of an enemy weapon.
 
If we were to consolidate our overall military strength to just one branch, which branch should it be and why?

My apologies for making this a U.S. poll question - feel free to start one that outlines military branches in other countries.

What a Chinese fire drill that would be if it ever happened.
 
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