View Poll Results: A democratic Iraq means..........

Voters
24. You may not vote on this poll
  • More people standing up against tyranny, like we're seeing in Iran

    8 33.33%
  • Democracy will not last, dictatorship will inevitably return

    9 37.50%
  • Democracy will take hold, but the results will not be favorable for the US

    3 12.50%
  • I'm a malodorous hippie who believes Dick Cheney and George Bush eat arab babies for fuel

    4 16.67%
Page 9 of 9 FirstFirst ... 789
Results 81 to 87 of 87

Thread: The Implications of a Democratic Iraq on the Middle East

  1. #81
    Matthew 16:3

    Join Date
    Jul 2008
    Location
    Everywhere and nowhere
    Last Seen
    06-24-17 @ 05:05 PM
    Gender
    Lean
    Progressive
    Posts
    45,603

    Re: The Implications of a Democratic Iraq on the Middle East

    Quote Originally Posted by reefedjib View Post
    Awesome exchange, Tucker. I do love this topic and have since the Iraq war started. I was kinda skeptical on the WMD thing as they had been under tight sanctions, but honestly I got caught up in the threat as well. But I have always thought my most important reason for going to war was the objective, which was establishing a democracy. I was in favor of going in the beginning, heartened by how fast the regime folded but worried about insurgency, sickened by the decay into civil war and glory, glory hallejulah when Petraeus, Odierno and Keane made their entrance.

    I moved some of your quotes to group them...
    I've enjoyed our exchange immensely as well, reefedjib. Your passion for the topic is clear and I've learned quite a bit from it, so I must thank you for that.

    And if you've enjoyed talking with me about this, you'd love to discuss this with my brother. He's basically the same as me on his views about the initial strategic importance vs. current strategic importance, but he's far more informed on military history and strategies than I am, and has read everything written on the Iraq war that he could find.

    Essentially it would be the same as discussing it with me, but I'd be smarter.


    Iraqi politics: Let us look at the results: http://www.understandingwar.org/file...ults_30MAR.pdf.

    Which parties are Islamist?
    • Not Iraqiyyah, 91 seats.
    • Not State of Law, 89 seats.
    • Iraqi National Alliance is, especially Sadr, but it is of the Shiite variety, 70 seats.
    • Not the Kurdistan Alliance, 43 seats.
    • Not Gorran, 8 seats.
    • Tawafuq is, Sunni variety, 6 seats.
    • Unity of Iraq, unknown, 3 seats
    • KIU is, 4 seats
    • KIG is, 3 seats
    • Two Rivers List, unknown, 1 seat.


    Total Islamist (including unknowns for the hell of it): 87 seats
    Total Secular: 231

    The battle is between Iraqiyyah and SOL.
    I might be wrong on this, but I though SOL was primarily comprised of the Islamic Dawa Party, which I thought was considered to be non-secular in nature? Although it might be more moderate Islamic instead of outright "Islamist".

    If I am correct about them being non-secular, though, it would mean that the numbers are actually:

    Islamist/non-secular: 172

    Secular: 142

    Unknown: 4

    Like I said, though, I might have it wrong. They do seem like moderates, but they are pretty clearly non-secular.

    Seeing people identify with their religions in the wake of all of these changes is not surprising. Seeing them swing back to secular political parties is a big surprise.

    Re: INA and SOL...I will be very surprised if they can form a coalition considering the majority seat holders in INA is Sadr and Sadr and SOL get along like oil and water. Whatever is expedient I suppose.
    Both sides have been rumbling about it the past couple of days. I don't know what will come of it, though.

    I also agree with you about the rise of secularism recently being somewhat surprising. I would hope that this trend continues, but I think that if disenfranchisement in the secular government begins to increase, the Islamists will regain the lost ground.

    But the secular gains are somewhat lessened by the fact that the sadrists gained some ground in the recent election's as well. This is something that brings uo a degree of concern, especially with the increased iranian influence.

    Not a big surprise since 1) Iraq was the primary opponent of Iran and 2) the Shiites in Iraq became empowered.
    I agree, but this was one of the reasons I was not in favor of the invasion, and one of my biggest worries about the ultimate result. We invaded our enemy's biggest enemy in the region and have essentially given that enemy a friend, or at least potential friend.

    If the secularists win in the end, I'll have been wrong, and thus happy. If not, we'll have two Irans.



    I tend to watch for changes in Iran as a result of Iraq, Iraq's elections, Iraq's democracy and Al'SIstani's Quietist Movement effects in Qom. It is interesting that the Green Revolution masked a struggle among the clerics for power, between Rafsanjani and Ayatollah Khamenie.
    I've been fascinated about the Iranian developments. That's your best argument that my initial assessments about strategic importance were wrong.

    But again, I'm still concerned about long-term developments, but I must admit the short-term developments have been heartening.




    Does this


    Have anything to do with our strategy?
    Touche. Perhaps "long-term goals" and reasoned assessment of how doing a specific action can help attain those "goals" would have been a better way for me to put it.

    I'll actually address what I now consider the "strategic importance" of the invasion in the next section. I had a bit of an epiphany about it yesterday.

    To me something has strategic importance. Period. We separately have a strategy for dealing with it.
    I was thinking about our discussion a bit last night. I came to a realization about what you've been saying as far as "breaking the stasis" goes.

    The problem in your estimation was not the instability in the region that Libs was talking about, it was about the relative stability in the region.

    It was a stable anti-American and anti-democracy region for the most part.

    Essentially your belief is that this was and is a threat to the US. (Where I differ is that I think our meddling in the region is potentially more of a threat to the US in the long-term, but I can see the other side as well, and starting from the presumption that I'm wrong -which is something I like to do when faced with a compelling argument I may disagree with to make sure I give it as objective of an analysis as possible- I can actually agree with it).

    Essentially, what I've realized is that often the wrong terms are being used by people who are defending the invasion. The goal was not to increase stability, it was already fairly stable. It was to, at first, increase instability to break up the anti-American, Anti-democracy stasis, and then re-stabilize the region as more in favor of America and pro-democracy.

    What I'm not convinced about is if this was the best approach to attain those goals. But after this discussion, I'll have to reconsider that stance somewhat.

    I'm still pretty strongly inclined towards anti-interventionism, and this is a product of me having an anti-federalist philosophy in general. I'm in favor of extreme variance in political ideology and highly localized governance. Interventionism, by it's nature, seeks the opposite.

    It's hard for me to reconcile the two concepts.

    I do agree that the strategic importance of Iraq has changed from before the invasion to after. We have escalated a problem in the heart of the ME and completely changed the policies of the countries surrounding it. For instance, Saudi Arabia started cracking down HARD on their Islamists.
    This is true, and supports the ideas about the war in Iraq having worked towards destabilizing the region you shared before, and I finally understood above.
    Tucker Case - Tard magnet.

  2. #82
    Banned
    Join Date
    Oct 2009
    Last Seen
    07-23-12 @ 03:52 PM
    Gender
    Lean
    Private
    Posts
    6,763
    Blog Entries
    2

    Re: The Implications of a Democratic Iraq on the Middle East

    Quote Originally Posted by Tucker Case View Post
    I've enjoyed our exchange immensely as well, reefedjib. Your passion for the topic is clear and I've learned quite a bit from it, so I must thank you for that.

    And if you've enjoyed talking with me about this, you'd love to discuss this with my brother. He's basically the same as me on his views about the initial strategic importance vs. current strategic importance, but he's far more informed on military history and strategies than I am, and has read everything written on the Iraq war that he could find.

    Essentially it would be the same as discussing it with me, but I'd be smarter.
    Yeah, I have learned a lot too. Thanks!

    I have read a few books and seen a few documentaries, mostly about the Surge. [ame=http://www.amazon.com/Surge-Whole-Bruce-Van-Dusen/dp/B002W8SRPI/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=dvd&qid=1270133415&sr=1-1]Amazon.com: The Surge: The Whole Story: Bruce Van Dusen, The Institute for the Study of War: Movies & TV[/ame]

    I read Thomas Ricks' "[ame="http://www.amazon.com/Gamble-Petraeus-American-Adventure-2006-2008/dp/1594201978"]The Gamble[/ame]" about the Surge. I read just a part of Thomas Ricks' "[ame="http://www.amazon.com/Fiasco-American-Military-Adventure-Iraq/dp/159420103X"]Fiasco[/ame]" which is an excellent book about 2003 - 2006 and the mess we created. Unfortunately I didn't get to the part about disbanding the Iraqi Army, to see if my hypothesis holds up - necessary to break Sunni power.

    I have read books by George Friedman of STATFOR which are interesting.

    I might be wrong on this, but I though SOL was primarily comprised of the Islamic Dawa Party, which I thought was considered to be non-secular in nature? Although it might be more moderate Islamic instead of outright "Islamist".

    If I am correct about them being non-secular, though, it would mean that the numbers are actually:

    Islamist/non-secular: 172

    Secular: 142

    Unknown: 4

    Like I said, though, I might have it wrong. They do seem like moderates, but they are pretty clearly non-secular.
    You are right, it is the Islamic Dawa Party. I view them as secular, in spite of this. Certainly not Islamist, so while my numbers may be suspect, so are yours. I wish I could ask Marisa at the Institute for the Study of War about this. She helped give a talk on the Iraqi Elections.

    Both sides have been rumbling about it the past couple of days. I don't know what will come of it, though.

    I also agree with you about the rise of secularism recently being somewhat surprising. I would hope that this trend continues, but I think that if disenfranchisement in the secular government begins to increase, the Islamists will regain the lost ground.

    But the secular gains are somewhat lessened by the fact that the sadrists gained some ground in the recent election's as well. This is something that brings uo a degree of concern, especially with the increased iranian influence.
    I think it is ok to see Islamists gain political power. They are not necessarily in bed with Iran and I don't think the Iraqis would stand for it.

    I agree, but this was one of the reasons I was not in favor of the invasion, and one of my biggest worries about the ultimate result. We invaded our enemy's biggest enemy in the region and have essentially given that enemy a friend, or at least potential friend.

    If the secularists win in the end, I'll have been wrong, and thus happy. If not, we'll have two Irans.
    I think the relationship is much more complicated. Regardless of whether Iraqis are secular or sectarian, there is the quality of nationalism. Iraq is clearly a nation which its inhabitants identify with. Iran must tread lightly.

    I've been fascinated about the Iranian developments. That's your best argument that my initial assessments about strategic importance were wrong.

    But again, I'm still concerned about long-term developments, but I must admit the short-term developments have been heartening.
    Well, I think it was always "planned" that Iraq would influence the region. Iran is in a special situation, majority Shia, 50% Persian, Islamist jurisprudence, rising dissatisfaction of its people. Iraq has a potentially strong influence, with it's "secular" jurisprudence, free elections, majority Shia, majority Arab, clerical exchange between Qom and Najaf, Quietist school.

    We may have had to dismantle existing structure before rebuilding democratic structure (your great observation below) and that offered opportunity to Iran to influence events. But structure and events are outside Iranian control now (well they have some influence) and the feedback into Iran is starting to occur. I want to know how much of an effect Iraqi democracy has on the Green Movement. State media in Iran are lying like hell to their people.



    I was thinking about our discussion a bit last night. I came to a realization about what you've been saying as far as "breaking the stasis" goes.

    The problem in your estimation was not the instability in the region that Libs was talking about, it was about the relative stability in the region.

    It was a stable anti-American and anti-democracy region for the most part.

    Essentially your belief is that this was and is a threat to the US. (Where I differ is that I think our meddling in the region is potentially more of a threat to the US in the long-term, but I can see the other side as well, and starting from the presumption that I'm wrong -which is something I like to do when faced with a compelling argument I may disagree with to make sure I give it as objective of an analysis as possible- I can actually agree with it).

    Essentially, what I've realized is that often the wrong terms are being used by people who are defending the invasion. The goal was not to increase stability, it was already fairly stable. It was to, at first, increase instability to break up the anti-American, Anti-democracy stasis, and then re-stabilize the region as more in favor of America and pro-democracy.
    I am less concerned that it be pro-American. The stability of the region was inhibiting political growth, leaving the only option as a rise in Islamist sentiments, which certainly did threaten the stability of the region, for which we are responsible out of the nations of the world. We guarantee ME security for the world (see George Friedman).

    We had to enable democratic growth.

    We destabilized Iraq and now are re-stabilizing Iraq. BUT, Iraq will continue to destabilize the region. This is desired. It is not over. We build a political weapon for the region.

    What I'm not convinced about is if this was the best approach to attain those goals. But after this discussion, I'll have to reconsider that stance somewhat.
    Interesting. Let me know what conclusions you reach.

    I'm still pretty strongly inclined towards anti-interventionism, and this is a product of me having an anti-federalist philosophy in general. I'm in favor of extreme variance in political ideology and highly localized governance. Interventionism, by it's nature, seeks the opposite.

    It's hard for me to reconcile the two concepts.
    Ok, now it is my turn to really listen. First, an explanation. I have always been an interventionist, on humanitarian grounds, for the Iraq war. We wouldn't go do Sudan, or Congo, or Burma because they are not strategically important. Iraq yes. Recently I have been convinced otherwise. After 7 years of pro-war, I still feel we must finish it well, like you, but my original reasons for going in are changed. Reason: Interventionism is not spelled out as a power in the Constitution - only common defense - and I did not feel the WMD argument holds up to common defense.

    Now you tell me you are anti-interventionism. Ok. But the reason you give escapes me. What is an anti-federalist philosophy? Please talk about extreme variance in political ideology and highly localized governance. How do they interrelate? How does interventionism seek the opposite?

    Cheers!
    Last edited by reefedjib; 04-01-10 at 12:36 PM.

  3. #83
    Matthew 16:3

    Join Date
    Jul 2008
    Location
    Everywhere and nowhere
    Last Seen
    06-24-17 @ 05:05 PM
    Gender
    Lean
    Progressive
    Posts
    45,603

    Re: The Implications of a Democratic Iraq on the Middle East

    Quote Originally Posted by reefedjib View Post
    Yeah, I have learned a lot too. Thanks!

    I have read a few books and seen a few documentaries, mostly about the Surge. Amazon.com: The Surge: The Whole Story: Bruce Van Dusen, The Institute for the Study of War: Movies & TV

    I read Thomas Ricks' "The Gamble" about the Surge. I read just a part of Thomas Ricks' "Fiasco" which is an excellent book about 2003 - 2006 and the mess we created. Unfortunately I didn't get to the part about disbanding the Iraqi Army, to see if my hypothesis holds up - necessary to break Sunni power.

    I have read books by George Friedman of STATFOR which are interesting.
    I'll have to pick those up. Thanks for the recommendations.



    You are right, it is the Islamic Dawa Party. I view them as secular, in spite of this. Certainly not Islamist, so while my numbers may be suspect, so are yours. I wish I could ask Marisa at the Institute for the Study of War about this. She helped give a talk on the Iraqi Elections.
    I think your description would be accurate.





    I think the relationship is much more complicated. Regardless of whether Iraqis are secular or sectarian, there is the quality of nationalism. Iraq is clearly a nation which its inhabitants identify with. Iran must tread lightly.
    True.

    Well, I think it was always "planned" that Iraq would influence the region. Iran is in a special situation, majority Shia, 50% Persian, Islamist jurisprudence, rising dissatisfaction of its people. Iraq has a potentially strong influence, with it's "secular" jurisprudence, free elections, majority Shia, majority Arab, clerical exchange between Qom and Najaf, Quietist school.
    Yeah, that much always made sense to me. I just worry about the long-term ramifications of it, but I'm also reconsidering some of my previous presumptions as well.

    We may have had to dismantle existing structure before rebuilding democratic structure (your great observation below) and that offered opportunity to Iran to influence events. But structure and events are outside Iranian control now (well they have some influence) and the feedback into Iran is starting to occur. I want to know how much of an effect Iraqi democracy has on the Green Movement. State media in Iran are lying like hell to their people.
    The two-way street of influence is where the gamble of the whole thing is, IMO.

    I think it could go either way, ATM. I think we are at an important turning point regarding which side will ultimately win out.



    I am less concerned that it be pro-American. The stability of the region was inhibiting political growth, leaving the only option as a rise in Islamist sentiments, which certainly did threaten the stability of the region, for which we are responsible out of the nations of the world. We guarantee ME security for the world (see George Friedman). It was less a threat to the US interests than a threat to regional stability (which is in US interests)

    We had to enable democratic growth.

    We destabilized Iraq and now are re-stabilizing Iraq. BUT, Iraq will continue to destabilize the region. This is desired. It is not over.
    Definitely not over.


    Interesting. Let me know what conclusions you reach.
    Will do.



    Ok, now it is my turn to really listen. First, an explanation. I have always been an interventionist, on humanitarian grounds, for the Iraq war. We wouldn't go do Sudan, or Congo, or Burma because they are not strategically important. Iraq yes. Recently I have been convinced otherwise. After 7 years of pro-war, I still feel we must finish it well, like you, but my original reasons for going in are changed. Reason: Interventionism is not spelled out as a power in the Constitution - only common defense - and I did not feel the WMD argument holds up to common defense.

    Now you tell me you are anti-interventionism. Ok. But the reason you give escapes me. What is an anti-federalist philosophy? Please talk about extreme variance in political ideology and highly localized governance. How do they interrelate? How does interventionism seek the opposite?

    Cheers!
    I don't want to hijack the thread discussing my "anti-federalist" views in detail, but real quickly I'll explain it a bit: It's more of a label I've given myself to describe how my views trend towards a sort of hyper-small-government conservative very much like the views given in the anti-federalist papers from the time when the Constitution was being adopted. The anti-federalists were the people who felt the Constitution granted too much authority to the federal government.

    After the constitution was adopted, the anti-federalist viewpoint was incorporated into the opposition for Hamilton's Federalist party, and the leaders of that opposition were James Madison and Thomas Jefferson. While Madison himself wrote many of the federalist papers, he was also highly in favor of limiting the federal authority as compared to the Hamiltonians. Jefferson was in France at the time of the writing of the Federalist and Anti-Federalist papers, but his views could easily be argued as being from the anti-federalist mindset.

    Anyway, I had developed a personal political philosophy that was highly decentralized and when I read the anti-federalist papers, I realized that my views were very much in line with theirs. Some notable anti-federalists were Patrick Henry, Samuel Adams, George Mason (who worked with Madison on the bill of rights, which only exists because of the anti-federalists) and Robert Yates.

    In general, it means my views cannot, in any way, be classified the modern variants of "liberal" or "conservative" which both start from a foundation of federalism, they just differ on the specifics. It also means that I'm an extremist, politically speaking. But most people don't recognize my extremism because it doesn't mimic the extremism found in the modern political dichotomy. I'd have been considered a hard-line extremist in 1787, though.

    Well, I've digressed from the thread topic enough with the above. If you want to discuss this further, feel free to PM me about it.
    Tucker Case - Tard magnet.

  4. #84
    Disappointed Evolutionist
    Catawba's Avatar
    Join Date
    Jun 2009
    Last Seen
    05-28-13 @ 08:15 PM
    Gender
    Lean
    Liberal
    Posts
    27,254

    Re: The Implications of a Democratic Iraq on the Middle East

    Quote Originally Posted by Libs_Luv_Weakness View Post
    Cool story bro.

    So who is the approving authority on the legislation to share oil revenue again?
    The US and the new regime we established and continue to prop up are the ones that will approve the new Iraqi oil law we enabled and pushed that opens up Iraqi oil finally to Western oil that had been kicked out of Iraq since 1972 when Iraq nationalized their oil.

    It was all spelled out in Cheney's secret task force report obtained by Newsnight on BBC and Harpers Magazine.

    "when President George Bush announced US, British and Allied forces would begin to bomb Baghdad - protesters claimed the US had a secret plan for Iraq's oil once Saddam had been conquered.

    In fact there were two conflicting plans, setting off a hidden policy war between neo-conservatives at the Pentagon, on one side, versus a combination of "Big Oil" executives and US State Department "pragmatists".

    "Big Oil" appears to have won. The latest plan, obtained by Newsnight from the US State Department was, we learned, drafted with the help of American oil industry consultants."
    BBC NEWS | Programmes | Newsnight | Secret US plans for Iraq's oil

    Please note the date of this was 2 years before we invaded and occupied Iraq:

    "So, we come to the report’s central dilemma: the American people continue to demand plentiful and cheap energy without sacrifice or inconvenience."

    "This Independent Task Force Report outlines some of the hard choices that should be considered and recommends specific policy approaches to secure the energy future of the United States. These choices will affect other U.S. policy objectives: U.S. policy toward the Middle East...."


    "U.S. strategic energy policy must prioritize and coordinate domestic and foreign policy choices and objectives, where possible."

    "This executive summary and the full report address the following questions. What are the potential effects of the critical energy situation for the United States? How did this critical energy situation arise? What are the U.S. policy options to deal with the energy situation? What should the United States do now?"

    "it is clear that energy disruptions could have a potentially enormous impact on the U.S. and the world economy, and would affect U.S. national security and foreign policy in dramatic ways."

    "An accident on the Alaska pipeline that brings the bulk of North Slope crude oil to market would have the same impact as a revolution cutting off supplies from a major Middle East oil producer."

    "And with spare capacity scarce and Middle East tensions high, chances are greater than at any point in the last two decades of an oil supply disruption that would even more severely test the nation’s security and prosperity."

    "What are the U.S. policy options to deal with the energy situation?"

    "the United States could develop a comprehensive and balanced energy security policy with near-term actions and long-term initiatives addressing both the supply side and demand side including diversification of energy supply resources, which would enable the United States to escape from a pattern of recurring energy crises."

    "More flexible environmental regulation and opening of more federal lands to drilling might slow but cannot stop this process."

    "For the most part, U.S. international oil policy has relied on maintenance of free access to Middle East Gulf oil and free access for Gulf exports to world markets."

    "These Gulf allies are finding their domestic and foreign policy interests increasingly at odds with U.S. strategic considerations, especially as Arab-Israeli tensions flare. They have become less inclined to lower oil prices in exchange for security of markets, and evidence suggests that investment is not being made in a timely enough manner to increase production capacity in line with growing global needs. A trend toward anti-Americanism could affect regional leaders’ ability to cooperate with the United States in the energy area."

    "The August 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait witnessed a major test of global energy security."

    " Bitter perceptions in the Arab world that the United States has not been evenhanded in brokering peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians have exacerbated these pressures on Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and given political leverage to Iraq’s Saddam Hussein to lobby for support among the Arab world’s populations."

    "A reopening of these areas to foreign investment could make a critical difference in providing surplus supplies to markets in the coming decade."

    "To guarantee that mechanisms are in place for warding off and, if necessary, for managing disruptions to energy supply."

    "The Gulf nations have one major asset—their oil and gas reserves. "

    "It is also in the strategic interest of the United States to assure that appropriate national and international mechanisms are in place to prevent disruptions in energy supplies where possible, and to manage efficiently and equitably any disruption that might occur."

    "Providing adequate safeguards, both at home and abroad, against energy supply disruptions and against manipulation of markets by any party, state or private."

    "Over the past year, Iraq has effectively become a swing producer, turning its taps on and off when it has felt such action was in its strategic interest to do so."


    "Still, the IEA must be assured of efficient joint decision-making in the event of a supply disruption under tight market conditions. This includes any possibility that Saddam Hussein may remove Iraqi oil from the market for an extended period of time..."

    "The administration needs to ensure that recent events do not derail this past success."


    "Iraq remains a destabilizing influence to U.S. allies in the Middle East, as well as to regional and global order, and to the flow of oil to international markets from the Middle East. Saddam Hussein has also demonstrated a willingness to threaten to use the oil weapon and to use his own export program to manipulate oil markets."

    "The United States should conduct an immediate policy review toward Iraq, including military, energy, economic, and political/diplomatic assessments."

    "Once an arms-control program is in place, the United States could consider reducing restrictions on oil investments inside Iraq. Like it or not, Iraqi reserves represent a major asset that can quickly add capacity to world oil markets and inject a more competitive tenor to oil trade."

    "Another problem with easing restrictions on the Iraqi oil industry to allow greater investment is that GCC allies of the United States will not like to see Iraq gain larger market share in international oil markets."

    "Middle East Gulf crude oil currently makes up around 25 percent of world oil supply, but could rise to 30–40 percent during the next decade as the region’s key producers pursue higher investments to capture expanding demand for oil in Asia and the developing world. If political factors were to block the development of new oil fields in the Gulf, the ramifications for world oil markets could be quite severe."

    "While there is no question that this investment is vitally important to U.S. interests, there is strong opposition to any such reopening among key segments of the Saudi and Kuwaiti populations."

    "More oil could likely be brought into the market place in the coming years if oil-field development could be enhanced by participation of U.S. companies in countries where such investments are currently banned"

    STRATEGIC ENERGY POLICY CHALLENGES
    Treat the earth well: it was not given to you by your parents, it was loaned to you by your children. We do not inherit the Earth from our Ancestors, we borrow it from our Children. ~ Ancient American Indian Proverb

  5. #85
    Banned
    Join Date
    Sep 2009
    Last Seen
    10-14-11 @ 10:09 PM
    Lean
    Undisclosed
    Posts
    1,164

    Re: The Implications of a Democratic Iraq on the Middle East

    Quote Originally Posted by reefedjib View Post
    Now hold on. Some estimates were 600,000 troops, which we did not have. Initial troop levels were fine for the first year and change. The problem was strategy, not troop levels. We weren't protecting the population. That it only took an additional 30,000 troops, at the height of the civil war, in the surge is proof that we went in with the right troop level.
    Should have secured the cities from day one. It would have required at least another division to do so, if not more. I'd say the troop strength for the Surge, plus a few more brigades would have been about right.

    Now about this issue of disbanding the army. It had to be done.
    100% disagree. Massive error. Maybe one of the biggest we made.

    The Iraqi Army was an institution of Sunni power.
    Not true. Ba'ath party wasn't even completely Sunni. The Iraqi Army had many Soldiers, to include leadership (yes, even generals) that were Shia and Kurds.

    It had to be disbanded to allow the Shiites to gain power that could be exercised freely. It predictably resulted in an insurgency. We weren't COIN at the time so it spiraled out of control.
    Could of saved ourselves a lot of heartache by keeping them intact and just removing some of the Ba'ath-loyal Sunnis in the leadership. Instead, we had to recruit an entirely new force after we pissed off the old one.

    It doesn't matter that we were adjusting our tactics. We had the wrong strategy until Keane, Odierno and Petraeus came along in 2006/2007. That's 4 years of the wrong strategy.
    Agreed. Don't forget Odierno was involved during the bad times. Glad to see he learned from his mistakes.

    EDIT: In addition to Tom Rick's books, I would also recommend Bing West's "The Strongest Tribe" and Ali Allawi's "the Occupation of Iraq".
    Last edited by kansaswhig; 04-01-10 at 02:03 PM.

  6. #86
    Banned
    Join Date
    Oct 2009
    Last Seen
    07-23-12 @ 03:52 PM
    Gender
    Lean
    Private
    Posts
    6,763
    Blog Entries
    2

    Re: The Implications of a Democratic Iraq on the Middle East

    Quote Originally Posted by kansaswhig View Post
    100% disagree. Massive error. Maybe one of the biggest we made.

    Not true. Ba'ath party wasn't even completely Sunni. The Iraqi Army had many Soldiers, to include leadership (yes, even generals) that were Shia and Kurds.

    Could of saved ourselves a lot of heartache by keeping them intact and just removing some of the Ba'ath-loyal Sunnis in the leadership. Instead, we had to recruit an entirely new force after we pissed off the old one.
    My speculation on this issue is not shared. I knew there were some Kurds and Shia officiers, but I am under the impression that it was majority Sunni, thus the institution of Sunni power for 1000 years.

    I suppose the real question is Is the current Iraqi Army more capable than the old one, both in terms of its ability to execute missions as well as its ability to stay out of politics?



    Agreed. Don't forget Odierno was involved during the bad times. Glad to see he learned from his mistakes.
    So was Petraeus.

    EDIT: In addition to Tom Rick's books, I would also recommend Bing West's "The Strongest Tribe" and Ali Allawi's "the Occupation of Iraq".
    Thanks!

  7. #87
    Banned
    Join Date
    Sep 2009
    Last Seen
    10-14-11 @ 10:09 PM
    Lean
    Undisclosed
    Posts
    1,164

    Re: The Implications of a Democratic Iraq on the Middle East

    Quote Originally Posted by reefedjib View Post
    My speculation on this issue is not shared. I knew there were some Kurds and Shia officiers, but I am under the impression that it was majority Sunni, thus the institution of Sunni power for 1000 years.
    Remember the Saddam era wasn't that long.

    To be honest, many of the leadership of the current Army are old Army guys; many of the jundees (lower enlisted) are new. I think what happened was that many of the more senior old army just integrated into the new when the recruiting started after disbandment. Many of the jundees of the disbanded army became insurgents; some radicalized, some not.

    I suppose the real question is Is the current Iraqi Army more capable than the old one, both in terms of its ability to execute missions as well as its ability to stay out of politics?
    We made the current army into a FID (foriegn internal defense) force; i.e., basic beat cops and counterinsurgents. The old Iraqi army was one that trained for external defense, like an army is supposed to. The new army hasn't been tested in a high-intensity conflict yet. They don't have the equipment to do so. It's hard to answer that question.


    So was Petraeus.
    True, but while in command of the 101st and as chief of Iraqi training, he was doing the "right" things during the "wrong" portion of the war, which is why I intentionally left him out. Odeirno's performance as 4ID commander during OIF I was severly flawed.

Page 9 of 9 FirstFirst ... 789

Posting Permissions

  • You may not post new threads
  • You may not post replies
  • You may not post attachments
  • You may not edit your posts
  •