View Poll Results: Does Iran have a "Right" to Nuclear Weapons?

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Thread: Does Iran have a "Right" to Nuclear Weapons?[W:296, 650]

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    Re: Does Iran have a "Right" to Nuclear Weapons?

    The findings of the Strategic Bombing Survey were politically motivated in order to insure greater grants to the USAF and the actual facts prove it to be as such:

    Some historians see ancient Japanese warrior traditions as a major factor in the resistance in the Japanese military to the idea of surrender. According to one Air Force account,

    "The Japanese code of bushido—'the way of the warrior'—was deeply ingrained. The concept of Yamato-damashii equipped each soldier with a strict code: never be captured, never break down, and never surrender. Surrender was dishonorable. Each soldier was trained to fight to the death and was expected to die before suffering dishonor. Defeated Japanese leaders preferred to take their own lives in the painful samurai ritual of seppuku (called hara kiri in the West). Warriors who surrendered were not deemed worthy of regard or respect."[23]

    Japanese militarism was aggravated by the Great Depression, and had resulted in countless assassinations of reformers attempting to check military power, among them Takahashi Korekiyo, Saitō Makoto, and Inukai Tsuyoshi. This created an environment in which opposition to war was a much riskier endeavor.[51]

    According to historian Richard B. Frank,

    "The intercepts of Japanese Imperial Army and Navy messages disclosed without exception that Japan's armed forces were determined to fight a final Armageddon battle in the homeland against an Allied invasion. The Japanese called this strategy Ketsu Go (Operation Decisive). It was founded on the premise that American morale was brittle and could be shattered by heavy losses in the initial invasion. American politicians would then gladly negotiate an end to the war far more generous than unconditional surrender."[52]

    The U.S. Department of Energy's history of the Manhattan Project lends some credence to these claims, saying that military leaders in Japan

    "also hoped that if they could hold out until the ground invasion of Japan began, they would be able to inflict so many casualties on the Allies that Japan still might win some sort of negotiated settlement."[53]

    While some members of the civilian leadership did use covert diplomatic channels to attempt peace negotiation, they could not negotiate surrender or even a cease-fire. Japan could legally enter into a peace agreement only with the unanimous support of the Japanese cabinet, and in the summer of 1945, the Japanese Supreme War Council, consisting of representatives of the Army, the Navy and the civilian government, could not reach a consensus on how to proceed.[51]

    A political stalemate developed between the military and civilian leaders of Japan, the military increasingly determined to fight despite all costs and odds and the civilian leadership seeking a way to negotiate an end to the war. Further complicating the decision was the fact no cabinet could exist without the representative of the Imperial Japanese Army. This meant the Army or Navy could veto any decision by having its Minister resign, thus making them the most powerful posts on the SWC. In early August 1945, the cabinet was equally split between those who advocated an end to the war on one condition, the preservation of the kokutai, and those who insisted on three other conditions:[54]

    Leave disarmament and demobilization to Imperial General Headquarters
    No occupation of the Japanese Home Islands, Korea, or Formosa
    Delegation to the Japanese government of the punishment of war criminals

    The "hawks" consisted of General Korechika Anami, General Yoshijirō Umezu, and Admiral Soemu Toyoda and were led by Anami. The "doves" consisted of Prime Minister Kantarō Suzuki, Naval Minister Mitsumasa Yonai, and Minister of Foreign Affairs Shigenori Tōgō and were led by Togo.[51] Under special permission of Hirohito, the president of the Privy council, Hiranuma Kiichirō, was also a member of the imperial conference. For him, the preservation of the kokutai implied not only the Imperial institution but also the Emperor's reign.[55]

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    Re: Does Iran have a "Right" to Nuclear Weapons?[W:296, 650]


    Japan had an example of unconditional surrender in the German Instrument of Surrender. On 26 July, Truman and other allied leaders - except the Soviet Union - issued The Potsdam Declaration outlining terms of surrender for Japan. The declaration stated, "The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction." It was not accepted, though there is debate on Japan's intentions.[56] The Emperor, who was waiting for a Soviet reply to Japanese peace feelers, made no move to change the government position.[57] In the PBS documentary "Victory in the Pacific" (2005), broadcast in the "American Experience" series, historian Donald Miller argues, in the days after the declaration, the Emperor seemed more concerned with moving the Imperial Regalia of Japan to a secure location than with "the destruction of his country." This comment is based on declarations made by the Emperor to Kōichi Kido on 25 and 31 July 1945, when he ordered the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal of Japan to protect "at all cost" the Imperial Regalia.[58]

    It has sometimes been argued Japan would have surrendered if simply guaranteed the Emperor would be allowed to continue as formal head of state. However, Japanese diplomatic messages regarding a possible Soviet mediation—intercepted through Magic, and made available to Allied leaders—have been interpreted by some historians to mean, "the dominant militarists insisted on preservation of the old militaristic order in Japan, the one in which they ruled."[52] On 18 and 20 July 1945, Ambassador Sato cabled to Foreign Minister Togo, strongly advocating that Japan accept an unconditional surrender provided that the U.S. preserved the imperial house (keeping the emperor). On 21 July, in response, Togo rejected the advice, saying that Japan would not accept an unconditional surrender under any circumstance. Togo then said that, "Although it is apparent that there will be more casualties on both sides in case the war is prolonged, we will stand as united against the enemy if the enemy forcibly demands our unconditional surrender."[59][60][61][62][63] They also faced potential death sentences in trials for Japanese war crimes if they surrendered.[64] This was also what occurred in the International Military Tribunal for the Far East and other tribunals.

    History professor Robert James Maddox wrote:

    Another myth that has attained wide attention is that at least several of Truman's top military advisers later informed him that using atomic bombs against Japan would be militarily unnecessary or immoral, or both. There is no persuasive evidence that any of them did so. None of the Joint Chiefs ever made such a claim, although one inventive author has tried to make it appear that Leahy did by braiding together several unrelated passages from the admiral's memoirs. Actually, two days after Hiroshima, Truman told aides that Leahy had 'said up to the last that it wouldn't go off.'
    Neither MacArthur nor Nimitz ever communicated to Truman any change of mind about the need for invasion or expressed reservations about using the bombs. When first informed about their imminent use only days before Hiroshima, MacArthur responded with a lecture on the future of atomic warfare and even after Hiroshima strongly recommended that the invasion go forward. Nimitz, from whose jurisdiction the atomic strikes would be launched, was notified in early 1945. 'This sounds fine,' he told the courier, 'but this is only February. Can't we get one sooner?'
    The best that can be said about Eisenhower's memory is that it had become flawed by the passage of time.
    Notes made by one of Stimson's aides indicate that there was a discussion of atomic bombs, but there is no mention of any protest on Eisenhower's part.[65]

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    Re: Does Iran have a "Right" to Nuclear Weapons?[W:296, 650]


    Maddox also wrote, "Even after both bombs had fallen and Russia entered the war, Japanese militants insisted on such lenient peace terms that moderates knew there was no sense even transmitting them to the United States. Hirohito had to intervene personally on two occasions during the next few days to induce hardliners to abandon their conditions."[65] "That they would have conceded defeat months earlier, before such calamities struck, is far-fetched to say the least."[66]

    Some argue that the fact that after the triple shock of the Soviet intervention and two atomic bombs, the Japanese cabinet was still deadlocked and incapable of deciding upon a course of action is telling both of the power of the Army and naval factions in the cabinet, and of their unwillingness to even consider surrender. Even following the personal intervention of the emperor to break the deadlock in favour of surrender, there were no less than three separate coup attempts by senior Japanese officers to try to prevent the surrender and take the Emperor into 'protective custody'. Once these coup attempts had failed, senior leaders of the air force and Navy ordered bombing and kamikaze raids on the U.S. fleet (in which some Japanese generals personally participated) to try to derail any possibility of peace. It is clear from these accounts that while many in the civilian government knew the war could not be won, the power of the military in the Japanese government kept surrender from even being considered as a real option prior to the two atomic bombs.[67]

    Another argument is that it was the Soviet declaration of war in the days between the bombings that caused the surrender. After the war, Admiral Soemu Toyoda said, "I believe the Russian participation in the war against Japan rather than the atom bombs did more to hasten the surrender."[68] Prime Minister Suzuki also declared that the entry of the USSR into the war made "the continuance of the war impossible."[69] Upon hearing news of the event from Foreign Minister Togo, Suzuki immediately said, "Let us end the war", and agreed to finally convene an emergency meeting of the Supreme Council with that aim. The official British history, The War Against Japan, also writes the Soviet declaration of war "brought home to all members of the Supreme Council the realization that the last hope of a negotiated peace had gone and there was no alternative but to accept the Allied terms sooner or later."

    The "one condition" faction, led by Togo, seized on the bombing as decisive justification of surrender. Kōichi Kido, one of Emperor Hirohito's closest advisers, stated, "We of the peace party were assisted by the atomic bomb in our endeavor to end the war." Hisatsune Sakomizu, the chief Cabinet secretary in 1945, called the bombing "a golden opportunity given by heaven for Japan to end the war."[70]
    “ Moreover, the enemy has begun to employ a new and most cruel bomb, the power of which to do damage is, indeed, incalculable, taking the toll of many innocent lives. Should We continue to fight, not only would it result in an ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese nation, but also it would lead to the total extinction of human civilization.

    Such being the case, how are We to save the millions of Our subjects, or to atone Ourselves before the hallowed spirits of Our Imperial Ancestors? This is the reason why We have ordered the acceptance of the provisions of the Joint Declaration of the Powers.

    Extract from Emperor Hirohito's "Gyokuon-hōsō" surrender speech, August 15, 1945


    Debate over the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

    The assertions based on the civilian leaderships wish to surrender are completely irrelevant as the militarists were in firm control and prepared, willing, and planning on carrying out the war to the bitter end.

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    Re: Does Iran have a "Right" to Nuclear Weapons?[W:296, 650]

    The assertion that the fall of Manchuria which by that time had already been completely cut off from the Japanese home islands, rather than the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki precipitated the surrender of Japan is laughable considering Operation Ketsu-Go:

    The intent of Ketsu-Go was to inflict tremendous casualties on the American forces, thereby undermining the American people's will to continue the fight for Japan's unconditional surrender. This intent is clear in a boastful comment made by an IGHQ army staff officer in July 1945:

    We will prepare 10,000 planes to meet the landing of the enemy. We will mobilize every aircraft possible, both training and "special attack" planes. We will smash one third of the enemy's war potential with this air force at sea. Another third will also be smashed at sea by our warships, human torpedoes and other special weapons. Furthermore, when the enemy actually lands, if we are ready to sacrifice a million men we will be able to inflict an equal number of casualties upon them. If the enemy loses a million men, then the public opinion in America will become inclined towards peace, and Japan will be able to gain peace with comparatively advantageous conditions.(11)

    It is evident by this statement that in the summer of 1945 Japanese strategists identified the will of the American people as the U.S. strategic center of gravity and a critical vulnerability as the infliction of high casualties.(12)


    OPERATION KETSU-GO

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    Re: Does Iran have a "Right" to Nuclear Weapons?[W:296, 650]

    Nobody's reading all that.
    Killing one person is murder, killing 100,000 is foreign policy

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    Re: Does Iran have a "Right" to Nuclear Weapons?[W:296, 650]

    Yes, because it is unfair that countries like US have hundreds of nuclear weapons that they can use to threaten anyone but Iran cannot. I think they should be allowed to have nuclear weapons as a means of self-defence, not out of an apocalyptic urge, under the same philosophy as the gun law.

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    Re: Does Iran have a "Right" to Nuclear Weapons?

    Quote Originally Posted by WCH View Post
    Considering they have strategic control over 4 middle east capitals at this point, them having the bomb would make it much easier to start an empire.

    Iran Declared "Iran Today Has Become An empire As It Was Throughout History And Its Capital Now Is Baghdad In Iraq" - Walid Shoebat
    And who was the moron that decided to remove their biggest enemy in the region and upset the balance between Shia and Sunni again?

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    Re: Does Iran have a "Right" to Nuclear Weapons?

    Quote Originally Posted by iguanaman View Post
    And who was the moron that decided to remove their biggest enemy in the region and upset the balance between Shia and Sunni again?
    Bush's Fault! Let it go man.

    The battle between Sunni and Shia is ages old.
    32 “Whoever acknowledges me before others, I will also acknowledge before my Father in heaven. 33 But whoever disowns me before others, I will disown before my Father in heaven.
    Matt. 10:32-33

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    Re: Does Iran have a "Right" to Nuclear Weapons?

    Quote Originally Posted by WCH View Post
    Bush's Fault! Let it go man.

    The battle between Sunni and Shia is ages old.
    True enough. And Hussein, Mubarak, Gaddafi, Assad and others contained it.
    Killing one person is murder, killing 100,000 is foreign policy

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    Re: Does Iran have a "Right" to Nuclear Weapons?

    Quote Originally Posted by WCH View Post
    Bush's Fault! Let it go man.

    The battle between Sunni and Shia is ages old.
    But Bush decided we should get in the middle of it in 2002 and sent 1000's of Americans to their deaths. You need to embrace the horror.

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