From this view of the subject it may be concluded that a pure (1) democracy, by which I mean a society consisting of a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the government in person
, can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction. A common passion or interest will, in almost every case, be felt by a majority of the whole; a communication and concert result from the form of government itself; and there is nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party or an obnoxious individual. Hence it is that such democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security or the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths. (2)Theoretic politicians, who have patronized this species of government, have erroneously supposed that by reducing mankind to a perfect equality in their political rights, they would, at the same time, be perfectly equalized and assimilated in their possessions, their opinions, and their passions.
(3A) A republic, by which I mean a government in which the scheme of representation takes place
, opens a different prospect, and promises the cure for which we are seeking. Let us examine the points in which it varies from pure democracy, and we shall comprehend both the nature of the cure and the efficacy which it must derive from the Union.
The two great points of difference between a democracy and a (3B) republic are: first, the delegation of the government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the rest
; secondly, the greater number of citizens, and greater sphere of country, over which the latter may be extended.
The effect of (3C) the first difference is, on the one hand, to refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens
, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations. Under such a regulation, it may well happen that the public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the public good than if pronounced by the people themselves, convened for the purpose.