Re: Do you support non-discrimination laws that protect our rights?
I already presented you with verifiable evidence of what a REPUBLIC is and what a DEMOCRACY is. It is clear from that evidence that the USA is a republic.
You - on the other hand - have presented nothing in the way of verifiable evidence to support your own rather peculiar definitions of both terms?
Why is that?
Analysis: federalist 62...titled the "Senate"
There can be little doubt that the designers of the Constitution saw good public policy and stability in the laws as paramount concerns. In Federalist 62, for example, Madison defended the Senate in the proposed bicameral Congress on the grounds, in part,
that the Senate could block passage of undesirable polices which a unicameral legislature might approve: "Another advantage accruing from this ingredient in the constitution of the
Senate is the additional impediment it must prove against improper acts of legislation. No law or resolution can now be passed without the concurrence, first, of a majority of the people, and then of a majority of the States."
Similarly, "a Senate, as a second branch of the legislative assembly distinct from and dividing the power with the first [house], must be in all cases a salutary check on the government. It doubles the security to the people by requiring the concurrence of two distinct bodies in schemes of usurpation or perfidy, where the ambition or corruption of one would otherwise be sufficient."
One reason that House members could not always be trusted stemmed from their short terms of office. To Madison, this meant that these legislators would be unable to develop the necessary wisdom about public policy. As he remarked about the virtues of a Senate whose members have longer terms, "Another defect to be supplied by a senate lies in a want of due acquaintance with the objects and principles of legislation. It is not possible that an assembly of men called for the most part from pursuits of a private nature continued in appointment for a short time and led by no permanent motive to devote the internals of public occupation to a study of the laws, the affairs, and the comprehensive interests of their country, should, if left wholly to themselves, escape a variety of important errors in the exercise of their legislative trust." It was thought that a Senate with a slow turnover and whose members had long terms of office would be able to avoid the unwise polices that a unicameral legislature might be expected to produce.
A bicameral legislature could also be expected to help prevent instability in the laws. There was no doubt in Madison's mind that instability in the laws had great costs: "To trace the mischievous effects of a mutable government would fill a volume." These effects were both external and internal. Externally, instability causes the nation to forfeit "the respect and confidence of other nations." Internally, the consequences of instability were even worse * "it poisons the blessings of liberty itself." Commerce could also expect to suffer from an unstable government.
In 1785, the Marquis de Condorcet published his Essai, in which he explicitly noted and discussed the particular problem of majority rule instability. While The Federalists do not specifically discuss the problems of majority rule instability, one scholar notes that Madison had read Condorcet's essay and is known to have written a review of it, a review which is now, unfortunately, lost. Although not explicitly, therefore, Madison and the Federalist papers do internally deal with instability, especially within Federalist 62 and the instability of the legislature branch.
that the Senate could
block passage of undesirable polices which a unicameral legislature might approve........................ [unicameral legislature] ---one single chamber
Senate is the
additional impediment it must prove against
improper acts of legislation...................................................[improper acts of legislation ]---collective action of the people
Similarly, "a Senate, as a second branch of the legislative assembly distinct from and
dividing the power with the first [House], must be in all cases a salutary
check on the government...............[divided power].........republican form of government
It
doubles the security to the people by requiring the concurrence of
two distinct bodies in schemes of usurpation or perfidy, where the ambition or corruption
of one would otherwise be sufficient."..............[two distinct bodies] ....where ambition and corruption of one sufficient [easier]