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Assassination Drones are OK or morally questionable?

Are spy/assassinatin drones morally acceptable?


  • Total voters
    75
  • Poll closed .
You originally contested the following statement I made:
"If the government suspects a citizen is a terrorist then they must be brought through the justice system."

My point was that a citizen can be apprehended by CIA or military and brought back to the US for prosecution. Never brought up FBI or local police forces.

The CIA or military don't even have to apprehend suspects for prosecution.

They could just try them in absentia.

But the federal government doesn't even want to do that!
 
That article was written two years ago. It was written to serve as a warning against the widespread use of drones in Yemen.

In the intervening two years, we have established a drone program in Yemen, and that warning has been shown to be unfounded. Which is exactly what I've stated and what my FA piece explains: we have not witnessed the sort of public outrage and blowback that we witnessed in Pakistan.

There are also some glaring errors in your article, namely the author's leap of faith from correlation to causation (a leap of faith, which, oddly the author points out she shouldn't be making, but goes ahead and makes it anyway) that suicide attacks increased from 2004-2009 that serves as the primary evidence for her blowback theory. :doh



In the case of Yemen, very little. For a variety of reasons.



History is absolutely critical for informing policy decisions. A more nuanced, comprehensive understanding of history, not one based on broad inaccurate generalizations.

Two years ago is hardly ancient. Nor do I believe it has been shown to be unfounded. And while leaps are common on both sides (too common sadly), you can't really claim a program is successful where there is an increase in what you're seeking to lessen.

History shows in both the general and the specific that in tis art of he world violence and use of force has not led to less violence or a decrease in terrorism.

Btw, not sure why you focus on Yemen. Do you believe it's the example that shows the whole? That it s not different elsewhere?
 
There is no evidence I know of that lives are saved this way. In fact, evidence of when the British changed tactics is that less violence and more discrete efforts were more effective and not less. While there is some Chet puffing for high body counts, mother evidence doesn't support that this us a better solution overall.

Exactly where, and when, were the British changing tactics to more discrete efforts in your example?
 
Exactly where, and when, were the British changing tactics to more discrete efforts in your example?

I linked long ago, but in dealing with the Irish problem.
 
There is no evidence I know of that lives are saved this way. In fact, evidence of when the British changed tactics is that less violence and more discrete efforts were more effective and not less. While there is some Chet puffing for high body counts, mother evidence doesn't support that this us a better solution overall.

No evidence? You know that isn't true. Drone strikes save fantastic amounts of lives when compared to air strikes, missile strikes, raids, and conventional military activity. We can pull the data on this but you cannot possibly believe it.
 
I linked long ago, but in dealing with the Irish problem.

In other words, a completely different tactical situation than the one faced in the Pakistan border areas. This is about as useful as saying a Bull and a Car both have a horn, so they are the same thing.
 
Pardon me, I was quoting the state from memory. I can't remember where I originally read it, so here is a figure from a study conducted by Stanford and NYU.


From your link:

...available data indicate that drone strikes killed 2,562-3,325 people in Pakistan, of whom 474-881 were civilians, including 176 children...

Now, admittedly, I took math for the non-math major, but that seems to indicate that between 73.51 and 82.5% of the deaths were combatants. Nice tag with the "high level", though, given that most drone missions are not against top tier targets.

And this isn't even going in to their deeply flawed methodology - the same that haunted the since-disproven Lancet Survey in Iraq. As a hint to the authors, "Go ask a bunch of Pakistanis if they think drones kill too many people, and then take what they tell you at face value" sucks as a collection method.

Not that the authors likely care. I like how you identify them as "Stanford and NYU". Because they identify themselves as "Stanford International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic (IHRCRC)" and "Global Justice Clinic (GJC) at NYU School of Law".

:roll:
 
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No evidence? You know that isn't true. Drone strikes save fantastic amounts of lives when compared to air strikes, missile strikes, raids, and conventional military activity. We can pull the data on this but you cannot possibly believe it.

Everyone actually involved with these ops realizes this. Which is why the Obama administration has expanded their use.
 
No evidence? You know that isn't true. Drone strikes save fantastic amounts of lives when compared to air strikes, missile strikes, raids, and conventional military activity. We can pull the data on this but you cannot possibly believe it.

I don't think that is what is being debated.
 
In other words, a completely different tactical situation than the one faced in the Pakistan border areas. This is about as useful as saying a Bull and a Car both have a horn, so they are the same thing.

Different in some ways, not in others. And no, the same tactic use there would be more effective than what we're doing.
 
Different in some ways, not in others. And no, the same tactic use there would be more effective than what we're doing.

Perhaps we'll have to agree to disagree. Negotiations DO work with rational people who truly seek peace. In such an instance your solution is better. It fails utterly against irrational people who's primary goal is power over a people or region, though these same people may claim they only want negotiations, a smoke screen that amazingly still works like a charm. I think we are dealing with the latter example.
 
I believe there are times where a drone can be an asset (on the battlefield), I do not think they should be allowed to target civilians.
 
Perhaps we'll have to agree to disagree. Negotiations DO work with rational people who truly seek peace. In such an instance your solution is better. It fails utterly against irrational people who's primary goal is power over a people or region, though these same people may claim they only want negotiations, a smoke screen that amazingly still works like a charm. I think we are dealing with the latter example.
Who sad anything about negotiation? I think you may want to examine that sue closer.
 
I think whatever works and saves American lives...
 
Situation, history, tactic, all of it. No one said a thing about negotiating with terrorists.

Okay, instead of making me guess what you're thinking about, how about you just say what your preferred alternative is?
 
Okay, instead of making me guess what you're thinking about, how about you just say what your preferred alternative is?

I did. You acted like you knew. The British worked quietly behind the scenes. Made alliances with people who wanted to end the conflict without being linked to the British. These people fed information and allowed quiet arrests and other actions. Taking it out of he public view allowed them to stop losing the PR war, making heros and martyrs of the enemy. They stopped elevating the status of an enemy who could never really win. In return for the help, the British quietly gave reasonable and proper concessions, carrot and stick (quietly) working to mostly end the problem.
 
I did. You acted like you knew. The British worked quietly behind the scenes. Made alliances with people who wanted to end the conflict without being linked to the British. These people fed information and allowed quiet arrests and other actions. Taking it out of he public view allowed them to stop losing the PR war, making heros and martyrs of the enemy. They stopped elevating the status of an enemy who could never really win. In return for the help, the British quietly gave reasonable and proper concessions, carrot and stick (quietly) working to mostly end the problem.

1. We have been doing much of what you advocate. Our efforts to make alliances and inroads with various elements of the Afghan Taliban and its associated militias has been a cornerstone of our strategy in that country for almost half a decade now. However we are limited in our ability to peel groups away because our ability to offer protection is limited. A maxim of counter-insurgency is that combatants rarely choose to flip allegiances or break neutrality just because of conviction, they must be assured that they are making a stronger bet. The strength of the Taliban is such that this has proven extremely vexing and our success in Iraq which was abetted by the Surge has not been replicated, far more troops were required and they never materialized. The result is that the best strategy we have is to reduce the combat power of the Taliban as much as possible so that the ANA and ANP can continue to solidify and gain the power needed to peel away components of the Taliban and force a settlement. The best mechanism for doing this short of keeping troops in the field is targeted strikes to kill fighters and to reduce the leadership cadres.

2. Launching 'quiet' arrests is not possible. These are heavily armed encampments and locales where the writ of Afghan law or American power does not run either because they are outside our capabilities to police and protect or because they are... not in Afghanistan. For those in Pakistan again arrest is impossible for a variety of reasons that should be obvious, but they include fantastically armed enclaves and an unwilling Pakistani government that has bled itself heavily in the AfPak mountains and foothills.

3. The British in Pakistan/Afghanistan/Punjab had extremely narrow aims. Their goal was the protection of British India and the prevention of Russian influence penetrating Afghanistan. As a result their main effort was in policing the frontier, not in suppressing an insurgency. Thus the possibility of engaging in tribal bartering and sleight of hand policies allowed a much smaller troop contingent to accomplish a great deal. It is highly analogous to the example of the British and the United States in their dealings with the American Indians along the frontier. One is much easier than the other. More to the point this is not comparable to our experience in Afghanistan.
 
1. We have been doing much of what you advocate. Our efforts to make alliances and inroads with various elements of the Afghan Taliban and its associated militias has been a cornerstone of our strategy in that country for almost half a decade now. However we are limited in our ability to peel groups away because our ability to offer protection is limited. A maxim of counter-insurgency is that combatants rarely choose to flip allegiances or break neutrality just because of conviction, they must be assured that they are making a stronger bet. The strength of the Taliban is such that this has proven extremely vexing and our success in Iraq which was abetted by the Surge has not been replicated, far more troops were required and they never materialized. The result is that the best strategy we have is to reduce the combat power of the Taliban as much as possible so that the ANA and ANP can continue to solidify and gain the power needed to peel away components of the Taliban and force a settlement. The best mechanism for doing this short of keeping troops in the field is targeted strikes to kill fighters and to reduce the leadership cadres.

2. Launching 'quiet' arrests is not possible. These are heavily armed encampments and locales where the writ of Afghan law or American power does not run either because they are outside our capabilities to police and protect or because they are... not in Afghanistan. For those in Pakistan again arrest is impossible for a variety of reasons that should be obvious, but they include fantastically armed enclaves and an unwilling Pakistani government that has bled itself heavily in the AfPak mountains and foothills.

3. The British in Pakistan/Afghanistan/Punjab had extremely narrow aims. Their goal was the protection of British India and the prevention of Russian influence penetrating Afghanistan. As a result their main effort was in policing the frontier, not in suppressing an insurgency. Thus the possibility of engaging in tribal bartering and sleight of hand policies allowed a much smaller troop contingent to accomplish a great deal. It is highly analogous to the example of the British and the United States in their dealings with the American Indians along the frontier. One is much easier than the other. More to the point this is not comparable to our experience in Afghanistan.

Your third point has nothing to do with what I'm talking about, but I believe we could be much quieter than we've been. Much quieter. We did not have to invade two countries and bomb civilian areas.
 
Your third point has nothing to do with what I'm talking about, but I believe we could be much quieter than we've been. Much quieter. We did not have to invade two countries and bomb civilian areas.

Then why did you cite the British? I'm not sure what else you could be referring to other than their efforts in the region? Moreover just saying 'we could be quieter' does not make a persuasive argument. We are incapable of accomplishing our stated objectives with police powers and cash, it is also not clear that we could accomplish more circumscribed goals with such tactics.
 
Then why did you cite the British? I'm not sure what else you could be referring to other than their efforts in the region? Moreover just saying 'we could be quieter' does not make a persuasive argument. We are incapable of accomplishing our stated objectives with police powers and cash, it is also not clear that we could accomplish more circumscribed goals with such tactics.

I cited earlier, with the person I was talking to, exactly what I was speaking to.

Yes, we could have been quieter, and I said how:

1. Don't invade countries.

2. Don't declare war on small groups.

3. Don't bomb from a distance and make noise by killing civilians.

What isn't clear here?

And we have not accomplished our stated goals with force. Instead, we're bogged down in nation building and likely creating more problems than we've solved.
 
I cited earlier, with the person I was talking to, exactly what I was speaking to.

Yes, we could have been quieter, and I said how:

1. Don't invade countries.

2. Don't declare war on small groups.

3. Don't bomb from a distance and make noise by killing civilians.

What isn't clear here?

And we have not accomplished our stated goals with force. Instead, we're bogged down in nation building and likely creating more problems than we've solved.

So by quieter you mean to not react. We cannot militarily strike at terrorist groups, arresting them is impossible considering their state and parastate support and significant armed size, we cannot invade or intervene in areas that host enemies of the United States, and we also cannot become involved or declare any sort of fighting with armed groups below a national level.

The Do Nothing Doctrine is seductive because it's the doctrine of indolence. "Just use police!"
 
So by quieter you mean to not react. We cannot militarily strike at terrorist groups, arresting them is impossible considering their state and parastate support and significant armed size, we cannot invade or intervene in areas that host enemies of the United States, and we also cannot become involved or declare any sort of fighting with armed groups below a national level.

The Do Nothing Doctrine is seductive because it's the doctrine of indolence. "Just use police!"

No, that's the mindless sound bite answer. I mean, do as I stated. And no, arresting and getting them is not impossible, and was even more possible back then when we had a major opportunity to gather support. As an American, you should know the value of making a better argument. There are those who can be reached, who would help, and we could actually get the people responsible and really shrink their ranks, and not add more than we take.
 
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