justabubba,
et al,
I started out in the business with a tour in Vietnam. Over the last decade, I've spent seven years in the Middle East/Persian Gulf, including Iraq, Afghanistan and Yemen. If there is one constant that I have observed, it is that the policy makers and those in senior leadership positions rarely (almost never) admit to a bad decision.
and replaced it with what, exactly?
If you sit and smoke a cigar with them, you will take notice that the staff of these senior leaders are very loyal to their boss and the direction they take in the administration of forces and policy. Whether is be General Sanchez, Casey, Petraeus, Odenero or Austin, I noticed that each staff saw the situation as evolving and completely different from the decision sets expected from the previous CJTF-7/MNF-I/USF-I commander. Every single decision that was made, somehow, was justified, rational, and valid under the circumstances and context for which they were made.
It boils down to, we did what we did, because that was the best course of action available at the time. And you will never be able to convince them otherwise.
(COMMENT)
To the question: What kind of Government did we leave behind? Does it differ from the Government of Saddam Hussein?
The answer comes with mixed reviews. In the first 72 hours, of rule without US Military in place, we see this:
There are some similarities, to be sure. BUT, it it what the US originally envisioned? The US over time and with each successive setback, adjusts it vision to meet the reality. The US never really claims it failed, but that some unforeseen force changed the dynamics. But it you were to set the metric for the performance of the overall strategy and plan that we set in the beginning, then you are able to judge how close today's reality is with the vision originally set.
Washington, DC, September 1, 2006 - The National Security Archive is today posting State Department documents from 2002 tracing the inception of the "Future of Iraq Project," alongside the final, mammoth 13-volume study, previously obtained under the Freedom of Information Act. "The Future of Iraq Project" was one of the most comprehensive U.S. government planning efforts for raising that country out of the ashes of combat and establishing a functioning democracy. The new materials complement previous postings on the Archive's site relating to the United States' complex relationship with Iraq during the years leading up to the 2003 invasion.
Source: New State Department Releases on the "Future of Iraq" Project
It is my view that the US, despite its best efforts, did not have the genius that was necessary to make the vision come true. As a nation, the US no longer has the necessary knowledge, skills and abilities to meet challenges like this; then, now or in the immediate future. Anyone that look at the planning documents can tell that today's Iraq is nothing like the vision our government had in 2002/2003. All good intentions aside, what we may had done is set the time table back to the point when Saddam forced President Bakr to step down under threat of being removed by force, and immediately had several top members of the Ba'ath party arrested and later executed under claim of espionage. In this case - the variant is, al-Maliki has top GOI members arrested on charges of terrorism. We don't know for sure, but it is NOT looking so good so far.
Most Respectfully,
R
