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The Evil Demon, Deus Deceptor

shagg

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Evil demon

The evil demon, also known as evil genius, and occasionally as malicious demon or genius malignus, is a concept in Cartesian philosophy. In his 1641 Meditations on First Philosophy, René Descartes hypothesized the existence of an evil demon, a personification who is "as clever and deceitful as he is powerful, who has directed his entire effort to misleading me." The evil demon presents a complete illusion of an external world, including other minds, to Descartes' senses, where there is no such external world in existence. The evil genius also presents to Descartes' senses a complete illusion of his own body, including all bodily sensations, when Descartes has no body. Some Cartesian scholars opine that the demon is also omnipotent, and thus capable of altering mathematics and the fundamentals of logic, though omnipotence of the evil demon would be contrary to Descartes' hypothesis, as he rebuked accusations of the evil demon having omnipotence.[1][2]

It is one of several methods of systematic doubt that Descartes employs in the Meditations.[1]


Deus deceptor
Further information: Theodicy and Dystheism

Another such method of systematic doubt is the deus deceptor (French dieu trompeur), the "deceptive god". Cartesian scholars differ in their opinions as to whether the deus deceptor and the evil demon are one and the same. Among the accusations of blasphemy made against Descartes by Protestants was that he was positing an omnipotent malevolent God.

In the process of exploring Cartesian Doubt, which brought us "I think therefore I am", Descartes stumbles upon this concept. Later versions included "The Brain in the Vat" and the basic plot of The Matrix. The long and the short of it, what if technology or a powerful being were bent on deceiving us at the most fundamental level of human perception.

While I'm not suggesting taking this so seriously that we should disregard human perception completely, this idea serves a very important purpose in philosophical discussion.

It absolutely decimates all arguments for the existence of God by necessity.

Thoughts?
 
In the process of exploring Cartesian Doubt, which brought us "I think therefore I am", Descartes stumbles upon this concept. Later versions included "The Brain in the Vat" and the basic plot of The Matrix. The long and the short of it, what if technology or a powerful being were bent on deceiving us at the most fundamental level of human perception.

While I'm not suggesting taking this so seriously that we should disregard human perception completely, this idea serves a very important purpose in philosophical discussion.

It absolutely decimates all arguments for the existence of God by necessity.

Thoughts?
It's interesting but I don't see how it decimates all arguments for the existence of God. It's hypothetical, there is no proof. Therefore same old problem as with all such arguments.
 
It's interesting but I don't see how it decimates all arguments for the existence of God. It's hypothetical, there is no proof. Therefore same old problem as with all such arguments.

Just arguments from necessity. Notably Aquinas, but any argument that deduces god must exist because of things observed in empirical reality. Its a consequence of shifting the definition of god from the traditional omnipotent/omniscient/omnibenevolent to something simply defined as "whatever designed people" or "the uncaused cause". I have yet to see an argument for gods existence by necessity that doesn't use this method.
 
In the process of exploring Cartesian Doubt, which brought us "I think therefore I am", Descartes stumbles upon this concept. Later versions included "The Brain in the Vat" and the basic plot of The Matrix. The long and the short of it, what if technology or a powerful being were bent on deceiving us at the most fundamental level of human perception.

While I'm not suggesting taking this so seriously that we should disregard human perception completely, this idea serves a very important purpose in philosophical discussion.

It absolutely decimates all arguments for the existence of God by necessity.

Thoughts?

It basically has the same problem as the arguments for the existence of God by necessity.. it relies not testable and not provable assumptions.
 
It basically has the same problem as the arguments for the existence of God by necessity.. it relies not testable and not provable assumptions.

What assumptions?

No one is trying to prove the Evil Demon exists, only that its equally as likely as a benevolent god. It explains just as much of the unknown or unknowable and doesn't contradict any known facts relevant to the discussion. It introduces an element of doubt that can not be addressed due to its very nature. Proving god exists by necessity is just that, proving he exists. When attempting to use arguments from necessity, all it takes is one equally plausible explanation to undermine the argument.

Because of this, attempting to prove god exists by necessity is futile and impossible.
 
shagg said:
In the process of exploring Cartesian Doubt, which brought us "I think therefore I am", Descartes stumbles upon this concept. Later versions included "The Brain in the Vat" and the basic plot of The Matrix. The long and the short of it, what if technology or a powerful being were bent on deceiving us at the most fundamental level of human perception.

Evil Genius (EG) doubt goes well beyond doubting propositions based on human perception. Descartes, by invoking the EG, wants to doubt mathematical propositions, historical propositions, geometric proofs, etc. Of course, he does also want to doubt propositions based on his sense data. There are a number of controversies about just how Cartesian doubt is supposed to work. He obviously cannot doubt what he calls "basic notions" in the Principles, since he uses them to escape EG doubt. But generally speaking, he tries to doubt as much as may be possible.

shagg said:
While I'm not suggesting taking this so seriously that we should disregard human perception completely, this idea serves a very important purpose in philosophical discussion.

It absolutely decimates all arguments for the existence of God by necessity.

Thoughts?

I guess my thought is I have no idea how this is supposed to work. You mention Aquinas later in the thread--do you mean, by "arguments for the existence of God by necessity," Aquinas' argument from contingency? Unless the scope of EG doubt is such as to call into question the modes of necessity and contingency, or the axioms of logic, there is no obvious threat from EG doubt to Aquinas' third argument. Of course, if EG doubt has that kind of scope, then no argument survives. It seems unlikely that's what Descartes could have intended--keep in mind he was writing at a time when the notion that mathematics and logic might rest on the same principles hadn't yet been floated.

So I'm a little curious to understand what you mean. It strikes me you might mean something like this: EG doubt calls into question the existence of the physical universe, and so therefore, cosmological arguments which reason from properties of the universe or things in the universe to God are called into question. It's not clear to me that this is correct. Will you be good enough to explain a little more clearly what you mean?
 
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It absolutely decimates all arguments for the existence of God by necessity.
How? It certainly didn't wreck Descartes' belief in a Christian God.

Nothing about it refutes a theist model of existence. If you only know the illusion, you have no idea if a deity exists in the "real" world (outside the illusion). And of course, the illusion itself could be supernatural in origin.
 
Just arguments from necessity. Notably Aquinas, but any argument that deduces god must exist because of things observed in empirical reality.
Erm... I have yet to see any such argument. The Argument From Necessity is a logical one, not an empirical one. It's not affected by an unfalsifiable claim such as "You are in The Matrix."
 
Just arguments from necessity. Notably Aquinas, but any argument that deduces god must exist because of things observed in empirical reality. Its a consequence of shifting the definition of god from the traditional omnipotent/omniscient/omnibenevolent to something simply defined as "whatever designed people" or "the uncaused cause". I have yet to see an argument for gods existence by necessity that doesn't use this method.
Well I don't know about that, Aquinas and stuff. I'd never agree that we could define god, perhaps on any level. Anyone who thinks they can do that...
:tocktock2
 
In the process of exploring Cartesian Doubt, which brought us "I think therefore I am", Descartes stumbles upon this concept. Later versions included "The Brain in the Vat" and the basic plot of The Matrix. The long and the short of it, what if technology or a powerful being were bent on deceiving us at the most fundamental level of human perception.

While I'm not suggesting taking this so seriously that we should disregard human perception completely, this idea serves a very important purpose in philosophical discussion.

It absolutely decimates all arguments for the existence of God by necessity.

Thoughts?




Doubting all the evidence of one's senses over the course of a lifetime on the basis that is MIGHT be some sort of sophisticated illusion, seems to border on insanity. Paranoid delusions in particular.

It certainly proves nothing, as it is mere speculative hypothesizing without evidence.
 
Doubting all the evidence of one's senses over the course of a lifetime on the basis that is MIGHT be some sort of sophisticated illusion, seems to border on insanity. Paranoid delusions in particular.

It certainly proves nothing, as it is mere speculative hypothesizing without evidence.

Living your life that way would be very impractical and untenable. But it wouldn't mean it wasn't true. :)

I think the more modern version of this is the simulated universe argument. It states that if it is, or ever will be, theoretically possible to create sentient artificial life forms inside computer simulations then it would stand to reason that a society that could create such simulations would create many of them. Perhaps millions of people would be running numerous simulated universes on their systems for varying reasons. A simulated individual living inside such a simulated universe, with nothing to compare it to, would have no way of knowing it was living in a simulated universe unless the programmer wished to reveal that information.

And if it ever does become theoretically possible for that to happen then you are left asking yourself: what are the odds that I am in the one real universe rather than the millions of potential simulated universes. And even if it isn't theoretically possible, perhaps that is just limitation on your particular simulated universe to save on processing power. :)

Of course, that still wouldn't necessarily rule out a God, though I can understand how it would complicate ever PROVING a God's existence through experiential phenomena.

Oh, and even if our universe IS simulated or dreamed up in a demon's mind, it is still real to us. And for all practical purposes that is all that matters.
 
Evil Genius (EG) doubt goes well beyond doubting propositions based on human perception. Descartes, by invoking the EG, wants to doubt mathematical propositions, historical propositions, geometric proofs, etc. Of course, he does also want to doubt propositions based on his sense data. There are a number of controversies about just how Cartesian doubt is supposed to work. He obviously cannot doubt what he calls "basic notions" in the Principles, since he uses them to escape EG doubt. But generally speaking, he tries to doubt as much as may be possible.



I guess my thought is I have no idea how this is supposed to work. You mention Aquinas later in the thread--do you mean, by "arguments for the existence of God by necessity," Aquinas' argument from contingency? Unless the scope of EG doubt is such as to call into question the modes of necessity and contingency, or the axioms of logic, there is no obvious threat from EG doubt to Aquinas' third argument. Of course, if EG doubt has that kind of scope, then no argument survives. It seems unlikely that's what Descartes could have intended--keep in mind he was writing at a time when the notion that mathematics and logic might rest on the same principles hadn't yet been floated.

So I'm a little curious to understand what you mean. It strikes me you might mean something like this: EG doubt calls into question the existence of the physical universe, and so therefore, cosmological arguments which reason from properties of the universe or things in the universe to God are called into question. It's not clear to me that this is correct. Will you be good enough to explain a little more clearly what you mean?

Without going into a detailed review of Cartesian Doubt, "I think therefore I am" really means that when one calls human perception into doubt the only thing which is undoubtedly true is that I exist and that I am a thinking being. Basic Notions was a cop out and holds no logical value is it relies on a subjective feeling to discern the true from the untrue.

As for how this is supposed to work. Take any of Aquinas' 5 ways. Your definition of god changes depending on which argument you're entertaining. God is defined as: 1)The Unmoved Mover, 2) The Uncaused Cause, 3) The Pinnacle of Perfection, 4) The Designer of all Things, 5) The Being Whose Existence is not Contingent on any other Beings Existence. All of these ways attempt to prove the necessary existence of something, and then redefines god to be that something. The watch must have a designer, so the designer must exist. I do not challenge that notion with the concept of the EG, instead I challenge premise that follows. that God must be that designer. There is nothing inconsistent with any of these definitions and the EG. Thus the premise that God must be the (insert new definition here) fails in the face of another, equally explanatory, plausible, and consistent theory.
 
Doubting all the evidence of one's senses over the course of a lifetime on the basis that is MIGHT be some sort of sophisticated illusion, seems to border on insanity. Paranoid delusions in particular.

It certainly proves nothing, as it is mere speculative hypothesizing without evidence.

Its not really a philosophy in how to live life, its more of an exercise in thought. To be fair though, this is a subject almost completely devoid of evidence, and for some has become a game of taking their speculative hypotheses and attempting to make them look logical.
 
In the process of exploring Cartesian Doubt, which brought us "I think therefore I am", Descartes stumbles upon this concept. Later versions included "The Brain in the Vat" and the basic plot of The Matrix. The long and the short of it, what if technology or a powerful being were bent on deceiving us at the most fundamental level of human perception.

While I'm not suggesting taking this so seriously that we should disregard human perception completely, this idea serves a very important purpose in philosophical discussion.

It absolutely decimates all arguments for the existence of God by necessity.

Thoughts?

I think, therefore I favour science over philosophy. If all the philosophy departments in every universtity in the world had been shut down 150 years ago nothing would be any different. Perhaps this process could be started now? The guys and gals staffing them could muse on 'arguments for the existence of God by necessity' while doing something useful like flipping burgers.
 
As for how this is supposed to work. Take any of Aquinas' 5 ways.... The premise that God must be the (insert new definition here) fails in the face of another, equally explanatory, plausible, and consistent theory.
Aside from the various weaknesses of the arguments: None of Aquinas' logical / cosmological arguments prove that a specific deity exists in the first place.

E.g. the "Unmoved Mover" could be Allah; the "Uncaused Cause" could be Brahama; the "Pinnacle of Perfection" could be Gotama Buddha; the Designer of All Things could be the Formless God of the Sikhs; the necessary external entity could be Marduk.

Along similar lines, let's say that your skepticism is so radical that you reject the very existence of causality, perfection, motion, necessity and contingency. All you are now saying is that you have no information about anything except your own existence. This means you cannot prove or disprove the existence of any deity.

Such radical doubt would also devastate any materialist claims, since you cannot prove or disprove the existence of any deity, or anything other than the most protean self.

So no, the Cartesian Demon doesn't pose any particular challenge to theism.
 
Aside from the various weaknesses of the arguments: None of Aquinas' logical / cosmological arguments prove that a specific deity exists in the first place.

E.g. the "Unmoved Mover" could be Allah; the "Uncaused Cause" could be Brahama; the "Pinnacle of Perfection" could be Gotama Buddha; the Designer of All Things could be the Formless God of the Sikhs; the necessary external entity could be Marduk.

Along similar lines, let's say that your skepticism is so radical that you reject the very existence of causality, perfection, motion, necessity and contingency. All you are now saying is that you have no information about anything except your own existence. This means you cannot prove or disprove the existence of any deity.

Such radical doubt would also devastate any materialist claims, since you cannot prove or disprove the existence of any deity, or anything other than the most protean self.

So no, the Cartesian Demon doesn't pose any particular challenge to theism.

The challenge is to arguments from necessity, not all theological arguments. And I agree nothing is really proven or disproven, except that nothing this abstract can ever be proven with an argument from necessity. Sure you could argue for Brahma or Allah, but those are deities with their own religion and theology. The EG leaves so much wiggle room for a skeptic to play with that no argument from necessity can maintain the imperative that a benevolent God of any kind must exist.
I don't advocate categorically denying all such arguments any attention at all. But when you see one there will always be a shift in definition that leads a vague enough vision of god that it is undeniably consistent with the EG as well.
 
I think, therefore I favour science over philosophy. If all the philosophy departments in every universtity in the world had been shut down 150 years ago nothing would be any different. Perhaps this process could be started now? The guys and gals staffing them could muse on 'arguments for the existence of God by necessity' while doing something useful like flipping burgers.

Ethics does have real world aplications. But did you really drop into the philosophy forums to tell us all you think philosophy is useless bull****?
 
shagg said:
Without going into a detailed review of Cartesian Doubt, "I think therefore I am" really means that when one calls human perception into doubt the only thing which is undoubtedly true is that I exist and that I am a thinking being.

No, that's not quite correct. Descartes called perception into doubt with the dream argument, and found that was not sufficient, since lots of propositions remained true. Blue is still blue, for example, even if no instances of blue in sense experience can be relied upon to indicate the existence of something blue outside the mind of the perceiver. Similarly, the square root of 16 is still 4, whether or not perception is reliable.

shagg said:
Basic Notions was a cop out and holds no logical value is it relies on a subjective feeling to discern the true from the untrue.

You seem to be confusing basic notions with clear and distinct ideas. As examples of basic notions, Descartes gives: knowing what doubt is and knowing what thinking is. IIRC, he took a basic notion to be such that any single such notion makes no metaphysical claims and is insufficient to support a metaphysical claim. His answer to EG doubt is to combine a few such notions to show that, together, they do support a substantive metaphysical claim.

shagg said:
As for how this is supposed to work. Take any of Aquinas' 5 ways. Your definition of god changes depending on which argument you're entertaining.

Well, sure, though have you read some of the recent stuff by Richard Gale and Alexander Pruss on their modal cosmological argument? The basic upshot is that, once you've shown that, given certain facts about the universe, there must be an unmoved mover, the gap problem (as it is usually called) maybe isn't quite as big as it first appeared. Of candidate ideas about what an unmoved mover could be, concepts like the theistic God are definitely in the neighborhood. And so for the other definitions (G and P's reasoning is more complex and about a different version of the CA). The point is that Aquinas may have had some such thoughts hanging around, but, lacking modern developments in formal modal logic, lacked the tools to properly express them.

shagg said:
The watch must have a designer, so the designer must exist. I do not challenge that notion with the concept of the EG, instead I challenge premise that follows. that God must be that designer.

OK, so a couple of things just to be clear:

1. Now you're talking about teleological arguments, though you seem to be saying that in all five of Aquinas' arguments, there is an analogous move from what should be inferred from the argument to God. While I don't quite agree, I suppose it's clear enough that we can proceed.

2. The "premise that follows" isn't a premise, but a conclusion, though I would agree it's not a well-supported one.

shagg said:
There is nothing inconsistent with any of these definitions and the EG. Thus the premise that God must be the (insert new definition here) fails in the face of another, equally explanatory, plausible, and consistent theory.

Do you mean that it is possible for a proposition expressing EG doubt to be true while Aquinas' definitions of God are also true? It still isn't clear how this is a threat to any of Aquinas' arguments.
 
Sweden said:
I think, therefore I favour science over philosophy. If all the philosophy departments in every universtity in the world had been shut down 150 years ago nothing would be any different. Perhaps this process could be started now? The guys and gals staffing them could muse on 'arguments for the existence of God by necessity' while doing something useful like flipping burgers.

Hmmmm...I've heard this sort of thing before. I wonder if you wouldn't mind expanding on why you think this.
 
The challenge is to arguments from necessity, not all theological arguments.
I did not say all arguments. I was referring to the Quinque viae you listed in your post. (Though generally speaking, few successful arguments for the existence of God today rely on empirical data.)

Here's the argument from contingency/necessity

- Since objects in the universe come into being and pass away, it is possible for those objects to exist or for those objects not to exist at any given time.
- Since objects are countable, the objects in the universe are finite in number.
- If, for all existent objects, they do not exist at some time, then, given infinite time, there would be nothing in existence. (Nothing can come from nothing—there is no creation ex nihilo) for individual existent objects.
- But, in fact, many objects exist in the universe.
- Therefore, a Necessary Being (i.e., a Being of which it is impossible that it should not exist) exists.


Nothing about this really changes because of the Cartesian Demon scenario.

You might not be able to prove that things come into being and pass out of being, but you also cannot deny it. You lack information, except that the illusion includes those features.

You might try to deny countability, but I'd say that type of math is a priori, not a posteriori.

You know at least two things exist -- you, and whatever creates your perceptions.

Rejection of creation ex nihilo is not an empirical claim, ultimately it's a logical one.

And of course, the scenario itself cannot rule out the nature of the illusion. Evil supernatural demon? Matrix? No way to know.

We should also note there are substantial criticisms of this argument. There really isn't much need to invoke an unfalsifiable scenario to posit yet another one.


Sure you could argue for Brahma or Allah, but those are deities with their own religion and theology.
....yes, but the larger point is that the argument from contingency can't narrow down the deity in the first place. It's already vague. Saying "all perceptions could be wrong" doesn't add anything that a more narrow skepticism did not provide in the first place.
 
No, that's not quite correct. Descartes called perception into doubt with the dream argument, and found that was not sufficient, since lots of propositions remained true. Blue is still blue, for example, even if no instances of blue in sense experience can be relied upon to indicate the existence of something blue outside the mind of the perceiver. Similarly, the square root of 16 is still 4, whether or not perception is reliable.

You seem to be confusing basic notions with clear and distinct ideas. As examples of basic notions, Descartes gives: knowing what doubt is and knowing what thinking is. IIRC, he took a basic notion to be such that any single such notion makes no metaphysical claims and is insufficient to support a metaphysical claim. His answer to EG doubt is to combine a few such notions to show that, together, they do support a substantive metaphysical claim.

You'll have to forgive me, I'm a touch rusty. Its been a long time since I've discussed this with anyone and some of the finer details have gone a little fuzzy on me. You're 100% correct that I'm confusing Basic Notions with Clear and Distinct Ideas. I seem to recall the latter being Descartes solution to the EG, but I'm willing to take your word for it since you seem more familiar with the entirety of the work than I am, and since it doesn't really change anything with regards to my position.


Well, sure, though have you read some of the recent stuff by Richard Gale and Alexander Pruss on their modal cosmological argument? The basic upshot is that, once you've shown that, given certain facts about the universe, there must be an unmoved mover, the gap problem (as it is usually called) maybe isn't quite as big as it first appeared. Of candidate ideas about what an unmoved mover could be, concepts like the theistic God are definitely in the neighborhood. And so for the other definitions (G and P's reasoning is more complex and about a different version of the CA). The point is that Aquinas may have had some such thoughts hanging around, but, lacking modern developments in formal modal logic, lacked the tools to properly express them.

I took a few minutes to read a little on this. Interesting stuff, but I didn't see anything (in my admittedly brief perusal) that made the gap problem any less severe. It boils down to the same problem, if one can prove that there are in fact Necessary Beings through abstract logic, how does one prove anything about the nature of said beings? All you can prove is that there must be something that started the chain on contingent beings.

OK, so a couple of things just to be clear:

1. Now you're talking about teleological arguments, though you seem to be saying that in all five of Aquinas' arguments, there is an analogous move from what should be inferred from the argument to God. While I don't quite agree, I suppose it's clear enough that we can proceed.

2. The "premise that follows" isn't a premise, but a conclusion, though I would agree it's not a well-supported one.



Do you mean that it is possible for a proposition expressing EG doubt to be true while Aquinas' definitions of God are also true? It still isn't clear how this is a threat to any of Aquinas' arguments.

I did jump to a different argument, it just seemed a better example, and any of the 5 ways fall into the same trap, imo.

To put it simply, using the argument from design.

1. A watch can not come from nature

2. Watches exist

3. A watchmaker therefore must exist, because a watch can not exist without a watchmaker

4. Like the watch, life is too complex to arise from nature

5. A designer of life must therefore exist.

6. This designer is God.


#6 is a declaration that sits independent of the argument and does not follow from the premises. #5 is really the conclusion, and leaves you with an undefined necessary being. #6 could just as easily be "This designer is the EG", and the entire package would be just as plausible. Therefore, god does not exist by necessity, since the EG could just as easily be the designer of life. Arguments from necessity like this always attempt to prove the existence of something, and sometimes succeed. But never do they prove the existence of god, only The Uncaused Cause, Designer of life, etc. I suppose this all falls under the gap problem, and the EG is just one way of pointing out that if one wishes to prove gods existence using an argument from necessity, one must find a way of addressing the gap problem, because it will always arise if the person listening to you isn't just looking for something to hang their faith on.

Unless one is not out to prove god exists, and is happy applying the label of God to whatever necessary being lies at the end of their argument. I suppose this is possible. I wouldn't want to pray to the EG though lol.
 
I did not say all arguments. I was referring to the Quinque viae you listed in your post. (Though generally speaking, few successful arguments for the existence of God today rely on empirical data.)

Here's the argument from contingency/necessity

- Since objects in the universe come into being and pass away, it is possible for those objects to exist or for those objects not to exist at any given time.
- Since objects are countable, the objects in the universe are finite in number.
- If, for all existent objects, they do not exist at some time, then, given infinite time, there would be nothing in existence. (Nothing can come from nothing—there is no creation ex nihilo) for individual existent objects.
- But, in fact, many objects exist in the universe.
- Therefore, a Necessary Being (i.e., a Being of which it is impossible that it should not exist) exists.


Nothing about this really changes because of the Cartesian Demon scenario.

You might not be able to prove that things come into being and pass out of being, but you also cannot deny it. You lack information, except that the illusion includes those features.

You might try to deny countability, but I'd say that type of math is a priori, not a posteriori.

You know at least two things exist -- you, and whatever creates your perceptions.

Rejection of creation ex nihilo is not an empirical claim, ultimately it's a logical one.

And of course, the scenario itself cannot rule out the nature of the illusion. Evil supernatural demon? Matrix? No way to know.

We should also note there are substantial criticisms of this argument. There really isn't much need to invoke an unfalsifiable scenario to posit yet another one.



....yes, but the larger point is that the argument from contingency can't narrow down the deity in the first place. It's already vague. Saying "all perceptions could be wrong" doesn't add anything that a more narrow skepticism did not provide in the first place.

I think I see where we're not connecting. Saint Thomas' 5 ways are often used in attempts to prove gods existence. The EG does not cause a problem for most of the argument, only that the necessary being at the end of the argument has to be God. In college my professors never mentioned "the gap problem" (this was 15 years ago), but we did discuss the concept at legnth, and it is really what I'm using the EG to point out here.
 
I think I see where we're not connecting. Saint Thomas' 5 ways are often used in attempts to prove gods existence. The EG does not cause a problem for most of the argument, only that the necessary being at the end of the argument has to be God. In college my professors never mentioned "the gap problem" (this was 15 years ago), but we did discuss the concept at legnth, and it is really what I'm using the EG to point out here.
I guess, but it just doesn't seem necessary to me.

Aquinas wasn't arguing against atheism; that wasn't a normal part of the intellectual discourse at that time. We're not aware of any overt expressions of atheism at that time, it was more often used as an insult or slander against political opponents. Open declarations of atheism would at least get you excommunicated and shunned, if not persecuted, if not prosecuted, if not executed.

My impression is that Aquinas was setting up for a discussion of the epistemology of the divine, and it was only much later that those arguments were recruited to bolster the "unfaithful faithful." He proposed non-scriptural reasons to believe, in order to establish that reason could be used to understand God, its nature, its injunctions. It probably did not occur to him that his arguments did not prove the specific divinity of Jesus or the Trinity, as that was a given.
 
shagg said:
You'll have to forgive me, I'm a touch rusty. Its been a long time since I've discussed this with anyone and some of the finer details have gone a little fuzzy on me. You're 100% correct that I'm confusing Basic Notions with Clear and Distinct Ideas. I seem to recall the latter being Descartes solution to the EG, but I'm willing to take your word for it since you seem more familiar with the entirety of the work than I am, and since it doesn't really change anything with regards to my position.

No problem. Clear and distinct ideas do play a major role for Descartes; it is his clear and distinct idea of God that, he says, guarantees that he can trust his proof of God. It's called the Cartesian circle, which is most succinctly formulated this way:

1. Before I can trust my clear and distinct ideas, I must first know that God exists and is not a deceiver.

2. Before I can know that God exists and is not a deceiver, I must first trust my clear and distinct ideas.

Or so it's been thought since the Meditations were first published. It's a puzzle that such an otherwise philosophically talented person--as Descartes clear was--would fail to see the problem. Even more confusing is Descartes' reply, which is basically to say that someone who thinks that's a good objection hasn't understood the difference between occurent thoughts and remembered thoughts. There's been a lot of ink spilled over the problem. I myself have. I'm in the minority in my profession, but I think he does have the resources to answer the problem. Basically, I think he conceives of doubt under two different modes, and mode1 doubt lets him doubt all his beliefs as a group, without doubting each one individually. The "clear and distinct ideas" are really ideas illuminated by what he (and other 17th century philosophers) called the lumen naturale, which is a kind of basic epistemic faculty or ability underwriting all our intellectual efforts. The thought at the time was that if the lumen naturale could be defeated, then any further discussion is pointless.

shagg said:
I took a few minutes to read a little on this. Interesting stuff, but I didn't see anything (in my admittedly brief perusal) that made the gap problem any less severe. It boils down to the same problem, if one can prove that there are in fact Necessary Beings through abstract logic, how does one prove anything about the nature of said beings? All you can prove is that there must be something that started the chain on contingent beings.

Sure. Even G and P admit they don't have a knock-down for the gap problem. I think the best we can say is that, if you buy a CA, something very weird must exist. Whether that weird thing is God or not...well, who knows?

shagg said:
#6 is a declaration that sits independent of the argument and does not follow from the premises.

The gap problem is not quite as bad with the teleological argument, since God is billed in scripture as the creator of the universe (not that there aren't other things wrong with the teleological argument). I agree the gap problem isn't presently answered for CA's, and is, I think, the main problem I have with them as arguments for the existence of God. I think CA's do establish the existence of something, though I prefer to think of that something as just one big mystery.
 
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You'll have to forgive me, I'm a touch rusty. Its been a long time since I've discussed this with anyone and some of the finer details have gone a little fuzzy on me. You're 100% correct that I'm confusing Basic Notions with Clear and Distinct Ideas. I seem to recall the latter being Descartes solution to the EG, but I'm willing to take your word for it since you seem more familiar with the entirety of the work than I am, and since it doesn't really change anything with regards to my position.




I took a few minutes to read a little on this. Interesting stuff, but I didn't see anything (in my admittedly brief perusal) that made the gap problem any less severe. It boils down to the same problem, if one can prove that there are in fact Necessary Beings through abstract logic, how does one prove anything about the nature of said beings? All you can prove is that there must be something that started the chain on contingent beings.



I did jump to a different argument, it just seemed a better example, and any of the 5 ways fall into the same trap, imo.

To put it simply, using the argument from design.

1. A watch can not come from nature

2. Watches exist

3. A watchmaker therefore must exist, because a watch can not exist without a watchmaker

4. Like the watch, life is too complex to arise from nature

5. A designer of life must therefore exist.

6. This designer is God.


#6 is a declaration that sits independent of the argument and does not follow from the premises. #5 is really the conclusion, and leaves you with an undefined necessary being. #6 could just as easily be "This designer is the EG", and the entire package would be just as plausible. Therefore, god does not exist by necessity, since the EG could just as easily be the designer of life. Arguments from necessity like this always attempt to prove the existence of something, and sometimes succeed. But never do they prove the existence of god, only The Uncaused Cause, Designer of life, etc. I suppose this all falls under the gap problem, and the EG is just one way of pointing out that if one wishes to prove gods existence using an argument from necessity, one must find a way of addressing the gap problem, because it will always arise if the person listening to you isn't just looking for something to hang their faith on.

Unless one is not out to prove god exists, and is happy applying the label of God to whatever necessary being lies at the end of their argument. I suppose this is possible. I wouldn't want to pray to the EG though lol.

woah that's really deep, am i safe in assuming your a theist, that's really very well put
 
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