My position is that this forms the entire basis for morality.
No, it's a basis for
how it is humans came to possess a sense of morality. It's not a basis and says absolutely nothing as to whether or not that sense of morality accurately reflects some aspect of reality.
We invent philosophies or other systems on top, but we only do it because we are inclined to out of instinct and systematizing things helps us enhance our pleasurable feelings from utilizing this instinct.
We don't believe things in order to feel good. We believe things that appear to us to be true (ie, describe reality as it is)
by definition. If you are saying we evolved the faculties and urge to understand the world as it is because understanding the world as it is confers a survival advantage to navigating and interacting with the world, then yes. But there's no intent in evolution or our desires. It's simply a description of
how we came to posses these qualities (capacity for understanding the world and a yearning to do so), not why. We don't engage in trying to understand the world around us because it makes us feel good and we yearn to feel good (although we do yearn that), it's because we yearn to understand the world around us, period. Feeling good isn't the ultimate underlying motive in our actions - it's one of many.
I never claimed I didn't care about the philosophy of morality (hell, I even quoted a philosopher, david hume to contextualize my view on the matter), I only stated that I disagreed with popular philosophical sentiment on the matter and declared popularity wasn't good enough for me to disregard my own thoughts on the matter for an ultimately subject pursuit (that pretends to be objective)
I've never asked you to accept any position based on popular opinion - that comment was a response to a post deferring to some philosopher as
the authority on the matter.
As far as the lack of ought making me a nihilist, then I that label may fit. :shrug: But its the truth I found so far.
You can use whatever label you wish, but, no, I highly doubt that nihilism accurately describes your view of morality.
Why would I address something I don't feel is important or even exists? why would I expend wasted effort?
:shrug: I have no interest in convincing you to be interested in something.
morality is made of "is things" therefore science can describe it
Yeesh, you are all over the map here. First you acknowledge the is-ought problem saying that you've never seen an argument solve it, then you say "there is no there there" and that morality doesn't exist - a nihilist position.
Now you say that morality does indeed exist, and not only that but morality is made of "is things" implying that there is no is-ought problem at all (so your boy Hume, whose view of morality, as you said, most closely matches yours, had it completely wrong apparently
) espousing a hardcore realist naturalist position - the complete opposite end of the spectrum. :doh
Are there any other contradictory positions you'd like to throw in just for good measure? Perhaps a little noncognitivism just to make things really confusing? :lol:
But, seriously, morality isn't made of "is things". It requires a context of "is things", certainly. John IS hitting Susan. Susan IS feeling pain. Susan OUGHT not feel pain, therefore John OUGHT not hit Susan. Moral statements are meaningless absent a context of is-statements. But they doesn't necessarily mean is-statements entirely capture ought-statements. Or, I should say, we don't see how they can be captured as such. Naturalists would argue that the is-ought problem is not insurmountable and that eventually we'll discover how to reduce ought-statements to is-statements (as you suggest); we just don't know how to do it yet.
But as of right now, the is-ought problem is still a problem. You can't derive an ought-statement from is-statements. Until that is remedied, science can't shed any light on ought-statements.
Now, I should qualify that by saying that science (and understanding is-things) actually is important to morality - for exactly the reason I just stated: that morality requires a context of "is" to make sense. For example, if we conclude that utiltarianism is correct - that what we
ought to do is maximize happiness for everyone, then science can play the very important role of helping us understand what it
is that maximizes happiness, what actions and laws we should emplace to maximize happiness. What science cannot do, though, is inform us that maximizing happiness is what we
ought to do.
they just aren't being consistent, but consistency never helped us make babies back when we were more vulnerable to nature and predators, in fact it could have easily got in the way as the one survival situation may be different from another, so we never developed a behavioral need for consistency.
So? That doesn't mean incoherent beliefs are any less wrong.
If you want usefulness, then you're in the wrong subforum my friend. Philosophy is nothing if not useless pondering.
I do believe its true we shouldn't torture children, but my view of the tribal part of my morality tends to be broad enough to encompass the entire human race (in varying degrees), so therefore I identify with them and feel the emotional pain of them being hurt when I am confronted with it.
If you believe "it's true that we ought not torture children", then that is a realist position. The position that that moral statement describes some aspect of reality
as it actually is. To acknowledge that statement as true while simultaneously maintaining that "there is no there there" is just
incoherence. If there's no there there, then such statements cannot be accurately describing some aspect of reality because that aspect of reality isn't there.
also, you are mistaken in thinking that morality comes from beliefs. Beliefs to help shape our moral instincts, sure. They give us an object to apply our moral instincts to, but they are a tool, not a source.
Morality comes from beliefs? No, a person's morality (in that sense of the word)
is a collection of beliefs, specifically ethical beliefs (ie, the belief that we ought not torture children).
Your confusion here is in
how we come to hold such beliefs (if we can't derive them from understanding of "is-things"). And, that, is basically just a matter of moral intuition. It's the inherent sense that certain things ought or ought not happen evolution has instilled in us (that you feel the need to keep describing over and over). Some of that sense is hardwired into us and some of it is likely shaped by social environment (growing up in a ultra-conservative Christian household might cause you to develop a sense that homosexuality is icky and wrong somehow). This is why people are often unable to articulate more fully why something seems wrong to them (like torturing children) - they say "it just is". This of course is a problem because it provides no grounds to settle disputes over what is wrong - but that's another issue entirely and it does not mean there isn't some truth to the matter.
Whether this intuitive sense of right/wrong may accurately reflect any aspect of reality is up for debate (ie, the debate over metaethics).
