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Overview And Summary of WW2 In The Pacific

There's some parallels between the Japanese and the Germans when it comes to their military, particularly when it comes to their skill and professionalism.

And it's a mistake to discount the Japanese, since they went from having almost no industry in the 1870's when Perry arrived and forced Japan to open themselves up to the rest of the world, to defeating a major power - Russia - in the naval Battle of Tsutshima in 1904, when everyone in the West thought that the Russians would sweep the Japanese from the sea. That was a direct result of the Meiji Restoration and is a leap of national power that I think is unparalleled in human history, simply incredible...and, even more incredible, that victory that shocked the world directly followed the longest period of peace - 250 years during the Tokugawa Shogunate - experienced by any major nation in human history. I would say that one victory was more surprising (though less influential) than Nelson's victory at Trafalgar.

So...for any student of the military, we should indeed study the Russians, the Germans, the British...but we should not discount what was accomplished by the Japanese in modern times, and particularly the Mongols in the 1200's.

If you haven't already done so, I strongly recommend Dan Carlin's Hardcore History podcast. I really think you'd enjoy it.

Tsushima was a fascinating battle. Japan lost a couple little boats, and devastated the Russian fleet.
 
Wait...you start a thread on the Pacific War, and you do not want to know about the Japanese military? You cannot understand events in the Pacific without understanding the Japanese military.

For me the Japanese mentality on war begins with the Russo Japanese War. Japan was the East Asian superpower, as Russia was a dormant European superpower yet to be, while the other two pre WW1 superpowers were England and the USA.

The next move that Japan makes is against China in the early 1930's. However American business interests in China for Chinese markets for American goods becomes challenged by the Japanese incursions.

And THIS is where relations between the USA and Japan then begin to break down strategically in the latter 1930's.

"Sea Power" supra makes all that very clear. The whole purpose of the voyage of Teddy Roosevelt's Great White Fleet was to open markets in Asia for American goods.

This was unlike the Japanese who wanted to exploit Asia's natural resources like a European Imperialist nation.

My point in illustrating how the USA got sucked into war with Japan and also Germany was to highlight this strategic latticework.

I really don't want to learn about the everyday Japanese officer or soldier.

Anyone who can chop off someone else's head for no reason is not worthy of further concern, in my view.
 
For me the Japanese mentality on war begins with the Russo Japanese War. Japan was the East Asian superpower, as Russia was a dormant European superpower yet to be, while the other two pre WW1 superpowers were England and the USA.

The next move that Japan makes is against China in the early 1930's. However American business interests in China for Chinese markets for American goods becomes challenged by the Japanese incursions.

And THIS is where relations between the USA and Japan then begin to break down strategically in the latter 1930's.

"Sea Power" supra makes all that very clear. The whole purpose of the voyage of Teddy Roosevelt's Great White Fleet was to open markets in Asia for American goods.

This was unlike the Japanese who wanted to exploit Asia's natural resources like a European Imperialist nation.

My point in illustrating how the USA got sucked into war with Japan and also Germany was to highlight this strategic latticework.

I really don't want to learn about the everyday Japanese officer or soldier.

Anyone who can chop off someone else's head for no reason is not worthy of further concern, in my view.

If you do not understand the people, you cannot understand the reasons. You are vastly oversimplifying things, and that can only lead to wrong conclusions.
 
There's some parallels between the Japanese and the Germans when it comes to their military, particularly when it comes to their skill and professionalism.

And it's a mistake to discount the Japanese, since they went from having almost no industry in the 1870's when Perry arrived and forced Japan to open themselves up to the rest of the world, to defeating a major power - Russia - in the naval Battle of Tsutshima in 1904, when everyone in the West thought that the Russians would sweep the Japanese from the sea. That was a direct result of the Meiji Restoration and is a leap of national power that I think is unparalleled in human history, simply incredible...and, even more incredible, that victory that shocked the world directly followed the longest period of peace - 250 years during the Tokugawa Shogunate - experienced by any major nation in human history. I would say that one victory was more surprising (though less influential) than Nelson's victory at Trafalgar.

So...for any student of the military, we should indeed study the Russians, the Germans, the British...but we should not discount what was accomplished by the Japanese in modern times, and particularly the Mongols in the 1200's.

If you haven't already done so, I strongly recommend Dan Carlin's Hardcore History podcast. I really think you'd enjoy it.

While I do not find the Japanese very interesting at all, I do find the Germans extremely fascinating.

The most predictably thing about them however was their fury at the way WW1 was concluded. And Adam Hochschild in his book "To End All Wars" quotes several diplomats in the 1920's predicting another German major war within another 20 years.
 
If you do not understand the people, you cannot understand the reasons. You are vastly oversimplifying things, and that can only lead to wrong conclusions.

The Japanese people were sheep.

And the Japanese leadership was brutal and barbarian. Shinto-ism apparently had no redeeming values to it.

The one single Japanese business person that I ever had to work with was a liar and a cheat.

My views are already quite jaded.
 
Note that Sakai's description of some events is not considered to be terribly accurate, though it is a good read.

I didn't know it wasn't considered that accurate...but then, it's a personal recollection, and such are always subject to the vagaries of memory. But good to see that you read it too!
 
The Japanese people were sheep.

And the Japanese leadership was brutal and barbarian. Shinto-ism apparently had no redeeming values to it.

The one single Japanese business person that I ever had to work with was a liar and a cheat.

My views are already quite jaded.

I remember walking down the street in Nagasaki. One store was a "sea tortoise shell shop", and in the front window was a five-foot clipper ship made all of sea tortoise shell. I looked at the window - no cameras, no alarms. There were no lights on the street. The only thing that kept someone from taking that ship - which had a price tag of 10M yen - about $100K at the time - was the plate glass window. How long would that have lasted in the states?

Later that same day I was looking for a place to buy some yakisoba. I opened up a door to one restaurant...and it was completely empty. The restaurant was obviously still in business, but everyone - including all employees - had gone home for their afternoon break...and left the door unlocked. How long would that have lasted in the states?

I see your claims above...and I remember my first-hand experiences there. I truly pity you, for not only are you deeply ignorant of other cultures, but - even worse - you seem to feel no need to educate yourself considering those other cultures.
 
One thing to note is that Yamamoto could have won Midway, and probably should have. 3 more carriers and it would have been almost impossible for the US to win. Yamamoto made several mistakes in the planning(Operation AL for one, which accomplished almost nothing and split his force, which he then further split by having the command fleet not on station at Midway) that led to the Japanese defeat. I cannot recommend Shattered Sword enough as THE book to read on Midway. It brilliantly lays out all the faults the Japanese made(and follows the flow of the battle almost to the minute).

I strongly agree - we got stupidly lucky that the carriers' planes were not there when ours arrived - there was no air cover - and that their sailors still had fuel and ordnance on the flight decks. But then, I remember reading something where some leader (I think it was an admiral) said, "I'd rather be lucky than good".
 
While I do not find the Japanese very interesting at all, I do find the Germans extremely fascinating.

The most predictably thing about them however was their fury at the way WW1 was concluded. And Adam Hochschild in his book "To End All Wars" quotes several diplomats in the 1920's predicting another German major war within another 20 years.

Yes, Hochschild did correctly predict it...just as Engels (who wrote "The Communist Manifesto" along with Marx) predicted surprisingly well just how terrible the next great war (WWI) would be, even though he died long before it occurred.

And when it comes to 'brutal and barbarian' - as you called the Japanese leadership in reply #30, how, exactly, was the German leadership in WWII less brutal and barbarian than the Japanese? What's good for the Japanese goose is good for the German gander, and all that....
 
If Japanese leadership at the time were smart, they would have tried for a deal with the US, perhaps promising a distant peace with China, leaving the Philippines alone, and suggesting economic concessions for the US in the soon to be seized European colonies in Asia. There was still a lot of isolationist sentiment in the US, and they might have carried it off, for a few years anyway.

In the end though, the US would have been at war with Germany, as a strategic threat from a Nazi regime controlling Europe, and possibly the Soviet Union and Britain would have been unacceptable. Advancing technology at the time meant N America would have very soon been under real threat.

This would have lead to friction with Japan, but a Japan that had another 10 or 20 years to develop would have been a much harder target.
 
The Japanese people were sheep.

And the Japanese leadership was brutal and barbarian. Shinto-ism apparently had no redeeming values to it.

The one single Japanese business person that I ever had to work with was a liar and a cheat.

My views are already quite jaded.

That would be 100 % inaccurate view of the Japanese.
 
I strongly agree - we got stupidly lucky that the carriers' planes were not there when ours arrived - there was no air cover - and that their sailors still had fuel and ordnance on the flight decks. But then, I remember reading something where some leader (I think it was an admiral) said, "I'd rather be lucky than good".

There where CAP fighters there, and they had a very long day and a lot of success for a long time. They got distracted by a group of US fighters and drawn a little too far from the carriers.

Edit: all carriers have fuel and ordnance on deck, though the killer was in the hanger deck, where planes are armed.
 
Strategically Yamamoto's plan was pure insanity. Why would he want to attack the Americans? He had studied in the USA and had a favorable experience during his early career visiting the USA. Had he even been successful at destroying the entire American Pacific Fleet including all the aircraft carriers and the fuel depot on Hawaii, it would still have been necessary for Tojo to invade the American West Coast.

The problem here is that you are not looking at the War in the Pacific properly.

Remember, Japan never understood the United States. Plus, they believed in Bushido, and that they were basically a "Master Race", and would get anything that they wanted. After all, were they not one of the most technologically advanced nations on the planet? With the oldest Empire in the history of the planet? Led by an Emperor who was also a diety?

To begin with, Japan never wanted to invade the US. They saw no need, and never planned for it. Their assumption was that if pressed hard the US would sue for peace, and leave the West Pacific to them, retreating to the Continent to lick their wounds. Their actual target in the early days was the British possessions primarily, and also those of the French.

As to why they attacked the US, that should be obvious when you look at the map of the region in 1941. All of the resources they needed (primarily rubber and oil) were found in the South-West Pacific. What is now Indonesia, Burma, and other islands in that reagion. And they knew that they would be forced into a war with the UK if they were to try and take them.

Now most of the UK force was in Australia, on the other side of the objective. So that is not that much of a worry, they could take them before the UK could react. But there was another country that stood in the way.

The US. From it's bases in the Philippines.

If Japan was to invade the UK territories, they would literally be sticking their necks onto a chopping block if the US was to enter the war at a later date. With the bases in the Philippines, they could quickly severl all Japanese supply lines, and more then likely cause significant damage to any supplies going to and from Japan itself. Therefore, from a strategic point of view, the US had to be eliminated as a threat before they could go after the rest of their plan.

Hence, the attack on Pearl Harbor, and the siezing of the Philippines.

The biggest problem with their assessment (and one that Admiral Yamamoto knew was wrong), was that they assumed a strong and decisive blow would cause the US to retreat and want out of the war. They miscalculated the outrage that such actions would create, and that it would become a battle to the death. This can even be seen in 1945 when they tried repeatedly to sue for peace on a status quo ante bellium basis. And they could simply not understand why the US and other allies would not agree to those terms.

Now the Soviets did not join in to recapture lost territory, they pushed their possessions far beyond any they had ever held before. They in essence were advancing the Eastern borders of their empire, gaining huge chunks of the Asian colonies that Japan had previously held.

And ironically, surrendering to the Allies is what ultimately saved them. We allowed them to keep their Emperor (no longer divine), and stripped away the almost feudal system and replaced it with a true modern democracy. And other then the islands and territories largely stripped and either returned to it's previous owners or allowed to become independent, the US and other allies (with the exception of the USSR) returned all they had taken.
 
The Japanese people were sheep.

And the Japanese leadership was brutal and barbarian. Shinto-ism apparently had no redeeming values to it.

The one single Japanese business person that I ever had to work with was a liar and a cheat.

My views are already quite jaded.

They were anything but sheep. And the leadership was brutal, not because of Shinto, but because of Bushido.

Remember, this is a people who believed that your place in life is determined by birth, and on past lives. And that honor was everything.

Better to die in glory, then to live in dishonor. And they actually lived by those beliefs. In most of the battles of WWII, very few Japanese were ever captured. Most prefered to die in suicide charges rather then surrender. This can be strongly seen in the Battle of Tarawa, of the 4,719 military and civilians on the island, only 17 military and 129 civilians were captured. 4,690 were killed in action, or thought it was better to kill themselves rather then surrender.

And the same on Saipan. Over 5,000 suicides on the tail end of the battle, often times entire families throwing themselves off of cliffs to their deaths.

To put it in modern terms, not unlike those of radical Muslims and their own desire to kill themselves to kill those they see as enemies. But this was not a mindset created by Shinto, but by Bushido.

And yes, the Japanese are often cut-throat businessmen. What they once used to destroy the enemy in war, they now often apply to business. Hence, the popularity of Miyamoto Musashi and Go Rin No Show (The Book of Five Rings). But the concept of death to remove dishonor is still all to common in their culture even today. Now however it is mostly aimed internally. Look at suicide rates and this can easily be seen.
 
If Japanese leadership at the time were smart, they would have tried for a deal with the US, perhaps promising a distant peace with China, leaving the Philippines alone, and suggesting economic concessions for the US in the soon to be seized European colonies in Asia. There was still a lot of isolationist sentiment in the US, and they might have carried it off, for a few years anyway.

The US would never have accepted it.

Remember, by 1941, the US had been de facto at war with Japan since 1937. Relations had been deteriorating for over a decade, and their increasing attacks in China had already caused the US to go from an ally to almost hostile relations. There had been actual attacks on US forces and consulates even before 1941, and there was simply no way that Japan could have "bribed" the US with anything.

And this was made all to obvious in 1940 when Japan announced the Great East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere. Which they considered their own "Monroe Doctrine", basically laying claim to the entire region. And more or less saying all other regions needed to stay out.

Which included the Philippines, at that time US Terroritory.

Now I have no idea why you think the US could have been "bought". But at that time, there was really no concessions Japan could have offered. This was 1940-1941, not 2014. The US was the largest oil exporter in the world, the largest steel exporter in the world, and the largest food exporter in the world. What on earth could they have offered the US?

Not a damned thing the US wanted. In fact, they were already in the process of trying to divest themselves of most of the territories they did have in the region. SO why in the hell would they have wanted more? Which BTW they already had, because of their occupation zone in China.
 
If Japanese leadership at the time were smart, they would have tried for a deal with the US, perhaps promising a distant peace with China, leaving the Philippines alone, and suggesting economic concessions for the US in the soon to be seized European colonies in Asia. There was still a lot of isolationist sentiment in the US, and they might have carried it off, for a few years anyway.

In the end though, the US would have been at war with Germany, as a strategic threat from a Nazi regime controlling Europe, and possibly the Soviet Union and Britain would have been unacceptable. Advancing technology at the time meant N America would have very soon been under real threat.

This would have lead to friction with Japan, but a Japan that had another 10 or 20 years to develop would have been a much harder target.

Absolutely correct, in my view. So I completely agree.
 
The US would never have accepted it.

Remember, by 1941, the US had been de facto at war with Japan since 1937. Relations had been deteriorating for over a decade, and their increasing attacks in China had already caused the US to go from an ally to almost hostile relations. There had been actual attacks on US forces and consulates even before 1941, and there was simply no way that Japan could have "bribed" the US with anything.

And this was made all to obvious in 1940 when Japan announced the Great East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere. Which they considered their own "Monroe Doctrine", basically laying claim to the entire region. And more or less saying all other regions needed to stay out.

Which included the Philippines, at that time US Terroritory.

Now I have no idea why you think the US could have been "bought". But at that time, there was really no concessions Japan could have offered. This was 1940-1941, not 2014. The US was the largest oil exporter in the world, the largest steel exporter in the world, and the largest food exporter in the world. What on earth could they have offered the US?

Not a damned thing the US wanted. In fact, they were already in the process of trying to divest themselves of most of the territories they did have in the region. SO why in the hell would they have wanted more? Which BTW they already had, because of their occupation zone in China.

The fact was that the US was bending over backwards in its attempt to stay out of the European war, even though by 1941 it was clear they would have to jump in . This must have crossed the minds of Japanese strategists at the time. Many Americans wanted to stay out of the European war, and most at the time had even less interest in, or knowledge of Asia. FDR had stated that he was not happy with the old European empires, and when Japan bullied its way into French Indochina, let it slip by without definitive action. Given these events, one could imagine a Japanese regime giving in to some demands, like cessation of the war with China, giving promises of future cooperation, and perhaps offers of joint development of oil, rubber, tin, etc resources in SE Asia. They could even make promises of moving the former colonies to independence, in due course. Those in Washington would no doubt smell insincerity in the offers, however, selling war to the US public under such circumstances (no attacks on US forces or interests, promises- even modest- of future cooperation and joint enterprise, and a willingness to concede certain points) would have been extremely difficult. If German torpedoing of US ships, and acts of genocide were not enough to sell war to Americans, would the change in administration of some Asian backwaters, most Americans would not have even heard of, be enough?

I'm not saying it would have happened, just that such a strategy would have been a far safer gamble than the attack on Pearl Harbour.
 
The fact was that the US was bending over backwards in its attempt to stay out of the European war, even though by 1941 it was clear they would have to jump in . This must have crossed the minds of Japanese strategists at the time. Many Americans wanted to stay out of the European war, and most at the time had even less interest in, or knowledge of Asia. FDR had stated that he was not happy with the old European empires, and when Japan bullied its way into French Indochina, let it slip by without definitive action. Given these events, one could imagine a Japanese regime giving in to some demands, like cessation of the war with China, giving promises of future cooperation, and perhaps offers of joint development of oil, rubber, tin, etc resources in SE Asia. They could even make promises of moving the former colonies to independence, in due course. Those in Washington would no doubt smell insincerity in the offers, however, selling war to the US public under such circumstances (no attacks on US forces or interests, promises- even modest- of future cooperation and joint enterprise, and a willingness to concede certain points) would have been extremely difficult. If German torpedoing of US ships, and acts of genocide were not enough to sell war to Americans, would the change in administration of some Asian backwaters, most Americans would not have even heard of, be enough?

I'm not saying it would have happened, just that such a strategy would have been a far safer gamble than the attack on Pearl Harbour.

On July 2, 1940, the US announced it would not allow sales to Japan of, among other things, scrap steel that Japan felt it needed critically. This was followed on July 26 by freezing all Japanese assets in the US. This was followed by banning all exports to Japan of oil. At that point, Japan leadership felt that war with the US was inevitable, and that a virtual state of war had been declared by the US with those actions.
 
My father was a sailor on the USS Enterprise when it sailed into Pearl Harbor on December 8, 1941. I know the Japanese attacked on December 7, because they thought US carriers would be in port. It was lucky for my family as well as the rest of the world they weren't. I know for part of the war he was a crew chief on PBYs, but I don't know much else because he never spoke of his time on the CV-6, or any duty he held during the entire war.

I do know he was aboard when the Enterprise received a Presidential Unit Citation because my mom showed it to me once.
 
The fact was that the US was bending over backwards in its attempt to stay out of the European war, even though by 1941 it was clear they would have to jump in . This must have crossed the minds of Japanese strategists at the time. Many Americans wanted to stay out of the European war, and most at the time had even less interest in, or knowledge of Asia. FDR had stated that he was not happy with the old European empires, and when Japan bullied its way into French Indochina, let it slip by without definitive action. Given these events, one could imagine a Japanese regime giving in to some demands, like cessation of the war with China, giving promises of future cooperation, and perhaps offers of joint development of oil, rubber, tin, etc resources in SE Asia. They could even make promises of moving the former colonies to independence, in due course. Those in Washington would no doubt smell insincerity in the offers, however, selling war to the US public under such circumstances (no attacks on US forces or interests, promises- even modest- of future cooperation and joint enterprise, and a willingness to concede certain points) would have been extremely difficult. If German torpedoing of US ships, and acts of genocide were not enough to sell war to Americans, would the change in administration of some Asian backwaters, most Americans would not have even heard of, be enough?

I'm not saying it would have happened, just that such a strategy would have been a far safer gamble than the attack on Pearl Harbour.

Have you ever really studied WWII in the Pacific?

The US was "bending over backwards" to avoid getting in any war, so why you keep bringing up Europe I have no idea. This is obvious when you look on the attack on the USS Panay in 1937. Where Japan carried out an unprovoked attack upon the USS Panay, sinking the ship, killing 3 US sailors, and wounding 43 others.

And there is nothing the US could have done about relations with Japan. This was a horribly antagonistic government, which ignored any conditions they were ordered to follow by the League of Nations, including unprovoked war against China, and expanding their sphere of influence into territory controlled by other countries.

You bring up these pipe dreams, that are completely and utterly removed from the reality of the time.

And no, there was no way in hell that the US would have ever abandoned the UK, which was now her strongest ally. Since the Boxer Rebellion of almost half a century before, the Anglo-American Alliance had already become steadfast, after over 125 years of antagonism and hostility. And the two countries were also the most outspoken nations agains tthe Japanese excesses in China.

Add to that barely a month later the Alison Incident, where Japanese soldiers attacked a US Consulate (not the building but the US Consul) and relations between the two from 1937-1938 were going south fast.

No, your ideas are complete fantasy, lacking in any understanding of the situation in East Asia in the 1930's and 1940's.

On July 2, 1940, the US announced it would not allow sales to Japan of, among other things, scrap steel that Japan felt it needed critically. This was followed on July 26 by freezing all Japanese assets in the US. This was followed by banning all exports to Japan of oil. At that point, Japan leadership felt that war with the US was inevitable, and that a virtual state of war had been declared by the US with those actions.

Japan at that time had the amazing ability to completely ignore any reactions done against their actions, but taking anything against them as a deep personal attack. The honestly had a belief that everything in their "Co-Prosperity Sphere" was theirs by right, and it was obvious to most that war was coming, it was inevitable.

The Navy was paying particular attention, especially since the advances of Japan were following a pattern predicted over 15 years prior by Major Ellis.
 
Μολὼν λαβέ;1065353262 said:
My father was a sailor on the USS Enterprise when it sailed into Pearl Harbor on December 8, 1941. I know the Japanese attacked on December 7, because they thought US carriers would be in port. It was lucky for my family as well as the rest of the world they weren't. I know for part of the war he was a crew chief on PBYs, but I don't know much else because he never spoke of his time on the CV-6, or any duty he held during the entire war.

I do know he was aboard when the Enterprise received a Presidential Unit Citation because my mom showed it to me once.

Actually, the Japanese knew that at best, they would only catch a single carrier in Pearl Harbor. USS Enterprise was enroute back to Pearl from delivering fighters to Wake. USS Lexington was enroute to Midway to deliver fighters. The only unknown was the USS Saratoga, which was known to be at sea (the Japanese thought it was going to Pearl, but it was actually off of the coast of Washington doing sea trials after a refit).

However, Japan was happy with the sinking of the Battleships, since at the time conventional naval tactics stated that such ships were indispensible in amphibious operations. And in many ways this is right, but they did not anticipate the speed at which the US could make up for these losses with cruisers and destroyers built after the attack. On average, the US was building 43 Fletcher class destroyers every month. From 1942-1945, the US was outbuilding naval ships at a rate of 6 to 1 in tonage. They simply could not keep up with that pace of ship building, even if they had somehow managed to sink all 3 carriers.
 
Actually, the Japanese knew that at best, they would only catch a single carrier in Pearl Harbor. USS Enterprise was enroute back to Pearl from delivering fighters to Wake. USS Lexington was enroute to Midway to deliver fighters. The only unknown was the USS Saratoga, which was known to be at sea (the Japanese thought it was going to Pearl, but it was actually off of the coast of Washington doing sea trials after a refit).

However, Japan was happy with the sinking of the Battleships, since at the time conventional naval tactics stated that such ships were indispensible in amphibious operations. And in many ways this is right, but they did not anticipate the speed at which the US could make up for these losses with cruisers and destroyers built after the attack. On average, the US was building 43 Fletcher class destroyers every month. From 1942-1945, the US was outbuilding naval ships at a rate of 6 to 1 in tonage. They simply could not keep up with that pace of ship building, even if they had somehow managed to sink all 3 carriers.

the japanese were also surprised that the united states was able to salvage and rebuild all but three of the battleships that were sunk at Pearl Harbor.

In fact, several battleships that were raised and rebuilt after being sunk at pearl harbor were able to get some payback in the battle of Surogauo straight at the battle of Leyte Gulf.
 
Japan at that time had the amazing ability to completely ignore any reactions done against their actions, but taking anything against them as a deep personal attack. The honestly had a belief that everything in their "Co-Prosperity Sphere" was theirs by right, and it was obvious to most that war was coming, it was inevitable.

The Navy was paying particular attention, especially since the advances of Japan were following a pattern predicted over 15 years prior by Major Ellis.

The reality is that Japan and the US had a major ignorance of each other. And realistically, we were moving towards war, and those moves I listed by the US where part of that. It was not a sure thing at that point by any stretch, but, yeah, it was coming. This does not minimize Japan's failings in the lead up to Pearl Harbor in any way I would hasten to add.
 
The reality is that Japan and the US had a major ignorance of each other. And realistically, we were moving towards war, and those moves I listed by the US where part of that. It was not a sure thing at that point by any stretch, but, yeah, it was coming. This does not minimize Japan's failings in the lead up to Pearl Harbor in any way I would hasten to add.

Actually, the higher echelon of the US military was very aware of what Japan was capable of.

Including their standard tactic of starting a war with a sneak attack. They did the same thing to Russia in 1905, and both China and Manchuria in 1931. And remembe,r the Japanese agression and expansion into this region (as well as the sneak attack on both the Philippines and Pearl Harbor) were predicted as early as 1920. Earl Ellis' predictions and plans were followed almost perfectly in War Plan Orange, which was the main battle plan used during the war.

While I would admit that the general public was horribly ignorant of what Japan could do (and the political only slightly less ignorant), the US military did indeed understand that a war with Japan was coming, and the form that it would take.
 
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