Are you saying they ordered it?
No. They legalized it in 1905.
UNSCOP were very aware of the situation of Jewish refugees. Indeed while they were there the British sent a boatload away. The Arabs refused to talk. It was an impossible situation. IMO they should have said that it was not possible to come to a conclusion.
Britain had no desire to perpetuate the Mandate. It had neither the financial resources nor the manpower to sustain the Mandate. Under such circumstances, a decision was required, even if it was difficult.
Of course, there are many hypotheticals as to what might have been done. But the idea of disenfranchising any of the region's two peoples would have cut against some of the most basic and widely-accepted rights e.g., the equality of the right of self-determination. It would also have posed enormous logistical challenges.
However I have found an extract from a book written by writers one of whom was a member of the team.
Camp David and After: An Exchange (2. A Reply to Ehud Barak) | The New York Review of Books
The Hussein Agha/Robert Malley piece addresses some of the post-Oslo process narrative, namely it seeks to rebut Prime Minister Barak’s account of what happened (a different point from the narrower assessment issued by President Clinton). It also sheds some additional light on the Palestinian negotiating position.
It also notes the existence of significant differences at Camp David (Summer 2000). As I previously stated, the diplomatic complexities at that negotiation were such that I don’t believe any single party should be blamed. Those complexities involved the level of trust, level of understanding concerning the parties’ needs, size of the differences between their negotiating positions, etc.
However, relevant to President Clinton’s December 2000 bridging proposal, rather than denying that Yasser Arafat rejected that initiative, though it describes that failure to accept the agreement in the softer language of seeking to “renegotiate,” the commentary offers the Palestinian rationale for doing so. It explains, “The Palestinians undoubtedly were not satisfied with Clinton’s parameters, which they wanted to renegotiate.” Even if one sets aside the term “reject,” as the piece seeks to do, the piece does not seek to overturn the fact that the Palestinians did not accept President Clinton’s proposal. IMO, the Palestinians’ not accepting the President’s proposal constituted a missed opportunity, especially now that one can look back at developments in hindsight.
Three relevant highlights on the Palestinian negotiating position:
Refugee Issue:
… there is no Palestinian position on how the refugee question should be dealt with as a practical matter. Rather, the Palestinians presented a set of principles. First, they insisted on the need to recognize the refugees’ right of return, lest the agreement lose all legitimacy with the vast refugee constituency—roughly half the entire Palestinian population.
While I understand that the Palestinians have a need to deal with a domestic constituency on the refugee matter, Israel cannot accept a “right of return,” as such acceptance would entail legal obligations and it would pose a threat to Israel’s raison d’etre as a Jewish state (original intent of the partition plan). Softer language that would recognize the existence of a refugee position or a general right to move to the Palestine region, but limited to the Palestinian state (without embracing any specific narrative as to how the refugee issue arose), justice of finding a solution to accommodate the refugees’ needs (including those of descendants), and framework that allowed for their freedom to settle in the new Palestinian state and financing to make that possible would serve the refugees’ needs.
Responsibility for the Refugee Issue:
The Palestinians did insist that Israel recognize that it bore responsibility for creating the problem of the refugees.
Each party has its own narrative on the issue. In addition, there is also the issue of the Jewish refugees from Arab lands. Historically, each narrative offers some insight. However, neither narrative provides the complete picture.
A look at news accounts from the 1948 war and months preceding that war, for example, find Arabs and Jews being dislocated on account of the low-level ethnic conflict and later a variety of reasons during the 1948 war. Indeed, about 25%-33% of refugees counted after the war were persons who were dislocated prior to Israel's re-establishment and prior to the 1948 War.
Neutral language on the matter that reasonably reflects the myriad factors that resulted in the refugee issue would be preferable to insisting that any party’s narrative be accepted. Failing that, the parties should avoid trying to use a diplomatic agreement to assess blame. Such an endeavor could get in the way of a reasonable settlement of the historic conflict. Sometimes it is best to leave the past to history when it comes to achieving diplomatic results.
The Western Wall:
Arafat did not reject Israeli sovereignty over the Wailing Wall but over the much larger Western Wall (of which it is a part), which encroaches on the Muslim Quarter of the Old City.
The entire Western Wall is sacred to the Jewish people. What the Palestinians could have done is ask that the two parties share sovereignty over the portion of the wall that extends in the Muslim Quarter of Old Jerusalem. My guess is that such an arrangement would not create an irreconcilable dilemma for Israel.
Finally, what the commentary piece fails to mention about Prime Minister Barak’s reservations is that they were not reservations, but actually technical questions about clarification. The Israeli Prime Minister did not rescind his acceptance of the President’s bridging proposal nor ask that any of the terms of the framework be changed. That is a very different proposition from seeking that terms be “renegotiated.”
I have more faith in Obama than previous admins to work from a middle unbiased position. I just hope as I have said a few times that it is not too late. I do think time is running out.
I believe President Obama is sincere in his determination to break the logjam. However, I don't believe his approach of trying to extract unilateral Isaeli concessions in advance of the talks is productive. Payment of entrance prices can only harden the beneficiary's rigidity, as it can produce an expectation that firmness can yield rewards and others will be prepared to extract them, if necessary. It also undermines the spirit of reciprocity--"something for something"--that is at the heart of diplomatic agreements and a necessary element of any binding contract. Failure on the part of the world community to criticize the Palestinian boycott of talks does the Palestinians no favors. It allows them to avoid accountability for refusing to talk (despite the passage of time and possible erosion of opportunity) and strengthens incentives for such counterproductive conduct.
I share your hope that it is not too late to reach a mutually acceptable agreement. Toward that end, I believe the Palestinians should return to the negotiating table immediately and unconditionally. If they have objections/concerns about Israel's policy, they need to raise those objections/concerns during the talks.