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The Myth of the 1953 CIA Coup in Iran

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Jack Hays

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Almost everything that "everyone knows" about the 1953 fall of Mossadegh and rise of the Shah in Iran is wrong. Everything would have happened almost the same way had there been no CIA. A false narrative arose from several motives among several players, and has been exploited by the Islamic regime in Iran since 1979. Their claims are false.:peace

What Really Happened in Iran - Foreign Affairs

Foreign Affairs | Political and Economic Insights | Articles, Interviews, Videos & InformationFeaturesCommentsForeign Affairs


What Really Happened in Iran. The CIA, the Ouster of Mosaddeq, and the Restoration of the Shah. By Ray Takeyh. RAY TAKEYH is Senior Fellow for Middle ...

"Back in 2009, during his heavily promoted Cairo speech on American relations with the Muslim world, U.S. President Barack Obama noted, in passing, that “in the middle of the Cold War, the United States played a role in the overthrow of a democratically elected Iranian government.” Obama was referring to the 1953 coup that toppled Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq and consolidated the rule of the shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. Obama would go on to remind his audience that Iran had also committed its share of misdeeds against Americans. But he clearly intended his allusion to Washington’s role in the coup as a concession -- a public acknowledgment that the United States shared some of the blame for its long-simmering conflict with the Islamic Republic.

Yet there was a supreme irony to Obama’s concession. The history of the U.S. role in Iran’s 1953 coup may be “well known,” as the president declared in his speech, but it is not well founded. On the contrary, it rests heavily on two related myths: that machinations by the CIA were the most important factor in Mosaddeq’s downfall and that Iran’s brief democratic interlude was spoiled primarily by American and British meddling. For decades, historians, journalists, and pundits have promoted these myths, injecting them not just into the political discourse but also into popular culture: most recently, Argo, a Hollywood thriller that won the 2013 Academy Award for Best Picture, suggested that Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution was a belated response to an injustice perpetrated by the United States a quarter century earlier. That version of events has also been promoted by Iran’s theocratic leaders, who have exploited it to stoke anti-Americanism and to obscure the fact that the clergy itself played a major role in toppling Mosaddeq.
In reality, the CIA’s impact on the events of 1953 was ultimately insignificant. Regardless of anything the United States did or did not do, Mosaddeq was bound to fall and the shah was bound to retain his throne and expand his power. Yet the narrative of American culpability has become so entrenched that it now shapes how many Americans understand the history of U.S.-Iranian relations and influences how American leaders think about Iran. In reaching out to the Islamic Republic, the United States has cast itself as a sinner expiating its previous transgressions. This has allowed the Iranian theocracy, which has abused history in a thousand ways, to claim the moral high ground, giving it an unearned advantage over Washington and the West, even in situations that have nothing to do with 1953 and in which Iran’s behavior is the sole cause of the conflict, such as the negotiations over the Iranian nuclear program. . . . "
 
Almost everything that "everyone knows" about the 1953 fall of Mossadegh and rise of the Shah in Iran is wrong. Everything would have happened almost the same way had there been no CIA. A false narrative arose from several motives among several players, and has been exploited by the Islamic regime in Iran since 1979. Their claims are false.:peace

What Really Happened in Iran - Foreign Affairs

Foreign Affairs | Political and Economic Insights | Articles, Interviews, Videos & InformationFeaturesCommentsForeign Affairs


What Really Happened in Iran. The CIA, the Ouster of Mosaddeq, and the Restoration of the Shah. By Ray Takeyh. RAY TAKEYH is Senior Fellow for Middle ...

"Back in 2009, during his heavily promoted Cairo speech on American relations with the Muslim world, U.S. President Barack Obama noted, in passing, that “in the middle of the Cold War, the United States played a role in the overthrow of a democratically elected Iranian government.” Obama was referring to the 1953 coup that toppled Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq and consolidated the rule of the shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. Obama would go on to remind his audience that Iran had also committed its share of misdeeds against Americans. But he clearly intended his allusion to Washington’s role in the coup as a concession -- a public acknowledgment that the United States shared some of the blame for its long-simmering conflict with the Islamic Republic.

Yet there was a supreme irony to Obama’s concession. The history of the U.S. role in Iran’s 1953 coup may be “well known,” as the president declared in his speech, but it is not well founded. On the contrary, it rests heavily on two related myths: that machinations by the CIA were the most important factor in Mosaddeq’s downfall and that Iran’s brief democratic interlude was spoiled primarily by American and British meddling. For decades, historians, journalists, and pundits have promoted these myths, injecting them not just into the political discourse but also into popular culture: most recently, Argo, a Hollywood thriller that won the 2013 Academy Award for Best Picture, suggested that Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution was a belated response to an injustice perpetrated by the United States a quarter century earlier. That version of events has also been promoted by Iran’s theocratic leaders, who have exploited it to stoke anti-Americanism and to obscure the fact that the clergy itself played a major role in toppling Mosaddeq.
In reality, the CIA’s impact on the events of 1953 was ultimately insignificant. Regardless of anything the United States did or did not do, Mosaddeq was bound to fall and the shah was bound to retain his throne and expand his power. Yet the narrative of American culpability has become so entrenched that it now shapes how many Americans understand the history of U.S.-Iranian relations and influences how American leaders think about Iran. In reaching out to the Islamic Republic, the United States has cast itself as a sinner expiating its previous transgressions. This has allowed the Iranian theocracy, which has abused history in a thousand ways, to claim the moral high ground, giving it an unearned advantage over Washington and the West, even in situations that have nothing to do with 1953 and in which Iran’s behavior is the sole cause of the conflict, such as the negotiations over the Iranian nuclear program. . . . "

That's like saying that invading Iraq benefitted the Iranians more than the U.S....oh wait that is true.
 
"..the CIA’s impact on the events of 1953 was ultimately insignificant. Regardless of anything the United States did or did not do, Mosaddeq was bound to fall and the shah was bound to retain his throne and expand his power....'

That is like saying that if John Wilkes Boothe hadn't shot Lincoln, someone else would have done it. Even if that is accurate it doesn't make our interference moral or a good strategy nor does it make the Iranian's outrage over our interference misguided.
 
"..the CIA’s impact on the events of 1953 was ultimately insignificant. Regardless of anything the United States did or did not do, Mosaddeq was bound to fall and the shah was bound to retain his throne and expand his power....'

That is like saying that if John Wilkes Boothe hadn't shot Lincoln, someone else would have done it. Even if that is accurate it doesn't make our interference moral or a good strategy nor does it make the Iranian's outrage over our interference misguided.

Try reading the article before gracing us with your opinion. In fact, the appropriate analogy would be a discovery that in reality JWB did not shoot Lincoln.
 
Very interesting read, but I think the OP is leaving out some juicy tidbits. Fortunately, I love this stuff.

By that point, however, Washington was already actively considering a plan the British had developed to push Mosaddeq aside. The British intelligence agency, MI6, had identified and reached out to a network of anti-Mosaddeq figures who would be willing to take action against the prime minster with covert American and British support. Among them was General Fazlollah Zahedi, a well-connected officer who had previously served in Mosaddeq’s cabinet but had left after becoming disillusioned with the prime minister’s leadership and had immersed himself in opposition politics. Given its history of interference in Iran, the British government also boasted an array of intelligence sources, including members of parliament and journalists, whom it had subsidized and cultivated. London could also count on a number of influential bazaar merchants who, in turn, had at their disposal thugs willing to instigate violent street protests.

The CIA took a rather dim view of these British agents, believing that they were “far overstated and oversold.” Nevertheless, by May, the agency had embraced the basic outlines of a British plan to engineer the overthrow of Mosaddeq. The U.S. embassy in Tehran was also on board: in a cable to Washington, Henderson assured the Eisenhower administration that “most Iranian politicians friendly to the West would welcome secret American intervention which would assist them in attaining their individual or group political ambitions.”

The joint U.S.-British plot for covert action was code-named TPAJAX. Zahedi emerged as the linchpin of the plan, as the Americans and the British saw him as Mosaddeq’s most formidable rival. The plot called for the CIA and MI6 to launch a propaganda campaign aimed at raising doubts about Mosaddeq, paying journalists to write stories critical of the prime minister, charging that he was corrupt, power hungry, and even of Jewish descent -- a crude attempt to exploit anti-Semitic prejudices, which the Western intelligence agencies wrongly believed were common in Iran at the time. Meanwhile, a network of Iranian operatives working for the Americans and the British would organize demonstrations and protests and encourage street gangs and tribal leaders to provoke their followers into committing acts of violence against state institutions. All this was supposed to further inflame the already unstable situation in the country and thus pave the way for the shah to dismiss Mosaddeq.

...

But enlisting the Iranian monarch proved more difficult than the Americans and the British had initially anticipated. On the surface, the shah seemed receptive to the plot, as he distrusted and even disdained his prime minister. But he was also clearly reluctant to do anything to further destabilize his country. The shah was a tentative man by nature and required much reassurance before embarking on a risky course. The CIA did manage to persuade his twin sister, Princess Ashraf, to press its case with her brother, however. Also urging the shah to act were General Norman Schwarzkopf, Sr., a U.S. military officer who had trained Iran’s police force and enjoyed a great deal of influence in the country, and Kermit Roosevelt, Jr., a CIA official who had helped devise the plot. Finally, on August 13, 1953, the shah signed a royal decree dismissing Mosaddeq and appointing Zahedi as the new prime minister.

Zahedi and his supporters wanted to make sure that Mosaddeq received the decree in person and thus waited for more than two days before sending the shah’s imperial guards to deliver the order to the prime minister’s residence at a time when Zahedi was certain Mosaddeq would be there. By that time, however, someone had tipped Mosaddeq off. He refused to accept the order and instead had his security detail arrest the men the shah had sent. Zahedi went into hiding, and the shah fled the country, going first to Iraq and then to Italy. The plot, it seemed, had failed. Mosaddeq took to the airwaves, claiming that he had disarmed a coup, while neglecting to mention that the shah had dismissed him from office. Indeed, it was Mosaddeq, not the shah or his foreign backers, who failed to abide by Iran’s constitution.

After the apparent failure of the coup, a mood of resignation descended on Washington and London. According to an internal review prepared by the CIA in 1954, after Mosaddeq’s refusal to follow the shah’s order, the U.S. Department of State determined that the operation had been “tried and failed,” and the official British position was equally glum: “We must regret that we cannot consider going on fighting.” General Walter Bedell Smith, Eisenhower’s confidant and wartime chief of staff, who was now serving as undersecretary of state, had the unenviable task of informing the president. In a note to Eisenhower, Smith wrote:

The move failed. . . . Actually, it was a counter-coup, as the Shah acted within his constitutional power in signing the [decree] replacing Mosaddeq. The old boy wouldn’t accept this and arrested the messenger and everybody else involved that he could get his hands on. We now have to take a whole new look at the Iranian situation and probably have to snuggle up to Mosaddeq if we’re going to save anything there.

...

In the aftermath of the failed coup, chaos reigned in Tehran and political fortunes shifted quickly. The Tudeh Party felt that its time had finally come, and its members poured into the streets, waving red flags and destroying symbols of the monarchy. The more radical members of the National Front, such as Foreign Minister Hossein Fatemi, also joined the fray with their own denunciations of the shah.

...

Mosaddeq was a principled politician with deep reverence for Iran’s institutions and constitutional order. He had spent his entire public life defending the rule of law and the separation of powers. But the pressures of governing during a crisis accentuated troubling aspects of his character. His need for popular acclaim blinded him to compromises that could have resolved the oil conflict with the United Kingdom and thus protected Iran’s economy. Worse, by 1953, Mosaddeq -- the constitutional parliamentarian and champion of democratic reform -- had turned into a populist demagogue: rigging referendums, intimidating his rivals, disbanding parliament, and demanding special powers.

Popular lore gets two things right: Mosaddeq was indeed a tragic figure, and a victim. But his tragedy was that he couldn’t find a way out of a predicament that he himself was largely responsible for creating. And more than anyone else, he was a victim of himself.
 
Try reading the article before gracing us with your opinion. In fact, the appropriate analogy would be a discovery that in reality JWB did not shoot Lincoln.

"..in reality JWB did not shoot Lincoln?" Seriously, is that's your analogy to the OP? :lamo
 
In the context of a reply to that poster, the analogy is precise and appropriate.:peace


Then I'll look forward to your explanation to that poster why it is an appropriate analogy. Because as it stands it just looks like you're trying to rewrite history.
 
Then I'll look forward to your explanation to that poster why it is an appropriate analogy. Because as it stands it just looks like you're trying to rewrite history.

The OP author takes the position that everything people think they know about Iran in 1953 is wrong. In the context of the post to which I replied, which introduced the Lincoln assassination into the discussion, the appropriate analogy would be a discovery that JWB did not, in fact, shoot Lincoln.:peace
 
The OP author takes the position that everything people think they know about Iran in 1953 is wrong. In the context of the post to which I replied, which introduced the Lincoln assassination into the discussion, the appropriate analogy would be a discovery that JWB did not, in fact, shoot Lincoln.:peace
Well it is well documented that JWB did in fact shoot Lincoln, so based on that analogy the premise of your OP is in fact, false.
 
Well it is well documented that JWB did in fact shoot Lincoln, so based on that analogy the premise of your OP is in fact, false.


The exchange was in "as if" mode. Now that you're done plumbing the shallows, care to discuss the topic?
 
Even the CIA admits we took part in the coup. C'mon...
 
Even the CIA admits we took part in the coup. C'mon...

From the OP:

"In reality, the CIA’s impact on the events of 1953 was ultimately insignificant. Regardless of anything the United States did or did not do, Mosaddeq was bound to fall and the shah was bound to retain his throne and expand his power."
 
As does the OP author. He concludes it didn't matter, and what happened would have happened anyway.:peace

Sot he CIA partook in a coup which it didnt have to. But it did because of BP oil interests and fear of a fake "communist organization" but in reality Mossadegh was a Social-democrat. Which after the overthrow lead to the US installing a authoritarian leader who ruled with an iron fist, which then lead to the Iranian revolution against his (the Shah) authoritarian rule. *muah!* freedom!
 
From the OP:

"In reality, the CIA’s impact on the events of 1953 was ultimately insignificant. Regardless of anything the United States did or did not do, Mosaddeq was bound to fall and the shah was bound to retain his throne and expand his power."

No he wasnt bound to fall. Just because you have a protest movement against your rule does not mean you are "bound to fall".
 
Sot he CIA partook in a coup which it didnt have to. But it did because of BP oil interests and fear of a fake "communist organization" but in reality Mossadegh was a Social-democrat. Which after the overthrow lead to the US installing a authoritarian leader who ruled with an iron fist, which then lead to the Iranian revolution against his (the Shah) authoritarian rule. *muah!* freedom!

No he wasnt bound to fall. Just because you have a protest movement against your rule does not mean you are "bound to fall".

Waving your arms and raising your voice doesn't make your argument any more convincing.:peace
 
Waving your arms and raising your voice doesn't make your argument any more convincing.:peace

The move against Mossadegh was widely unpopular. The move to nationalize Iranians oil was overwhelmingly popular. The overthrow of Mossadegh was a rallying point against the Shah years later. How are you going to say his government failed?
 
The exchange was in "as if" mode. Now that you're done plumbing the shallows, care to discuss the topic?


As if? In the OP you claimed that "almost "everything" that "everyone knows" about the 1953 fall of Mossadegh and rise of the Shah is wrong." You seemed so **** sure even though it would've been easy to prove you wrong...and now you want to argue "what if". What for?
 
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