But lets look what Israeli academics, and the head of the Shin Bet:
In an especially insightful analysis of Palestinian decision-making, the academic Yezid Sayigh suggested Arafat's approach was the exact opposite: "Contrary to the Israeli account, [Arafat's] behaviour since the start of the intifada has reflected not the existence of a prior strategy based on the use of force, but the absence of any strategy."5 Ami Ayalon, former head of Israel's Shin Bet (General Security Service), was clear: "Yasser Arafat neither prepared nor triggered the Intifada."6 Menachem Klein, an Israeli academic, agreed: "[t]here is no evidence whatsoever that there was any such pre-planned decision by the Palestinian Authority."7 Much of the evidence often cited for a PA-led uprising was misconstrued, as I explain in discussing Palestinian and Israeli military preparations in section three below.
And there is more:
"Arafat said he warned Barak that Sharon's impending visit might cause unrest. Palestinian and U.S. officials urged then Prime Minister Ehud Barak to prohibit the visit."14 PLC Speaker Ahmed Qurei opposed the visit: "The timing is not suitable . . .. It will provoke problems."15 Faisal Husseini, the late Palestinian representative in East Jerusalem, phoned an Israeli negotiator, Yisrael Hasson, and warned against the visit fearing it would ignite the territories. "The warning was relayed to the most senior echelons."16Leaders of the Islamic Movement "adamantly oppose the idea of Sharon visiting the holy site and have asked Barak to stop Sharon from carrying out his 'provocative' plan."17 Ben-Ami claimed Jibril Rajoub, a top Palestinian security official on the West Bank, approved the visit to the Temple Mount/Noble Sanctuary as long as Sharon did not enter the two mosques. Rajoub denied this version. Rajoub's position is backed up by comments he made to theJerusalem Post on the eve of Sharon's visit: "The visit is a provocation which will trigger bloodshed and confrontation . . . Sharon is putting oil on fire." He added: "If Sharon tries to enter the Haram a-Sharif, the Moslems will stop him."18 In short, "Many among the Palestinian leadership sought the assistance of their Israeli counterparts to prevent Sharon's visit. They were turned down."19"
That doesnt sound like a leader and his associates who want to stir up violence. This looks like people who were trying to stop violence from exploding....
Also speaking directly to your Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs source which speaks to many militant groups and the rhetoric they use. You can find it under section "Military Preparations" subsection "Palestinians". Link is here:
https://journals.lib.unb.ca/index.php/jcs/article/view/220/378
But to sum up in response to the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs: "The signal one intends to send may be very different from the one that is received. More generally, this case illuminates the operation of a classic spiral of insecurity and two factors that might exacerbate the spiral, namely misperceptions about the relative importance of domestic and external factors for understanding one's adversary, and the linkage of diplomacy to the threat to use force.. Two other factors helped fuel the spiral. Actors may misunderstand the balance between domestic and external motivations for policy. Rather than an intense factional struggle, Israel saw Palestinian militarization as a PA policy aimed at Israel. What the Tanzim did was seen as part of the PA and Arafat's Fatah rather than as a challenge to Arafat and the PA. Klein said there was "total blindness" in Israel to the reality of this Palestinian factionalism.103Israel mistakenly saw the Palestinians as a unitary actor. Israel's reading of Palestinian action, in turn, fed the escalatory spiral of military preparations. The final implication is a reminder of the risks of a policy that links diplomacy with the threat to use force. Some Palestinians implicitly followed Carl von Clausewitz's famous dictum: "War is the continuation of politics by other means."104 Threats to use force, however, may undermine diplomacy, as was the case here. Israel probably saw the Palestinian threat of violence as an alternative to diplomacy; they did not see the two as inter-related. In other words, Israel probably assumed the Palestinian militants preferred to resort to force rather than an Israeli withdrawal to the 4 June 1967 lines."
-It was not a well planed Arafat, Palestinian Authority conspiratorial uprising.