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The Invisible Hand? A Quick Survey (1 Viewer)

Xerographica

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Thought I'd post a quick survey to see just how many of you actually understand how the invisible hand works.

If taxpayers were allowed to directly allocate their individual taxes among the various government organizations (GOs) at anytime throughout the year...how would the allocation of limited public resources compare with the current allocation?

1. Would the allocation be...

A. A lot less efficient
B. Less efficient
C. Equally efficient
D. More efficient
E. A lot more efficient

2. Would it be possible for any GOs to be over/underfunded? (Yes/No...please explain)

3. Please explain whether it is possible for planners to guarantee the best possible use of limited resources.

4. Does the invisible hand determine the allocation of resources in the non-profit sector?

5. Please provide one example from your life of the opportunity cost concept


After you submit your reply please read this article to see just how well you understand the invisible hand concept... A Marvel of Cooperation: How Order Emerges without a Conscious Planner

This public service survey was brought to you by pragmatarianism.
 
You don't vote if you don't pay taxes?
 
The invisible hand is the concept that, in a free market, only those companies that comply with the public's demands would thrive. Meaning, no regulations would be needed to protect consumers, or their environments, because we would not shop at places that endanger either. Etc etc.


Is THAT what you mean?
 
Answer is None of the above

What the effect would be is that taxpayers money would go to the areas that individual taxpayers feel is the most important to that individual taxpayer. It will have no impact on how efficiently those services are delivered without extra forces being applied.

If for example said taxpayer has the ability to direct funding to three different groups providing police services, then efficiency would most likely improve, but if the choice is between police services and say road maintanance then efficiency will not improve. Efficiency is improved through the competition of different entities fighting for the same funding for the same services or goods, or through very good managment policies (which tends to be temporary.


Your plan would ensure that funding is more representative of individual taxpayer wishes, but it by itself will not improve efficiency
 
Lord Tammerlain, my question was how would the pragmatarian allocation differ from the current allocation. Your response was none of the above...but then you went on to describe choice 1(D) or 1(E). For example, let's say that last year the war on drugs received $15 billion dollars. That is the current allocation as decided by congress. Under a pragmatarian system the amount of funding that the drug war received would reflect exactly how much society valued the drug war...relative to all the other public goods.

The problem is that nearly everybody believes that votes effectively convey value. If you vote for the drug war and for a secure border then congress only knows that you value those two public goods...but it has no idea exactly how much you value those public goods. The only way that we can objectively determine exact value is by forcing you to decide how to divvy your taxes between the two public goods. The more money you spend on one public good the less money you have for the other public good. This is the opportunity cost concept.

The contradiction in your response seems to indicate that you're not familiar with allocation efficiency.

In terms of productive efficiency...simply put, people want the most bang for their buck. This is reflected by the popularity of non-profit organizations whose sole mission is to rate the efficiency of the various non-profit organizations. If a government organization (GO) has a monopoly in providing a public good...then the people who value this public good will be strongly motivated to exert considerable pressure for that GO to operate more efficiently. If that GO does not improve its efficiency then it's entirely possible that these supporters will seriously consider starting a non-profit organization dedicated to efficient provision of the same public good.
 
You don't vote if you don't pay taxes?
Would it not be better if you were disqualified from voting if you receive over 1/2 of your nonworking income/benefits from the government you want to vote in the elections of ?
 
Lord Tammerlain, my question was how would the pragmatarian allocation differ from the current allocation. Your response was none of the above...but then you went on to describe choice 1(D) or 1(E). For example, let's say that last year the war on drugs received $15 billion dollars. That is the current allocation as decided by congress. Under a pragmatarian system the amount of funding that the drug war received would reflect exactly how much society valued the drug war...relative to all the other public goods.

The problem is that nearly everybody believes that votes effectively convey value. If you vote for the drug war and for a secure border then congress only knows that you value those two public goods...but it has no idea exactly how much you value those public goods. The only way that we can objectively determine exact value is by forcing you to decide how to divvy your taxes between the two public goods. The more money you spend on one public good the less money you have for the other public good. This is the opportunity cost concept.

The contradiction in your response seems to indicate that you're not familiar with allocation efficiency.

In terms of productive efficiency...simply put, people want the most bang for their buck. This is reflected by the popularity of non-profit organizations whose sole mission is to rate the efficiency of the various non-profit organizations. If a government organization (GO) has a monopoly in providing a public good...then the people who value this public good will be strongly motivated to exert considerable pressure for that GO to operate more efficiently. If that GO does not improve its efficiency then it's entirely possible that these supporters will seriously consider starting a non-profit organization dedicated to efficient provision of the same public good.

Your use of the word efficiency in this case is different then mine. I use the term efficiency as how productive is the use of the resources are. Does group A build roads more efficiently then group B

Not as does building roads meet my desires more effectively then providing fire protection services


As for my use of the word efficiency. Tax allocation will not cause an increase in efficiency unless taxes can be withheld to allow the person to direct that money to the NPO's rather then the government. One is not going to fund the government, then ontop of that spend more money on services the government supplies with their tax dollar. I am not going to pay twice to fund the government provided fire DP and then spend more money on an NPO Fire DP. Only if I could withhold the money to be paid in taxes and instead spend it on the NPO Fire DP would an increase in efficiency be realized. The FDP could possibly have effective compition if enough people in a certain geographical area decided to support the NGO FD
 
Would it not be better if you were disqualified from voting if you receive over 1/2 of your nonworking income/benefits from the government you want to vote in the elections of ?

So prevent the majority of seniors from voting
 
So prevent the majority of seniors from voting
I do not wish to see anyone that is a citizen prevented from voting. I have reservations about why some vote the way they do (dependent upon largesses from the government treasury), but other than verifying voter validity and preventing fraud no ones right to vote should be otherwise questioned. Now if you mean to imply that asking this question means I support the idea then it is your own assumptions that are questionable !
 
Lord Tammerlain, my question was how would the pragmatarian allocation differ from the current allocation. Your response was none of the above...but then you went on to describe choice 1(D) or 1(E). For example, let's say that last year the war on drugs received $15 billion dollars. That is the current allocation as decided by congress. Under a pragmatarian system the amount of funding that the drug war received would reflect exactly how much society valued the drug war...relative to all the other public goods.

The problem is that nearly everybody believes that votes effectively convey value. If you vote for the drug war and for a secure border then congress only knows that you value those two public goods...but it has no idea exactly how much you value those public goods. The only way that we can objectively determine exact value is by forcing you to decide how to divvy your taxes between the two public goods. The more money you spend on one public good the less money you have for the other public good. This is the opportunity cost concept.

The contradiction in your response seems to indicate that you're not familiar with allocation efficiency.

In terms of productive efficiency...simply put, people want the most bang for their buck. This is reflected by the popularity of non-profit organizations whose sole mission is to rate the efficiency of the various non-profit organizations. If a government organization (GO) has a monopoly in providing a public good...then the people who value this public good will be strongly motivated to exert considerable pressure for that GO to operate more efficiently. If that GO does not improve its efficiency then it's entirely possible that these supporters will seriously consider starting a non-profit organization dedicated to efficient provision of the same public good.

The problem with this stance is that you want taxpayers to base their allotment of taxes based on the value they have a public service, but there's a difference between the perceived value and the actual value of a public service.
 
You don't vote if you don't pay taxes?

If one was reliant on another then every soldier's absentee ballots should count . . . and they don't.

And if one was reliant on another then polling stations should provide childcare and more ideal accessibility for those who are disabled, etc - as well as using reliable methods of polling
 
Lord Tammerlain, people's allocation decisions in the private sector would influence their allocation decisions in the public sector. If they donate money to the Red Cross then they might not allocate any of their taxes to FEMA. If FEMA did not cut costs and operate as efficiently as the Red Cross then it might go extinct. As the scope of government narrowed so too would the tax rate.

Just because you might not make any donations to a NPO FD doesn't necessarily mean that nobody else would. If the NPO FD was completely operated and run by volunteers then its costs would be lower than a GO FD that had to pay wages and benefits to its employees. Personally I have no idea how many anarcho-capitalists there are but I'm sure they would actively try to put as many GOs "out of business" as they possibly could in order to try and realize their dream of a 0% tax world.

Of course, socialists would attempt to realize their dream of a 100% tax world. Every citizen would benefit when the two sides of the scope of government spectrum competed to either narrow or broaden the scope of government.
 
The problem with this stance is that you want taxpayers to base their allotment of taxes based on the value they have a public service, but there's a difference between the perceived value and the actual value of a public service.

Errr...I've been waiting so patiently hoping that you would quantify the difference between the two values. But the suspense is just killing me!

So how do you objectively calculate the actual value of a public service when every single person values every single public service differently?
 
Lord Tammerlain, people's allocation decisions in the private sector would influence their allocation decisions in the public sector. If they donate money to the Red Cross then they might not allocate any of their taxes to FEMA. If FEMA did not cut costs and operate as efficiently as the Red Cross then it might go extinct. As the scope of government narrowed so too would the tax rate.
Just because you might not make any donations to a NPO FD doesn't necessarily mean that nobody else would. If the NPO FD was completely operated and run by volunteers then its costs would be lower than a GO FD that had to pay wages and benefits to its employees. Personally I have no idea how many anarcho-capitalists there are but I'm sure they would actively try to put as many GOs "out of business" as they possibly could in order to try and realize their dream of a 0% tax world.

Of course, socialists would attempt to realize their dream of a 100% tax world. Every citizen would benefit when the two sides of the scope of government spectrum competed to either narrow or broaden the scope of government.

The bold is my point

Without the cut in taxes/funding (overall) government services will not have pressures to become more efficient,
 
Lord Tammerlain, here are the two main forces...
  1. people want the most bang for their buck
  2. the government produces less public goods for more bucks
In a pragmatarian system these two forces will go head to head. This will create a high level of tension...something will have to give. Either people will stop wanting more bang for their buck...or GOs will operate more efficiently.

Obviously we can't allow people to choose not to pay taxes...and we can't let them choose how much taxes that they'll pay. But we can let them choose which GOs receive their individual taxes at anytime through the year. Taxpayers' allocation choices will be determined by their values and one value that all taxpayers have in common is the strong desire not to have their hard earned money be wasted.

Right now taxpayers can see that their taxes are being wasted but there's little that they can do about it. Pragmatarianism will empower taxpayers to withhold their individual taxes from the most wasteful GOs. These GOs will either adapt and operate efficiently or they will go extinct.
 
If taxpayers were allowed to directly allocate their individual taxes among the various government organizations (GOs) at anytime throughout the year...how would the allocation of limited public resources compare with the current allocation?

1. Would the allocation be...

A. A lot less efficient
B. Less efficient
C. Equally efficient
D. More efficient
E. A lot more efficient

I'm afraid I don't understand the question. Are taxpayers allowed to send their tax dollars to the GO of their choice? Are they just sending their tax dollars to the govt at any time of the year, versus all at one time? Your question is worded overly technically but with limited information. Please simplify with less jargon.

2. Would it be possible for any GOs to be over/underfunded? (Yes/No...please explain)

Again, I don't understand the question being asked. Please explain.

3. Please explain whether it is possible for planners to guarantee the best possible use of limited resources.

Are you speaking of long-term or short-term? What do you consider the "best use"? This seems like a loaded question, honestly. If you asking in general, if government can perfectly allocate resources where they are most efficiently used, then no. But no one expects that in the real world.

4. Does the invisible hand determine the allocation of resources in the non-profit sector?

The laws of supply and demand are are little different in the non-profit sector. Since many non-profits are funded in large part by donations, you are considering a different type of value placed on that donation. People don't just give money to McDonalds without expecting a hamburger, but people do give money to United Way expecting nothing but helping the less fortunate and the sense of chairty. That is a type of value, but not in the type I think you are speaking of.

5. Please provide one example from your life of the opportunity cost concept.

I choose to go to school in stead of work full time. I am giving up what I pay for college, plus what I would have made working full time in exchange for the long term return of (hopefully) higher wages due to my degree.
 
Lord Tammerlain, people's allocation decisions in the private sector would influence their allocation decisions in the public sector. If they donate money to the Red Cross then they might not allocate any of their taxes to FEMA. If FEMA did not cut costs and operate as efficiently as the Red Cross then it might go extinct. As the scope of government narrowed so too would the tax rate.

Just because you might not make any donations to a NPO FD doesn't necessarily mean that nobody else would. If the NPO FD was completely operated and run by volunteers then its costs would be lower than a GO FD that had to pay wages and benefits to its employees. Personally I have no idea how many anarcho-capitalists there are but I'm sure they would actively try to put as many GOs "out of business" as they possibly could in order to try and realize their dream of a 0% tax world.

Of course, socialists would attempt to realize their dream of a 100% tax world. Every citizen would benefit when the two sides of the scope of government spectrum competed to either narrow or broaden the scope of government.

I think thats the point. No one individual or groups ideology would be fully served. But the average goal of the population would be met.

Maybe rather than voting on it at the voting booth, it should be done on the income tax form. Everyone allocates their share of income taxes to go to what they desire it to go towards. So someone who pays a lot in taxes would have more decision making power than someone who pays no taxes or little in taxes. Sounds fair on the surface, after all, it is their tax money.

My issue with the idea is that most people are morons. It's a tough call between letting a population of morons control our government spending and letting a population of egotistical politions who have been bought off by campain contributions and illegal bribes and promises to control our spending. Sounds like tit for tat to me.
 
Lord Tammerlain, here are the two main forces...
  1. people want the most bang for their buck
  2. the government produces less public goods for more bucks
In a pragmatarian system these two forces will go head to head. This will create a high level of tension...something will have to give. Either people will stop wanting more bang for their buck...or GOs will operate more efficiently.

Obviously we can't allow people to choose not to pay taxes...and we can't let them choose how much taxes that they'll pay. But we can let them choose which GOs receive their individual taxes at anytime through the year. Taxpayers' allocation choices will be determined by their values and one value that all taxpayers have in common is the strong desire not to have their hard earned money be wasted.

Right now taxpayers can see that their taxes are being wasted but there's little that they can do about it. Pragmatarianism will empower taxpayers to withhold their individual taxes from the most wasteful GOs. These GOs will either adapt and operate efficiently or they will go extinct.


The faluire to allow people to withhold taxes is where your idea falls down

Lets say my taxes are $10 000 dollars a year, the only GO that I feel is efficient is the roads department, so I put 90% of my taxes to that area. Lets also say the vast majority of people do the same. The Roads Department will all of sudden have an influx of money, with very little incentive to use it effectively or efficiently. The other GO's will be starved for cash and be unable to provide services effectively, what they do provide might be efficiently provided, but the amount of services they provide would be curtailed drasticallty. Now I would have to use extra money to cover the services that previously were funded by tax dollars. I will in effect have to pay twice for the services I used to pay for once before. This will cost me more then just the $10 000 I paid in taxes before.

Only if I could withhold some of the taxes would the overall government face the need to become more efficient, by just transferring same amount around some departments may become efficient, others less. The net effect would be (other then year to year chaos as budgets would vary drastically) no real benifit in efficiency, if not an overall decrease in efficiency and overall cost effectiveness for the tax payer (which taxpayer will want to pay twice for security services, once to the Government and once to a private supplier). The fact that one year could see budgets rise or fall by 20%, would ensure a high level of staff turnover, meaning increased training costs and less overall knowledgable employees.

The only true means to ensure efficiency in government services is to allow people to withhold the tax revenues that would be applied to those services, and instead direct them to non government providers. Dont like the School system, direct the money that you would have paid in school taxes to charter schools. Dont like the Police department, direct the money to a private security company to provide the protection you require. The direct withhold of the tax revenues will ensure that other GO do not gain extra money and become inefficient, the higher level of competition will cause the differing GO and NGO to become more efficient in order to provide the best service for the price.
 
So how do you objectively calculate the actual value of a public service when every single person values every single public service differently?

I'm tired at the moment, so I'm not in the right state of mind to fully state the difference.


But I intuitively think it's a bad idea. I think citizens would be too likely to pay according to their emotions, and would be less likely to pay for "less sexier" programs.

See, I favor professional politicians. I favor them because as they serve in various political offices they gain experience in how policies work. Thus, they can better fashion policies for their constituents.

Another reason why I don't like citizen allocation of tax revenue is because it means that government agencies don't know how much money they'll get from one year to the next. It is very difficult to do long-term planning when you don't know if you'll have the budget to pay for your employees or staff from one year to the next. That's an incredibly slipshod way of running a government.
 
1 RadicalModerate...taxpayers can 1. choose which GOs receive their taxes and 2. directly pay their taxes to the various GOs at anytime throughout the year.

3 It's not a loaded question...the answer is "no". But the answer can be "yes" simply by allowing taxpayers to allocate their individual taxes among the various government organizations.

4 Yes, that's the same type of value that I am speaking of. The laws of supply and demand can be applied to government organizations just like they are applied to non-profit organizations.

5Thanks for being the first to offer an example of the opportunity cost concept. When each and every taxpayer is forced to consider the opportunity costs of their tax allocation decisions then we can guarantee the best possible use of limited public resources.
 
imagep, rather than allocating their taxes on their tax form...taxpayers would directly submit their taxes to the various GO websites. Each GO website would have a fund-raising progress bar and GOs would send notice of payment to the IRS.

Yeah, I agree that most people are morons...but morons generally don't have to pay a lot of taxes. There's actually a very strong correlation between education and income.

What's super moronic is our current system. Voters say that want more public goods and less taxes. Candidates that promise both are elected. Our current level of debt is a tribute to how unsustainable our system is.
 
Lord Tammerlain, the basic problem with your example is that we all have different sets of values. We don't all purchase the exact same private goods and we definitely wouldn't all purchase the same exact public goods. So it's unlikely that one GO will have an influx of funding above and beyond its value to taxpayers.

As I already mentioned, people being able to withhold money from the most inefficient GOs will put pressure on those GOs to become more efficient. Right now there are already plenty of people who "double pay". For example, people donate to all types of welfare NPOs but then also have to pay taxes to welfare GOs. The motto of the Salvation Army is "Doing the most good". If somebody donates to an NPO that they believe is "doing the most good" then why would they want to allocate their taxes to a GO that isn't doing as much good in the same area?

My method and your method would have the exact same results...but your method would achieve the results in less time. The drawback of your method is that people would pay less taxes. I know that people would still pay the same amount of money to public good through donations to NPOs...but liberals would hear "less taxes" and instinctively oppose it. Personally as a pragmatarian I could care less whether an organization is public or private...what matters most is results.

It's kind of confusing because we're both using the term "withholding" somewhat differently. Perhaps we can refer to your type of withholding as "tax substitution". You're advocating that people can substitute taxes to GOs for donations to NPOs. So if you donated $5000 to NPOs then your taxes would only be $5000. Of course, not all NPOs would qualify for tax substitution...just the ones that a reasonable amount of people agree should qualify.
 
samsmart, the core values of taxpayers would not significantly change from year to year so it's fairly unlikely that the allocation of taxes would vary that greatly from year to year.

In a pragmatarian system you would certainly be allowed, and encouraged, to favor congress simply by allocating all of your taxes to congress. The tax allocation decisions of congress in themselves are a public good. So if you did not trust your ability to discern shortages of the public goods that you valued then you would just allocate your taxes to congress.

Given that I wouldn't obstruct your ability to support the public goods that you value...what justification do you have for obstructing my ability to support the public goods that I value?
 
Lord Tammerlain, the basic problem with your example is that we all have different sets of values. We don't all purchase the exact same private goods and we definitely wouldn't all purchase the same exact public goods. So it's unlikely that one GO will have an influx of funding above and beyond its value to taxpayers.
If the shifts in spending is not going to see some GO with an increase in revenues and others with a decrease in revenues your entire suggestion is meaningless. If I have $10000 dollars in tax revenue to spread around and I take some away from what I feel is an inefficient GO, it has to go somewhere else. If that somewhere else is an efficient and effective GO, it does not need more money and giving it more will make it inefficient
As I already mentioned, people being able to withhold money from the most inefficient GOs will put pressure on those GOs to become more efficient. Right now there are already plenty of people who "double pay". For example, people donate to all types of welfare NPOs but then also have to pay taxes to welfare GOs. The motto of the Salvation Army is "Doing the most good". If somebody donates to an NPO that they believe is "doing the most good" then why would they want to allocate their taxes to a GO that isn't doing as much good in the same area?
People donate to Sally Ann not because government funded social assistance (homeless shelters) are inefficient, but because government funded social assistance is not enough to cover the problem. People in this case double pay because they feel what they pay in taxes is not covering the needs of the services. Few people double pay for services that are receiving large amounts of government funding, and those are the areas people want to be funded in the first place. Most taxpayers would at the local level at least complain about funding homeless shelters at the same rate the fire department is funded
My method and your method would have the exact same results...but your method would achieve the results in less time. The drawback of your method is that people would pay less taxes. I know that people would still pay the same amount of money to public good through donations to NPOs...but liberals would hear "less taxes" and instinctively oppose it. Personally as a pragmatarian I could care less whether an organization is public or private...what matters most is results.

It's kind of confusing because we're both using the term "withholding" somewhat differently. Perhaps we can refer to your type of withholding as "tax substitution". You're advocating that people can substitute taxes to GOs for donations to NPOs. So if you donated $5000 to NPOs then your taxes would only be $5000. Of course, not all NPOs would qualify for tax substitution...just the ones that a reasonable amount of people agree should qualify.

It is my opinion your method would not increase efficiency of government operations for two main reasons

1. Budgeting inefficiency. Large organizations to operate effectively need budgetting stability from year to year. If one year I had to fire 20% of the staff and close down 10% of the office space because of budget cuts the organization would become quite lean, but probably not as effective in providing services. If the next year the budget goes up 25% and I have to train new people to do the job, effeciency will go down as training takes time and reduces effeciency compared to trained and skilled staff.

2. Overall Stable revenues. The government would still have the same overall revenues. A reduction in funding for one department would be met by an increase in funding for another. The potential increase in efficiency for the one department do to lower funding could be met with a decrease in efficiency by the department with extra funding. The department with extra funding might buy new equipment that is unneeded just to use up the funding, they might provide excess wage and salary increases to their staff, or they may hire unneeded new employess again only because they have the excess money
 
Given that I wouldn't obstruct your ability to support the public goods that you value...what justification do you have for obstructing my ability to support the public goods that I value?

In 510 BC, the Greek city-state of Athens developed its system of direct democracy. One of the Greeks who was a boy at this time was Themistocles.

In 492 BC, the Persian Empire went on its first invasion of Greece. This invasion was halted at the Battle of Marathon in 490 BC by the citizens of Athens. Themistocles took part in this battle, and was possibly a Strategoi, or general.

Themistocles, in the later years, became a politician in Athens. He always advocated Athens becoming a major naval power, both in order to protect themselves from hostile powers and to project their own power throughout the Mediterranean. However, because Athens was governed by a direct democracy, Themistocles had to get a majority of the citizens to agree with that, especially since the Athenians themselves would have to row the boats and man them - an expensive proposition since every Athenian who was a rower was one less Athenian growing crops.

It should also be noted that the Athenians used as a check against politicians the practice of "ostracism." Every year, the citizens would vote whether or not they wanted to perform an ostracism. If they voted, "yes," every citizen was required to write on a shard of pottery the name of a politician they wanted banished from the city for 10 years. These shards were put into urns. The urns were emptied and the names were counted. Whoever got the most votes, and as long as that person got 6,000 votes, that politician was exiled.

So politicians of Athens had a very good incentive to not be too unpopular with their citizenry. Thus, should a politician propose an unpopular policy, even though it may be necessary for the city to undergo, they could face banishment.

In 483 BC, a massive new seam of silver was discovered at Laurium, which was controlled by the city of Athens. When the citizens were debating what should be done with this newfound wealth, of the two camps were Aristides and Themistocles.

Aristides was a rival of Themistocles. Aristides proposed that the silver be mined and that the wealth would be evenly distributed to all the citizens of Athens.

Themistocles, however, wanted to use that wealth to to go to the building of 200 triremes. Themistocles suspected that Persian ambitions on conquering Greece had not yet diminished. He wanted to build a navy that could resist Persia's military might.

But he couldn't ask the citizens to give up this wealth to face the threat of a far-off empire that the Athenians had already repelled. After all, why would the average Greek citizen give up the personal wealth they could put in their own pocket instead for a threat that may never rise against them again? For Themistocles to ask the citizens of Athens to give up that personal wealth would risk him being banished.

So Themistocles decided that he would not mention the threat that Athens faced from Persia. Instead, he said that Athens was at risk from Aegina, an Greek island that was a rival to Athenian interests. Because Aegina was an island city-state, it also developed as a naval power.

So Themistocles lied to the citizenry of Athens.

He was able to convince them to build up a navy to face against the Aeginetans, who were a much closer threat. The silver was spent on ships and the supplementary purchases required to maintain a fleet of ships.

3 years later, in 480 BC, Xerxes I of Persia decided to invade Greece. Luckily, and thanks to the forethought of Themistocles, Athens was able to provide a navy to counter the one the Persians brought with them. With the Spartans holding the Persians at the pass at Thermopylae and the Athenians using their navy to stop the Persians from seeking a maritime route around the pass. Because the Athenian navy was able to maintain maritime dominance, Xerxes was forced to continue his ground attack through Thermopylae. Although the Greek defenders, led by the Spartan king Leonidas, eventually lost the defense of Thermopylae, they killed 20,000 of Xerxes' troops despite being only 5,000 in number. The great cost of this land battle helped to blunt the rest of Xerxes' invasion.

If Themistocles had not lied and had not convinced the citizens of Athens that a naval buildup was in their best collective interests despite the personal loss Xerxes would have been able to bypass the Spartans by sea, and would have had a greater force with which to pitch against the Greeks.

So what justification do I have for obstructing your ability to support the public goods you value?

I justify it by saying that I do not know whether you, or every other citizen of this country, are a good judge of which public goods to support. And that is why we have elected officials to represent us in this manner. And as they gain experience legislating and executing policy, those politicians are likely better judges of the budgeting money for government policies than you or I are.
 

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