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On August 31, 2008, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev set forth the principles behind Russia’s foreign policy in an interview aired on Channel One, Rossia, and NTV. President Medvedev declared:
I will make five principles the foundation for my work in carrying out Russia’s foreign policy.
First, Russia recognizes the primacy of the fundamental principles of international law, which define the relations between civilized peoples. We will build our relations with other countries within the framework of these principles and this concept of international law.
Second, the world should be multi-polar. A single-pole world is unacceptable. Domination is something we cannot allow. We cannot accept a world order in which one country makes all the decisions, even as serious and influential a country as the United States of America. Such a world is unstable and threatened by conflict.
Third, Russia does not want confrontation with any other country. Russia has no intention of isolating itself. We will develop friendly relations with Europe, the United States, and other countries, as much as is possible.
Fourth, protecting the lives and dignity of our citizens, wherever they may be, is an unquestionable priority for our country. Our foreign policy decisions will be based on this need. We will also protect the interests of our business community abroad. It should be clear to all that we will respond to any aggressive acts committed against us.
Finally, fifth, as is the case of other countries, there are regions in which Russia has privileged interests. These regions are home to countries with which we share special historical relations and are bound together as friends and good neighbors. We will pay particular attention to our work in these regions and build friendly ties with these countries, our close neighbors.
These are the principles I will follow in carrying out our foreign policy.
President Medvedev’s rejection of the Krauthammer “Unipolar World” thesis is consistent with former Russian President Putin’s repudiation of that model. On February 10, 2007, President Putin proclaimed at the Munich Conference on Security Policy, “I consider that the unipolar model is not only unacceptable but also impossible in today’s world. And this is not only because if there was individual leadership in today’s—and precisely in today’s—world, then the military, political and economic resources would not suffice. What is even more important is that the model itself is flawed because at its basis there is and can be no moral foundations for modern civilization.”
What President Medvedev’s formulation does is that it asserts that:
• Russia recognizes the value international law can play in establishing agreed principles of conduct.
• Russia sees a multi-polar world. As a consequence, the balance of power remains highly relevant in its conception of 21st century foreign policy doctrine.
• Russia remains open to cooperation and partnership with the West. The extent of partnership and cooperation will be constrained by the national interests of the parties.
• Russia, like the rest of the world’s major powers, has interests that extend beyond its borders. Its critical overseas interests will need to be taken into consideration by the rest of the world. Russia is prepared to defend those critical interests.
In sum, Russia reaffirms the kind of world that is familiar to the pragmatic Realist approach to foreign policy. In that world, the balance of power is seen as a necessary foundation for reducing the risk of major international conflict. Moral principles are helpful, but not a substitute for the balance of power. Collective security, by itself, is a flawed instrument for promoting international peace and stability, as nations’ interests are not universal and the world’s nations’ desire to run risks is not equal. Effective foreign policy is anchored in national interests. Such policy recognizes the differences in national interests that exist among nations and seeks a balancing of such interests so as to accommodate the needs (though not maximum demands) of the world’s nations. Such a policy recognizes that spheres of influence still matter and must be considered, as no single nation can outlaw that reality by itself.
In an insightful op-ed piece in The Times, former British Ambassador to the United States, Christopher Meyer articulates the need for a foreign policy approach based on pragmatic Realism. He writes:
It is useless to say that nationalism and ethnic tribalism have no place in the international relations of the 21st century. If anything the spread of Western-style democracy has amplified their appeal and resonance. The supreme fallacy in foreign policy is to take the world as we would wish it to be and not as it actually is…
Most important of all, Russia and the West need to draw up rules of the road for the 21st century… Something similar [to the arrangement based on recognition of spheres of influence that followed the Congress of Vienna of 1815] is needed today, based again on spheres of influence. Nato must renounce the provocative folly of being open to Georgian or, worse, Ukrainian membership. This strikes at the heart of the Russian national interest and offers no enhanced security to either Tbilisi or Kiev. As for Russia, it must be made unambiguously clear where any revanchist lunge westwards would provoke a military response by Nato.
Ambassador Meyer notes that many today would find such an approach unpalatable. Yet, he explains, “there is no other way to remove the scope for miscalculation, the mother of far too many wars.”
How might that work with respect to Georgia and larger U.S./NATO-Russia relations?
Following the development and implementation of an agreed political process that resolves the status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Georgia’s borders could be guaranteed in what would amount to a tri-party security framework that would be accepted by Georgia, Russia, and the nations that comprise the NATO alliance. While Georgia would remain outside the NATO alliance, its boundaries would be assured by the relevant major powers, including NATO’s members.
That way, Russia’s needs would be respected and Georgia’s territorial integrity that would arise following the agreed political process to settle Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s status would also be safeguarded. Under such an arrangement, Georgia would remain free to pursue deeper political and economic relations with the West. At the same time, it would no longer be perceived along lines of Russia’s historic nightmare as an emerging component of a potentially hostile ring of nations that could collectively pose a threat of strangling Russia. That is Russia’s historic nightmare and that historic fear needs to be considered in diplomatic arrangements that aim to enhance the security and stability of the Caucasus region. Words alone toward the effect that NATO is not hostile to Russia’s interests will not suffice. There is too much historical baggage that needs to be addressed. Later, the tri-party arrangement between Russia, the NATO alliance, and Georgia could serve as a viable model for Ukraine, not to mention other former Soviet states who might desire it.
I will make five principles the foundation for my work in carrying out Russia’s foreign policy.
First, Russia recognizes the primacy of the fundamental principles of international law, which define the relations between civilized peoples. We will build our relations with other countries within the framework of these principles and this concept of international law.
Second, the world should be multi-polar. A single-pole world is unacceptable. Domination is something we cannot allow. We cannot accept a world order in which one country makes all the decisions, even as serious and influential a country as the United States of America. Such a world is unstable and threatened by conflict.
Third, Russia does not want confrontation with any other country. Russia has no intention of isolating itself. We will develop friendly relations with Europe, the United States, and other countries, as much as is possible.
Fourth, protecting the lives and dignity of our citizens, wherever they may be, is an unquestionable priority for our country. Our foreign policy decisions will be based on this need. We will also protect the interests of our business community abroad. It should be clear to all that we will respond to any aggressive acts committed against us.
Finally, fifth, as is the case of other countries, there are regions in which Russia has privileged interests. These regions are home to countries with which we share special historical relations and are bound together as friends and good neighbors. We will pay particular attention to our work in these regions and build friendly ties with these countries, our close neighbors.
These are the principles I will follow in carrying out our foreign policy.
President Medvedev’s rejection of the Krauthammer “Unipolar World” thesis is consistent with former Russian President Putin’s repudiation of that model. On February 10, 2007, President Putin proclaimed at the Munich Conference on Security Policy, “I consider that the unipolar model is not only unacceptable but also impossible in today’s world. And this is not only because if there was individual leadership in today’s—and precisely in today’s—world, then the military, political and economic resources would not suffice. What is even more important is that the model itself is flawed because at its basis there is and can be no moral foundations for modern civilization.”
What President Medvedev’s formulation does is that it asserts that:
• Russia recognizes the value international law can play in establishing agreed principles of conduct.
• Russia sees a multi-polar world. As a consequence, the balance of power remains highly relevant in its conception of 21st century foreign policy doctrine.
• Russia remains open to cooperation and partnership with the West. The extent of partnership and cooperation will be constrained by the national interests of the parties.
• Russia, like the rest of the world’s major powers, has interests that extend beyond its borders. Its critical overseas interests will need to be taken into consideration by the rest of the world. Russia is prepared to defend those critical interests.
In sum, Russia reaffirms the kind of world that is familiar to the pragmatic Realist approach to foreign policy. In that world, the balance of power is seen as a necessary foundation for reducing the risk of major international conflict. Moral principles are helpful, but not a substitute for the balance of power. Collective security, by itself, is a flawed instrument for promoting international peace and stability, as nations’ interests are not universal and the world’s nations’ desire to run risks is not equal. Effective foreign policy is anchored in national interests. Such policy recognizes the differences in national interests that exist among nations and seeks a balancing of such interests so as to accommodate the needs (though not maximum demands) of the world’s nations. Such a policy recognizes that spheres of influence still matter and must be considered, as no single nation can outlaw that reality by itself.
In an insightful op-ed piece in The Times, former British Ambassador to the United States, Christopher Meyer articulates the need for a foreign policy approach based on pragmatic Realism. He writes:
It is useless to say that nationalism and ethnic tribalism have no place in the international relations of the 21st century. If anything the spread of Western-style democracy has amplified their appeal and resonance. The supreme fallacy in foreign policy is to take the world as we would wish it to be and not as it actually is…
Most important of all, Russia and the West need to draw up rules of the road for the 21st century… Something similar [to the arrangement based on recognition of spheres of influence that followed the Congress of Vienna of 1815] is needed today, based again on spheres of influence. Nato must renounce the provocative folly of being open to Georgian or, worse, Ukrainian membership. This strikes at the heart of the Russian national interest and offers no enhanced security to either Tbilisi or Kiev. As for Russia, it must be made unambiguously clear where any revanchist lunge westwards would provoke a military response by Nato.
Ambassador Meyer notes that many today would find such an approach unpalatable. Yet, he explains, “there is no other way to remove the scope for miscalculation, the mother of far too many wars.”
How might that work with respect to Georgia and larger U.S./NATO-Russia relations?
Following the development and implementation of an agreed political process that resolves the status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Georgia’s borders could be guaranteed in what would amount to a tri-party security framework that would be accepted by Georgia, Russia, and the nations that comprise the NATO alliance. While Georgia would remain outside the NATO alliance, its boundaries would be assured by the relevant major powers, including NATO’s members.
That way, Russia’s needs would be respected and Georgia’s territorial integrity that would arise following the agreed political process to settle Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s status would also be safeguarded. Under such an arrangement, Georgia would remain free to pursue deeper political and economic relations with the West. At the same time, it would no longer be perceived along lines of Russia’s historic nightmare as an emerging component of a potentially hostile ring of nations that could collectively pose a threat of strangling Russia. That is Russia’s historic nightmare and that historic fear needs to be considered in diplomatic arrangements that aim to enhance the security and stability of the Caucasus region. Words alone toward the effect that NATO is not hostile to Russia’s interests will not suffice. There is too much historical baggage that needs to be addressed. Later, the tri-party arrangement between Russia, the NATO alliance, and Georgia could serve as a viable model for Ukraine, not to mention other former Soviet states who might desire it.
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