Today, Kosovo’s government is moving to declare that the majority Albanian ethnic territory of Serbia is an independent state. This declaration would follow negotiations in which the Kosovo delegation remained implacable on the point of independence. That implacability is not a model for good faith aimed at reaching a mutually agreed solution. Nevertheless, that outcome is what it is.

In general, such a move that promotes the fragmentation of states can be destabilizing. Long-running conflicts do not necessarily dissipate. Instead, what often begin as conflicts within the domestic affairs of states are transformed into interstate conflicts on account of the breakup of that country into multiple states. In a bid to better protect or advance their own interests, the risk that outside countries could then align themselves with the parties could increase beyond what would be the case were the conflict reserved to a purely domestic internal affair.

In addition, fragmentation that takes place over the objection of one or more of the parties to a conflict, can establish a precedent that encourages separatist movements elsewhere. Such a precedent is of particular concern to Russia given some of the restive areas that lie within its borders. It may also give renewed life to separatist movements in Iraq. A further shift toward disintegration of either country, especially Russia, could have profound, far-reaching adverse consequences.

Nevertheless, Realists in foreign policy understand that there are occasionally situations in which it is not possible to preserve the integrity of a state. In those cases, attempting to hold a state together against the will of its people can make situations worse. Apparently, that appears to be the case with respect to Kosovo.

In the face of Kosovo’s declaration of independence, the United States and European Union should only grant recognition to Kosovo upon firm guarantees that Kosovo will grant full protection and rights of citizenship to its minority populations, including the Serbs, safeguard Serb historic sites, and allow Serbs from neighboring Serbia unrestricted access in visiting those sites. Implicit in that understanding should be the notion that performance will be crucial to maintaining formal diplomatic relations and establishing deeper ties in other fields e.g., economics. In fact, to mitigate the risk that Kosovo might not fulfill its obligations, initial recognition could be conditional. Later, Kosovo’s performance could lead to the removal of that conditionality.

NATO should make clear that it will preclude any attempted military solution to the Kosovo situation. U.S. and European police forces within Kosovo should also be prepared to help Kosovo’s law enforcement agencies deal with any unrest that might arise before such problems have the potential to spiral out of control.

Russia should make clear that the Kosovo situation is an exception and that it has no bearing whatsoever on its sovereign right to preserve its domestic integrity. It should make reaffirm to would-be separatists that it will use economic, legal, and, if necessary, decisive military means to preserve its country.

The UN should refrain making itself the arbiter of whether or not Kosovo has become a sovereign state. The breakup of Serbia is not the same thing as bringing a dependent territory to sovereignty in a fashion that respects the self-determination of peoples of that territory. Instead, it has to do with a sovereign state’s peoples seeking to chart separate destinies.

In addition, the UN’s determining whether a new state deserves recognition would undermine the sovereignty of other states, as each state has the sovereign freedom to decide on its own whether or not it will recognize another state. Recognition is voluntary. It is not coerced. At some future time, the UN should give fair consideration to any application for membership by Kosovo. However, that decision would strictly address whether or not Kosovo should be a member of the UN, not whether or not its sovereignty should be recognized. Sovereign recognition would certainly have occurred earlier when the world’s other nations decided to establish formal diplomatic relations with Kosovo.

In my opening post on this subject, I noted:

In the face of Kosovo’s declaration of independence, the United States and European Union should only grant recognition to Kosovo upon firm guarantees that Kosovo will grant full protection and rights of citizenship to its minority populations, including the Serbs, safeguard Serb historic sites, and allow Serbs from neighboring Serbia unrestricted access in visiting those sites. Implicit in that understanding should be the notion that performance will be crucial to maintaining formal diplomatic relations and establishing deeper ties in other fields e.g., economics. In fact, to mitigate the risk that Kosovo might not fulfill its obligations, initial recognition could be conditional. Later, Kosovo’s performance could lead to the removal of that conditionality.

The importance withholding recognition of Kosovo until iron-clad guarantees for the protection of Kosovo's minority populations, namely the Serbs, are in place, and possibly only after those commitments have been leavened by performance, cannot be understated.

This move by Kosovo is not an ideal outcome and it follows negotiations that were not conducted in a good faith effort to achieve a compromise solution that addressed the core needs of both Serbia and the Kosovo region. A negotiated agreement with Serbia would have been preferable to the unilateral declaration of independence. But, given the decision, it is probably futile to try to hold together the fractured state. Hence, in addition to seeking to minimize violence in Kosovo, efforts should be made to minimize the geopolitical damage that could result.

The greatest risk lies in the precedent the Kosovo move will create for other ethnic groups aspiring to carve out their own mini-states from within the boundaries of existing sovereign states. Russia is particularly concerned about that matter.

Leonid Slutskiy, deputy chair of the State Duma's committee on international affairs declared, "The declaration of Kosovo's independence has opened Pandora's box. It can encourage other ethnic groups in many countries of the world to take similar actions... This means that they can also self-declare their independence, and new states may appear on the political map of the world."

For its part, it will be crucial that Russia make clear that the Kosovo situation is an exception and that it has no bearing whatsoever on its sovereign right to preserve its domestic integrity. Moreover, it needs to affirm in unambiguous language that it will be prepared to use all the tools at its disposal to prevent separatist elements from attempting to tear apart the country. The U.S., Germany, France, and Britain should support that position to ease Russia's specific issues and also cooperate with Russia to develop a framework that addresses Russia's concerns that the Kosovo precedent would make it possible for any ethnic enclave to "self-declare their independence" and that such declarations would lead to automatic sovereignty of those breakaway regions. Neither step would compromise the critical interests of the U.S., Germany, France, or Britain. In contrast, those steps would help safeguard international stability. The rise of largely ethnic-based statelets, many of which might not be viable, would almost certainly have a destabilizing impact. That is a serious issue when it comes to attempting to maintain international stability and security.

Finally, United Nations intervention into the matter would be unhelpful. The UN should avoid taking positions or attempting to issue statements on the matter.

For those who are interested, on February 20, Stratfor.com published a piece on Kosovo's independence bid. In part, that piece discussed possible precedents that could be established. Relevant excerpts follow:

Those recognizing Kosovo’s independence have gone out of their way specifically to argue that this decision in no way constitutes a precedent. They argue that the Serbian oppression of the late 1990s, which necessitated intervention by outside military forces to protect the Kosovars, made returning Kosovo to Serbian rule impossible. The argument therefore goes that Kosovo’s independence must be viewed as an idiosyncratic event related to the behavior of the Serbs, not as a model for the future.

Other European countries, including Spain, Romania, Slovakia and Cyprus, have expressly rejected this reasoning. So have Russia and China. Each of these countries has a specific, well-defined area dominated by a specific ethnic minority group. In these countries and others like them, these ethnic groups have demanded, are demanding or potentially will demand autonomy, secession or integration with a neighboring country. Such ethnic groups could claim, and have claimed, oppression by the majority group. And each country facing this scenario fears that if Kosovo can be taken from Serbia, a precedent for secession will be created.

The Spanish have Basque separatists. Romania and Slovakia each contain large numbers of Hungarians concentrated in certain areas. The Cypriots — backed by the Greeks — are worried that the Turkish region of Cyprus, which already is under a separate government, might proclaim formal independence. The Chinese are concerned about potential separatist movements in Muslim Xinjiang and, above all, fear potential Taiwanese independence. And the Russians are concerned about independence movements in Chechnya and elsewhere. All of these countries see the Kosovo decision as setting a precedent, and they therefore oppose it.

Europe is a case in point. Prior to World War II, Europe’s borders constantly remained in violent flux. One of the principles of a stable Europe has been the inviolability of borders from outside interference, as well as the principle that borders cannot be redefined except with mutual agreement. This principle repeatedly was reinforced by international consensus, most notably at Yalta in 1945 and Helsinki in 1973.

Thus, the Czech Republic and Slovakia could agree to separate, and the Soviet Union could dissolve itself into its component republics, but the Germans cannot demand the return of Silesia from Poland; outsiders cannot demand a British withdrawal from Northern Ireland; and the Russians cannot be forced to give up Chechnya. The principle that outside powers can’t redefine boundaries, and that secessionist movements can’t create new nations unilaterally, has been a pillar of European stability.

The critics of Kosovo’s independence believe that larger powers can’t redraw the boundaries of smaller ones without recourse to the United Nations. They view the claim that Yugoslavia’s crimes in Kosovo justify doing so as unreasonable; Yugoslavia has dissolved, and the Serbian state is run by different people. The Russians view the major European powers and the Americans as arrogating rights that international law does not grant them, and they see the West as setting itself up as judge and jury without right of appeal.