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The Only Efficient Form of Taxation

Hong Kong, which has a modest LVT, provides some evidence that a LVT would not necessarily curb real estate speculation. In fact, Hong Kong suffered from a significant real estate bubble that popped during the Asian Financial Crisis. In real terms, Hong Kong's real estate prices rose 50% in the 1995-97 period. The decline following the onset of the Asian financial crisis was even larger, although it extended over a longer period of time

Hong Kong has a much too small supply of land relative to their population. It makes sense that this would drive up the cost of land.

A LVT of a size necessary to be tax neutral with the current tax system would discourage ownership of real estate due to the excessive land costs. People would still have a need for housing. Hence, even as homeownership would fall, a larger share of people would rent. Landlords would seek to pass on as much of their costs as possible to renters. Lower income people would suffer most under such an arrangement as the inflated rents--inflated on account of the huge LVT--would consume a much larger share of their income than that of higher income persons.

Whether or not a tax is passed onto consumers (renters) is determined by the elasticity of its supply and demand. The supply of land is completely inelastic; meaning its cost is borne completely by the landlord.

Besides the influx of new properties on the market would drive down property values and make it a more viable option to own your own home rather than rent.

Not every business is involved in let's say mining or agriculture or other activities that directly rely on land exploitation. In fact, those sectors constitute only a small share of the economy.

True. But in some form or another all industries need land to function. Even if it's just office buildings etc.

Aside from imposing an additional cost on businesses from their locating offices, plants, or other facilities on land, a LVT would also increase the costs of inputs from domestic sources, as industries extracting raw materials would likely seek to pass on their new land-related costs to their customers.

There aren't any new land-related costs. I've already shown why.

As a result, a LVT would put make it relatively more expensive to conduct business in the U.S. relative to other countries than it would otherwise be. A cost disadvantage would not be beneficial to U.S. competitiveness. Firms would have a strong incentive to relocate their operations abroad.

I'm not just proposing a land tax. I'm proposing an end to all income, payroll, and sales taxes, in addition to a universal insurance system for health care; all of which would drive down the cost of doing business in the U.S.
 
Hong Kong has a much too small supply of land relative to their population. It makes sense that this would drive up the cost of land.

I wasn't talking about permanently elevated real estate prices on account of a demand imbalance. I was referring to a speculative bubble that sent real estate prices up more than 50% on an inflation-adjusted basis in the 1995-97 period. Afterward, like all bubbles, it popped. Real estate prices then fell by more than 50% before bottoming out.

The supply of land is completely inelastic; meaning its cost is borne completely by the landlord.

The idea that the landlord would completely bear the cost of a LVT runs counter to classical economic principles. Every business--landlords included--pass costs on to their customers. If they could not earn an economic profit over the long-term, they would simply not be in business. Hence, they need to pass along their costs and charge an excess over those costs to earn the economic profits necessary to stay in business.

But in some form or another all industries need land to function. Even if it's just office buildings etc.

If the LVT is sufficiently large--and it would be if it were to supplant all existing taxes--companies would measure the costs-benefits of continuing operations in the U.S. or moving overseas. If there is a net benefit to moving their operations overseas to cut exposure to the LVT, they would do so. In the long-run, the U.S. economy would suffer from such a development (reduced jobs, reduced income growth, reduced tax revenue as a meaningful share of land would sit idle).

I'm not just proposing a land tax. I'm proposing an end to all income, payroll, and sales taxes, in addition to a universal insurance system for health care; all of which would drive down the cost of doing business in the U.S.

Universal coverage would cost money. There would be an added cost for eliminating the current incidence of uninsurance. If you are talking about a government-financed single-payer system as I think you are, the government would need to raise revenue to pay for such a system. While such a system might reduce the costs employers pay for private coverage for their employees, the costs associated with universal coverage (to cover employees and practically eliminate the incidence of uninsured persons) would then be passed back onto them via your suggested LVT. There is no free lunch so to speak.

In short, a LVT is little more than a 19th century solution that would have little relevance in a 21st century society. It is not a superior alternative to the present system. If anything, it could be quite destructive.

Any near- or medium-term tax reform will likely be incremental in nature. Some of the tax rates will be revised, loopholes closed, existing system simplified. There is a smaller prospect that the existing income tax system could be replaced with a consumption tax (either designed as an income tax as a flat tax was, or a retail sales tax or value-added tax). The conceptual sell for a consumption tax would be more difficult even as regressivity could be addressed through a large personal exemption. Given the nation's long-term financing challenges, there is also a chance that a VAT would eventually be adopted to coexist with present system.

Prospects for a LVT are extremely remote. A LVT would not be a clearly superior alternative (and could be far worse), would be highly regressive, would require a constitutional amendment, and it would bring about a dramatic shift away from private property rights, a fundamental tenet on which the nation's founders built their republic. For economic, policy, and historic reasons, such a tax has virtually no prospect of replacing the existing system, even with the existing system's shortcomings.

I clearly understand some will cling to the idealistic assumptions behind a LVT. However, practical considerations such as those I noted in the preceding paragraph essentially preclude replacing the existing system with a LVT. It is practical reasons, not utopian ideals, that will drive public policy.
 
I wasn't talking about permanently elevated real estate prices on account of a demand imbalance. I was referring to a speculative bubble that sent real estate prices up more than 50% on an inflation-adjusted basis in the 1995-97 period. Afterward, like all bubbles, it popped. Real estate prices then fell by more than 50% before bottoming out.

If you look at how Hong Kong has actually implemented it, there are some policies that have been very ill-advised. While taxing land has allowed them to lower their other taxes and create a much freer market, they have also spent a tremendous amount of time trying to keep land prices high. Instead of letting market forces drive land ownership, the govt. holds land in its hands and only releases small amounts of it in small increments, thereby keeping the demand higher than it should be, and keeping prices higher than they should be.

Now of course you can argue that this is the inevitable result of land taxation, but it's really not. If the govt would let go of all of its land, its value would drop substantially, and they could then impose higher taxes to offset said drop. Once the market settles and unused land is bought up and people stop opt out of renting their homes, land prices would stabilize, and the govt. would have a steady source of income.

By the way, they only tax land at 15%.

The idea that the landlord would completely bear the cost of a LVT runs counter to classical economic principles. Every business--landlords included--pass costs on to their customers. If they could not earn an economic profit over the long-term, they would simply not be in business. Hence, they need to pass along their costs and charge an excess over those costs to earn the economic profits necessary to stay in business.

How so? According to the currently accepted theories of tax incidence it can not be said that the tax will be passed on. In any meaningful amount anyway.

Universal coverage would cost money. There would be an added cost for eliminating the current incidence of uninsurance. If you are talking about a government-financed single-payer system as I think you are, the government would need to raise revenue to pay for such a system. While such a system might reduce the costs employers pay for private coverage for their employees, the costs associated with universal coverage (to cover employees and practically eliminate the incidence of uninsured persons) would then be passed back onto them via your suggested LVT. There is no free lunch so to speak.

it would be possible with a gradual transformation from our current tax system to an LVT.

I clearly understand some will cling to the idealistic assumptions behind a LVT. However, practical considerations such as those I noted in the preceding paragraph essentially preclude replacing the existing system with a LVT. It is practical reasons, not utopian ideals, that will drive public policy.

like Milton Friedman, Adam Smith, John Kenneth Gailbraith, Bill Vickrey, and Joseph Stiglitz?
 
...like Milton Friedman, Adam Smith, John Kenneth Gailbraith, Bill Vickrey, and Joseph Stiglitz?

The issue isn't so much whether a modest LVT could replace let's say property taxes, it is the crushing burden, among other issues that would arise from replacing all taxes with a LVT.

For example, with respect to Milton Friedman, while he described a tax on unimproved land as "the least bad tax," he explained his preferred form of tax reform as follows:

I could design my ideal tax system it would contain an income tax, but it would not be the kind of monstrosity we have now. It would be a flat-rate tax on all income, from whatever source derived, less only a personal deduction and strict occupational expense, and that kind of income tax I think would be the least inconsistent with a strong free enterprise system.

In short, Dr. Friedman was not advocating replacing all taxes with a LVT.
 
The issue isn't so much whether a modest LVT could replace let's say property taxes, it is the crushing burden, among other issues that would arise from replacing all taxes with a LVT.

For example, with respect to Milton Friedman, while he described a tax on unimproved land as "the least bad tax," he explained his preferred form of tax reform as follows:

I could design my ideal tax system it would contain an income tax, but it would not be the kind of monstrosity we have now. It would be a flat-rate tax on all income, from whatever source derived, less only a personal deduction and strict occupational expense, and that kind of income tax I think would be the least inconsistent with a strong free enterprise system.

In short, Dr. Friedman was not advocating replacing all taxes with a LVT.

I'm aware of this. But he was nonetheless an advocate of land value taxation.
 
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