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Today, The Jerusalem Post reported:
Libya rebels set conditions for any ceasefire
Just so it is clear, I strongly support free speech and poltical liberalization in Libya. But as enlightened as those principles are, the problem associated with the demand actually has nothing to do with those principles.
The problem is that the anti-Gadhafi forces are actually raising demands in a position of weakness. Their political performance and battlefield setbacks (even with Coalition air cover) has put them in a weaker position than they were even a few days ago for making such demands. Demands have credibility when a party has, in theory, the possibility of imposing those conditions if the demands are not met. In this case, the on-the-ground situation suggests that the anti-Gadhafi forces lack such a capability. Hence, they are not in a position to be making such demands and it is highly likely that the demands associated with troop withdrawals will be ignored by the Gadhafi regime. Those demands might connect with outsiders, but the anti-Gadhafi forces already enjoy outside support. Instead, they need to build popular support in Libya.
Why would the dictatorship do something that its foes have little chance to accomplish on their own, even with the generous air support that has been furnished? If such a realistic capability existed or appeared likely to develop, then the regime's calculations might have a better chance of shifting toward a managed exit. Of course, being that it is a truly revolutionary regime, such an exit is not the most likely course it would pursue. Nonetheless, that outcome would be far more likely if the anti-Gadhafi forces had a possible capability to force the outcome. Right now, they don't. In fact, they've been on the retreat in recent days. Therefore, the Gadhafi dictatorship is not likely to give them what they cannot hope to achieve on their own. Power and concrete battlefield achievements matter, but the anti-Gadhafi elements don't understand that.
The larger and more disturbing aspect of this fundamental lack of understanding of the fit between power, policy, and diplomacy is that if the anti-Gadhafi elements cannot get those basic principles right, how can one reasonably expect that they would suddenly be able to handle the far more complex responsibilities of governance, uniting Libya's peoples and tribes, and restoring stability, all of which would be needed to avoid the significant dangers associated with a post-Gadhafi power vacuum. Yet, those are precisely the tasks that would be required once the Gadhafi regime collapsed or was driven from power.
Libyan rebels fighting Muammar Gaddafi said on Friday they would agree to a ceasefire based on conditions including that the Libyan leader's forces quit cities in the west and give the people freedom to speak out.
Libya rebels set conditions for any ceasefire
Just so it is clear, I strongly support free speech and poltical liberalization in Libya. But as enlightened as those principles are, the problem associated with the demand actually has nothing to do with those principles.
The problem is that the anti-Gadhafi forces are actually raising demands in a position of weakness. Their political performance and battlefield setbacks (even with Coalition air cover) has put them in a weaker position than they were even a few days ago for making such demands. Demands have credibility when a party has, in theory, the possibility of imposing those conditions if the demands are not met. In this case, the on-the-ground situation suggests that the anti-Gadhafi forces lack such a capability. Hence, they are not in a position to be making such demands and it is highly likely that the demands associated with troop withdrawals will be ignored by the Gadhafi regime. Those demands might connect with outsiders, but the anti-Gadhafi forces already enjoy outside support. Instead, they need to build popular support in Libya.
Why would the dictatorship do something that its foes have little chance to accomplish on their own, even with the generous air support that has been furnished? If such a realistic capability existed or appeared likely to develop, then the regime's calculations might have a better chance of shifting toward a managed exit. Of course, being that it is a truly revolutionary regime, such an exit is not the most likely course it would pursue. Nonetheless, that outcome would be far more likely if the anti-Gadhafi forces had a possible capability to force the outcome. Right now, they don't. In fact, they've been on the retreat in recent days. Therefore, the Gadhafi dictatorship is not likely to give them what they cannot hope to achieve on their own. Power and concrete battlefield achievements matter, but the anti-Gadhafi elements don't understand that.
The larger and more disturbing aspect of this fundamental lack of understanding of the fit between power, policy, and diplomacy is that if the anti-Gadhafi elements cannot get those basic principles right, how can one reasonably expect that they would suddenly be able to handle the far more complex responsibilities of governance, uniting Libya's peoples and tribes, and restoring stability, all of which would be needed to avoid the significant dangers associated with a post-Gadhafi power vacuum. Yet, those are precisely the tasks that would be required once the Gadhafi regime collapsed or was driven from power.