As noted previously, while I could support a no fly zone, I do not support offensive operations that go beyond a no fly zone, as no critical U.S. interests are involved. The recent air strikes in the vicinity of Sirte, for example, indicate that there is an offensive component involved in the mission, even if NATO has denied it. Sirte is a Gadhafi loyalist city. Gadhafi’s forces there pose no threat to civilians. They do, however, stand in the way of potential advances by the anti-Gadhafi elements. The underlying rationale, which substantively allows for the ongoing close air support without describing it as such, goes as follows: Gadhafi’s forces have had a history of brutality against civilians. Wherever they exist, they pose a threat to civilians, as they could relocate elsewhere. Therefore, their armor, equipment, and personnel should be targeted when opportunities for such targeting exist. Indeed, President Obama hinted at just such rationale in describing Libya as remaining “dangerous” so long as Col. Gadhafi remains in power. Needless to say, the expansive language of UNSC Res. 1973 permits such use of force.
In his
speech last night, the President stated his case for U.S. intervention. As eloquent as the speech was, it could not overcome the absence of a critical U.S. interest to justify U.S. military intervention with an offensive component. A critical U.S. interest is something that would, if damaged, pose a significant and imminent threat to the U.S. and its key allies for which non-military alternatives were not viable.
If one reviews the President’s speech, the key themes were as follows:
• Libya was faced with “brutal repression and a looming humanitarian crisis.” Heart-wrenching as this might be, such a situation did not pose a credible risk to critical U.S. interests. Indeed, there have been worse humanitarian catastrophes e.g., Darfur, that drew no U.S. military intervention. A no fly zone strictly limited to protecting civilians in areas opposed to the Gadhafi dictatorship would have addressed that issue. Close air support should depend on critical U.S. interests.
• “The Libyan opposition, and the Arab League, appealed to the world to save lives in Libya.” Both those parties have far stronger interests than the U.S. What is revealing is that the Arab League passed a hollow no fly zone declaration. It committed no resources whatsoever to enforcement. Only after the Western Coalition took on the burden of neutralizing Gadhafi’s air defenses did the Arab League commit planes. In other words, the party with far stronger interests left the risktaking to those with far fewer interests.
• Benghazi faced “a massacre that would have reverberated across the region and stained the conscience of the world.” A strict no fly zone was sufficient. The massacre was avoided. The issue is whether the U.S. has justification to participate in an operation that includes close air support for one of the parties in what is a de facto civil war in Libya. Again, the humanitarian issue does not rise to the level where critical U.S. interests are threatened. Hence, a narrower approach that avoided the humanitarian issue would be adequate. Offensive air support aimed at securing a given outcome in the de facto Libyan civil war goes beyond that approach. Moreover, it is not nor should not be U.S. policy to use military force whenever a situation could ‘stain the conscience of the world.’ That is far too expansive a mission. It is an invitation for overreach.
• Until Gadhafi “steps down…Libya will remain dangerous.” Again, that danger is largely confined away from U.S. interests. Gadhafi’s offensive capabilities have been seriously damaged. Although there is a threat of terrorism, the dictatorship is not really in a position to aggressively pursue that option given its having been weakened substantially and put in a rather precarious position. Were it to actually pose a credible and imminent threat of launching terrorist attacks against the U.S. or critical allies, then and only then, would critical U.S. interests be at stake. Then, the U.S. would have sufficient cause to use force to topple the dictatorship. The long-surviving dictator understands this reality and is, therefore, unlikely to actually pursue the terrorism front.
• The “writ of the UN Security Council” would have been revealed to have been hollow. That’s not really the kind of serious U.S. problem, much less a responsibility, that requires application of U.S. military force. Instead, it’s a structural issue that requires fundamental reform of the UN. In its nearly seven decades of existence, the UN has, with few exceptions, contributed surprisingly little to international peace and stability. Most of the breakthroughs have occurred on the bilateral diplomatic front. The balance of power has also helped maintain stability in many regions far more than any UN action. UN operations in Lebanon, Rwanada, and Bosnia, among other places proved dismal failures. In Lebanon, Hezbollah was armed by Syria and Iran and grew into a formidable terrorist force during the period in which the UN has maintained a presence in Lebanon. In Rwanda, the UN ignored warnings of possible imminent genocide and could do nothing when the genocide unfolded. In Bosnia, the UN failed to halt genocidal activity during the three-party civil war that tore apart the Balkans. The General Assembly and its organs are forums in which radicalized voices foment divisions and undercut prospects for compromise and conciliation, making diplomacy more difficult.
• The transition to stable post-Gadhafi governance will be “difficult” because “forty years of tyranny has left Libya fractured and without strong civil institutions.” This assessment is exactly correct. It is also the strongest argument why the U.S. should not take an expansive military role in Libya. After all, with the U.S. participating in a mission that has been facilitating the advances of the anti-Gadhafi forces (actions that undercut the words that the U.S. is not pursuing regime change), the U.S. will bear a degree of responsibility for the post-Gadhafi outcome. Merely passing off the matter on process e.g., highlighting the coming international conference, is wholly inadequate. If the U.S. contributes to regime change, it needs to have a plan in place to help prevent the outbreak of a wider civil war (a high risk in Libya given tribal rivalries, significant popular support still enjoyed by the Gadhafi dictatorship, and the Islamist/secularist divide) and reconstruction/technical/economic assistance to facilitate the rapid creation of a stable transitional government. The situations in Iraq and Afghanistan highlight the difficulties involved with such a process.
• A potential refugee problem would have imposed “enormous strains” on the ongoing political transitions in Tunisia and Egypt. In theory, there was a potential significant risk to Egypt and Tunisia. Nonetheless, non-military alternatives were available to deal with that potential issue. For example, humanitarian aid and logistical support could have been offered to accommodate the refugees’ needs.
In sum, the speech failed to highlight a sufficiently critical U.S. interest that justified direct military intervention with an offensive component. A purely protective no fly zone is one thing. Providing air cover to one of the parties in the de facto civil war is quite another.
