• This is a political forum that is non-biased/non-partisan and treats every person's position on topics equally. This debate forum is not aligned to any political party. In today's politics, many ideas are split between and even within all the political parties. Often we find ourselves agreeing on one platform but some topics break our mold. We are here to discuss them in a civil political debate. If this is your first visit to our political forums, be sure to check out the RULES. Registering for debate politics is necessary before posting. Register today to participate - it's free!

End Operations in Afghanistan, Karzai Tells NATO

Well, if you're pretending that you have installed a democratic government in the country, then if that government tells you to leave, shouldn't you leave.

No, not until that government is well established and democracy is secured.

That IS the voice of the Afghan people, according to you. Isn't NOT leaving tantamount to admitting that the government you have installed is just a puppet of your occupation?

No, it is the voice of Mr. Karzi, a well known corrupt and neurotic man. If NATO was to base their security on the voice of one very eccentric individual the area, and the world, would be chaos. It is the responsibility, once we are in there and many sacrifices have been made, that we don''t just walk on his say so.
 
I'm not so sure I agree that we should remain in a foriegn country in a military manner, if that country tells us to leave.

Several quick things:

1. The Karzai regime has limited jurisdiction and, by definition, lacks a basic ingredient of a sovereign state.
2. Its legitimacy is also suspect.

That U.S. strategy is flawed in that it is Kabul-centric does not alter those two realities. What Afghanistan's various tribal leaders say is far more relevant and important than Mr. Karzai's whim de jour.

In any case, if the U.S. has strategic interests that require a continued U.S. military presence, those interests, not Mr. Karzai's wishes should take precedence. Furthermore, it is highly likely that the majority of Afghanistan's tribal leaders would oppose a rash pullout that would all but assure that Afghanistan would succumb to power vacuums and collapse into true failed state status (it remains on the edge under Mr. Karzai's corrupt and incompetent rule). Even if Mr. Karzai were not making impulsive statements concerning the U.S./NATO, a strategy correction that shifts the focus to Afghanistan's tribal leaders and away from Karzai would be helpful, both for the country's long-term political evolution and for U.S. interests.
 
I think that the best thing we can do, is basically use this as an opportunity to get the hell out. Since the new rules of engagement have been implemented, handcuffing our troops, there is no possible way to reach any objective set.

Karzal, can't be trusted, to say the least, we aren't wanted there by the people according to some here. The left in this country, would rather point to the innocent civilians being killed by our troops there, then worry about our American men and women dying there. It's time to tuck our tails between our legs and remove ourselves from another Vietnam that cannot be won. I would also hope that our aid to that country be withdrawn as well. If we are wanted out, lets do what is asked, but the aid given by American should be removed as well.

Cut and run now, as happened in Vietnam, and the slaughter will begin, as also happened in Vietnam. There are lessons to be learned from Vietnam, but it seems many are learning the wrongs ones.
 
Several quick things:

1. The Karzai regime has limited jurisdiction and, by definition, lacks a basic ingredient of a sovereign state.
2. Its legitimacy is also suspect.

That U.S. strategy is flawed in that it is Kabul-centric does not alter those two realities. What Afghanistan's various tribal leaders say is far more relevant and important than Mr. Karzai's whim de jour.

In any case, if the U.S. has strategic interests that require a continued U.S. military presence, those interests, not Mr. Karzai's wishes should take precedence.
Unfortunately Don, you seem as unable as anyone else in this thread to specify what those strategic interests and goals are. What is the US and NATO hoping to achieve in the long-term from their involvement in Afghanistan? I would be very surprised if any of those goals have more than a minimal impact on the national interests of the Allies.


Furthermore, it is highly likely that the majority of Afghanistan's tribal leaders would oppose a rash pullout that would all but assure that Afghanistan would succumb to power vacuums and collapse into true failed state status (it remains on the edge under Mr. Karzai's corrupt and incompetent rule). Even if Mr. Karzai were not making impulsive statements concerning the U.S./NATO, a strategy correction that shifts the focus to Afghanistan's tribal leaders and away from Karzai would be helpful, both for the country's long-term political evolution and for U.S. interests.
Supporting a loose confederation of regional and tribal groups and leaders was the West's policy after the 1989 Russian pull-out. The disastrous consequences of that approach were felt after the fall of the Najibullah regime and right up until the death of Massoud and 9/11. What makes you believe that adopting the same approach now would be any more successful?
 
the strategy underpinning OBAMA'S WAR in afghanistan is completely incoherent

1. it's equal parts ESCALATION and withdrawal

2. the pull out date has been pushed back every season, biden (longtime senate foreign relations chair) last november announced the admin's newest "drop dead" date of 2014

3. afghanization of the effort is impossible so long as the corrupt kook karzai is in control

4. there's no way any kind of real stability can be achieved by july

5. the enemy we seek, al qaeda, isn't even in afghanistan

6. obama has been, therefore, waging a not so SECRET WAR in pakistan

7. we are more dependent on the efficacies of karzai and zardari than we are reliant on the efforts of our own troops

8. why are almost 100,000 american soldiers over there, what is their mission, what is our exit strategy?

9. BOB WOODWARD provided a very inconvenient answer---POLITICS

10. american casualties in OBAMA'S WAR have increased 400% since he assumed office

11. our heroes are operating under ridiculous roe's, rules of engagement, that appear to have been written by a montessori

12. obama's first general spoke with mcchrystal clarity, so he was fired

13. the man the former junior senator from illinois called general betray us was brought in at the last second to rescue OBAMA'S WAR

14. dennis blair was ousted because he was a military realist not interested in politics

15. jim jones jammed after complaining about obama's waterbugs

16. john kerry calls for inclusion of iran in negotiations

17. the deceased richard holbrooke held out for the haqqani

18. afghanistan is the WRONG WAR, the taliban is the wrong enemy

19. our entire foreign policy, from china to mexico to iran to korea to palestine to putin, is today conducted by rank amateurs, mrs clinton

20. afghanistan is killing this president, where's it gonna be in summer, 2012?
 
Last edited:
the strategy underpinning OBAMA'S WAR in afghanistan is completely incoherent

1. it's equal parts ESCALATION and withdrawal

2. the pull out date has been pushed back every season, biden (longtime senate foreign relations chair) last november announced the admin's newest "drop dead" date of 2014

3. afghanization of the effort is impossible so long as the corrupt kook karzai is in control

4. there's no way any kind of real stability can be achieved by july

5. the enemy we seek, al qaeda, isn't even in afghanistan

6. obama has been, therefore, waging a not so SECRET WAR in pakistan

7. we are more dependent on the efficacies of karzai and zardari than we are reliant on the efforts of our own troops

8. why are almost 100,000 american soldiers over there, what is their mission, what is our exit strategy?

9. BOB WOODWARD provided a very inconvenient answer---POLITICS

10. american casualties in OBAMA'S WAR have increased 400% since he assumed office

11. our heroes are operating under ridiculous roe's, rules of engagement, that appear to have been written by a montessori

12. obama's first general spoke with mcchrystal clarity, so he was fired

13. the man the former junior senator from illinois called general betray us was brought in at the last second to rescue OBAMA'S WAR

14. dennis blair was ousted because he was a military realist not interested in politics

15. jim jones jammed after complaining about obama's waterbugs

16. john kerry calls for inclusion of iran in negotiations

17. the deceased richard holbrooke held out for the haqqani

18. afghanistan is the WRONG WAR, the taliban is the wrong enemy

19. our entire foreign policy, from china to mexico to iran to korea to palestine to putin, is today conducted by rank amateurs, mrs clinton

20. afghanistan is killing this president, where's it gonna be in summer, 2012?

I hope the American people realize in 2012 that it's more important to elect a leader for the content of their character rather than the color of their skin.
 
I hope the American people realize in 2012 that it's more important to elect a leader for the content of their character rather than the color of their skin.

Eh, it's not like we had that many great options to choose from in 2008. If I had to go back and vote again I would potentially have switched for Hillary, but I'm not sure.
 
I hope the American people realize in 2012 that it's more important to elect a leader for the content of their character rather than the color of their skin.

Obama was the better choice between McCain :coffeepap

Had nothing to do with the fact he's black.

For some yes.
 
Unfortunately Don, you seem as unable as anyone else in this thread to specify what those strategic interests and goals are.

Notice, I have repeatedly premised by statements with "if." Key issues that would have to be resolved would be:

1) Would Iran exploit a post-withdrawal power vacuum in Afghanistan to project its growing regional power and further destablize the region?
2) Would a power vacuum in Afghanistan lead to increased risk in neighboring Pakistan that could heighten risks associated with Pakistan's nuclear arsenal?
3) Would a U.S. withdrawal significantly reduce the United States' ability to project power in the region?
4) Would a power vacuum in Afghanistan exacerbate long-running geopolitical rivalries between India, Pakistan, China, etc.?
5) Would a power vacuum in Afghanistan lead to various radical groups gaining a safe-haven from which they could export violence to destabilize the broader Central Asia region?

Depending on the answers to those questions, would viable alternatives exist so as to mitigate those potential problems?

At the same time, the U.S. would have to balance those issues with whether the mission in place can reasonably achieve U.S. goals. If not, could the strategy be restructured?

As noted previously and well today's events, I've noted that I believe the Karzai regime is part of the problem, not the solution. It has been corrupt, inept, and unreliable. It has often put Karzai family members and cronies ahead of Afghanistan's people. Not surprisingly, it has only very limited ability to exercise jurisdiction and it is widely perceived among Afghans to be illegitimate. In part, the violence directed against it is from the Taliban. At the same time, there is a dynamic of home-grown rejection of it arising from various tribes.

Making a strategic correction away from a Kabul-centric orientation would be more compatible with the country's historic experience, structure, and dynamics. Hence, if the issue concerns maintaining the status quo approach vs. withdrawal, the answer might differ from the choice of pursuing a corrected course (non-Kabul-centric approach) vs.withdrawal.

Finally, geopolitical significance matters. With Somalia's having collapsed into failed state status, piracy poses the current threat to U.S. interests. The impact of the pirates is, in the whole scheme of things, insignficant to U.S. interests. Access to a narrow strip of water through which most oil shipments pass, not the larger body of water proximate to Somalia is critical to the U.S. Were Afghanistan to fall into failed state status, the geopolitical fallout would potentially be magnitudes of order greater than that of Somalia (regional destabilization, opportunity for Iran, increased risk to Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, diminished U.S. ability to project regional power, etc.). I would also suggest that the geopolitical impact from a collapse of Afghanistan would be far greater than that associated with whatever the outcome in Libya would be. In short, there are enough variables of importance that suggest that the U.S. could have sufficiently critical interests in the evolution of Afghanistan to reject any formal call by Mr. Karzai to withdraw. If, in fact, that's the case, then the U.S. should reject Mr. Karzai's call, especially as Mr. Karzai lacks sufficient power to compel such a move.


Supporting a loose confederation of regional and tribal groups and leaders was the West's policy after the 1989 Russian pull-out. The disastrous consequences of that approach were felt after the fall of the Najibullah regime and right up until the death of Massoud and 9/11. What makes you believe that adopting the same approach now would be any more successful?

The U.S. provided arms and nothing more. Had the U.S. worked with the tribal leaders to build a cohesive state following the conclusion of the war, a different outcome might have been achieved. By that, I mean had the U.S. provided technical, economic, and reconstruction assistance, as well as mediated the development of a reasonably stable political system. Instead, the U.S. did none of that. The power vacuum that followed is not surprising given that country's structure and historic experience.
 
End operations in Afghanistan, Karzai tells NATO

I guess Karzai and the people of Afghanistan have decided the cure is worse than the disease. The drone attacks must be horrifying on many levels. It's too bad the coward terrorists insist on hiding behind women and children.

With a handshake and a kiss on the cheek, we should grant their wish and be done with the place. Who knows...maybe they surprise us all and actually manage to maintain their progress and grow. or...they get overwhelmed and the Taliban reasserts itself in their government and they go back to the stone age hell they were. Either way they will deserve their fate.
 
It's the best interests of the Afghan people, as well as international security, that must take top priority, not the wishes of Mr. Karzai,

If he is the recognized leader of the country & government, and their government wants us out, we would become invaders instead of liberators if we ignored their wishes and remained. We'd also further alienate the general population, possibly shifting their sympathies to the Taliban... or worse.
 
Notice, I have repeatedly premised by statements with "if."
Yes, I had noted that.

Key issues that would have to be resolved would be:

1) Would Iran exploit a post-withdrawal power vacuum in Afghanistan to project its growing regional power and further destablize the region?
Is there any reason to believe they would? Between 1989 and 2001 Iran's 'meddling' in Afghanistan was fairly low level, much less so than that of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Of course things might be different, but I fail to see what they might hope to gain.

2) Would a power vacuum in Afghanistan lead to increased risk in neighboring Pakistan that could heighten risks associated with Pakistan's nuclear arsenal?
Increased risk of what in Pakistan? Increased risk of the regime falling in favour of a more extreme Islamist regime? I would say that that risk is increasing under the current situation.

3) Would a U.S. withdrawal significantly reduce the United States' ability to project power in the region?
Well, that's not an issue anyone but Americans need to worry about. Many of us would suggest that such a reduction may not be entirely unwelcome.

4) Would a power vacuum in Afghanistan exacerbate long-running geopolitical rivalries between India, Pakistan, China, etc.?
It's possible, but unlikely. China would only be interested if it had any knock-on consequences for the Uighur insurrection in Xinjiang. The Indians might actually welcome it as anything which served to weaken the Pakistani regime and turn its attention from its eastern to western borders could benefit them.

5) Would a power vacuum in Afghanistan lead to various radical groups gaining a safe-haven from which they could export violence to destabilize the broader Central Asia region?
This may happen in any case. The Allies have failed to eliminate AQ or the Taliban despite overwhelming military superiority. I don't think that this situation could only arise if NATO withdrew.
Depending on the answers to those questions, would viable alternatives exist so as to mitigate those potential problems?
You mean alternative sources of authority to NATO troops?
At the same time, the U.S. would have to balance those issues with whether the mission in place can reasonably achieve U.S. goals. If not, could the strategy be restructured?
Well, it looks as if I'll have to suggest what US goals might be, as no one seems to wish to state them:
  1. Eliminate the potential for terrorist groups to use Afghanistan as a logistical and training base.
  2. Maintain a strong military presence on Iran's eastern border for intimidation purposes.
  3. Maintain a strong military presence on Pakistan's western border to ensure they remain nominally Western-friendly.

As noted previously and well today's events, I've noted that I believe the Karzai regime is part of the problem, not the solution. It has been corrupt, inept, and unreliable. It has often put Karzai family members and cronies ahead of Afghanistan's people. Not surprisingly, it has only very limited ability to exercise jurisdiction and it is widely perceived among Afghans to be illegitimate. In part, the violence directed against it is from the Taliban. At the same time, there is a dynamic of home-grown rejection of it arising from various tribes.
This is all true, yet where was the pro-active involvement of the Allies when Karzai committed widespread electoral fraud? The Allies are inextricably linked in the minds of the world, not just Afghans, with the policies of Karzai who is seen as the puppet of the West. He seems to be attempting to distance himself from the Allies now, but the Allies cannot undermine his regime and at the same time ensure its survival.

Making a strategic correction away from a Kabul-centric orientation would be more compatible with the country's historic experience, structure, and dynamics. Hence, if the issue concerns maintaining the status quo approach vs. withdrawal, the answer might differ from the choice of pursuing a corrected course (non-Kabul-centric approach) vs.withdrawal.
Well that would presuppose an entirely new policy shift, one that will require the creation of an entirely new political and administrative infrastructure built under the hostile gaze of the current regime. It is a project of many years. Are you sure NATO has the political will to remain there another decade? Or longer?

Finally, geopolitical significance matters. With Somalia's having collapsed into failed state status, piracy poses the current threat to U.S. interests. The impact of the pirates is, in the whole scheme of things, insignficant to U.S. interests. Access to a narrow strip of water through which most oil shipments pass, not the larger body of water proximate to Somalia is critical to the U.S. Were Afghanistan to fall into failed state status, the geopolitical fallout would potentially be magnitudes of order greater than that of Somalia (regional destabilization, opportunity for Iran, increased risk to Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, diminished U.S. ability to project regional power, etc.). I would also suggest that the geopolitical impact from a collapse of Afghanistan would be far greater than that associated with whatever the outcome in Libya would be. In short, there are enough variables of importance that suggest that the U.S. could have sufficiently critical interests in the evolution of Afghanistan to reject any formal call by Mr. Karzai to withdraw. If, in fact, that's the case, then the U.S. should reject Mr. Karzai's call, especially as Mr. Karzai lacks sufficient power to compel such a move.
Afghanistan between 1992 and 2001 WAS a failed state, one that the Taliban brought some order to, albeit barbaric, mediaeval order at the point of a gun. The implications of that for the region were minimal, but for the Afghans horrific. They would have remained in control were it not for their strategic blunder of inviting AQ to stay for a while.

In the light of my previous comments about your new regionalist strategy, it seems to me that there is no exit plan. NATO will remain for the forseeable future unable to extricate itself from its perceived role as backers of Karzai and yet certain that the Karzai regime will never be able to survive without their foreign backers. Your new, "Devolved Afghanistan" is a policy diametrically opposed to current policy, threatening to all current players in the regime and the two policies - current and new - cannot be conducted simultaneously. How do you think it could work?
 
Last edited:
If he is the recognized leader of the country & government, and their government wants us out, we would become invaders instead of liberators if we ignored their wishes and remained. We'd also further alienate the general population, possibly shifting their sympathies to the Taliban... or worse.

Karzai is the the head of the Afghan government but there is no indication that the people or the rest of the government wants us out. To have sacrificed so much and then leave because one questionable man says so would not make much sense. There is, so far, no "their wishes".

And if the people do decide to go with the Taliban, which is very unlikely, and there are more terrorist attacks generated from Afghanistan, then it would be an act of war. It is best, over the long term, to be sure the country is secure before anyone leaves.
 
Whovian said:
If he is the recognized leader of the country & government, and their government wants us out, we would become invaders instead of liberators if we ignored their wishes and remained. We'd also further alienate the general population, possibly shifting their sympathies to the Taliban... or worse.

Karzai is the the head of the Afghan government but there is no indication that the people or the rest of the government wants us out. To have sacrificed so much and then leave because one questionable man says so would not make much sense. There is, so far, no "their wishes".

And if the people do decide to go with the Taliban, which is very unlikely, and there are more terrorist attacks generated from Afghanistan, then it would be an act of war. It is best, over the long term, to be sure the country is secure before anyone leaves.

I wasn't saying the people agree with him, or that we should go now.

I was simply stating that if all involved parties who matter... the government, leaders and people wanted us out, and we refused to leave, we would then become invaders.
 
I wasn't saying the people agree with him, or that we should go now.

I was simply stating that if all involved parties who matter... the government, leaders and people wanted us out, and we refused to leave, we would then become invaders.

Oh, ok. It seems i misunderstood, Sorry about that.
 
Is there any reason to believe they would? Between 1989 and 2001 Iran's 'meddling' in Afghanistan was fairly low level, much less so than that of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Of course things might be different, but I fail to see what they might hope to gain.

If one examines past historical documents (primary or secondary sources), there is no credible evidence that the U.S. pursued a meaningful economic reconstruction/political development strategy in post-Soviet Afghanistan. Such an approach might have reduced the risk that the nation would have slid into a full-fledged failed state.

Increased risk of what in Pakistan? Increased risk of the regime falling in favour of a more extreme Islamist regime? I would say that that risk is increasing under the current situation.

In Pakistan, the U.S. erred in pushing the Musharraf government aside in favor of a regime that is no less legitimate, is probably at least as corrupt, and is far more inept. A better approach would have entailed the Musharraf government's pursuing a gradual but steady shift toward a more representative government. Once the political institutions necessary to support representative government were in place, then an elected government could have been chosen. But that's not what happened. As a consequence, anti-Western forces gained influence and Pakistan's military was demoralized to the extent that the military is now much less willing to run risks on behalf of U.S. interests. The country is now sliding toward failed state status.

Afghanistan's collapse into failed state status would only accelerate and intensify the trends now under way in nuclear-armed Pakistan. Such a development in Pakistan could be geopolitically more significant than the Iranian Revolution was.

Well, that's not an issue anyone but Americans need to worry about. Many of us would suggest that such a reduction may not be entirely unwelcome.

I strongly disagree. The lack of an effective response by the UN to events in Libya, not to mention past cases in Rwanda and Darfur, highlight the very real limits of attempting to rely on world organization for major international peace and security objectives. That approach is flawed. Given the widely-varying interests of the UN's member states, such impotence is to be expected. Not coincidentally, it was the difference of interests that previously led the League of Nations to suffer from similar impotence. Hence, if the U.S. seeks to safeguard its critical interests--and Central Asian stability is one of them--it needs to have the capacity to project power.

It's possible, but unlikely. China would only be interested if it had any knock-on consequences for the Uighur insurrection in Xinjiang.

That would be a real danger for China. Arms trafficking could dramatically increase to the Xinjiang Province.

The Indians might actually welcome it as anything which served to weaken the Pakistani regime and turn its attention from its eastern to western borders could benefit them.

But not if the price were ramped up instability in parts of Kashmir, not to mention along the lengthy Indo-Pakistan border. In addition, if nuclear arms fell into the hands of hostile elements willing to proliferate such weapons, it would also destabilize the region and undermine India's interests.

This may happen in any case. The Allies have failed to eliminate AQ or the Taliban despite overwhelming military superiority. I don't think that this situation could only arise if NATO withdrew.

An immediate withdrawal of NATO forces at a time when Afghanistan lacks the institutions for self-governance and security capabilities to maintain order would greatly increase the risks of such an outcome.

You mean alternative sources of authority to NATO troops?

Alternatives to the current approach. What could be done to mitigate the risks if NATO troops withdrew? Would such measures be effective? That's a necessary exercise that should be repeated on a regular basis.

Well, it looks as if I'll have to suggest what US goals might be, as no one seems to wish to state them:
  1. Eliminate the potential for terrorist groups to use Afghanistan as a logistical and training base.
  2. Maintain a strong military presence on Iran's eastern border for intimidation purposes.
  3. Maintain a strong military presence on Pakistan's western border to ensure they remain nominally Western-friendly.

IMO, the strong military presence should be part of maintaining a balance of power that reduces Iran's ability to project power into the region and allows for a capability to address developments in Pakistan were the country to slide further toward failed state status to the extent that its nuclear arms were at risk of being compromised.

This is all true, yet where was the pro-active involvement of the Allies when Karzai committed widespread electoral fraud? The Allies are inextricably linked in the minds of the world, not just Afghans, with the policies of Karzai who is seen as the puppet of the West. He seems to be attempting to distance himself from the Allies now, but the Allies cannot undermine his regime and at the same time ensure its survival.

That the NATO states ignored the massive fraud and suspect outcome of the election is in the past. The countries need to worry about today and tomorrow. If their interests are sufficiently important and alternatives for securing those interests are lacking, then they need to be willing to ignore Mr. Karzai's demands. In other words, they need to put their interests ahead of Mr. Karzai's wishes. Initially, there might be some public relations fallout, but in the end, if a better outcome is secured, that fallout will fade from memory.

Well that would presuppose an entirely new policy shift, one that will require the creation of an entirely new political and administrative infrastructure built under the hostile gaze of the current regime. It is a project of many years. Are you sure NATO has the political will to remain there another decade? Or longer?

I'm not wed to either the sunk cost or escalation of commitment falacies. If a strategic adjustment is needed, it should be pursued. IMO, it is needed. The Karzai regime is more part of the problem, than the solution. Moreover, my guess is that if the U.S./NATO continue to rely on the Karzai regime, prospects for a stay of another decade or longer are higher than they would be if the U.S./NATO de-emphasized Kabul.

Under a new approach, I believe Afghanistan’s tribal leaders should be charged with allocating resources that would be furnished for reconstruction, economic development, education, within their jurisdictions. Security operations should be coordinated with the tribal leaders. Local security forces would be developed and trained. Those forces should be charged with maintaining security in areas under the jurisdiction of each tribal leader. They should be developed with attention to maintaining a careful balance of power so that no local area would be in a position to try to gain preeminence at the expense of others. Only truly national issues--those that impact the entire country--should be financed through and coordinated with Kabul. Those efforts should immediately be focused on developing an adequate legal and constitutional framework, financial system, central army that would complement local security forces when needed (including a "balancing" role), but not serve as a substitute for them, and ultimately culminate in an election that would create a government that Afgans would widely view as legitimate.

In fact, in a welcome development, the U.S. has taken the first small steps in that direction. On December 17, 2010, Business Week reported:

The Obama administration will rely more heavily on Pakistan and local power-brokers in Afghanistan as the U.S. seeks to turn “significant progress” in the war against al-Qaeda and the Taliban into long-term gains...

Karzai in the past has objected to U.S. ties with local leaders as an attempt to undermine his authority. The resulting emphasis by the U.S. on working with and through Karzai has worsened corruption, said Robert L. Grenier, CIA station chief in Islamabad from 1999 until 2002, at a Council on Foreign Relations forum in Washington yesterday.


In the light of my previous comments about your new regionalist strategy, it seems to me that there is no exit plan. NATO will remain for the forseeable future unable to extricate itself from its perceived role as backers of Karzai and yet certain that the Karzai regime will never be able to survive without their foreign backers. Your new, "Devolved Afghanistan" is a policy diametrically opposed to current policy, threatening to all current players in the regime and the two policies - current and new - cannot be conducted simultaneously. How do you think it could work?

It's threatening to the corrupt and, much more important to U.S. interests, inept and unreliable Karzai regime, only. However, a strategic shift would have a better chance to lead to a legtimate government that could enjoy broad-based support. Not surprisingly, the U.S. has finally taken the first tentative steps in that direction.

Mr. Karzai has been propped up for nearly a decade now. He remains viewed widely as illegitimate by Afghans. He is capable of exercising jurisdiction without NATO assistance over only a small part of the country. As a consequence, the current "exit strategy" is little more than a mirage.

Sound policy cannot rest on sentimentality alone. Just because the U.S./NATO states have invested in Mr. Karzai's regime is not sufficient grounds to continue an approach that quite frankly has generated insignificant returns based on the resources already deployed and enormous amount of time given to the regime to evolve into a competent government. Continued "investment" in the Karzai regime is little more than a de facto rationalization of the earlier experiment that has generated such minimal returns.

Instead, sentimentalities should be put aside--and Karzai's latest impulsive outburst makes it easier to justify doing just that--and the changes necessary to increase prospects for a better outcome should be pursued.

Finally, given Afghanistan's tribal structures, it makes eminent sense to build from the ground up starting with its tribal leaders. Moreover, unlike the Karzai regime, the tribal leaders are perceived broadly within their communities as legitimate and trustworthy. The greater trust and credibility these leaders command would offer a fresh starting point for the political strategy, and an effective political strategy would contribute to a better security environment. Now that the U.S. has moved modestly in that direction, it has developed working relationships that would enable it to move fairly quickly away from a Kabul-centric approach.
 
Last edited:

I would suggest that is because 99% of the country doesnt have a clear idea of what exactly is going on and what the war currently entails and what the goal and end-game is even expected to be. We arent 'at war' against Afghanistan. We are fighting taliban insurgents that are trying to reclaim the country. I think if people understood what our presence and mission was there people might see things differently. Maybe not...but...they might. There are some that will blindly support it because Obama says we shjould be there. There are some that will blindly oppose it because Obama says we need to be there. Write those idiots off and I wonder what the percentages would look like.
 
I would suggest that is because 99% of the country doesnt have a clear idea of what exactly is going on and what the war currently entails and what the goal and end-game is even expected to be.

if so, then the president has failed in his primary mission

in my opinion, increasing numbers of americans are coming to see that we simply cannot succeed over there

personally, i believe we have no chance of military success anywhere so long as this incompetent crew is in the white house

war is difficult, war is serious, war requires mobilizing a nation

obama's not even personally committed to the effort, i think it's obvious

so does BOB WOODWARD, by the way
 
if so, then the president has failed in his primary mission

in my opinion, increasing numbers of americans are coming to see that we simply cannot succeed over there

personally, i believe we have no chance of military success anywhere so long as this incompetent crew is in the white house

war is difficult, war is serious, war requires mobilizing a nation

obama's not even personally committed to the effort, i think it's obvious

so does BOB WOODWARD, by the way

I disagree about the 'winning'. It comes with the definition. The war against Afghanistan ended damn near a decade ago. Winning should have involved
-helping their people form a new government-check
-provide a reasonably stable platform and help train a police and military-nope
-Set a specific deadline for departure....ummm...nope.

And Obama doesnt shoulder the blame for that part. Bush mismanged the post war operation. Obama owns his portion and I agree...he is doing a dismal job.
 
I disagree about the 'winning'. It comes with the definition. The war against Afghanistan ended damn near a decade ago. Winning should have involved
-helping their people form a new government-check
-provide a reasonably stable platform and help train a police and military-nope
-Set a specific deadline for departure....ummm...nope.

And Obama doesnt shoulder the blame for that part. Bush mismanged the post war operation. Obama owns his portion and I agree...he is doing a dismal job.

If you wanna be real, the first objective didn't really get achieved either as Afghanistan is still a failed state.
 
If you wanna be real, the first objective didn't really get achieved either as Afghanistan is still a failed state.

Not sure I agree. We have pretty much kept them co-dependent. We dont know if it is a failed state or not and wont until they are actually given the reponsibility to manage on their own. A successful Afghanistan doesnt have to look like the US. Point of fact I believe that in the long term they will still be tribal, there will still be corruption (OK...in that part they are JUST like the US)...basically they will have their own failings like all countries. We cant know until they have had the opportunity to succeed. i think we have hindered their growth as a country.
 
Not sure I agree. We have pretty much kept them co-dependent. We dont know if it is a failed state or not and wont until they are actually given the reponsibility to manage on their own. A successful Afghanistan doesnt have to look like the US. Point of fact I believe that in the long term they will still be tribal, there will still be corruption (OK...in that part they are JUST like the US)...basically they will have their own failings like all countries. We cant know until they have had the opportunity to succeed. i think we have hindered their growth as a country.

I suspect the recent polling results are a function of a number of factors:

1. Lack of understanding of the strategic importance of Afghanistan.
2. Failure to achieve better results to date than what have been attained and that were attainable (this failure, in particular, has changed expectations related to a successful outcome).
3. Irregular and ineffective communication of developments and outcomes in Afghanistan.
4. Competing priorities that have grown more prominent.
5. National fatigue.
 
there are a lot of areas of mega importance, geo politically

regionally, MEXICO is a major problem

even gorby failed in the mountains on the moon, and those folks fought with a ruthless WILL totally unknown to the chicago crowd currently occupying our capitol

pray for our soldiers, pray for the people of afghanistan/pakistan

pray for billions of others

peace
 
End operations in Afghanistan, Karzai tells NATO

I guess Karzai and the people of Afghanistan have decided the cure is worse than the disease. The drone attacks must be horrifying on many levels. It's too bad the coward terrorists insist on hiding behind women and children.

This has nothing to do with the "people" of Afghanistan. Most of the people are Pashtun. Most of the Pashtun want the Afghanistan that was emerging in the early 1970s before the Communist Party gained power and invited in the Soviet Union. And the outlying tribes are content with Afghanistan being run by a Pashtun (historical) just as long as he respects their tribal soveriegnty (also historical). Karzai is just growing tired of the pressures that we are placing upon him. He is slow to attack corruption and even slower when it comes to feeding his security forces with the resources they need to fight his people's enemy. Everytime the enemy doesn't deliver us a perfect combat scenario, people get upset. He uses this to try to pressure the international community into believeing that his people want us gone. He would prefer a business deal with the Taliban that leaves him in power and delivers "peace." This deal would allow 70 percent of the world's heroin to go on funding the Taliban and Al-Quedas with a kick back to his cabinet. And all would be merry except for the miserable farmer who gets terrorized every year for not producing and the worsening education situation that feeds into Al-Queda type organizations. Of course, the Taliban would have other plans for his cabinet once we left, but Karzai is just that stupid. The intellectuals of Iran once believed in Khomeini. That was before he got his power and executed much of them.

The people do not want us gone. Not yet.
 
Last edited:
Back
Top Bottom