Not force idiotic extreme ROE on the troops.
The rules of engagement are General McChrystal's rules. From The New York Times:
Since last year, the counterinsurgency doctrine championed by those now leading the campaign has assumed an almost unchallenged supremacy in the ranks of the American military’s career officers. The doctrine, which has been supported by both the Bush and Obama administrations, rests on core assumptions, including that using lethal force against an insurgency intermingled with a civilian population is often counterproductive.
Since General McChrystal assumed command, he has been a central face and salesman of this idea, and he has applied it to warfare in a tangible way: by further tightening rules guiding the use of Western firepower — airstrikes and guided rocket attacks, artillery barrages and even mortar fire — to support troops on the ground.
That the still largely unproved COIN theory has Presidential support does not mean that the President has imposed the tactics in place.
Approved the troop increase request long ago and not skimped on the numbers.
Call this war and this enemy what they are.
Met with his generals in more places than a tarmac for an hour.
Not force idiotic extreme ROE on the troops.
:shrug:
yes, but let's also not pretend that those kinds of decisions are made in a vacuum. if the President does fire McCrystal in such a manner that he feels the need to write a book, it will be interesting to see where the breakdown is.
that being said, COIN is pretty clear: minimum necessary force. the argument coming from those on the ground, as i understand it, is that we are cheating to the point where we are below the necessary line. McCrystal has the right idea, i just wonder if decision making is too centralized (who has authority to bless off on an airstrike? who can put EF on the kill/capture list? who has the authority to authorize pursuit into or attack on a compound?) and he hasn't taken a good concept too far.
but you don't win a counterinsurgency by using the same kind of large-scale kinetic shock and awe strategy that you use in a conventional campaign. we tried that once - it was called the Vietnam War. You also don't win a counterinsurgency by staying on large bases and only sending out SOF teams, large heavily armed units, and drones. We tried that once too - it was called the Rumsfeld Doctrine.
If he is fired, his public comments shouldn't be the issue. A legitimate issue concerns the strategy that he largely designed, as what is currently happening in Afghanistan risks becoming a case study in bad planning despite heroic efforts of execution by the troops.
On June 10, 2009, The Washington Post reported:
The top U.S. commander in Afghanistan said Thursday that major parts of the military operation to secure Kandahar, the birthplace of the Taliban movement, would be pushed back because it was taking longer than expected to win local support...
But McChrystal said it was taking longer than anticipated to gain the blessing of local tribal leaders -- and Kandaharis in general -- for the operation. He also said commanders needed more time to ensure that Afghan government could step in after the fighting stops and provide effective public services, something that has been lacking in Kandahar for years.
The underlined part is key. It again reflects Kabul-centric thinking that is a problem. The widely unpopular Karzai regime's legitimacy is suspect it has cronyism-related issues to deal with in Kandahar. Family ties have visibly benefited Karzai's half-brother there. Carl Forsberg, an analyst at the Institute for the Study of War described prevailing perceptions there as follows, "In Kabul, as in Kandahar, state-building and family interests have become confused, such that they are equated with one another, in ways that sometimes parallel the monarchical political order of the old regime, in which the strength of the state relied on the strength of the Shah [king], his family and its personal allies." In that atmosphere, the lack of support from local tribal leaders is reasonable. They are not about to run risks presented by the Taliban largely to benefit the Karzai family.
That the Kabul-centric strategy has yielded suboptimal results was expected, particularly by those who are knowledgeable about Afghan affairs. Ambassador Eikenberry and General Petraeus had concerns about partnering with the Karzai regime during the time the current strategy was being developed. From the December 6, 2009 edition of The New York Times:
That very afternoon, someone leaked word of a cable sent by Ambassador Eikenberry from Kabul expressing reservations about a large buildup of forces as long as the Karzai government remained unreformed. At one of their meetings, General Petraeus had told Mr. Obama to think of elements of the Karzai government like "a crime syndicate." Ambassador Eikenberry was suggesting, in effect, that America could not get in bed with the mob.
Sadly, as had been the case before the new strategy was devised, the architects of the strategy are the ones who yet again have fallen behind the proverbial curve. Worse, in this case they should never have fallen behind the curve. The evolution of events was readily foreseeable (and foreseen by some such as Amb. Eikenberry) and very likely avoidable (had the strategy not been Kabul-centric in nature).
I'm wondeirng how many of you who lean more on Gen. McCrystal's side have actually read the Rolling Stone article? If you have not, I think you should!! Rolling Stone has published it online here. From a PR and a command structure point of view, it's bad! Really bad!! Unless the President is willing to stick to the COIN strategy AND he really believes that he needs Gen. McCrystal to win this Afghan war, I'd say the General should be fired! You'll have to read the article to fully understand why.
Not only does he undermine the President and the W.H. staff, but from a political standpoint he shows total disrespect for some of our allies in this war, as well as the Afghan government. The man is acting just like Gen. Patton did during WWII when he thought he was the HNIC over everything he touched! It's bad, folks...really bad.
Obama can't win on this, because if he fires the general, loses a good general who can go public with further criticism; and if he doesn't fire him he looks like he's not in charge.
He knew the consequences of such statements, what this should lead us to believe is that there is some ****ed up **** coming down so much so that he felt he needed to say it.
You don't talk badly about the people who sign your paychecks.
Can someone explain how this "resignation" thingy works?? He (McChrystal) is a military General assigned a command. Maybe i just need to get out more, but i have never heard of a General in the middle of a war resigning.
If Obama needs/wants to fire McChrystal he should have the coconuts to fire his butt. Not "accept a resignation".
In 2008, Navy Adm. William J. Fallon, then the head of U.S. forces in the Middle East, was forced to retire after an article ran in Esquire in which he appeared to question Bush administration policies.
-- Its simply a sign of immaturity how Obama has reacted.
--But ohhh wait, McChrystal dares speak out of turn about Obama --
An Afghanistan strategy session is under way at the White House as scheduled without word from President Barack Obama about the fate of war commander Gen. Stanley McChrystal, who is under fire for blistering remarks in a magazine.
McChrystal came to the White House for a 30-minute face-to-face with Obama over his remarks and then left. He was not seen returning for the bigger war meeting, as he had been expected to.
EDIT: Watching CNN. He has been relieved of Command. Mcchrystal has been relieved of Command. Obama shall talk in about 10 minutes.
EDIT: Watching CNN. He has been relieved of Command. Mcchrystal has been relieved of Command. Obama shall talk in about 10 minutes.
General Petraeus will be taking over.
Hasn't been confirmed... but it is highly likely.
I've read it. It was interesting to read that among the general descriptions you provide, that General McChrystal's "Team America" inner circle had a "disdain for authority." That is the antithesis of the principles at the heart of the military chain of command. It suggests not only a General whose conduct was inappropriate but also a potentially dysfunctional culture. To say the least, it is a troubling detail.
P.S. My initial response that you quoted was prior to the full article's having been published online. Certainly, the article alone would be sufficient grounds for dismissal.