Nation building, however, is not something we can give to the Afghani people, unless we are willing to be their adversaries.
It's true. I am still not understanding what fighting in Afghanistan's end goal is. There's very little evidence that Bin Laden is even in Waziristan! We are witnessing Al Qai'da attacks, even with the Military kicking A.Q. out of Afghanistan.I'm afraid that to win this war we would have to "kill them all and let God sort them out", then occupy the country for 50 years until a new generation came of age in the modern world.
because Soldiers were being killed by the 100s per month in Iraq. It was not a priority for the Bush administration to win in Afghanistan. The biggest legacy of the Bush administration is the absolute military incompetence. If it weren't for David Paetreus we would still be at the 100/ month mark.However, when it comes to strategy, Washington should ask the difficult questions that need to be asked including:
1) Why did the earlier strategies fail?
Which forecasts? The only forecast was that American military would displace the Taliban regime and it did. There was no further forecast. Afghanistan was more or less put on the back burner.2) Why were early forecasts so far off the mark?
Absolute incompetence. It's disgusting how unprepared we are, as a nation, to fight the Tribesmen in Afghanistan.3) Why did the earlier strategies not consider the rise of situations that confronted the British and Soviets in Afghanistan?
It's absolutely not. But the Bush Administration made the effort to immediately replace the "oppressive Taliban" with a Democratic regime. It almost sickens me how one could conceive that such a strategy would work. Bush and his Populist bull**** of "Democracy for everyone!". God, like democracy can be built when there is no majority.4) How would disproportionate reliance on the Karzai government in a country based on local/dispersed power be better than building a bottom-up strategy based around local tribal leaders?
No Clue.5) What contingencies are considered in the proposed strategy?
Because, according to many Generals, what works in Iraq is bound to work in Afghanistan. This is not counter-insurgency it's much tougher than that.6) Why should Washington have confidence that the proposed strategy has a high probability of success given the experience with the past strategies, including the earlier troop surge?
We are not taking into consideration the amount of support that the ISI gives to the Taliban leadership; even ranking members in the Pakistan military are Pro-Taliban!
The Tribesmen aren't stupid. They know that by accepting the Karzi Regime (or even Pakistan or NATO) and accepting their help (codename: Infrastructure) they are signing their autonomy, their heritage, and their identity away.
It's not the military's job to articulate. It's the military's job to eradicate.7) Can the military planners articulate the broader geopolitical implications of the conflict in Afghanistan?