First of all....no it wasn't. He lent general and basic ideas towards parts of it as did many others. The actual writers were from think tanks and largely drew from scenarios that have nothing to do with today's insurgency make up and merely regurgitated past theories. The final product was far better than the initial version that was largely rejected at the war college and senior leadership in the Army, Marine Corps and tactical experts, but it is still immersed in politicial correctness and avoids the very topics at the heart of present day insurgencies.
Second of all, Iraq turned around because of Patreaus, Nasr, Lake and the fact that Iraqis grew tired of the senseless internal slaughter they were orchestrating.
Third, the default position of the manual is still the Maoist model, with soundbites of T.E. Lawrence tossed in. This manual defends the old intellectual order. It's an attempt to validate somebody's doctrinal thesis. It's a dishonest look at history because it picks and chooses that which helps people to define the wars they want to fight versus the wars they are actively fighting. This isn't fair to the troop nor the leaders that guide them on the battlefield.