No. It just states that you have a prefernce.
It doesnt -change- the fact that nuclear weapons deter war and that their absence mnakes war more likely, it simply states that YOU would prefer to not have that deterrence.
Hate to tell you this, but your preferences do not overturn facts.
I'm only going to post this once, since talking with you is always like talking to a brick wall, and frankly I'd much rather discuss the issue with Ethereal than with you (which is why my comment was addressed to him and not you).
This really boils down to game theory, so let's make a list of the rules for nuclear deterrence:
Divide all countries into three groups: Group A are the non-nuclear powers, Group B are the nuclear powers without no-first-strike policies (Pakistan, North Korea), and Group C are the nuclear powers with no-first-strike policies (all the others).
Now, who is deterred from attacking who, with what kinds of weapons? Group A/B/C countries are deterred from attacking a Group B country with conventional weapons, since they could elicit a nuclear response. Group B/C countries are deterred from attacking a Group C country with nuclear weapons, since they would almost certainly elicit a nuclear response.
The question, then, is if these deterrents outweigh the carnage of a potential nuclear war. Let's examine the potential combinations of state actors that could have caused (or could still cause) a nuclear war, and how deterred they would be.
USA-USSR (Both are deterred, assuming each trusts the other to keep its no-first-strike policy. Several close calls of nuclear launches though.)
USA-Maoist China (USA is deterred due to possible Chinese nuclear retaliation. China is not deterred from conventional attacks if they assume the USA will not respond with nuclear weapons.)
India-Pakistan (Both are deterred, assuming each trusts the other not to launch first despite Pakistan's lack of a no-first-strike policy. Close call with nuclear war.)
USA-DPRK (DPRK has no additional deterrent to starting a conventional war if they assume the US will not launch nukes in response. USA is deterred if they fear nuclear retaliation, but not deterred from starting a war if they assume they can preemptively wipe out all of the DPRK's nukes.)
Israel-Arab states/groups (Israel has no additional deterrent since no Arab states or groups possess nuclear weapons. Arab states/groups are not deterred if they assume Israel will not launch nukes in response to conventional weapons.)
USA-Iran (USA is not deterred since Iran does not yet have nuclear weapons. Iran is not deterred from conventional weapons attacks if they assume the USA will not respond with nukes.)
These are the only potential conflicts involving a nuclear power that I can foresee in the immediate future, or that have already occurred. In every single case, at least one party either has no deterrent, or there was a close call DESPITE the deterrents.
Therefore, I think it's perfectly valid to question the assumption that the deterrence of nuclear weapons is worth the potential carnage. A nuclear weapons-free world is a laudable goal, even though it's somewhat distant.