• This is a political forum that is non-biased/non-partisan and treats every person's position on topics equally. This debate forum is not aligned to any political party. In today's politics, many ideas are split between and even within all the political parties. Often we find ourselves agreeing on one platform but some topics break our mold. We are here to discuss them in a civil political debate. If this is your first visit to our political forums, be sure to check out the RULES. Registering for debate politics is necessary before posting. Register today to participate - it's free!

C.I.A. Had Plan to Assassinate Qaeda Leaders

Re: Will the Liar?

One of the things mentioned was hijacking. That right there should have sent red flags to airports across the country. There is no reason why anaylists shouldn't have IMMEDIATELY been on the job to search for odd habits in airports.

Sent red flags to do, what? Accost swarthy looking men with Arab accents? That ain't gonna happen and you know it. Can you imagine the squeeling from the Leftists had Bush inacted post-9/11 security in the airports?



Right so the ENTIRE Al-Q movement is dead then because most are not communicating openly, so no more terrorists right? Come on.

Again, silence is not proof of death.


Zawahiri is communicating openly. Why him and not UBL? It doesn't make sense.
 
Re: Will the Liar?

Zawahiri is communicating openly. Why him and not UBL? It doesn't make sense.

I wouldn't call it openly. It isn't like he clicked on his mic and started talkiung to the world. It was on a tape.

He made one comment in how long? It also depends on where he is at. He may be able to afford the opportunity to communicate.

However, if Osama is in a situation where he is giving orders and actively engaged in Al-Q operations, it would be best for him to remain silent.

Did it ever occur to you that Zawahiri might be communicating to draw attention away from where Osama is?

As much as some people would like to portray Islamic extremists as barbaric unintelligent lunatics, Osama is not unintelligent.

He has evaded U.S. capture for years. He has also learned (from the death of the first Al-Q leader in Iraq) that publicity can get you killed.
 
APDST, We may disagree on many things, but I TRULY wish that Osama was dead.

I would like him dead. I just don't think he is.
 
APDST, We may disagree on many things, but I TRULY wish that Osama was dead.

I would like him dead. I just don't think he is.

I never had any doubt that you felt that way.
 
Re: Will the Liar?

One of the things mentioned was hijacking. That right there should have sent red flags to airports across the country. There is no reason why anaylists shouldn't have IMMEDIATELY been on the job to search for odd habits in airports.

Exactly what odd habits should they have picked up on?
 
I never had any doubt that you felt that way.

Getting back to the question, you are assuming that Bin Laden is dead from logic, correct? Thats fine, in my eyes. And let's not start calling "logical fallacy" on him please....

And frankly, he was pretty old when he bombed us in the first place, and he doesn't exactly have a hospital to drop in every day...
 
And, all three cases the order to strike should have been given. Just think of the hundreds of thousands of lives it would have saved. As long as we allow the enemy to use civilians as human shields, they will do it.

I never disagreed with that. But saying that assasination is "surgical" is an overstatement when there will likely be collateral damage.


The particulars of this operation are classified, so no, we don't know how the engagements were executed, or that there even were any.
We know that UAV's were used to operate in the tribal regions while we did not use conventional aircraft or weapons. This was mostly due to us trying to lower the pressure on Pakistan, who see it as less agressive if there is not actually pilots flying over their airspace. So if there were engagements involving these hit team squads, they would rely on UAV's.


And, after a while the civilians of the area figured out that the reason their homes were getting blown up was because there was an indirect fire weapon hiding in the living room. When the houses stopped being used as a base of fire, the houses weren't getting blown up anymore. It was called, "The Anbar Awakening".
That's not how it happened at all. Two battles of Fallujah, Abu Gahraib scandal, Sole Al Jazeera reporting(No competing news agencies so that Al Jazeera was able to spew propaganda) etc. took place before the "Anbar Awakening" in 2006. By that time, a whole new fleet of commanders had taken reins with Petraeus at the forefront. (Well, to be fair, General Casey did a lot to faciliate change in the military and in how the Coalition was fighting the war in Iraq... foremost by forming a formal, nation-wide strategy, which Sanchez had failed to do.)



However, you can't spare civilians to the point that your force can't effectively fight the enemy.
You need to fight with a scalpel, not a hammer or even a knife. That is how to be most effective in counter-insurgency.


Anytime you allow the enemy sactuary, they're going to take advantage of it.
Another one of Casey's accomplishments was to make it policy to not allow any enemy sanctuaries. That had not been true before, when places like Tal Afar and others were used as safe havens.
When you show the enemy, as well as the civilian populace that you're going to engage the enemy whenever and where ever, the enemy will stop using civilians as human shields and the civilians will stop allowing themselves to be used as human shields.
Civilians aren't used just as human shields. They quarter troops, supply troops, join the ranks... They are the pool which the insurgency swims. So if you can provide the people with their basic needs: Jobs, security, water, electricity etc., then they will have no need to turn to the insurgency to fulfill those needs and the insurgency will begin to starve.

Its much more complicated then just human shields and the underlying point is that killing the enemy is one factor in defeating the insurgency.
 
Last edited:
I never disagreed with that. But saying that assasination is "surgical" is an overstatement when there will likely be collateral damage.

Assissination, by it's nature, is a surgical attack. In actuality if we're not killing a political figure, it's not an assissination. Targetting an killing a terrorist honcho isn't an assissination, technically.



We know that UAV's were used to operate in the tribal regions while we did not use conventional aircraft or weapons. This was mostly due to us trying to lower the pressure on Pakistan, who see it as less agressive if there is not actually pilots flying over their airspace. So if there were engagements involving these hit team squads, they would rely on UAV's.

You're talking about a completely different operation.



That's not how it happened at all. Two battles of Fallujah, Abu Gahraib scandal, Sole Al Jazeera reporting(No competing news agencies so that Al Jazeera was able to spew propaganda) etc. took place before the "Anbar Awakening" in 2006. By that time, a whole new fleet of commanders had taken reins with Petraeus at the forefront. (Well, to be fair, General Casey did a lot to faciliate change in the military and in how the Coalition was fighting the war in Iraq... foremost by forming a formal, nation-wide strategy, which Sanchez had failed to do.)

But, ultimately, the people in Anbar figured out that if the terrorists were gone, they would stop being killed by American fire.


You need to fight with a scalpel, not a hammer or even a knife. That is how to be most effective in counter-insurgency.

Hence the need for sniping operations. Which we've done in both Afghanistan and Iraq to great effect.


Another one of Casey's accomplishments was to make it policy to not allow any enemy sanctuaries. That had not been true before, when places like Tal Afar and others were used as safe havens.

They were allowed to used as safe havens, because no one wanted to hose the place down, in fear that there might be collateral damage.

Civilians aren't used just as human shields. They quarter troops, supply troops, join the ranks...

At which time they stop being civilians and start being members of the enemy force, making them a ligit target.

Its much more complicated then just human shields and the underlying point is that killing the enemy is one factor in defeating the insurgency.
[/quote]

But, it's the primary objective in fighting any war. Obviously the avoiddance of civilian casualties is of the ighest priority, however you don't want to let that take away the momentum of your offensive operations thereby losing your combat effectiveness.

A good historical example is the invasion of Normandy, where 15,000+ French civilians were killed.
 
Counter-Insurgency

Assissination, by it's nature, is a surgical attack. In actuality if we're not killing a political figure, it's not an assissination. Targetting an killing a terrorist honcho isn't an assissination, technically.
to kill suddenly or secretively, esp. a politically prominent person; murder premeditatedly and treacherously.
Killing Osama Bin Laden would befit the definition of assassination since he is a politically prominent person and it would be done premeditatedly.

You're talking about a completely different operation.
I'm talking about all operations in the region where Osama Bin Laden finds safe haven. Since we know that UAV's were used in this region--instead of manned aircraft for reasons detailed before-- then any operation in that area would have to rely on UAV's and not "precise and accurate long range"

But, ultimately, the people in Anbar figured out that if the terrorists were gone, they would stop being killed by American fire.
You have a failed idea as to how they reach that conclusion.

Hence the need for sniping operations. Which we've done in both Afghanistan and Iraq to great effect.
Sniping operations is only an element.

They were allowed to used as safe havens, because no one wanted to hose the place down, in fear that there might be collateral damage.
No. That's simply not true. There was very little precaution in the military hierarchy when it came to collateral damage in 2003-2004. They lacked sufficient manpower and the proper strategic resolve to assault such safe havens.

At which time they stop being civilians and start being members of the enemy force, making them a ligit target.
What you are talking about is genocide. The Sunni populace was alienated early on in the conflict, so virtually the entire Sunni community was against the Shi'ite led government and the Coalition. So your logic tells you that the entire Sunni community is a legit military target? WRONG.

But, it's the primary objective in fighting any war. Obviously the avoiddance of civilian casualties is of the ighest priority, however you don't want to let that take away the momentum of your offensive operations thereby losing your combat effectiveness.
No. The primary objective in fighting a war is victory, which depends on your ultimate goal. Since our goal in Iraq was to ensure a stable and free government in Iraq, then killing the enemy is not the sole priority. When killing your enemy is sole priority, then you get a purely attritional conflict... which we have experience with, and know does not work well against Insurgencies(ie Vietnam).

A good historical example is the invasion of Normandy, where 15,000+ French civilians were killed.
Invasions are much, much different than Insurgencies.
 
Last edited:
Re: Counter-Insurgency

Killing Osama Bin Laden would befit the definition of assassination since he is a politically prominent person and it would be done premeditatedly.
I'm talking about all operations in the region where Osama Bin Laden finds safe haven. Since we know that UAV's were used in this region--instead of manned aircraft for reasons detailed before-- then any operation in that area would have to rely on UAV's and not "precise and accurate long range"[/quote]

Again, you're talking about a different operation.


You have a failed idea as to how they reach that conclusion.

Post something to prove your point.


Sniping operations is only an element.

Snipers are combat multipliers.


No. That's simply not true. There was very little precaution in the military hierarchy when it came to collateral damage in 2003-2004. They lacked sufficient manpower and the proper strategic resolve to assault such safe havens.

Prove it.


What you are talking about is genocide. The Sunni populace was alienated early on in the conflict, so virtually the entire Sunni community was against the Shi'ite led government and the Coalition. So your logic tells you that the entire Sunni community is a legit military target? WRONG.

It's not genocide to kill the enemy. That's totally naive. The Sunnis who are actively engaged in combat operations, are legitimate targets, yes. When defining combat operations, that includes logistical support.


No. The primary objective in fighting a war is victory, which depends on your ultimate goal. Since our goal in Iraq was to ensure a stable and free government in Iraq, then killing the enemy is not the sole priority. When killing your enemy is sole priority, then you get a purely attritional conflict... which we have experience with, and know does not work well against Insurgencies(ie Vietnam).

Yes, and vitory is achieved by engaging the enemy in close quarter combat and destroying his ability to fight. You can spin it however you want, but in ANY combat situation, destroying the enemy's combat power is priority #1. Using Vietnam as an example of a tactical failure is erroneous on your part. US forces defeated the enemy on the battlefield in Vietnam.
 
Last edited:
Re: Counter-Insurgency

Invasions are much, much different than Insurgencies.


It all has the same objective: take away the enemy's ability to resist.
 
Re: Counter-Insurgency

Snipers are combat multipliers

I thought this was specifically about assasinations, not all out offensives. While your statement is true, it lends credence to the fact that you are starting to get off base a little bit. Please stick to it, this is fun to watch :)
 
Re: Counter-Insurgency

It all has the same objective: take away the enemy's ability to resist.

...easiest way to do that: Nagasaki and Hiroshima. That's essentially what you're saying....and it's not something even thought of as likely to happen, so dismiss it.
 
Re: Counter-Insurgency

I thought this was specifically about assasinations, not all out offensives. While your statement is true, it lends credence to the fact that you are starting to get off base a little bit. Please stick to it, this is fun to watch :)

Combat multipliers aren't only used to effect in offensive operations. Combat multipliers give a commander more flexibility on the battlefield, whether it be offensive, or defensive operations.

The doctrinal definition of a combat multiplier is: “Supporting and subsidiary means that significantly increase the relative combat strength (power) of a force while actual force ratios remain constant.”

With sniping operations, one, or two men can provide as much combat power as a 12 man squad, or even a 30 man platoon, depending on MET-T.


...easiest way to do that: Nagasaki and Hiroshima. That's essentially what you're saying....and it's not something even thought of as likely to happen, so dismiss it.

The, "easiest", way? That's debatable, but certainly not the only way. Sometimes, depleating the enemy's combat power is to take out key military leaders. In other cases, it may be important for certain key military leaders to remain in place, because of their inability to command troops in battle.

There are five elements of combat power: leadership, maneuver, firepower, protection and information. If you deny the enemy's ability to access these elements, then you're on the road to defeating him.
 
Re: Counter-Insurgency

Combat multipliers aren't only used to effect in offensive operations. Combat multipliers give a commander more flexibility on the battlefield, whether it be offensive, or defensive operations.

The doctrinal definition of a combat multiplier is: “Supporting and subsidiary means that significantly increase the relative combat strength (power) of a force while actual force ratios remain constant.”

With sniping operations, one, or two men can provide as much combat power as a 12 man squad, or even a 30 man platoon, depending on MET-T.

Doesnt mean anything if you need to take out 1 man, and don't know where he is. In that case, it'd be far better to have a UAV over a sniper team.

The, "easiest", way? That's debatable, but certainly not the only way. Sometimes, depleating the enemy's combat power is to take out key military leaders. In other cases, it may be important for certain key military leaders to remain in place, because of their inability to command troops in battle.

There are five elements of combat power: leadership, maneuver, firepower, protection and information. If you deny the enemy's ability to access these elements, then you're on the road to defeating him.

Hmm...like everything it's much easier to talk about it then actually do it. How are you going to limit any of those 5 elements? Leadership I can imagine, but they replace those rather quickly don't they? And we can't even think of reducing their maneuver, firepower, protection or information can we?

They have tunnel networks everywhere, and masquerade as civilians, thats maneuver.

Firepower, those same tunnels, and unless we somehow eliminate Iran from the equation, we can't stop the weapons going in.

Protection, they can walk right by our troops without being spotted, and they have tunnel networks which we sometimes can't find, and are not going to necessarily clear out.

Information...I don't think I really need to explain that, do I?

You are talking about how we would fight the Russians for Western Europe, not how we would fight some psycho's in a desert. What combat troops? They are all goat herders, who take a few cheap shots, and blend back into the crowd...we can't effectively stop them without pacifying the entire population, and we cannot do that bloodlessly.
 
If it were not for the CIA, Afghanistan would be another North Korea, a nuclear power under Russian influence. I think it is one of our most valuable defenses in America's arsenal.

Do you have faith in their killers though? I don't. I think all those assassins in SAD are just too old to do their thing. I have heard that the average age for a SAD is 60ish. Way too old for jumping out of planes and the sort. Way to old.
 
Re: Counter-Insurgency

Doesnt mean anything if you need to take out 1 man, and don't know where he is. In that case, it'd be far better to have a UAV over a sniper team.

If you don't know where the target is, a UAV isn't going to do you anygood, either. Besides that, a sniper team can confirm the kill, where an air-strike can't.



Hmm...like everything it's much easier to talk about it then actually do it. How are you going to limit any of those 5 elements? Leadership I can imagine, but they replace those rather quickly don't they? And we can't even think of reducing their maneuver, firepower, protection or information can we?

Replacing a leader is another one of those things that easier said than done.[/quote]

They have tunnel networks everywhere, and masquerade as civilians, thats maneuver.

Firepower, those same tunnels, and unless we somehow eliminate Iran from the equation, we can't stop the weapons going in.

Protection, they can walk right by our troops without being spotted, and they have tunnel networks which we sometimes can't find, and are not going to necessarily clear out.

Information...I don't think I really need to explain that, do I?

You are talking about how we would fight the Russians for Western Europe, not how we would fight some psycho's in a desert. What combat troops? They are all goat herders, who take a few cheap shots, and blend back into the crowd...we can't effectively stop them without pacifying the entire population, and we cannot do that bloodlessly.

When engaging an enemy that relies heavily on assymetrical warfare as his main strategy, it the degree of difficutly goes up to be sure, but the objectives are the same. It's this kind of warfare where combat multipliers become even more important. A sniper team, or a light hunter/killer team will have more success in reducing the enemy's combat power. The most important mission for those teams would be observe the enemy's movements, so as to learn more about how they operate.

If we locate tunnel entrances we can monitor movement and thereby interdict that movement. If the enemy's movement is restricted to the tunnels, then we have hurt their ability to maneuver, in a big way. When we start infiltrating the tunnels, then we've restricted their movement, even more, not to mention reduced the level of protection that their fighters have.

Weapons are transported. There's no other way to accomplish that. They're brought by vehicle, pack animal, or carried by humans. Locating and interrupting logistical routes is way to interrupt combat power.

The principles of warfare are the same, no matter what enemy you're fighting. He has to use those same principles. If you force him to deviate from those principles and deny him the ability to fully utilize his combat power, you will destroy his ability to resist.
 
Re: Counter-Insurgency

If you don't know where the target is, a UAV isn't going to do you anygood, either. Besides that, a sniper team can confirm the kill, where an air-strike can't.

Called a kill cam...and sniper teams have to be deployed to the right area, and they have to facing the right direction, and they have to be in less-windy areas, and they have to have the supplies to survive for X number of days, and they have families.

Replacing a leader is another one of those things that easier said than done.

Yeah, just like about everything you said. Theoretically plausible and possible. Practically impossible. And if they couldn't replace them, well, I think we would have won this war quite some time ago.

When engaging an enemy that relies heavily on assymetrical warfare as his main strategy, it the degree of difficutly goes up to be sure, but the objectives are the same. It's this kind of warfare where combat multipliers become even more important. A sniper team, or a light hunter/killer team will have more success in reducing the enemy's combat power. The most important mission for those teams would be observe the enemy's movements, so as to learn more about how they operate.

If we locate tunnel entrances we can monitor movement and thereby interdict that movement. If the enemy's movement is restricted to the tunnels, then we have hurt their ability to maneuver, in a big way. When we start infiltrating the tunnels, then we've restricted their movement, even more, not to mention reduced the level of protection that their fighters have.

Weapons are transported. There's no other way to accomplish that. They're brought by vehicle, pack animal, or carried by humans. Locating and interrupting logistical routes is way to interrupt combat power.

The principles of warfare are the same, no matter what enemy you're fighting. He has to use those same principles. If you force him to deviate from those principles and deny him the ability to fully utilize his combat power, you will destroy his ability to resist.

Once again, good in theory. And how exactly do you tell who is the enemy, when one moment, they pop a few rounds, the next, they are "running in terror" from the big bad US troops. Thats the problem. If we could notably distinguish the enemy from the civilians, there would be no problem. Iraq and Afghanistan would have been won, and everything would be as close to being back to normal in that region as possible. But, we can't tell who is the bad guy and who isn't. Due to this, they can watch our troops patrol, and think of places for IED's. They can get up close to our tropps before atatcking. they can stealthily get out of fights. They can smuggle weapons (unless of course, you want to do a full-body search on every single person you see) whenever and wherever they want, and they controled the entire country a few years back.

There is no way to completely stop the problem, not without killing every single person in the whole country, and that's completely unfeasible. I'm sorry, but counter-insurgency operations (when dealing with radical religionists) are giong to be impossible until you kill every single one of them, that's all there is to it.
 
Re: Counter-Insurgency

Code:
Called a kill cam...and sniper teams have to be deployed to the right area, and they have to facing the right direction, and they have to be in less-windy areas, and they have to have the supplies to survive for X number of days, and they have families.

And, it's alot harder to hide from a sniper team than an aircraft.



Yeah, just like about everything you said. Theoretically plausible and possible. Practically impossible. And if they couldn't replace them, well, I think we would have won this war quite some time ago.

Let me be more specific. Replacing a leader with a competant leader is sometimes easiser said than done. Of course someone is going to step up, but when you take out leader, after leader, after leader morale will suffer among the enemy ranks. Morale is also a combat multiplier. Therefore, when you create an environment where not even the senior leadership is safe from enemy fire, you have denied the enemy of one of his important combat multipliers.

These tactics aren't, "practically impossible", and I'm not just pulling all of this out of my ass. It's been proven time and time again on the battlefield. The Confederate Army is a perfect example of how attrition among an army's officer corps can have an adverse effect on the army's performance on the battlefield.



Once again, good in theory. And how exactly do you tell who is the enemy, when one moment, they pop a few rounds, the next, they are "running in terror" from the big bad US troops. Thats the problem. If we could notably distinguish the enemy from the civilians, there would be no problem. Iraq and Afghanistan would have been won, and everything would be as close to being back to normal in that region as possible. But, we can't tell who is the bad guy and who isn't. [/quote]

It's not a theory. It's been proven to work thousands of times over the centuries, or at least since firearms were introduced into warfare. An unconventional enemy isn't, as you say, "impossible", to defeat. Historically, unconventional forces have proved that they can't sustain effective offensive operations, without the support and combined efforts of a conventional force. Unconventional forces/assymetrical forces are only economy of force. That's it. They do have the advantage of blending in with the local population, because they don not wear distinctive uniform items. However, at some point, for them to be effective, they must come out in the open, with their personal weapons and engage friendly forces. They have to move from one place to another, carrying their weapons. scout/sniper teams are primary employment to deploy on this type of battlefield. It's not hard to spot the enemy. He's the one with the rifle. And, yes, it will be more time consuming than a conventional war might be, but it's not impossible to defeat an enemy of this kind. We've already done it once, to a better trained, more motivated and better supplied enemy.

Due to this, they can watch our troops patrol, and think of places for IED's. They can get up close to our tropps before atatcking. they can stealthily get out of fights.

That's why you imploy tactics and SOP's that take away the effectiveness of the enemy's tactics. It's called, "adapting to the environment", and American soldiers do it better than any soldier in the world.

Don't be fooled by the spin you've been taught. Guerilla fighters have to practice the same principles that any other infantryman does. They have to initiate and break contact just like any other infantry unit and the lack of uniforms isn't going to give them any kind of advantage.

They can smuggle weapons (unless of course, you want to do a full-body search on every single person you see) whenever and wherever they want, and they controled the entire country a few years back.

Weapons have to smuggled in large enough numbers to do some good. Carrying one weapon through at a time isn't going to have any kind of positive effect on the enemy's war effort.

Did you notice that you said that in the past tense?

There is no way to completely stop the problem, not without killing every single person in the whole country, and that's completely unfeasible. I'm sorry, but counter-insurgency operations (when dealing with radical religionists) are giong to be impossible until you kill every single one of them, that's all there is to it.


You're wrong. You don't have to kill everyone in the country to take aways a unit's will to fight. If that were the case, there would be several million armed fighters in Afghanistan than just a few thousand. I think you're under the impression that everyone in the country is a part of the Taliban, which is far from the truth.
 
Re: Counter-Insurgency

Doesnt mean anything if you need to take out 1 man, and don't know where he is. In that case, it'd be far better to have a UAV over a sniper team.

Hmm...like everything it's much easier to talk about it then actually do it. How are you going to limit any of those 5 elements? Leadership I can imagine, but they replace those rather quickly don't they? And we can't even think of reducing their maneuver, firepower, protection or information can we?

They have tunnel networks everywhere, and masquerade as civilians, thats maneuver.

Firepower, those same tunnels, and unless we somehow eliminate Iran from the equation, we can't stop the weapons going in.

Protection, they can walk right by our troops without being spotted, and they have tunnel networks which we sometimes can't find, and are not going to necessarily clear out.

Information...I don't think I really need to explain that, do I?

You are talking about how we would fight the Russians for Western Europe, not how we would fight some psycho's in a desert. What combat troops? They are all goat herders, who take a few cheap shots, and blend back into the crowd...we can't effectively stop them without pacifying the entire population, and we cannot do that bloodlessly.

Called a kill cam...and sniper teams have to be deployed to the right area, and they have to facing the right direction, and they have to be in less-windy areas, and they have to have the supplies to survive for X number of days, and they have families.



Yeah, just like about everything you said. Theoretically plausible and possible. Practically impossible. And if they couldn't replace them, well, I think we would have won this war quite some time ago.



Once again, good in theory. And how exactly do you tell who is the enemy, when one moment, they pop a few rounds, the next, they are "running in terror" from the big bad US troops. Thats the problem. If we could notably distinguish the enemy from the civilians, there would be no problem. Iraq and Afghanistan would have been won, and everything would be as close to being back to normal in that region as possible. But, we can't tell who is the bad guy and who isn't. Due to this, they can watch our troops patrol, and think of places for IED's. They can get up close to our tropps before atatcking. they can stealthily get out of fights. They can smuggle weapons (unless of course, you want to do a full-body search on every single person you see) whenever and wherever they want, and they controled the entire country a few years back.

There is no way to completely stop the problem, not without killing every single person in the whole country, and that's completely unfeasible. I'm sorry, but counter-insurgency operations (when dealing with radical religionists) are giong to be impossible until you kill every single one of them, that's all there is to it.

The military and CIA are so stupid - they keep on coming up with these flawed plans based on their own "experience" when they could be getting the really good ideas from our own resident experts.

You should send them a letter.
 
Re: Counter-Insurgency

Code:

And, it's alot harder to hide from a sniper team than an aircraft.

Let me be more specific. Replacing a leader with a competant leader is sometimes easiser said than done. Of course someone is going to step up, but when you take out leader, after leader, after leader morale will suffer among the enemy ranks. Morale is also a combat multiplier. Therefore, when you create an environment where not even the senior leadership is safe from enemy fire, you have denied the enemy of one of his important combat multipliers.

These tactics aren't, "practically impossible", and I'm not just pulling all of this out of my ass. It's been proven time and time again on the battlefield. The Confederate Army is a perfect example of how attrition among an army's officer corps can have an adverse effect on the army's performance on the battlefield.

Once again, good in theory. And how exactly do you tell who is the enemy, when one moment, they pop a few rounds, the next, they are "running in terror" from the big bad US troops. Thats the problem. If we could notably distinguish the enemy from the civilians, there would be no problem. Iraq and Afghanistan would have been won, and everything would be as close to being back to normal in that region as possible. But, we can't tell who is the bad guy and who isn't.
It's not a theory. It's been proven to work thousands of times over the centuries, or at least since firearms were introduced into warfare. An unconventional enemy isn't, as you say, "impossible", to defeat. Historically, unconventional forces have proved that they can't sustain effective offensive operations, without the support and combined efforts of a conventional force. Unconventional forces/assymetrical forces are only economy of force. That's it. They do have the advantage of blending in with the local population, because they don not wear distinctive uniform items. However, at some point, for them to be effective, they must come out in the open, with their personal weapons and engage friendly forces. They have to move from one place to another, carrying their weapons. scout/sniper teams are primary employment to deploy on this type of battlefield. It's not hard to spot the enemy. He's the one with the rifle. And, yes, it will be more time consuming than a conventional war might be, but it's not impossible to defeat an enemy of this kind. We've already done it once, to a better trained, more motivated and better supplied enemy.

That's why you imploy tactics and SOP's that take away the effectiveness of the enemy's tactics. It's called, "adapting to the environment", and American soldiers do it better than any soldier in the world.

Don't be fooled by the spin you've been taught. Guerilla fighters have to practice the same principles that any other infantryman does. They have to initiate and break contact just like any other infantry unit and the lack of uniforms isn't going to give them any kind of advantage.

Weapons have to smuggled in large enough numbers to do some good. Carrying one weapon through at a time isn't going to have any kind of positive effect on the enemy's war effort.

Did you notice that you said that in the past tense?

You're wrong. You don't have to kill everyone in the country to take aways a unit's will to fight. If that were the case, there would be several million armed fighters in Afghanistan than just a few thousand. I think you're under the impression that everyone in the country is a part of the Taliban, which is far from the truth.

You know what, I don't really need to reply to each part of your post individually, because one thing really covers it all: this isn't a ground war in the conventional sense.

The frontlines are so blurred, neither side can find them, and neither side can define them. We cannot operate against a counter-insurgency like we would a standing army, and thats pretty much what you are saying we should do. 5 elements of combat, paralyze combat units, etc.

The last time we faced anything like what we face in Afghanistan is Iraq, and as you can probably tell, pretty much all we can do is send as many men into the area as possible. All we can really do is dissuade them from fighting us there, and maybe persuade them to fight in more favorable terms. What those are, don't ask me.

And unless you misread/ignored a lot of what I've been saying, the exact problem is that everyone isn't a terrorist in Afghanistan.
 
Last edited:
Re: Counter-Insurgency

The military and CIA are so stupid - they keep on coming up with these flawed plans based on their own "experience" when they could be getting the really good ideas from our own resident experts.

You should send them a letter.

Thank you for donating another helping of crap to the forum.
 
Re: Counter-Insurgency

You know what, I don't really need to reply to each part of your post individually, because one thing really covers it all: this isn't a ground war.

Sure it is.

The frontlines are so blurred, neither side can find them, and neither side can define them.

Just because there are no "front lines" doesn't mean there aren't well-defined boundaries.

We cannot operate against a counter-insurgency like we would a standing army, and thats pretty much what you are saying we should do. 5 elements of combat, paralyze combat units, etc.

That's not what he's saying. Our military has altered and refined its SOPs since day one of Afghanistan/Iraq. We have the most effective counter-insurgency forces on the planet, and they will only continue to get better.

The last time we faced anything like what we face in Afghanistan is Iraq, and as you can probably tell, pretty much all we can do is send as many men into the area as possible. All we can really do is dissuade them from fighting us there, and maybe persuade them to fight in more favorable terms. What those are, don't ask me.

Why would we ask you anything? You have no experience whatsoever.
 
Re: Counter-Insurgency

Thank you for donating another helping of crap to the forum.

It just seriously blows my mind that you're arguing that the CIA and military have no idea what they're doing and should listen to you instead. It's like me trying to tell a radiologist what he's looking at on the film.
 
Re: Counter-Insurgency

Again, you're talking about a different operation.
Then what operation are you talking about? I'm talking about every single operation that should take place in the border region between Pakistan and Afghanistan, which would concern the operation this thread is about. So what other operation are you talking about?

Post something to prove your point.
I posted several things. You failed to address them.




Snipers are combat multipliers.
Irrelevant.



Prove it.
Read sometime.

Najaf Safe Haven
Tal Afar Safe Haven
Fallujah Safe Haven
Casey makes attacking Safe Havens policy
End of Safe Havens

"In the wake of the personnale changes, U.S. policy also began to shift. Most notably, the summer of 2004 saw the beginning of fundamental changes in U.S. military presence and posture. On August 5, 2004, Casey issued a campaign plan, a classified document of about twenty-five pages, plus a series of appendices detailing aspects of the campaign. Remarkably, this was the first time the U.S. effort in Iraq had a road map for attacking the insurgency.("We did not have a campaign plan the whole time Sanchez was out there," recalled a senior military intelligence officer..."(Fiasco 392)


It's not genocide to kill the enemy. That's totally naive.
Your expanding the parameters of who is and who isn't the enemy to encompass way too wide of a scope. Polls conducted in 2004 found numbers like 72% or 84% of Sunnis oppose the American presence and some 36% find attacks acceptable. This was an effect of the CPA's alienation of the Sunni community... So your answer is to label them as combatants and say they are legitimate targets? Nice try... you are the unbelievably naive one.

Source1
Source2

The Sunnis who are actively engaged in combat operations, are legitimate targets, yes. When defining combat operations, that includes logistical support.
Its genocide when virtually an entire religious sect opposed the occupation and you respond by labeling them all combatants. But no, its very black and white, right? Civilians and combatants are clearly marked. Your naivete is being exuded at its highest.



Yes, and vitory is achieved by engaging the enemy in close quarter combat and destroying his ability to fight.
What are you even talking about? Victory in what? Close quarter combat?... What? Victory is achieved in a number of ways... but it also depends on what degree or what objective you are victorious in... your statement here makes little sense.

You can spin it however you want, but in ANY combat situation, destroying the enemy's combat power is priority #1.
:lol: You completely disacknowledged what I said and just went back to "killing people wins wars". When its an insurgency, killing people can lose your war just as much as win it. You don't understand counterinsurgency at all.

Let me help you:Introduction to Insurgencies and how to defeat them

The second strategic approach, and one that proved most successful at achieving long-term stability, sought to resolve the conflict in all its dimensions. In this approach, counterinsurgency was not primarily about defeat of an armed enemy; rather, its main objective centered on establishing lasting stability in a state or region. Not only were the actions of the insurgents suppressed, long-term solutions to both the symptoms, and, more important, the causes of the insurgency comprised essential elements

Using Vietnam as an example of a tactical failure is erroneous on your part. US forces defeated the enemy on the battlefield in Vietnam.
But tactical victory did not give way to strategic advances. Without a coersive strategy, MACV simply sought to rack up body counts. Tactical victories can also be counterproductive to strategic success, especially when using overly-agressive tactics that make civilians more likely to become insurgents. Such was true, without a strategy and with many units that failed to understand counterinsurgency and endorsed overly agressive tactics, in the first 20 months of the Iraq war.


PS: There is a point of ignorance that is reasonable when defending a point. Try not to cross that line.
 
Back
Top Bottom