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Dems Usher in New Era of Dull Scandals

So... the army has stood (that is, there has been a standing army) since 1775.

Maybe we're using different definitions of standing army. A standing army is an army which has the personnel on hand and trained to move whenever it needs to. A non-standing army needs to call up troops into its ranks before it can move (this is a simplistic definition, there are nuances). The bureaucracy of the military has been in place for some time. The Continental Army Washington commanded was disbanded. Some of the framework was left in place and then Congress made the US Army off of it. But that army is not the same, the initial Continental Army was disbanded, the troops dismissed and sent home. The new army was created after the Continental Army was disbanded. But it was not a standing army. It relied heavily on State militia to be called up when needed in order to act. The first standing army came about in 1794 when the Navy was being well established. The Army was made standing at the same time, but was standing in name only for awhile as at the very beginning it was still reliant on State militia.
 
So what you're really saying is that unless Congress formally declares war then the US military cannot be deployed? Okay.

Again, for like the tenth time, why is a congressional resolution declaring its intent to authorize the President to use military force not a sufficient declaration? Like a formal declaration it must be passed by both chambers and must be presented to the President for his approval.

As I stated before, it's too loose. It gives too much discretion over the use of the military to one branch. A formal declaration of war is well more constrained. You declare war against a State, there is a specific goal and an end game in mind. The President isn't allowed to act indiscriminately with the military and go wherever it is that he sees fit. There is well more constraint in a formal declaration of war than there is in an authorization of force.
 
Maybe we're using different definitions of standing army. A standing army is an army which has the personnel on hand and trained to move whenever it needs to. A non-standing army needs to call up troops into its ranks before it can move
That's not the definition of 'standing army' -- that was provided in this thread some time ago. You're describing a regular/reserve component situation, which is what we have now (and have had since 1775).

By your definition, we don't have a standing army even now.

The Continental Army Washington commanded was disbanded. Some of the framework was left in place and then Congress made the US Army off of it. But that army is not the same, the initial Continental Army was disbanded, the troops dismissed and sent home.
Not all of them. The line is continuous; there have been active regular army components (and thus, a standing army) continually in service since 1775.
 
Well then let's just get our rhetoric straight.

A standing army is an army composed of full-time career soldiers who 'stand over', in other words, who do not disband during times of peace. They differ from army reserves who are activated only during such times as war or natural disasters. Standing armies tend to be better equipped, better trained, and better prepared for emergencies, defensive deterrence and particularly wars. [1]

Standing army - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

We did not have a standing army till 1794. The Constitution wasn't written with a standing army in mind, though it later became apparent that we needed one. The Continental Army wasn't a standing army, it was disbanded after the Revolutionary War. A framework is kept for when the need arises and Congress had to call up the State militia into service. They became the soldiers, but they are not "full-time". The fighting force is sent home after hostilities ceased. We now have a standing army, but it wasn't initially a standing army. Thus with no troops, the President couldn't independently go to war; he required the Congress to give official declaration and call up the State militia. With a standing army, you have to be very careful in what you allow. The President alone shouldn't have sole say in when and how and against whom we go to war with. He gets to set the battle plans and take the military into war; but it requires Congress to give official declaration in order for him to move in that manner.
 
Well then let's just get our rhetoric straight.
Yes, that'd the definition I was using.
It doesnt have anything to do with regular/reserve components, as you suggest.

We did not have a standing army till 1794.
It has been proven here, for you, that we have had, in continual, uninterrupted service, a standing army - composed of full-time career soldiers, who do not disband during times of peace - since the inception of the Continental Army in 1775.
 
No, we didn't. Parts of the bureaucracy remained, but the fighting force itself was sent home. The troops were dismissed, they were no longer paid for their service, they were no longer considered to be in the US army. They returned to the State militia. That's not a standing army, a standing army always has troops; always has a substantial fighting force. It doesn't depend on the calling up of militia into the ranks to fight; it's on standby with the personnel and infrastructure on hand. The Continental Army was disbanded. They maintained a skeletal frame of infrastructure but did not have the personnel. The personnel had to be called up from the militia. It wasn't until 1794 that the ability to keep a fighting force on hand was established, and even then it took time to build the standing army. Initially, even after been given the ability to keep a full time fighting force (which didn't exist before then), the army still relied heavily on calling up State militia. That's not a standing army, a standing army has everything, including personnel (i.e. full time career soldiers) on hand. If you had to wait to call up the State militia before you had the fighting force you did not have a standing army. You had an infrastructure in place to be able to react and accommodate the call up; but you did not have the fighting force. That's why you had to call up the militia, you didn't have the people on hand to go to war.
 
There is none.
There is no constitutionally mandated form or pattern for a declaration of war.

I know...I'm just trying to get Ikari to understand this...
 
As I stated before, it's too loose. It gives too much discretion over the use of the military to one branch.

How so? Specifically.

Have you even reviewed prior declarations of war and compared them to the congressional authorizations authorizing various Presidents to use military force?

How are they different?

A formal declaration of war is well more constrained.

Please demonstrate this.

You declare war against a State, there is a specific goal and an end game in mind.

Oh? Care to explain the absence of such in the DoW I cited regarding Germany in WWII?

Or do you want to fess up and just admit that you're making this up as you go along?

The President isn't allowed to act indiscriminately with the military and go wherever it is that he sees fit.

I know. And I don't see anyone here arguing otherwise. So why declare the self-evident?

There is well more constraint in a formal declaration of war than there is in an authorization of force.

How so? Specifically, please.
 
No, we didn't. Parts of the bureaucracy remained, but the fighting force itself was sent home. The troops were dismissed, they were no longer paid for their service, they were no longer considered to be in the US army. They returned to the State militia. That's not a standing army, a standing army always has troops; always has a substantial fighting force. It doesn't depend on the calling up of militia into the ranks to fight; it's on standby with the personnel and infrastructure on hand. The Continental Army was disbanded. They maintained a skeletal frame of infrastructure but did not have the personnel. The personnel had to be called up from the militia. It wasn't until 1794 that the ability to keep a fighting force on hand was established, and even then it took time to build the standing army. Initially, even after been given the ability to keep a full time fighting force (which didn't exist before then), the army still relied heavily on calling up State militia. That's not a standing army, a standing army has everything, including personnel (i.e. full time career soldiers) on hand. If you had to wait to call up the State militia before you had the fighting force you did not have a standing army. You had an infrastructure in place to be able to react and accommodate the call up; but you did not have the fighting force. That's why you had to call up the militia, you didn't have the people on hand to go to war.

So what?

None of this has any bearing on whether the President is CiC nor is it relevant to the question of whether a congressional resolution is an insufficient mechanism to declare war.
 
How so? Specifically.

Have you even reviewed prior declarations of war and compared them to the congressional authorizations authorizing various Presidents to use military force?

How are they different?



Please demonstrate this.



Oh? Care to explain the absence of such in the DoW I cited regarding Germany in WWII?

Or do you want to fess up and just admit that you're making this up as you go along?



I know. And I don't see anyone here arguing otherwise. So why declare the self-evident?



How so? Specifically, please.

Extremely heated debate developed in the United States beginning on or around September 11, 2001. Opponents of the uses of military force since began to argue, chiefly, that the Iraq War was unconstitutional, because it lacked a clear declaration of war, and was waged over the objection of a significantly sized demographic in the United States.

Instead of formal war declarations, the United States Congress has begun issuing authorizations of force. Such authorizations have included the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution that greatly increased American participation in the Vietnam War, and the recent "Authorization of the Use of Military Force" (AUMF) resolution that started the War in Iraq. Some question the legality of these authorizations of force. Many who support declarations of war argue that they keep administrations honest by forcing them to lay out their case to the American people while, at the same time, honoring the constitutional role of the United States Congress.

Those who oppose requiring formal declarations of war argue that AUMFs satisfy constitutional requirements and have an established historical precedent (see Quasi-War). Furthermore, some have argued that the constitutional powers of the president as commander-in-chief invest him with broad powers specific to "waging" and "commencing" war.

The February 6, 2006, testimony of Alberto Gonzales to the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing on Wartime Executive Power and the National Security Agency's Surveillance Authority, however indicates otherwise:

GONZALES: There was not a war declaration, either in connection with Al Qaida or in Iraq. It was an authorization to use military force. I only want to clarify that, because there are implications. Obviously, when you talk about a war declaration, you're possibly talking about affecting treaties, diplomatic relations. And so there is a distinction in law and in practice. And we're not talking about a war declaration. This is an authorization only to use military force.

Declaration of war by the United States - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
 
So what?

None of this has any bearing on whether the President is CiC nor is it relevant to the question of whether a congressional resolution is an insufficient mechanism to declare war.

You didn't read previous posts which led to this discussion. Before the contention was that we didn't have a standing army and thus the President couldn't go to war without Congress because he didn't have the forces to go to war. Congress had to call up the militia to give the President the personnel by which he could wage war. So without a standing army, the President is CinC, but in peace time there is only the executive framework to be CinC over; there were no troops. It wasn't until the establishment of a standing army in which the President always had at hand an adequate fighting force by which he could go to war without the necessity of calling up State militia. A standing army is necessary, but it must be constrained. The President is CinC of our standing army; but he's not the owner. Declarations of War put into place a slew of bureaucracy and ends in treaty being signed. Military action in and of itself doesn't necessarily enact the same restrictions. You can go into a place and blow it up and leave. But with declarations, there are enemies, actual States and governments, and it calls up treaty and foreign relations. Gonzales was right when he said there is a distinction between declaration of war and authorization to use military force. That's why we must carefully restrain how and for what and against whom we fight. Authorization to use military force doesn't have to call up all the red tape a declaration of war calls up; and thus can be used for more arbitrary "war".
 
No, we didn't. Parts of the bureaucracy remained, but the fighting force itself was sent home. The troops were dismissed, they were no longer paid for their service, they were no longer considered to be in the US army.
Again, this has been proven to be incorrect.
You can still contine to think otherwise, but the facts remain, and they show you to be wrong.
 
Ikari, citing Gonzo's distinction doesn't answer my question. Gonzo's comments don't address your assertion that a formal legal declaration offers more constraints on the President than a congressional authorization.

For you to present such an assertion you'd have had to reviewed both DoW's and congressional authorizations and compared if and how each attempted to restrain executive authority.

You have not done this. Obviously. Hence, as I noted this earlier, you are simply making this up as you go along.

Additionally, you're completing ignoring the focal point of Gonzo's comments. In other words, declaring a state of war is much broader than the use of force as it affects diplomatic relations, treaties, etc.

It now appears that you're arguing that military forces may not be deployed without a declaration of war. But the Framers were clear on this as they decided to substitute the word "make" war to "declare" war expliitly to leave the power to repel sudden attacks to the President. The power to initiate war was granted to Congress, with the reservation that the president need not await authorization from Congress to repel a sudden attack on the United States. Provided that constitutional lesson it should be clear that the Framer did not intend to leave the President without any warmaking capacity and to vest in the Congress the authority to declare war or commence war in the first instance. Congressional authorizations reflect the exercise of the war making/commencing power that the Framers intended the Congress to exercise.

Aditionally, the understanding of "declare" war at that time was settled on announcing the intention of hostilities and the legal consequences of such a commencement and declaring intentions to allies and adversaries as well as neutral nations. Congressional authorization also satisfy this function of declarations as they announce the intent to initiate hostilities and announce our intentions to adversaries and neutrals.

From your citation:
Some question the legality of these authorizations of force. Many who support declarations of war argue that they keep administrations honest by forcing them to lay out their case to the American people while, at the same time, honoring the constitutional role of the United States Congress.

Uh, Bush spent the last half of 2002 and first two months of 2003 laying out his case for war to the American people. He spent the summer of 2002 laying out his case for war to Congress culminating in a joint congressional authorization to use force in late 2002.

Hence, this argument against such authorizations is false.
 
You didn't read previous posts which led to this discussion.

I had and have.

Before the contention was that we didn't have a standing army and thus the President couldn't go to war without Congress because he didn't have the forces to go to war. Congress had to call up the militia to give the President the personnel by which he could wage war. So without a standing army, the President is CinC, but in peace time there is only the executive framework to be CinC over; there were no troops. It wasn't until the establishment of a standing army in which the President always had at hand an adequate fighting force by which he could go to war without the necessity of calling up State militia. A standing army is necessary, but it must be constrained. The President is CinC of our standing army; but he's not the owner.

None of this has anything to do with the Framers intent to empower the Congress with the authority to declare war.

Declarations of War put into place a slew of bureaucracy and ends in treaty being signed.

No they don't.

Examples, please.

Military action in and of itself doesn't necessarily enact the same restrictions. You can go into a place and blow it up and leave. But with declarations, there are enemies, actual States and governments, and it calls up treaty and foreign relations.

Examples?

Declarations of war merely announce the intention to initiate/commence hostilities. Declarations don't "call up treaty and foreign relations" (whatever you mean by that.) It is simply an announcement that the nation is going from a state of peace with a foreign power to a state of war.

Gonzales was right when he said there is a distinction between declaration of war and authorization to use military force.

Sure there is and no one was arguing otherwise. What we, well, me, am arguing is that the President is CiC no matter whether a declaration has been passed by Congress and enacted by Presidential signature and that a authorization to use force is a proper form of declaration as it satisfies what the Framers intended the Congress to do in declaring war.

That's why we must carefully restrain how and for what and against whom we fight.

No, we consider these things as a matter of national interest, not in drafting an announcement to others our intent to wage war.

Authorization to use military force doesn't have to call up all the red tape a declaration of war calls up; and thus can be used for more arbitrary "war".

What "red tape" do you think is "called up" when a formal declaration is issued?

If you look at the congressional actions taken to jointly meet and issue a DoW and when it jointly meets to issue an authorization, it's the same process and results in the same thing...the announcement that the US is going to initiate hostilities.
 
Again, this has been proven to be incorrect.
You can still contine to think otherwise, but the facts remain, and they show you to be wrong.

No, it hasn't been proven false. You quoted something that said some core remained that possibly carried over; it wasn't even a definite. What is definite is that the troops were sent home, and that's by definition not a standing army.
 
No, it hasn't been proven false. You quoted something that said some core remained that possibly carried over; it wasn't even a definite.
Then you werent reading carefully enough.

Its been proven that there has been a standing army, in place, continually, since 1775.
You dont kave to admit to me that you're wrong, but you shoudl admit ti to yourself.
 
Then you werent reading carefully enough.

Its been proven that there has been a standing army, in place, continually, since 1775.
You dont kave to admit to me that you're wrong, but you shoudl admit ti to yourself.

No, it has not been proven, in fact it's quite the opposite. The standing army came about in 1794, that's fact. Argue all you want; that's when the standing army was established even though at that time it still relied heavily on the militia to supplement their numbers. You're merely being obtuse and stubborn because you have no proof to assert your claim.
 
Hmmm

Prior to and during the founding of the United States, military forces were supplied by untrained militia commanded by the states. When the Continental Congress first ordered a Continental Army to be formed, it was to be made up of militia from the states. That army, under the command of General George Washington, won the Revolutionary War, but afterwards was disbanded.

However, it soon became obvious that a standing army and navy were required. The United States Navy (and the Marine Corps) began when Congress ordered several frigates in 1794, and a standing army was created, however it was still only minimal and it relied mostly on contributions from state militia in times of war. The Coast Guard was created in 1790.

Are you done lying now?
 
Hmmm
Are you done lying now?
I cited for you a unit that has been part of the standing army, continually, since 1776, thru to the present day.

That, alone, disproves your assertion.

Thus, the only person lying here is you, and it's to yourself.
 
Hmmm
As the newly minted nation emerged from the Revolution, it confronted a fundamental question: could a military establishment be created that met both the ideological concerns for liberty and the necessity for internal and external security? For a constellation of reasons, under the Articles of Confederation ratified by the states in 1781, the answer was a resounding “No!” The Confederation faced severe economic problems, in part resulting from war-induced dislocations but made worse because Congress did not have the power to tax. And many people asked why the country needed an expensive peacetime preparedness program. After all, the colonists had very little mobilized military power in 1775 and yet had gone on to victory against the mighty British Empire.

Equally disturbing, in 1783–84 the climate of opinion was hostile toward regular forces because the Revolution ended on three discordant notes for civil-military relations that reanimated Radical Whig ideological fears. One crisis was the so-called Newburgh Conspiracy, with its implied threat by Continental Army officers against the Continental Congress. In this ugly affair, when Congress refused to accede to officers’ demands for half-pay for life as a postwar pension, some of the officers appeared to threaten civil supremacy. Also raising civil-military tensions was the Society of the Cincinnati, which was officially founded in the spring of 1783 to bind Continental Army officers together in a fraternal and charitable organization. To those sympathetic to Radical Whig ideology, the Society seemed anti-democratic in several ways. For example, membership was hereditary, passing to the oldest male descendent of a Continental Army officer, and thereby seemingly creating a privileged class based on birth, not merit. Finally, a mutiny occurred among some enlisted men after news of the preliminary peace arrived. Having served honorably for years under often dire conditions, the men demanded immediate discharge and payment. Nearly bankrupt and still not positive that peace was really at hand, Congress promised a financial settlement at some later date and offered the men furloughs, not discharges. Several hundred disgruntled Continental Army soldiers from Pennsylvania mutinied; they held Congress and the Pennsylvania state government hostage with fixed bayonets for several hours before the incident ended, fortunately, without bloodshed.

As a result of all these factors an outburst of antimilitarism swept the country in the Revolution’s aftermath. The Confederation government was unable to maintain anything other than a miniscule military establishment. It completely disbanded the Continental Navy and Marines, and disbanded the Continental Army, keeping only eighty men and a handful of officers in service. The military institutions founded in 1775 disappeared completely. Thus no modern regiment directly traces its lineage to the Continental Army, which was not, then, a standing regular army in the sense that the British Army was. The latter had existed in war and peace ever since 1645. On the other hand, the Continental Army was akin to Washington’s Virginia Regiment: just another in a long line of ad hoc, volunteer, expeditionary forces that disbanded when the emergency ended.

Understanding the Creation of the U.S. Armed Forces - FPRI

So you're not done lying, ok.
 
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Hmmm
So you're not done lying, ok.

I cited for you a unit that has been part of the standing army, continually, since 1776, thru to the present day.

That, alone, disproves your assertion.
 
I cited for you a unit that has been part of the standing army, continually, since 1776, thru to the present day.

That, alone, disproves your assertion.

No you didn't. I cited sources showing that the military disbanded. That it wasn't a standing army, and that modern military can't trace it's beginnings back to the Continental Army. You are lying, that's all there is to it.
 
During the American Revolutionary War, the New York Provincial Company of Artillery was created by the New York Provincial Congress in 1776 to defend New York City from British attack.

[edit] History

The revolutionary government of the province commissioned Alexander Hamilton, then a student at King's College (now, Columbia University) and an officer in a militia unit of artillery called the Hearts of Oak, to create the new Provincial Company of Artillery.[1] The new Company saw action in the Battle of White Plains and the Battle of Trenton, among others.[2] It was while commanding this unit with distinction that Hamilton came to the attention of many high-ranking officers in the Continental Army, a number of them offering him positions on their staffs. Hamilton refused them all to become de facto Chief of Staff to General George Washington, the commander-in-chief, for much of the remainder of the war.

The New York Provincial Company of Artillery is considered the ancestor of the 1st Battalion, 5th Field Artillery, which therefore holds the distinction of being the oldest active unit in the U.S. Army.[3]

So let's see, a division which is considered and ancestor to a battalion of the US Army, which was created by a State and not federal government and which an expert in US Military history says that no modern division of the US military has any relation to the Continental army. Hmm, seems to me that this is more a tradition thing than it is an actual link.
 
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