KAY: I think you will have, when you get the final ISG report, pretty compelling evidence that Saddam had the intention of continuing the pursuit of WMD when the opportunity arose and that the first start on that, the long pole in the tent, was this restart of the long-range missile program.
CORNYN: So that, given time, these programs would have matured and Saddam would have been able to reconstitute his WMD arsenal?
KAY: I hesitate, Senator -- only I think that that's the safe assumption. What I don't know over time, and I'm more and more struck with, is how corrupt and destructive that society had become. But you can't count on when it would fall apart. And it might fall apart in ways that are far more dangerous. So I think that is a safe assumption.
CORNYN: You said something during your opening statement that intrigues me, and something that I'm afraid may be overlooked in all of this back and forth; and that has to do with proliferation.
You said that there was a risk of a willing seller meeting a willing buyer of such weapons or weapon stockpiles, whether they be large, small or programs, whether it's information that Iraqi scientists might be willing to sell or work in cooperation with rogue organizations or even nations.
But do you consider that to have been a real risk in terms of Saddam's activities and these programs -- the risk of proliferation?
KAY: Actually, I consider it a bigger risk. And that's why I paused on the preceding questions. I consider that a bigger risk than the restart of his programs being successful.
KAY: I think the way the society was going, and the number of willing buyers in the market, that that probably was a risk that if we did avoid, we barely avoided.