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Obama to Be First Sitting President to Visit Hiroshima

Paleocon said:
I'd have preferred an acceptance of their offer of conditional surrender.
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They did not make that offer until after both A-bombs had already been dropped.

Accepting it would have been a bad idea. Their condition asked that we guarantee Hirohito's unlimited dictatorial power as Japan's living deity.


Paleocon said:
But that's beside the point. The point is that the intentional killing of civilians is inherently wrong.
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Hiroshima was bombed because it was a huge military center filled with tens of thousands of Japanese soldiers, and was the military headquarters in charge of the defense of half of Japan.

Nagasaki was bombed because it was an industrial center containing huge weapons factories.
 
Gaius46 said:
What do you make of the fact that many senior Naval leaders, including Leahy and Nimitz, saw the dropping of the bombs as unnecessary?
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They saw it as unnecessary only long after the war was over, when they had the benefit of hindsight and they didn't have to worry anymore about what it would take to make Japan surrender.

All Leahy had to say about the A-bombs during the war was "I'm an expert in explosives, and I guarantee you that these contraptions will never work." (not an exact quote, but that is the gist of it)

Nimitz was one of the military leaders who was so enthusiastic about Nagasaki that they lobbied Washington to redirect the third A-bomb to Tokyo to see if that would get the Emperor's attention better.
 
Toggle Almendro said:
They did not make that offer until after both A-bombs had already been dropped.
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Japan had made secret peace overtures earlier in the year, around when Germany surrendered.

Was Hiroshima Necessary?

Accepting it would have been a bad idea. Their condition asked that we guarantee Hirohito's unlimited dictatorial power as Japan's living deity.
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Their domestic government was not our legitimate concern.

Hiroshima was bombed because it was a huge military center filled with tens of thousands of Japanese soldiers, and was the military headquarters in charge of the defense of half of Japan.

Nagasaki was bombed because it was an industrial center containing huge weapons factories.
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Which does not change the fact that they were civilian population centers deliberately targeted as such.
 
Higgins86 said:
Sometimes America cracks me up.

I mean you're the only country that has used the atomic weapon in a conflict, you have the biggest nuke arsenal in the world, your missiles are located accross the globe and then you want to lecture everyone on stopping the spread of Nuclear weapons...:lamo
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Most people believe that the spread of nuclear weapons to countries around the globe (and the eventual inevitable nuclear war once everyone has them) would be a horrible disaster for humanity.
 
Paleocon said:
Japan had made secret peace overtures earlier in the year, around when Germany surrendered.
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That is incorrect. Japan's first peace overture came the day after the second A-bomb was dropped on Nagasaki.


Paleocon said:
Was Hiroshima Necessary?
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IHR is a Holocaust denial website that is filled with falsehoods about allied bombing. They seem to think that if they make allied bombing look bad enough and then minimize the Holocaust, they can claim that the Nazis were no worse than any other party in WWII.


Paleocon said:
Their domestic government was not our legitimate concern.
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We had a legitimate interest in reshaping their culture into a peaceful society.


Paleocon said:
Which does not change the fact that they were civilian population centers deliberately targeted as such.
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They were targeted for their military value. There was no effort to target civilians.
 
Higgins86 said:
You could start with withdrawing your missiles from Europe, practice what you preach.
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I presume from context that you mean nuclear missiles. I do not believe that we have any nuclear missiles in Europe.

We do have some nifty new tactical bombs that we just developed. They have a low yield and unheard-of accuracy so they can take out Russian military targets with minimal collateral damage.

The presence of those tactical bombs in Europe is pretty important at the moment. They help to prevent Putin from invading the EU.
 
Toggle Almendro said:
They saw it as unnecessary only long after the war was over, when they had the benefit of hindsight and they didn't have to worry anymore about what it would take to make Japan surrender.

All Leahy had to say about the A-bombs during the war was "I'm an expert in explosives, and I guarantee you that these contraptions will never work." (not an exact quote, but that is the gist of it)

Nimitz was one of the military leaders who was so enthusiastic about Nagasaki that they lobbied Washington to redirect the third A-bomb to Tokyo to see if that would get the Emperor's attention better.
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While many of the statements the men made publicly, and that includes many in the airforce including Hap Arnold and Curtis LeMay, and MacArthur himself, came after the bombing in some cases it was only days - Arnold publicly stated the bombings were unnecessary a week or two afterwards, it's hard to understand why these men would change their views given that in the years immediately after the war there was little real criticism of the bombings.

I've always found the fact that MacArthur claimed he wasn't even informed of the decision ahead of time, let along given an opportunity to voice his opinion to be very troubling. He was the theater commander and would have been tasked with any invasion.

I'd also note that Japan was willing to surrender conditionally. The condition being the preservation of the emperor. Potsdam demanded unconditional surrender. In the end the surrender was conditional and the emperor was preserved. Makes one wonder about just what effect the bombing had.
 
Toggle Almendro said:
IHR is a Holocaust denial website . . .
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I don't care. Address the facts not the source.

We had a legitimate interest in reshaping their culture into a peaceful society.
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No, we did not. Our interest in that was no more Letitia te than Bloomberg's busybody war on soda. Indeed it was less so, since we had no authority over Japan, whereas he did have authority over New York.

That's not even getting into the substantive content of e changes we made, which were bad.

They were targeted for their military value. There was no effort to target civilians.
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If you're admitting that the proposition "the atomic bombings were moral" is dependent on the proposition "it is possible to drop a nuclear bomb on a city without targeting civilians", then I think I've demonstrated my point.
 
Toggle Almendro said:
I presume from context that you mean nuclear missiles. I do not believe that we have any nuclear missiles in Europe.

We do have some nifty new tactical bombs that we just developed. They have a low yield and unheard-of accuracy so they can take out Russian military targets with minimal collateral damage.

The presence of those tactical bombs in Europe is pretty important at the moment. They help to prevent Putin from invading the EU.
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Putin doesnt have the military capability to invade the EU.
 
Higgins86 said:
Sometimes America cracks me up.

I mean you're the only country that has used the atomic weapon in a conflict, you have the biggest nuke arsenal in the world, your missiles are located accross the globe and then you want to lecture everyone on stopping the spread of Nuclear weapons...:lamo
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And, were the USA to unilaterally dismantle all of its nuclear weapons, would the world be:

A. safer
B. less safe
C. no difference

Your opinion, supported by facts, is???
 
Gaius46 said:
While many of the statements the men made publicly, and that includes many in the airforce including Hap Arnold and Curtis LeMay, and MacArthur himself, came after the bombing in some cases it was only days - Arnold publicly stated the bombings were unnecessary a week or two afterwards, it's hard to understand why these men would change their views given that in the years immediately after the war there was little real criticism of the bombings.
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LeMay is another of the military leaders who reacted to Nagasaki by pressing to drop the third one on Tokyo. Arnold was the guy who passed their "nuke Tokyo" request along to Washington.

If you are referring to this Hap Arnold Quote:
It always appeared to us that atomic bomb or no atomic bomb the Japanese were already on the verge of collapse.

Note the full quote:
It always appeared to us that atomic bomb or no atomic bomb the Japanese were already on the verge of collapse. Nevertheless, the abrupt surrender of Japan came more or less as a surprise, for we had figured we would probably have to drop about four atomic bombs or increase the destructiveness of our B-29 missions by adding heavy bombers from Europe.


Gaius46 said:
I'd also note that Japan was willing to surrender conditionally. The condition being the preservation of the emperor. Potsdam demanded unconditional surrender. In the end the surrender was conditional and the emperor was preserved. Makes one wonder about just what effect the bombing had.
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Potsdam didn't demand unconditional surrender. It was a list of generous surrender terms. Unconditional surrender means surrender with no terms given.

Japan's willingness to surrender conditionally only came after both A-bombs had already been dropped. There was no offer of conditional surrender until after Nagasaki.

Their condition was far more than mere preservation of the Emperor. They wanted us to guarantee Hirohito's unlimited dictatorial power.

We did not grant that condition. We told them that Hirohito was going to be subordinate to MacArthur. A few days later they accepted that and surrendered.

The third A-bomb was about a week away from being dropped (probably on Tokyo because of all the requests) when Japan first offered their conditional surrender. Implosion assemblies were already waiting on Tinian, and all they needed to do was fly another plutonium pit out to them. That pit was just being shipped, but they halted the shipment in order to give Japan some breathing room since they had just made an offer of conditional surrender. A few days later when Japan surrendered, they had just started shipping the plutonium pit again. Due to the delay in shipment, the third A-bomb was still about a week away from being dropped when Japan surrendered fully.

Even if they had not delayed shipment though, Japan still surrendered before the third bomb could have been dropped. Although if they had not delayed shipment, Japan's surrender would have been cutting it considerably closer.
 
Paleocon said:
I don't care. Address the facts not the source.
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Why not address both?


Paleocon said:
No, we did not. Our interest in that was no more Letitia te than Bloomberg's busybody war on soda. Indeed it was less so, since we had no authority over Japan, whereas he did have authority over New York.

That's not even getting into the substantive content of e changes we made, which were bad.
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I'm satisfied with Japan's transition to a peaceful society.


Paleocon said:
If you're admitting that the proposition "the atomic bombings were moral" is dependent on the proposition "it is possible to drop a nuclear bomb on a city without targeting civilians", then I think I've demonstrated my point.
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I'm stating that it is possible to drop a nuclear bomb on a city without targeting civilians. All you have to do is be targeting something else.

I'm not really addressing morality. I don't see how the question of morality even applies. We needed to stop the reign of terror that Japan was inflicting on us, and the only way we knew how to do that was by smashing them as hard as we could until they stopped.

So that's what we did.
 
soot said:
First he goes and sucks Cuba's dick (and got pissed all over for his troubles), and now this kowtowing nonsense.

It's like this mope told his staff to go out and find a bunch of "historic firsts!" he could do before leaving office in order to pad his legacy and now he's off on a whirlwind tour.
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When Obama is sitting pretty with Secret Service protection, this is not going to make a difference. Obama's pride is not representative of the dignity of the American people. Anybody who wants trade regulations with the Chinese knows that.
 
Toggle Almendro said:
LeMay is another of the military leaders who reacted to Nagasaki by pressing to drop the third one on Tokyo. Arnold was the guy who passed their "nuke Tokyo" request along to Washington.

If you are referring to this Hap Arnold Quote:
It always appeared to us that atomic bomb or no atomic bomb the Japanese were already on the verge of collapse.

Note the full quote:
It always appeared to us that atomic bomb or no atomic bomb the Japanese were already on the verge of collapse. Nevertheless, the abrupt surrender of Japan came more or less as a surprise, for we had figured we would probably have to drop about four atomic bombs or increase the destructiveness of our B-29 missions by adding heavy bombers from Europe.



Potsdam didn't demand unconditional surrender. It was a list of generous surrender terms. Unconditional surrender means surrender with no terms given.

Japan's willingness to surrender conditionally only came after both A-bombs had already been dropped. There was no offer of conditional surrender until after Nagasaki.

Their condition was far more than mere preservation of the Emperor. They wanted us to guarantee Hirohito's unlimited dictatorial power.

We did not grant that condition. We told them that Hirohito was going to be subordinate to MacArthur. A few days later they accepted that and surrendered.

The third A-bomb was about a week away from being dropped (probably on Tokyo because of all the requests) when Japan first offered their conditional surrender. Implosion assemblies were already waiting on Tinian, and all they needed to do was fly another plutonium pit out to them. That pit was just being shipped, but they halted the shipment in order to give Japan some breathing room since they had just made an offer of conditional surrender. A few days later when Japan surrendered, they had just started shipping the plutonium pit again. Due to the delay in shipment, the third A-bomb was still about a week away from being dropped when Japan surrendered fully.

Even if they had not delayed shipment though, Japan still surrendered before the third bomb could have been dropped. Although if they had not delayed shipment, Japan's surrender would have been cutting it considerably closer.
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Unconditional means Japan couldn't condition their surrender and have to accept what terms, if any, we gave them. The final paragraph of the Potsdam proclamation states:

We call upon the government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction.
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Previous paragraphs sketch out the terms that the allies were giving Japan and what a post war Japan would look like. There is no direct mention of the emperor and both paragraphs 6 and the war crimes provision of paragraph can be construed to apply to the emperor.

I'm not sure how much actual power the emperor had during the war. Certainly all power was vested in the emperor after the Meiji Restoration but how much he personally wielded and how much was exercised on his behalf by the government is an open question in my mind and heavily debated. Clearly some in his government were unwilling to surrender until he ordered them to. I'm also not sure what Japan wanted for the emperor after the war. If you have sources I'd be interested in them.

Japan was apparently making surrender overtures to the Soviets before we dropped the bomb. I've been meaning to read the communiques but as yet haven't had the time.

In either case I'm not sure that it matters. Whether the Japan wanted an all powerful emperor or not, the fact that we didn't specify his fate probably contributed to the continuation of the war.
 
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Gaius46 said:
Unconditional means Japan couldn't condition their surrender and have to accept what terms, if any, we gave them.
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Normally unconditional surrender means that there are no surrender terms whatsoever. The person surrendering might receive mercy. But they also might simply be killed or enslaved.


Gaius46 said:
I'm not sure how much actual power the emperor had during the war. Certainly all power was vested in the emperor after the Meiji Restoration but how much he personally wielded and how much was exercised on his behalf by the government is an open question in my mind and heavily debated.
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That was exactly the problem. The Japanese military was wielding the Emperor's power for him. Had we granted Hirohito unlimited dictatorial power, we would have been granting the Japanese military unlimited dictatorial power.


Gaius46 said:
If you have sources I'd be interested in them.
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The book "Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan" by Tsuyoshi Hasegawa covers the nuances of Japan's conditional surrender offer. It's in the last few pages of "Chapter 5: The Atomic Bombs and Soviet Entry into the War", and the first few pages of "Chapter 6: Japan Accepts Unconditional Surrender".

I don't agree with the book's main conclusion (that the bombs were dropped with the goal of ending the war early enough to save Japan from Soviet invasion and occupation). Everyone always always overthinks the issue of motivation for dropping the bombs. Sure there might have been various side benefits to using the bombs, but ultimately we were in a terrible war and were just trying to do everything possible to get the war over with.

But despite not agreeing with the main conclusion, I think the book has lots of valuable data.


Gaius46 said:
Japan was apparently making surrender overtures to the Soviets before we dropped the bomb. I've been meaning to read the communiques but as yet haven't had the time.
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It wasn't what I would consider surrender. They were hoping to simply call off the war and have everyone just pack up and go home without Japan being defeated or occupied.

There wasn't much to the communiques. The main proposal would have been conveyed by Prince Konoye, and the Soviets refused to receive him. All the communications between Japan and Russia were variations of the Japanese ambassador pleading with the Soviets to allow Prince Konoye to come and talk to them while the Soviets continued to stonewall.

There were communications between the Japanese ambassador to Russia and Japan's foreign minister Togo. They mainly consisted of the ambassador expressing skepticism that this could achieve anything more than a guarantee for the emperor, and Togo (who agreed with that assessment, but was bound to carry out the broader policy of trying to end the war in a draw) telling him to shut up and pursue the broader strategy.


Gaius46 said:
In either case I'm not sure that it matters. Whether the Japan wanted an all powerful emperor or not, the fact that we didn't specify his fate probably contributed to the continuation of the war.
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Yes, but only for three days (and after the bombs had already been dropped).

Before August 10, Japan was pursuing their broader strategy with the Soviets. If we had clarified the Emperor's status before then, Japan still would have kept pursuing their wider goal with the Soviets.

However, clarification of the Emperor's status could have had the war end on August 10 instead of August 14.

What might have had a bigger impact on the end of the war would have been to let Japan know somehow that the Soviets were planning to go to war with them no matter what. If Japan had realized that, they might not have kept pursuing contacts with the Soviets to the exclusion of all other avenues.

But that would have been hard to do because we didn't speak for the Soviets. There was a proposal to include the Soviets in the Potsdam Proclamation, which might have carried a warning of sorts, but it would have also allowed the Soviets to insist that the Potsdam Proclamation be much harsher towards Japan so that they would be less likely to surrender before the Soviets could enter the war.

In the end, war is ultimately a series of mistakes by both sides, with the side that makes the fewest mistakes emerging as the victor. It would be highly improbable for the US to have conducted the war so perfectly that the most optimal result possible would be achieved.
 
Toggle Almendro said:
Normally unconditional surrender means that there are no surrender terms whatsoever. The person surrendering might receive mercy. But they also might simply be killed or enslaved.



That was exactly the problem. The Japanese military was wielding the Emperor's power for him. Had we granted Hirohito unlimited dictatorial power, we would have been granting the Japanese military unlimited dictatorial power.



The book "Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan" by Tsuyoshi Hasegawa covers the nuances of Japan's conditional surrender offer. It's in the last few pages of "Chapter 5: The Atomic Bombs and Soviet Entry into the War", and the first few pages of "Chapter 6: Japan Accepts Unconditional Surrender".

I don't agree with the book's main conclusion (that the bombs were dropped with the goal of ending the war early enough to save Japan from Soviet invasion and occupation). Everyone always always overthinks the issue of motivation for dropping the bombs. Sure there might have been various side benefits to using the bombs, but ultimately we were in a terrible war and were just trying to do everything possible to get the war over with.

But despite not agreeing with the main conclusion, I think the book has lots of valuable data.



It wasn't what I would consider surrender. They were hoping to simply call off the war and have everyone just pack up and go home without Japan being defeated or occupied.

There wasn't much to the communiques. The main proposal would have been conveyed by Prince Konoye, and the Soviets refused to receive him. All the communications between Japan and Russia were variations of the Japanese ambassador pleading with the Soviets to allow Prince Konoye to come and talk to them while the Soviets continued to stonewall.

There were communications between the Japanese ambassador to Russia and Japan's foreign minister Togo. They mainly consisted of the ambassador expressing skepticism that this could achieve anything more than a guarantee for the emperor, and Togo (who agreed with that assessment, but was bound to carry out the broader policy of trying to end the war in a draw) telling him to shut up and pursue the broader strategy.



Yes, but only for three days (and after the bombs had already been dropped).

Before August 10, Japan was pursuing their broader strategy with the Soviets. If we had clarified the Emperor's status before then, Japan still would have kept pursuing their wider goal with the Soviets.

However, clarification of the Emperor's status could have had the war end on August 10 instead of August 14.

What might have had a bigger impact on the end of the war would have been to let Japan know somehow that the Soviets were planning to go to war with them no matter what. If Japan had realized that, they might not have kept pursuing contacts with the Soviets to the exclusion of all other avenues.

But that would have been hard to do because we didn't speak for the Soviets. There was a proposal to include the Soviets in the Potsdam Proclamation, which might have carried a warning of sorts, but it would have also allowed the Soviets to insist that the Potsdam Proclamation be much harsher towards Japan so that they would be less likely to surrender before the Soviets could enter the war.

In the end, war is ultimately a series of mistakes by both sides, with the side that makes the fewest mistakes emerging as the victor. It would be highly improbable for the US to have conducted the war so perfectly that the most optimal result possible would be achieved.
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Thanks for the pointer, I'll check the book out.

At various times in my life I've been on either side of the fence with respect to the a-bomb decision. For the last decade or so I've been pretty well convinced that the bombings were not necessary though the decades before that, especially during the lifetime of my father in law who fought under MacArthur in the Pacific and was convinced he'd be killed in an invasion of Japan, I thought they were necessary. I try to be open minded about it and may well change my position again.
 
Gaius46 said:
At various times in my life I've been on either side of the fence with respect to the a-bomb decision. For the last decade or so I've been pretty well convinced that the bombings were not necessary though the decades before that, especially during the lifetime of my father in law who fought under MacArthur in the Pacific and was convinced he'd be killed in an invasion of Japan, I thought they were necessary. I try to be open minded about it and may well change my position again.
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My position is that necessity is a pointless issue to contemplate. It does seem that the war would have ended without the bombs being used. But we had no way of knowing that when the bombs were dropped, so what were we to do?
 
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