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Greece referendum: Early results show 'No' vote ahead

Regarding Greece's request for ESM support:

Luxembourg Finance Minister Pierre Gramegna told parliament on Wednesday that the Eurogroup of euro zone finance ministers would ask the European Commission and European Central Bank to review Greece's request for a bailout...

Gramegna described the loan request lodged by Greece with the ESM earlier on Wednesday as "extremely vague" in its proposals of tax and pension reforms.


UPDATE 1-Eurogroup to request analysis of Greek loan request -Luxembourg | Reuters

The current Syriza-led government certainly doesn't make things easy with its frittering away time while Greece's banks remain largely shuttered and its people suffer.

Syriza are moving faster than anyone could honestly expect, given the diplomacy by deadline game that the Troika are playing and the demands on the government's time from the EU, ECB, European parliament etc. Of course, I think the Germans, the Commission and the Dutch and Finnish have decided that they don't want a deal, they want Greece out and consider the eventual costs to be worth it, hence whatever proposal the Greeks come up with it will be dismissed out-of-hand, as they have dismissed all previous reform packages.

Here are just a few of the comments that they will use, come Thursday:
  • Unrealistic
  • Too vague
  • Doesn't address pensions
  • Doesn't address structural reform issues
  • Unrealistic timetable
  • Inadequate public spending cut proposals
I'm pretty sure that the decision to force Greece out of the Eurozone has already been taken and the entire EU summit (including all 28 members, not just the 19 Eurozone members) is being convened in order to present the decision as a unanimous one, which it emphatically will not be. However, what is going to be very interesting to watch between now and Sunday is the way in which Juncker, Dijsselbloem and Merkel will be working hard to bring Hollande, Renzi, LaGarde, Rajoy and other EU HoGs into line. I suspect the key players will be Hollande and Renzi because a split between France and Italy on one side, and Germany and Holland and the Commission on the other would be catastrophic.

Satirists here in Spain are already joking about Merkel being determined to finish off the job that her country started in 1939 - destroying European peace forever. Poor joke, chilling that it's now in common currency.
 
Generally I agree with you, although I'd call the 'Housing Bubble' a construction bubble, since it was also those ill-advised infrastructure investments - add to unused airports, toll-roads that no one uses, hundreds of theatres, sports halls, museums, aquaria and thematic tourist attractions that could never pay their way and which now sit idle because no one can afford to operate them - that caused the problem here. The Spanish economy, despite all that talking-up that the PP and its EU supporters are engaged in, is not in recovery. Unemployment has shown no sign of significant falls, and the business environment hasn't improved one bit; I know I've just started a company and having the experience to compare Spanish and British bureaucracy, there's no comparison.

Corruption is as bad as ever and there's a new major, multi-million scam or fraud - usually of public funds, usually by conservative politicians - coming to light every week. The latest is a scam devised and carried out by the director of the Alhambra Palace (don't forget, all such public posts are political appointments), here in Granada, with kick-backs, over-billing and diversion of funds to private accounts. It never stops, and if Podemos is to make major inroads at the coming elections, it won't be because Spaniards want to emulate the example of Syriza in Greece, but because the corruption of the main two traditional parties has destroyed the public's confidence in establishment politicians and the big businessmen who are their clients.
I have nothing to offer in opposition, having seen it all on minor to medium to large scale down here. All the way down to the smallest Ayuntamiento pulling the same tricks in cahoots with farmers turned builders (Yeah, I've heard of the Palace one).

Aznar, Zapatero and now Rajoy, the party doesn't matter.

The charts may paint their picture, nothing has arrived on the streets even where I never expected the transformation that quickly and am thus not surprised.

Yet beyond the building bubble the property market went into worrying fever that I already saw start some twenty years ago and that I predicted, year by year, would cause a massive crash of house prices soon. It kept not happening, on the contrary prices kept rising yet still people bought, as is usual on mortgages that the banks were handing out like stale bread. My incredulity rose with each year, it was the classical lemming demonstration. Had I sold say 6-7 years ago I'd have made a profit of around 300 pct in a bit less than 13 years. No point in it though, buying something else would have swallowed everything again.

That the banks finally crashed when everything and thus the job market tilted was foreseeable and they didn't need the US housing crisis to blame it all on (albeit waves of that coming ashore here as well), they did it all on their own. Well, not quite and there I'll concede to your criticisms, foreign banks, notably North European ones and by far not just German ones had their coffers so filled, they didn't know where to hedge to. Spain was a brilliant opportunity and where direct lending played a part, most of their backing went into the Spanish banking sector at good rates (for them), domestic markets providing no such opportunities with interest as low as it was.

Of course loads of it then got sunk in the building sector that had presented itself as a good investment as well.

Empty, never to be functional airports are sensational but the total sum of smaller projects that don't make the news and are just as idiotic, outweigh them by far.
 
Syriza are moving faster than anyone could honestly expect, given the diplomacy by deadline game that the Troika are playing and the demands on the government's time from the EU, ECB, European parliament etc. Of course, I think the Germans, the Commission and the Dutch and Finnish have decided that they don't want a deal, they want Greece out and consider the eventual costs to be worth it, hence whatever proposal the Greeks come up with it will be dismissed out-of-hand, as they have dismissed all previous reform packages.

We disagree. Syriza and the current government have wasted an enormous amount of time since taking office from posturing to raising demands that no rational actor would ever expect could be fulfilled. That it now faces what may be a hard deadline of just a few days is entirely the result of its actions. Had it shown reasonable flexibility, it might well have attained better terms than what were available when it called the referendum. Worse, on account of the adverse economic impact of capital controls--all fully avoidable had Greece not abruptly called a referendum--the terms that may now be available e.g., the amount of restructuring needed, may be more severe not easier than they were before.

On the other matter, I don't doubt that there are some within the EU who desire finality or believe the costs of trying to keep Greece in the Eurozone are too steep. I doubt that Chancellor Merkel is among them, as such an outcome would be bad for the European project to which she has been intensely committed throughout her tenure in office.
 
Aznar, Zapatero and now Rajoy, the party doesn't matter.
I'm certainly not saying it's all down to the PP, just about 80% of it is. BTW, there have been no accusations of corruption against Zapatero - loads against Rajoy and Aznar and, if you'd gone back further, González: a crook of the first order, now being lauded for fighting a corrupt government in Venezuela - too funny!

The charts may paint their picture, nothing has arrived on the streets even where I never expected the transformation that quickly and am thus not surprised.
I can't think of a single business start-up, a single case of expansion, a single economic good news story to have happened in this area for 8 years, minimum.

Yet beyond the building bubble the property market went into worrying fever that I already saw start some twenty years ago and that I predicted, year by year, would cause a massive crash of house prices soon. It kept not happening, on the contrary prices kept rising yet still people bought, as is usual on mortgages that the banks were handing out like stale bread. My incredulity rose with each year, it was the classical lemming demonstration. Had I sold say 6-7 years ago I'd have made a profit of around 300 pct in a bit less than 13 years. No point in it though, buying something else would have swallowed everything again.
I bought my house in 1999 for cash - 12,000€. I spent another 12-15k renovating it. In 2006 I was offered 155,000€ for it. Today, if I could sell it, which I couldn't, I'd get around 40,000€. Just pleased to not have a mortgage.

That the banks finally crashed when everything and thus the job market tilted was foreseeable and they didn't need the US housing crisis to blame it all on (albeit waves of that coming ashore here as well), they did it all on their own. Well, not quite and there I'll concede to your criticisms, foreign banks, notably North European ones and by far not just German ones had their coffers so filled, they didn't know where to hedge to. Spain was a brilliant opportunity and where direct lending played a part, most of their backing went into the Spanish banking sector at good rates (for them), domestic markets providing no such opportunities with interest as low as it was.
Well, to the list of culprits, you can add EU regional and structural funds which poured billions of match-funding into these infrastructure projects, failed to audit them correctly so that instead of those funds being matched by national and regional public funds, the EU money then became the working funds, less the cuts to the politicians Swiss accounts. Hence, so many of those projects were of poor quality and not built according to agreed specs. A new trunk road through the Alpujarras was built and completed in 2009. In early-2010 after heavy rains, it had to be closed again for 6 months because the contractor had used below-quality materials which washed away within 3 months of completion. It's a well-known story and not a single person has been held responsible.

Empty, never to be functional airports are sensational but the total sum of smaller projects that don't make the news and are just as idiotic, outweigh them by far.
Agreed. How many grandiose Pabellones de deportes have never seen a top class sporting event? There's an opera house in Valencia, open just 7 years, it was used just 14 times in one year. It then closed in 2013 because of deficiencies in design and construction, despite having cost the major part of €1 billion and having made its architect, the 'great' Santiago Calatrava a cool €94 million.
https://thefullcalatrava.wordpress.com/2014/05/29/palau-de-les-arts-reina-sofia-valencia-esp/

THIS is why Podemos are attracting support, nothing to do with solidarity with Greece or disaffection with the EU.
 
We disagree.
Yes, we do.

On the other matter, I don't doubt that there are some within the EU who desire finality or believe the costs of trying to keep Greece in the Eurozone are too steep. I doubt that Chancellor Merkel is among them, as such an outcome would be bad for the European project to which she has been intensely committed throughout her tenure in office.
I think that she has come to the decision, impelled by intense political pressure from within her government, to place the German national interest, and those of German banks, ahead of that 'intense commitment' to European unity.

We've already noted that economically speaking Germany benefits hugely from a weaker Euro, and a properly restructured Greek debt and subsequent recovery within the Eurozone would threaten that in the longer term. I also think she's been listening to her tame economists and their CBA of all the options and decided on the Grexit as Germany's least-worst scenario. I genuinely don't believe European unity is anywhere near the top of her priority list.
 
Started liking the European Parliament today, even if the banter can't offer anything tangible. Some good stuff in the public forum.




 
Time to voice disagreement again:lol:
Syriza are moving faster than anyone could honestly expect, given the diplomacy by deadline game that the Troika are playing and the demands on the government's time from the EU, ECB, European parliament etc.
Considering that Syriza promised to have the banks open again yesterday and that, at the time of the referendum, i.e. just after, he promised to negotiate a (better) deal within the next 48 hours, I think it fair that more speed was expected. So he arrives in Brussels and has nothing.
Of course, I think the Germans, the Commission and the Dutch and Finnish have decided that they don't want a deal, they want Greece out and consider the eventual costs to be worth it, hence whatever proposal the Greeks come up with it will be dismissed out-of-hand, as they have dismissed all previous reform packages.
Apart from the conundrum that Germany faces (I'm not sufficiently versed on Finns and Dutch of late) and that I've described at length here or elsewhere or both, one point is that there was only one reform package to speak of, the 2nd one of 2012 which included a pretty substantial haircut. This one ran out when Tsipras left the table around 2 weeks ago, offering no alternative suggestions at all.

Here are just a few of the comments that they will use, come Thursday:
  • Unrealistic
  • Too vague
  • Doesn't address pensions
  • Doesn't address structural reform issues
  • Unrealistic timetable
  • Inadequate public spending cut proposals
Indeed that'll probably come up. Basically because it will be the case. Add to that how in no way can any deal be better than the last one, the strictures, due to the longer running and financing period, will be more immense.

One need see, speaking of strictures, those of the IWF, ECB and Eurogroup as well here and I'm not speaking of the voter pressure back home.

Yet how a country that has shown itself to be incapable of managing the past debt is supposed to manage an even bigger one now is beyond me as well. Let alone how it's supposed to reform itself under these conditions to the point of addressing the steadily increasing humanitarian catastrophe. Raising the VAT that everyone has to pay for those that aren't buying anymore is as daft as cutting pensions even more.
I'm pretty sure that the decision to force Greece out of the Eurozone has already been taken
Where I don't share your assurance I suspect that, leaving aside all the invective to be seen in the EU parliament today, the proponents of Grexit are at their wits end. Not alone in frustration at this understandably unloved government but in barely whispered realization that whatever they'll be able to do towards help won't help since it can't. Not in Greece.

And I suspect that Tsipras, who certainly knows the strictures that govern ESM, IWF and ECB by rule, regulation and law, isn't even bothering to propose anything remotely acceptable, knowing that he's promised the people something from the realm of fantasy, both in his election campaign and in the referendum and afterwards.

It's pure speculation as such but it's the closest I can come to explain a behavior I'd otherwise have to deem as erratic, as most do.
and the entire EU summit (including all 28 members, not just the 19 Eurozone members) is being convened in order to present the decision as a unanimous one, which it emphatically will not be. However, what is going to be very interesting to watch between now and Sunday is the way in which Juncker, Dijsselbloem and Merkel will be working hard to bring Hollande, Renzi, LaGarde, Rajoy and other EU HoGs into line.
You may as well exclude LaGarde, she's as bound by law (as opposed to all that can freely spout without facing particular consequences) as the ECB and the ESM.
I suspect the key players will be Hollande and Renzi because a split between France and Italy on one side, and Germany and Holland and the Commission on the other would be catastrophic.
Yeah, Kohl in his time should have insisted his stance more strongly that Italy stay out (of the Euro) but he had a re-unification that he needed permission for and so Mitterand used it.
Satirists here in Spain are already joking about Merkel being determined to finish off the job that her country started in 1939 - destroying European peace forever. Poor joke, chilling that it's now in common currency.
Heard that or variations thereof and had to laugh as well.
 
Time to voice disagreement again:lol:Considering that Syriza promised to have the banks open again yesterday and that, at the time of the referendum, i.e. just after, he promised to negotiate a (better) deal within the next 48 hours, I think it fair that more speed was expected. So he arrives in Brussels and has nothing.Apart from the conundrum that Germany faces (I'm not sufficiently versed on Finns and Dutch of late) and that I've described at length here or elsewhere or both, one point is that there was only one reform package to speak of, the 2nd one of 2012 which included a pretty substantial haircut. This one ran out when Tsipras left the table around 2 weeks ago, offering no alternative suggestions at all.

Indeed that'll probably come up. Basically because it will be the case. Add to that how in no way can any deal be better than the last one, the strictures, due to the longer running and financing period, will be more immense.

One need see, speaking of strictures, those of the IWF, ECB and Eurogroup as well here and I'm not speaking of the voter pressure back home.

Yet how a country that has shown itself to be incapable of managing the past debt is supposed to manage an even bigger one now is beyond me as well. Let alone how it's supposed to reform itself under these conditions to the point of addressing the steadily increasing humanitarian catastrophe. Raising the VAT that everyone has to pay for those that aren't buying anymore is as daft as cutting pensions even more.
Where I don't share your assurance I suspect that, leaving aside all the invective to be seen in the EU parliament today, the proponents of Grexit are at their wits end. Not alone in frustration at this understandably unloved government but in barely whispered realization that whatever they'll be able to do towards help won't help since it can't. Not in Greece.

And I suspect that Tsipras, who certainly knows the strictures that govern ESM, IWF and ECB by rule, regulation and law, isn't even bothering to propose anything remotely acceptable, knowing that he's promised the people something from the realm of fantasy, both in his election campaign and in the referendum and afterwards.

It's pure speculation as such but it's the closest I can come to explain a behavior I'd otherwise have to deem as erratic, as most do. You may as well exclude LaGarde, she's as bound by law (as opposed to all that can freely spout without facing particular consequences) as the ECB and the ESM.Yeah, Kohl in his time should have insisted his stance more strongly that Italy stay out (of the Euro) but he had a re-unification that he needed permission for and so Mitterand used it.
Heard that or variations thereof and had to laugh as well.

Okay, well, as with Don, we'll agree to disagree.

I just don't get the pass that Merkel, Juncker et al seem to get from you guys. You recognise that their 7-year project has been a complete failure and that they've offered nothing but more of the same, yet your invective is all reserved for the poor, bloody sods trying to sort out a mess not of their own making. Even if their negotiating had been as inept as you've said, which it hasn't been, it still wasn't them that ran up the debt, corruptly profited from public funds and bail outs, and weren't the ones who failed to implement a rescue strategy.
 
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We disagree. Syriza and the current government have wasted an enormous amount of time since taking office from posturing to raising demands that no rational actor would ever expect could be fulfilled. That it now faces what may be a hard deadline of just a few days is entirely the result of its actions. Had it shown reasonable flexibility, it might well have attained better terms than what were available when it called the referendum. Worse, on account of the adverse economic impact of capital controls--all fully avoidable had Greece not abruptly called a referendum--the terms that may now be available e.g., the amount of restructuring needed, may be more severe not easier than they were before.

On the other matter, I don't doubt that there are some within the EU who desire finality or believe the costs of trying to keep Greece in the Eurozone are too steep. I doubt that Chancellor Merkel is among them, as such an outcome would be bad for the European project to which she has been intensely committed throughout her tenure in office.
I'm falling prey more and more to the suspicion that Tsipras wanted out from the getgo and that the whole thing was planned before he took office.

He can then blame it all on the EU, notably Germany, and work on the same line of "we are a proud nation and we have shown them, again".

As to Merkel, she's truly now between a rock and a hard place. Whichever way she leans, her reputation will suffer.
 
Okay, well, as with Don, we'll agree to disagree.

I just don't get the pass that Merkel, Juncker et al seem to get from you guys. You recognise that their 7-year project has been a complete failure and that they've offered nothing but more of the same, yet your invective is all reserved for the poor, bloody sods trying to sort out a mess not of their own making. Even if their negotiating had been as inept as you've said, which it hasn't been, it still wasn't them that ran up the debt, corruptly profited from public funds and bail outs, and weren't the ones who failed to implement a rescue strategy.
I agree on they not having ruined the Greece economy over years, on implementing a rescue strategy I couldn't disagree more.

But let's just do that.

As to Merkel and Juncker, I have no particular love for either of them. Nothing to do with the current thing but with stuff that would explode this thread so I'll leave it lay.
 
Yes, we do.

I think that she has come to the decision, impelled by intense political pressure from within her government, to place the German national interest, and those of German banks, ahead of that 'intense commitment' to European unity.

We've already noted that economically speaking Germany benefits hugely from a weaker Euro, and a properly restructured Greek debt and subsequent recovery within the Eurozone would threaten that in the longer term. I also think she's been listening to her tame economists and their CBA of all the options and decided on the Grexit as Germany's least-worst scenario. I genuinely don't believe European unity is anywhere near the top of her priority list.

We'll see what happens. Hopefully, if Greece offers something credible and reasonable, it will be given the aid it needs and remain within the Eurozone.
 
I'm falling prey more and more to the suspicion that Tsipras wanted out from the getgo and that the whole thing was planned before he took office.

I worry about that, too. I hope I'm wrong, but I find it difficult to believe that incompetence, alone, could explain some of Greece's recent actions e.g., its failing to offer anything yesterday, the very vague request today, etc. Greece could easily have modified one of the earlier proposals to make an offer it sincerely expected would be acceptable and come prepared yesterday with something concrete.
 
I see. Do you really think anyone but Americans would know what the biggest hub airport in the SE USA would be? :roll: I didn't even know Delta airlines was still flying. How about TWA? Braniff?

A majority of people on this forum are Americans ;) I also can't see that you are a foreigner on my phone. Forgive my god awful assumption that is easily understood with a few google searches ;)
 
9795c031b5bb6e79110ffdd63b3e842d.jpg
 
Whereas this detracts at least geographically from the topic, to those that do not share Andalublue's and my "totally irrelevant" place of residence and the lack of economic understanding of our country's situation that must subsequently result from this irrelevance, here's something from 2012

Spain real estate ‘madness’ continues despite burst housing bubble | Financial Post

To wit (excerpt): Encinar was mistaken, the decline was/is far bigger.

Now back on topic.


What are you even talking about right now? What about the reality of this situation confuses you? What in that link do you imagine supports your position?

There was a global construction and real estate bubble. That is a fact. Identical things happened in countries around the globe. To then isolate a national economy in the midst of a global economic trend makes no sense. You can't pretend Spain's real estate and construction bubble was somehow unrelated to the global real estate and construction bubble.

Financial institutions across the globe were involved in the same sort of complex financial speculation in real estate and construction. When a bank gives out a loan, then securitizes the debt and sells it off to investors, they make a profit either way. In such a scenario, the risk has been removed. Which makes speculation more likely. Speculation then drives up prices, which makes speculation more likely. And on and on and on. Without the financial speculation, there may have still been a construction and housing bubble, but it would have been much smaller. Which means no financial collapse on this scale. If there was never a real estate and construction bubble of that size, there would currently be no debt crisis in Spain. If there hadn't been austerity imposed on Spain, there would be a smaller debt problem in Spain.

All of this is inarguably true. You can pretend otherwise and act like you are ignoring me because your proximity based expertise means I am below consideration, but the reality is your ideas and understanding are entirely bankrupt, and you are incapable of countering my arguments in a coherent and substantive manner.
 
One big issue I see here is that Greece may become a hub for Isis and other terrorists. What better to use as a switching station than a place with people who look like you, a nation not really all that threatening, and then with money you could just hop to any nation you want.

What??? Have you ever been to Greece? They have NOTHING in common with the Muslim Arab countries that have been targeted by ISIS. Their language is Greek which bears no similitude to Arabic whatsoever. Their religion is overwhelmingly Greek Orthodox Christian. Their population is homogeneously white.

Do you realize that the Greeks were the freaking founders of Western civilization?

How can someone be so uninformed to think that ISIS would have an easy time in Greece???
 
Reportedly, this is the Greek proposal.

ANA-MPA: The Greek government's full proposal to the Eurogroup

If so, it's a dramatic shift to the creditors' earlier positions. Had the Greek government had the foresight to accept what was available to them back in June, the prolonged bank holiday, capital controls, and resulting macroeconomic damage could have been avoided.
 
Reportedly, this is the Greek proposal.

ANA-MPA: The Greek government's full proposal to the Eurogroup

If so, it's a dramatic shift to the creditors' earlier positions. Had the Greek government had the foresight to accept what was available to them back in June, the prolonged bank holiday, capital controls, and resulting macroeconomic damage could have been avoided.

That's exactly what I expected to happen - a somewhat modified proposal just to give the impression that the PM was able to negotiate better terms based on the referendum. It's a win-win for Tsipras: if it works, he's the hero; if it doesn't, it's the fault of the Greek people since they voted the way they did.

This whole thing was a political coup.
 
Reportedly, this is the Greek proposal.

ANA-MPA: The Greek government's full proposal to the Eurogroup

If so, it's a dramatic shift to the creditors' earlier positions. Had the Greek government had the foresight to accept what was available to them back in June, the prolonged bank holiday, capital controls, and resulting macroeconomic damage could have been avoided.

You were arguing just a day or two ago that Tsipras' strategy all along was to get Greece to leave the eurozone. Clearly, it wasn't.

Now we'll see whether Merkel et al had the same goal, because to reject, substantially modify or deny any debt relief on the basis of this plan would demonstrate that they have no intention of keeping Greece within the Euro.
 
You were arguing just a day or two ago that Tsipras' strategy all along was to get Greece to leave the eurozone. Clearly, it wasn't.

Now we'll see whether Merkel et al had the same goal, because to reject, substantially modify or deny any debt relief on the basis of this plan would demonstrate that they have no intention of keeping Greece within the Euro.

I was raising the question. I'm still not sure that wasn't his goal or Syriza's goal. I don't know.

Confronted by the reality that the EU was truly serious about letting Greece leave and realizing that Greece had no viable alternatives outside of the Eurozone might well have changed the government's calculus. Russia never was a serious option given its own tough situation. Hysteria from across the Atlantic that a Grexit would have led to its departure from NATO or presented a serious geopolitical change in the balance of power was baseless given Greece's national interests. Greece had no viable options. It had no meaningful leverage and it could never have expected the EU/ECB/IMF to capitulate to its demands. Greece's government either miscalculated badly, didn't take a sober look at what little leverage it actually had, or wanted to "explore" a possible exit. Undoubtedly, there were politicians who fell into all three categories on an individual basis.

Had the government offered what is on the table now, all of what happened from the time the talks fell apart i.e., capital controls, resulting macroeconomic damage, additional hardship on Greece's people, etc., could have been avoided. It should have been avoided. That the government finally made a sensible decision after gambling recklessly and consuming a large amount of time in the process doesn't win it much credit. A government that has the foresight to make tough choices before incurring high costs after trying to evade those decisions deserves credit.

It's good that Greece finally made a sound choice. But it did so only after incurring steep and wholly avoidable costs and after discovering that the EU was serious about allowing it to leave rather than capitulating.
 
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I was raising the question. I'm still not sure that wasn't his goal or Syriza's goal. I don't know.

Confronted by the reality that the EU was truly serious about letting Greece leave and realizing that Greece had no viable alternatives outside of the Eurozone might well have changed the government's calculus. Russia never was a serious option given its own tough situation. Hysteria from across the Atlantic that a Grexit would have led to its departure from NATO or presented a serious geopolitical change in the balance of power was baseless given Greece's national interests. Greece had no viable options. It had no meaningful leverage and it could never have expected the EU/ECB/IMF to capitulate to its demands. Greece's government either miscalculated badly, didn't take a sober look at what little leverage it actually had, or wanted to "explore" a possible exit. Undoubtedly, there were politicians who fell into all three categories on an individual basis.

Had the government offered what is on the table now, all of what happened from the time the talks fell apart i.e., capital controls, resulting macroeconomic damage, additional hardship on Greece's people, etc., could have been avoided. It should have been avoided. That the government finally made a sensible decision after gambling recklessly and consuming a large amount of time in the process doesn't win it much credit. A government that has the foresight to make tough choices before incurring high costs after trying to evade those decisions deserves credit.

It's good that Greece finally made a sound choice. But it did so only after incurring steep and wholly avoidable costs and after discovering that the EU was serious about allowing it to leave rather than capitulating.

Well, that 'sound choice' runs counter to the mandate he received on Sunday.

And that 'sound choice' appears not to have yet found favour with the Germans:
Finance ministry spokesman Martin Jaeger said Germany would not accept any reduction of debt that caused it more losses.
"The outcome of the Eurogroup meeting on Saturday is completely open," he said.

I foresee troops on the streets of Athens by Monday, and I don't think that that is being overly apocalyptic.
 
Well, that 'sound choice' runs counter to the mandate he received on Sunday.

Of course it does. He should never have punted in the first place. Had he accepted similar terms early on, he wouldn't have created a situation of accepting terms that run counter to a referendum's mandate, as there would have been no referendum.

And that 'sound choice' appears not to have yet found favour with the Germans:

The Greek government destroyed a lot of trust and good faith. It vilified some German officials e.g., its Finance Minister. It inflicted upon itself macroeconomic damage that makes the task of addressing its structural issues even more difficult. If the IMF, ECB, and EU's assessments conclude that the package is viable, Germany will come along.
 
Of course it does. He should never have punted in the first place. Had he accepted similar terms early on, he wouldn't have created a situation of accepting terms that run counter to a referendum's mandate, as there would have been no referendum.
I see. So it would have been better not to get a democratic decision on what the Greek people want. Better not to know, so that going against the democratic will is easier.

The Greek government destroyed a lot of trust and good faith. It vilified some German officials e.g., its Finance Minister. It inflicted upon itself macroeconomic damage that makes the task of addressing its structural issues even more difficult. If the IMF, ECB, and EU's assessments conclude that the package is viable, Germany will come along.
We'll see. It has to pass the Bundestag, which will not necessarily fall into line just because Merkel tells them to.

The 'macroeconomic damage' that Syriza may or may not have caused is as nothing to the macroeconomic destruction wreaked by austerity: mass unemployment, the collapse of GDP and the 70% increase of debt to GDP have nothing whatsoever to do with Syriza's policies or tactics.
 
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