Far from kowtowing to policymakers, there is sometimes a strong impulse on the part of intelligence officers to show that a policy or decision is misguided or wrong, to poke an analytical finger in the policy eye. Policymakers know this and understandably
resent it. To protect the independence of the analyst while keeping such impulses in check is one of the toughest jobs of intelligence agency managers. In this connection the policymaker sometimes has the sense that the CIA
is attempting, at least by inference, to "grade" his performance. Further, the policymaker is often suspicious that when the CIA's analysis suggests his policy is failing or in difficulty, these conclusions are widely circulated by the Agency,
with malice, for use as ammunition by critics of the policy in the Executive Branch, in Congress, or among the public. These suspicions are magnified by leaks that pit the policymaker against CIA in a contest for political advantage.