Occasionally the President undertakes a dramatic or sudden foreign policy action before Congress is fully informed about it. Congress then is faced with the dilemma of supporting the action or being charged with undercutting the President before the world. Congress usually supports the President, but on occasion it tries to halt or reverse the policy or pass legislation to restrain the President from similar actions in the future.
When President Reagan launched a military invasion of Grenada on October 24, 1983, Congress essentially supported the President in his stated effort to prevent the formation of a Communist foothold there. Although both Houses of Congress passed separate measures that would invoke the War Powers Resolution, neither measure was passed by both Houses. 32 Congressional leaders apparently received assurances from the White House that the troops would be out within 60 days, and public opinion strongly supported the action. Congress also supported the President's action by approving $15 million for grant economic assistance programs to Grenada.
Similarly, when President Reagan ordered the bombing of Libya on April 15, 1986, to counter state-supported terrorism, and when President Bush ordered the invasion of Panama on December 20, 1989, to apprehend General Manuel Noriega, most Members supported the President's effort. Widespread public support greeted the President's action and was also a factor in determining the congressional response.
In another instance, President Clinton addressed a financial crisis in Mexico, after a devaluation of the peso in late December 1994. In an effort to prevent Mexican default on billions of dollars worth of debt obligations, in early 1995, the President's economic advisors crafted a package of support for Mexico that did not require a Congressional vote on the controversial proposal. This action was taken when it appeared possible that Congress would not enact the Administration's legislation to deal with the crisis. The independent initiative by President Clinton included $20 billion in credits from the Exchange Stabilization Fund (ESF) of the Treasury Department, which is normally used to stabilize the U.S. dollar's value; $ 10 billion in credits from the Bank for International Settlements, and $17.8 billion from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The Clinton Administration's independent intervention in the Mexican peso crisis led to significant criticism in Congress, but efforts to modify or block it were either defeated or abandoned. 33
Occasionally, however, Congress significantly refines or alters a policy independently undertaken by the President. This was the case in the 1979 policy change toward the People's Republic of China and Taiwan. On December 15, 1978, President Carter announced suddenly that the United States would establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China on January 1, 1979, and terminate the defense treaty with the Republic of China on Taiwan after the one year's notice required by the treaty. The Administration also submitted legislation to govern future relations with Taiwan.
While few Members of Congress opposed the establishment of relations with China, a move anticipated since President Nixon's trip to China in 1972, many Members sought to modify the practical implications of the new policy and reassure allies in the Pacific.