Well, it's counter productive for Europe and the US. Especially when he raised the gas prices and cut off the Ukraine a few winters ago. Putin likes the monopoly of natural gas for winter heating that Russia currently enjoys, and is why he supported Assad for blocking the southern and western NLG pipelines to Europe.
I don't doubt that there would be pain if Russia deprives Europe of natural gas. Nevertheless, the U.S. and Europe need to put the long-term ahead of the short-term. Shorter-term inconvenience is a very attractive price if it means a long-term threat is alleviated. Brutal sanctions can raise the costs of Russian intervention in the total sense of the term and decrease the likelihood of future aggression and the staggering costs of war, particularly as it relates to Europe's NATO members. That's where the U.S.-European focus should be.
Yes, we have too much faith in that the Russians will back down because of financial realities, but they have historically been able to weather economical hardships. I agree that the US and NATO will keep up the sanctions and countering military aggression, where and when possible without escalating into something more direct.
The U.S. has drifted into a sort of post-Cold War high in which it was tempted by notions of a unipolar power structure in which no other great nation truly mattered and afterward by equally flawed notions that abstract appeals to international law and economic interconnectedness trumped the balance of power, spheres of influence, Realpolitik, etc. Kissinger, Scowcroft, among others have been sober voices pushing back.
We've actually been playing these geopolitical strategies with Russia since shortly after WWII. But something feels very different with the new world order.
Kissinger recently wrote an op-ed piece describing the focus and priorities, as a much different diplomatic situation than in previous decades due to changing attitudes, technologies and global trading.
I agree with a lot of that op-ed. It is essentially a piece that complements Kissinger's forthcoming book, which will be released in September.
Back on August 31, 2008, then Russian President Medvedev unveiled Russia's foreign policy doctrine (almost certainly shaped by then Prime Minister Putin). Medvedev's formulation asserted:
• Russia recognizes the value international law can play in establishing agreed principles of conduct.
• Russia sees a multi-polar world. As a consequence, the balance of power remains highly relevant in its conception of 21st century foreign policy doctrine.
• Russia remains open to cooperation and partnership with the West. The extent of partnership and cooperation will be constrained by the national interests of the parties.
• Russia, like the rest of the world’s major powers, has interests that extend beyond its borders. Its critical overseas interests will need to be taken into consideration by the rest of the world. Russia is prepared to defend those critical interests.
In that doctrine, Russia reaffirmed the kind of world that is familiar to the pragmatic Realist approach to foreign policy. In that world, the balance of power is seen as a necessary foundation for reducing the risk of major international conflict. Moral principles are helpful, but not a substitute for the balance of power. Collective security, by itself, is a flawed instrument for promoting international peace and stability, as nations’ interests are not universal and the world’s nations’ desire to run risks is not equal. Effective foreign policy is anchored in national interests. Such policy recognizes the differences in national interests that exist among nations and seeks a balancing of such interests so as to accommodate the needs (though not maximum demands) of the world’s nations. Such a policy recognizes that spheres of influence still matter and must be considered, as no single nation can outlaw that reality by itself.
Today, Putin is using military force to preserve part of what he views as Russia's sphere of influence. The U.S. was taken aback, rightly by Russia's aggression, but also from being blindsided that Russia's actions amounted to a "19th century" response in a "21st century world." Worse, the U.S. still does not seem to have a coherent foreign policy doctrine. That lack of doctrine has been the case for at least two Administrations, now. In addition, very little if any political and military contingency planning is taking place. As a result, the U.S. foreign policy has been almost entirely reactive in recent years and the U.S. has been forced to try to catch up after falling behind military and political events ranging from insurgency in Afghanistan to the rise of the Islamic State terrorist organization in Syria and Iraq (and possibly a toehold in Lebanon).
Kissinger's following questions offer a good starting point. He wrote:
To play a responsible role in the evolution of a 21st-century world order, the U.S. must be prepared to answer a number of questions for itself: What do we seek to prevent, no matter how it happens, and if necessary alone? What do we seek to achieve, even if not supported by any multilateral effort? What do we seek to achieve, or prevent, only if supported by an alliance? What should we not engage in, even if urged on by a multilateral group or an alliance? What is the nature of the values that we seek to advance? And how much does the application of these values depend on circumstance?