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Don't mess with nuclear Russia, Putin says

For a start we can elect a strong Conservative POTUS. The world does not respect liberal democrats.

A strong conservative? And who would that be? Putin is the one who does not respect the US.
 
Putin shows his new dominance over everything in the world, he is now giving even Gordon Ramsay and Jamie Oliver a run for their money

 
Well, it's counter productive for Europe and the US. Especially when he raised the gas prices and cut off the Ukraine a few winters ago. Putin likes the monopoly of natural gas for winter heating that Russia currently enjoys, and is why he supported Assad for blocking the southern and western NLG pipelines to Europe.

I don't doubt that there would be pain if Russia deprives Europe of natural gas. Nevertheless, the U.S. and Europe need to put the long-term ahead of the short-term. Shorter-term inconvenience is a very attractive price if it means a long-term threat is alleviated. Brutal sanctions can raise the costs of Russian intervention in the total sense of the term and decrease the likelihood of future aggression and the staggering costs of war, particularly as it relates to Europe's NATO members. That's where the U.S.-European focus should be.

Yes, we have too much faith in that the Russians will back down because of financial realities, but they have historically been able to weather economical hardships. I agree that the US and NATO will keep up the sanctions and countering military aggression, where and when possible without escalating into something more direct.

The U.S. has drifted into a sort of post-Cold War high in which it was tempted by notions of a unipolar power structure in which no other great nation truly mattered and afterward by equally flawed notions that abstract appeals to international law and economic interconnectedness trumped the balance of power, spheres of influence, Realpolitik, etc. Kissinger, Scowcroft, among others have been sober voices pushing back.

We've actually been playing these geopolitical strategies with Russia since shortly after WWII. But something feels very different with the new world order. Kissinger recently wrote an op-ed piece describing the focus and priorities, as a much different diplomatic situation than in previous decades due to changing attitudes, technologies and global trading.

I agree with a lot of that op-ed. It is essentially a piece that complements Kissinger's forthcoming book, which will be released in September.

Back on August 31, 2008, then Russian President Medvedev unveiled Russia's foreign policy doctrine (almost certainly shaped by then Prime Minister Putin). Medvedev's formulation asserted:

• Russia recognizes the value international law can play in establishing agreed principles of conduct.

• Russia sees a multi-polar world. As a consequence, the balance of power remains highly relevant in its conception of 21st century foreign policy doctrine.

• Russia remains open to cooperation and partnership with the West. The extent of partnership and cooperation will be constrained by the national interests of the parties.

• Russia, like the rest of the world’s major powers, has interests that extend beyond its borders. Its critical overseas interests will need to be taken into consideration by the rest of the world. Russia is prepared to defend those critical interests.

In that doctrine, Russia reaffirmed the kind of world that is familiar to the pragmatic Realist approach to foreign policy. In that world, the balance of power is seen as a necessary foundation for reducing the risk of major international conflict. Moral principles are helpful, but not a substitute for the balance of power. Collective security, by itself, is a flawed instrument for promoting international peace and stability, as nations’ interests are not universal and the world’s nations’ desire to run risks is not equal. Effective foreign policy is anchored in national interests. Such policy recognizes the differences in national interests that exist among nations and seeks a balancing of such interests so as to accommodate the needs (though not maximum demands) of the world’s nations. Such a policy recognizes that spheres of influence still matter and must be considered, as no single nation can outlaw that reality by itself.

Today, Putin is using military force to preserve part of what he views as Russia's sphere of influence. The U.S. was taken aback, rightly by Russia's aggression, but also from being blindsided that Russia's actions amounted to a "19th century" response in a "21st century world." Worse, the U.S. still does not seem to have a coherent foreign policy doctrine. That lack of doctrine has been the case for at least two Administrations, now. In addition, very little if any political and military contingency planning is taking place. As a result, the U.S. foreign policy has been almost entirely reactive in recent years and the U.S. has been forced to try to catch up after falling behind military and political events ranging from insurgency in Afghanistan to the rise of the Islamic State terrorist organization in Syria and Iraq (and possibly a toehold in Lebanon).

Kissinger's following questions offer a good starting point. He wrote:

To play a responsible role in the evolution of a 21st-century world order, the U.S. must be prepared to answer a number of questions for itself: What do we seek to prevent, no matter how it happens, and if necessary alone? What do we seek to achieve, even if not supported by any multilateral effort? What do we seek to achieve, or prevent, only if supported by an alliance? What should we not engage in, even if urged on by a multilateral group or an alliance? What is the nature of the values that we seek to advance? And how much does the application of these values depend on circumstance?
 
I don't doubt that there would be pain if Russia deprives Europe of natural gas. Nevertheless, the U.S. and Europe need to put the long-term ahead of the short-term. Shorter-term inconvenience is a very attractive price if it means a long-term threat is alleviated. Brutal sanctions can raise the costs of Russian intervention in the total sense of the term and decrease the likelihood of future aggression and the staggering costs of war, particularly as it relates to Europe's NATO members. That's where the U.S.-European focus should be.



The U.S. has drifted into a sort of post-Cold War high in which it was tempted by notions of a unipolar power structure in which no other great nation truly mattered and afterward by equally flawed notions that abstract appeals to international law and economic interconnectedness trumped the balance of power, spheres of influence, Realpolitik, etc. Kissinger, Scowcroft, among others have been sober voices pushing back.



I agree with a lot of that op-ed. It is essentially a piece that complements Kissinger's forthcoming book, which will be released in September.

Back on August 31, 2008, then Russian President Medvedev unveiled Russia's foreign policy doctrine (almost certainly shaped by then Prime Minister Putin). Medvedev's formulation asserted:

• Russia recognizes the value international law can play in establishing agreed principles of conduct.

• Russia sees a multi-polar world. As a consequence, the balance of power remains highly relevant in its conception of 21st century foreign policy doctrine.

• Russia remains open to cooperation and partnership with the West. The extent of partnership and cooperation will be constrained by the national interests of the parties.

• Russia, like the rest of the world’s major powers, has interests that extend beyond its borders. Its critical overseas interests will need to be taken into consideration by the rest of the world. Russia is prepared to defend those critical interests.

In that doctrine, Russia reaffirmed the kind of world that is familiar to the pragmatic Realist approach to foreign policy. In that world, the balance of power is seen as a necessary foundation for reducing the risk of major international conflict. Moral principles are helpful, but not a substitute for the balance of power. Collective security, by itself, is a flawed instrument for promoting international peace and stability, as nations’ interests are not universal and the world’s nations’ desire to run risks is not equal. Effective foreign policy is anchored in national interests. Such policy recognizes the differences in national interests that exist among nations and seeks a balancing of such interests so as to accommodate the needs (though not maximum demands) of the world’s nations. Such a policy recognizes that spheres of influence still matter and must be considered, as no single nation can outlaw that reality by itself.

Today, Putin is using military force to preserve part of what he views as Russia's sphere of influence. The U.S. was taken aback, rightly by Russia's aggression, but also from being blindsided that Russia's actions amounted to a "19th century" response in a "21st century world." Worse, the U.S. still does not seem to have a coherent foreign policy doctrine. That lack of doctrine has been the case for at least two Administrations, now. In addition, very little if any political and military contingency planning is taking place. As a result, the U.S. foreign policy has been almost entirely reactive in recent years and the U.S. has been forced to try to catch up after falling behind military and political events ranging from insurgency in Afghanistan to the rise of the Islamic State terrorist organization in Syria and Iraq (and possibly a toehold in Lebanon).

Kissinger's following questions offer a good starting point. He wrote:

To play a responsible role in the evolution of a 21st-century world order, the U.S. must be prepared to answer a number of questions for itself: What do we seek to prevent, no matter how it happens, and if necessary alone? What do we seek to achieve, even if not supported by any multilateral effort? What do we seek to achieve, or prevent, only if supported by an alliance? What should we not engage in, even if urged on by a multilateral group or an alliance? What is the nature of the values that we seek to advance? And how much does the application of these values depend on circumstance?


Very astute analysis. The US had become so successful on the world stage that we really had no direction, other than securing resources for energy needs, maintaining economic partners and securing the homeland and assets abroad against radical extremism.

I'm shocked that someone today actually picked up on this statement below.

Russia remains open to cooperation and partnership with the West. The extent of partnership and cooperation will be constrained by the national interests of the parties.

Putin is literally playing games and has no desire for any real confrontation, or even continued sanctions. He's got to be allowed to find an 'out' to maintain his authority, dignity and status in his country. He over-played his hand, but will still get something out of this. He couldn't let those western and southern pipelines come thru Syria, or for the Ukraine to break away without taking a financial beating. It's almost scripted, it's so well orchestrated.

You're absolutely correct in agreeing with Kissinger and Scowcroft, in that those are flawed notions that intl law, global trading and economic interconnectedness have trumped the balance of power.

Also, I agree where we've entered an era where the US cannot fix all of the world's problems. And our lack of direction and achievable goals for the long term are from a lack of political cohesiveness and economically driven policies. Corporate hegemony has been allowed too large an influence in our matters of governance. We need to organize our needs and priorities, before we keep running off half cocked, over reacting, to every News cycle, or we're going to face many great social upheavals.
 
Very astute analysis. The US had become so successful on the world stage that we really had no direction, other than securing resources for energy needs, maintaining economic partners and securing the homeland and assets abroad against radical extremism.

I'm shocked that someone today actually picked up on this statement below.



Putin is literally playing games and has no desire for any real confrontation, or even continued sanctions. He's got to be allowed to find an 'out' to maintain his authority, dignity and status in his country. He over-played his hand, but will still get something out of this. He couldn't let those western and southern pipelines come thru Syria, or for the Ukraine to break away without taking a financial beating. It's almost scripted, it's so well orchestrated.

You're absolutely correct in agreeing with Kissinger and Scowcroft, in that those are flawed notions that intl law, global trading and economic interconnectedness have trumped the balance of power.

Also, I agree where we've entered an era where the US cannot fix all of the world's problems. And our lack of direction and achievable goals for the long term are from a lack of political cohesiveness and economically driven policies. Corporate hegemony has been allowed too large an influence in our matters of governance. We need to organize our needs and priorities, before we keep running off half cocked, over reacting, to every News cycle, or we're going to face many great social upheavals.

Right now, it appears that the moves and countermoves of the parties have developed a momentum of their own. That momentum has reduced their flexibility to seek accommodations. Even a few weeks ago, possible terms that might have accommodated both Russia and the EU/U.S. would have involved leaving Crimea as is (perhaps to be discussed in the future with no Western recognition of Russia's annexation) and granting southeastern Ukraine's ethnic Russians a choice to remain in Ukraine or to depart for Russia with full amnesty for all who took part in the conflict. In return, most or all of each of the parties' sanctions would be lifted. Ukraine would have been most resistant, but tying such terms to renewed favorable natural gas pricing might have provided at least some chance of success. Nothing was assured, but some probability of success existed. That probability is clearly much lower now.

Now, resolving the problem has become more difficult. Ukraine will take a tougher stand and neither the EU nor U.S. will want to be seen as establishing a 21st century "Munich" moment. Russia is more deeply invested and Putin, who abhors weakness, will not want to be seen as making any meaningful concessions, especially as it has been widely reported that Russian military members have died in the conflict. Moreover, Russia stands to gain not just possible territory or influence/greater capacity to project power, but also the loyalties of ethnic Russians and even population if Russia annexes southeastern Ukraine. The population issue would help mitigate some of Russia's demographic pressures related to a general population decline, though there was recent stabilization with a modest increase. Whether that stabilization is temporary remains to be seen.

Overall, things are evolving toward a high stakes standoff. With room for maneuver narrowing, the risk that the standoff could be of a fairly long duration are increasing. That still may not be the most likely outcome, but it is no longer a low probability scenario.
 
Right now, it appears that the moves and countermoves of the parties have developed a momentum of their own. That momentum has reduced their flexibility to seek accommodations. Even a few weeks ago, possible terms that might have accommodated both Russia and the EU/U.S. would have involved leaving Crimea as is (perhaps to be discussed in the future with no Western recognition of Russia's annexation) and granting southeastern Ukraine's ethnic Russians a choice to remain in Ukraine or to depart for Russia with full amnesty for all who took part in the conflict. In return, most or all of each of the parties' sanctions would be lifted. Ukraine would have been most resistant, but tying such terms to renewed favorable natural gas pricing might have provided at least some chance of success. Nothing was assured, but some probability of success existed. That probability is clearly much lower now.

Now, resolving the problem has become more difficult. Ukraine will take a tougher stand and neither the EU nor U.S. will want to be seen as establishing a 21st century "Munich" moment. Russia is more deeply invested and Putin, who abhors weakness, will not want to be seen as making any meaningful concessions, especially as it has been widely reported that Russian military members have died in the conflict. Moreover, Russia stands to gain not just possible territory or influence/greater capacity to project power, but also the loyalties of ethnic Russians and even population if Russia annexes southeastern Ukraine. The population issue would help mitigate some of Russia's demographic pressures related to a general population decline, though there was recent stabilization with a modest increase. Whether that stabilization is temporary remains to be seen.

Overall, things are evolving toward a high stakes standoff. With room for maneuver narrowing, the risk that the standoff could be of a fairly long duration are increasing. That still may not be the most likely outcome, but it is no longer a low probability scenario.

I didn't know they were that close to a reasonable solution. Your detailed knowledge of the situation is far greater than mine. It also sounds like the devil is in the details with this situation. I couldn't understand after Putin had fairly well annexed Crimea, why they didn't stop there? But apparently the rest of Ukraine wasn't having none of that or the western alliance by pushing for Poroshenko replacing Yanukovych, which Russia didn't like at all.

I've seen enough Media snapshots of Obama with Putin leering at him, and Obama's head down in disappointment to know there's no love loss. Putin is old school KGB and has no respect for weakness, which I'm sure he see's our President as wearing a skirt. They need to find some subordinates or mediators that can have a meaningful dialogue, and figure out some diplomatic solution, before it gets out of hand. I suspect this won't be solved quickly, but with Russia's economy taking hits, it'll force Putin's hand sooner than later. And I'm afraid this will come down to some serious reactions before they settle on where to draw lines.
 
I didn't know they were that close to a reasonable solution. Your detailed knowledge of the situation is far greater than mine. It also sounds like the devil is in the details with this situation. I couldn't understand after Putin had fairly well annexed Crimea, why they didn't stop there? But apparently the rest of Ukraine wasn't having none of that or the western alliance by pushing for Poroshenko replacing Yanukovych, which Russia didn't like at all.

I've seen enough Media snapshots of Obama with Putin leering at him, and Obama's head down in disappointment to know there's no love loss. Putin is old school KGB and has no respect for weakness, which I'm sure he see's our President as wearing a skirt. They need to find some subordinates or mediators that can have a meaningful dialogue, and figure out some diplomatic solution, before it gets out of hand. I suspect this won't be solved quickly, but with Russia's economy taking hits, it'll force Putin's hand sooner than later. And I'm afraid this will come down to some serious reactions before they settle on where to draw lines.

I wouldn't say the parties were close, but there were concrete items being discussed and there were emerging understandings. With so many parties, the diplomacy was complicated. But now the probability of a diplomatic settlement is much lower. A ceasefire would now represent a positive development.
 
For a start we can elect a strong Conservative POTUS. The world does not respect liberal democrats.

That was a cop out answer. Basically not an answer. No surprise though.

Did you know the world couldn't believe we elected Reagan and Bush?
 
Don't mess with nuclear Russia, Putin says

For get about ISIS, I/P, Ebola, Ferguson and worry about slipping into an escalating conflict with a nuclear super power, or not.

What the **** is he going to do anyway?

I'd throw cannon fodder in his direction just to wake him up.....

Obama is such a tool tho......The retard doesn't even understand he's getting blasted by yo-yo's to the face....

That clown Obama is golfing and Putin is playing hockey.....
 
That was a cop out answer. Basically not an answer. No surprise though.

Did you know the world couldn't believe we elected Reagan and Bush?

Not a cop out. The world does not respect democrat presidents and they were made to respect that Reagan and Bush were President.
 
I hope Putin knows that if he even detonated a nuclear weapon he would be attacked by the entire armed world.... Not only that but if he launched one at the US it would be immediately shot down...

So yeah, that fool can make all the threats he wants but he damn well knows he can't make good on them without destroying his disgusting USSR wannabe state.

Besides, he probably doesn't even know where half of his nuclear arms are located after the collapse of the Soviet Union... Half of their munitions and other weaponry was sold on the black market after the collapse and I wouldn't be shocked if the US bought and destroyed a lot of it just to ensure it didn't fall into the wrong hands.
 
Not a cop out. The world does not respect democrat presidents and they were made to respect that Reagan and Bush were President.

Because democrat presidents are weak and make idol threats - the only ones I can think of in recent history that actually had balls were Clinton and Kennedy, but Kennedy wouldn't even be a democrat in todays political arena.
 
Because democrat presidents are weak and make idol threats - the only ones I can think of in recent history that actually had balls were Clinton and Kennedy, but Kennedy wouldn't even be a democrat in todays political arena.

Kennedy was still punked by Krushev, he was young and naive, even with his military background. A few weeks back Putins govt posted an unflattering comparison of Obama to putin, if you look at the actual tweet-one of them says they dont respect democrats. :lol:
 
Kennedy was still punked by Krushev, he was young and naive, even with his military background. A few weeks back Putins govt posted an unflattering comparison of Obama to putin, if you look at the actual tweet-one of them says they dont respect democrats. :lol:

Well, Kennedy was certainly a wacko and wet behind his ears but he did take a tough stance on communism - something present day democrats never would.

You should check out how obsessed he was with whacking Castro - some of the ideas he and his staff concocted are straight out of cartoons.... Then again he did consider "Operation Northwoods" which was terrible.

One could write a 2000 page book on Kennedy and his fiasco's...
 
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