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Ukraine accuses Russia of Occupation calls for help from US/UK

If true it shows that I am right that some people will be allowed to vote against a bill if the party has enough to win without his or her vote. For the parties it is all about keeping power.
Former Rep. Childers has more integrity than that.
This is why he is a BlueDog with a decent chance to be competitive in the Mississippi Senate race.

I have no idea who will win or lose in Mississippi. It matters very little. Only winning the Article V fight can make a difference.
It sure does matter.
Do you support Sen. McConnell filibustering a Veteran's bill last week with a poison pill ?
 
I never said Russia would declare it independent, but Crimea itself will. Using the coup in Ukraine as a pretext, along with a regional vote. Which Russia will recognize, and then support.

I don't see Crimean independence as being something even the Crimeans want. This whole episode is predicated on Russian culture's preoccupation with pretending to be a major world power again, and the desire of ethnic Russians in Ukraine to remain part of the Russian orbit.

Perhaps you should look up the definition of conquest, simply, its the act of taking control of a people/country through the use of force, which we have done as recently as the last administration. You want to say that because we left a decade latter it wasn't a conquest?

It wasn't a conquest because we made no plans to formally (or even informally) incorporate the territory into our system of government.
 
I don't see Crimean independence as being something even the Crimeans want. This whole episode is predicated on Russian culture's preoccupation with pretending to be a major world power again, and the desire of ethnic Russians in Ukraine to remain part of the Russian orbit.



It wasn't a conquest because we made no plans to formally (or even informally) incorporate the territory into our system of government.

Crimea is predominately ethnically Russian, and out right annexation would be diplomatically bad, leaving Crimea and other potential Ukrainian areas the option of becoming independent like South Ossetia and Transnistria. Russia will recognize the independence and protect them from outside agression
 
Crimea is predominately ethnically Russian, and out right annexation would be diplomatically bad, leaving Crimea and other potential Ukrainian areas the option of becoming independent like South Ossetia and Transnistria. Russia will recognize the independence and protect them from outside agression

Here is someone with a great deal of experience in the Reagan administration and has a few ideas and insights. What is Vladimir Putin's next move in Ukraine? | Latest News Videos | Fox News
 
Crimea is predominately ethnically Russian, and out right annexation would be diplomatically bad, leaving Crimea and other potential Ukrainian areas the option of becoming independent like South Ossetia and Transnistria. Russia will recognize the independence and protect them from outside agression

This line of discussion is pretty moot, really.

That said, I'm fine with moot discussions.

The vital difference between South Ossetia, Transnistria, and Crimea is that, as you said, Crimea is predominately Russian. Even in the case that Crimea became independent, I believe the endgame would be absorption into Russia.
 
This line of discussion is pretty moot, really.

That said, I'm fine with moot discussions.

The vital difference between South Ossetia, Transnistria, and Crimea is that, as you said, Crimea is predominately Russian. Even in the case that Crimea became independent, I believe the endgame would be absorption into Russia.

Over time probably but that would be a 10 year project rather then just a few months or weeks.

Of course my theory only stands provided the Ukraine does not end up with open warfare
 
The Ukraine situation remains a bad one. Even if Russia had not intervened, the country was ethnically divided. Those divisions could well have led to a split of the country following the political revolution that took place in Kiev. When central authority declines, the risk of fragmentation of such divided states can be high. Such fragmentation does not always take place peacefully, either. Czechoslovakia was a benign exception. Yugoslavia was a more common example.

Even if Russia withdraws its forces from Crimea (while making clear that it will defend its naval base at Sevastopol against any efforts to dislodge it), putting Ukraine back together as a single country is not an assured outcome. Events may have run to far ahead to allow that to happen. Some kind of political arrangement of autonomous regions within a loose Ukrainian confederation might be feasible (though I have my doubts about that given the parties’ profound differences and mistrust).

Tragically, as has happened time and again over the past decade, the U.S. was caught flat-footed and quickly fell behind the curve of events. The vital “what if” questions concerning the political revolution were not asked, much less addressed. The underlying assumption was that the political revolution against a leader widely opposed in western Ukraine but widely supported in eastern Ukraine would magically lead to a stable and democratic Ukraine. Another underlying assumption was that Russia would ignore whatever its interests were, including its doctrine of a compatriot foreign policy where it has asserted itself as a protector of ethnic Russian peoples in its near abroad. Such idealistic assumptions have become a hallmark of recent American foreign policy. Examples include the misplaced notion that the Syrian revolt (as opposed to the street demonstrations that preceded it) has a democratic nature, the “Arab Spring” was about democracy and would lead to stability, etc.

This problem is not solely the responsibility of the Obama Administration. It extends at least as far back as the Bush Administration. The Bush Administration had a neoconservative doctrine, but that doctrine was based on the flawed assumption of a unilateral world and American preeminence. It invited overreach. The excesses of that overreach were increasingly negative perceptions of the U.S. abroad and loss of trust of U.S. intentions. By President Bush’s second term, that doctrine was in shambles and increasingly disregarded, but the damage was largely done. That doctrine was increasingly replaced by ad hoc decision making.

Consequently, U.S. foreign policy has been running on auto pilot for nearly a decade. There has been no clear and coherent doctrine to provide guidance. Absent such a doctrine, there is no strategic direction. Instead, decisions are made ad hoc, inconsistently, and often without much though given to the larger structural dynamics driving events. Resources (fiscal, economic, and military) are allocated inefficiently and outcomes fall far short of what might otherwise be attainable. Certain nations view the U.S. as a great power on the cusp of decline or early stages of decline in terms of its power and influence. That friendly leaders in Israel and Egypt were treated with relative indifference compared to past U.S. bilateral relations raised questions about American reliability.

IMO, Crimea is probably lost to Ukraine. Economic sanctions and expulsion of Russia from the G-8 won’t change that, even as some measures need to be undertaken to mitigate damage to American credibility, as the ethnic Russian majority there almost certainly wants out of Ukraine. Their success in separating from Ukraine might embolden other sections in eastern Ukraine to follow suit.

Going forward, either the current Administration or next one would do well to address the nation’s current foreign policy vacuum. Putting together a panel led by distinguished diplomats and national security authorities—examples might include Madeleine Albright, Henry Kissinger, Dennis Ross, Brent Scowcroft, etc.—to devise a coherent foreign policy doctrine would be a first step. The next step would involve aligning fiscal priorities (including research investments and space technology research) and the nation’s military posture with that doctrine. Alignment is crucial. The proposed reductions in U.S. manpower are inconsistent with the United States’ maintaining a capacity to help manage a balance of power compatible with the nation’s interests and those of its allies. Those planned reductions can only reduce American power vis-à-vis the rest of the world, especially as the conventional military technology gap is possibly narrowing courtesy of the information revolution and increasing military R&D overseas. The continued managed retreat of the U.S. from scientific research via real (after-inflation) research funding failing to keep pace with inflation could increase the risk that a qualitative breakthrough in some military technology could well occur overseas at some point in time.

Finally, neo-isolationism is not a viable solution. It is an “escapist” approach that amounts to abdication of American interests. It is an approach that would foster a power vacuum in the wake of a retreating U.S., and that vacuum won’t necessarily lead to a more secure world, much less greater respect for U.S. interests.
 
Sanctions are an act of war, at least an invitation, of themselves. I don't think Putin has designs on Europe. This should be let alone.

The Ukraine is a part of Europe and Putin himself signed a pact guaranteeing their sovereignty. This cannot be allowed to stand either.
 
The Ukraine situation remains a bad one. Even if Russia had not intervened, the country was ethnically divided. Those divisions could well have led to a split of the country following the political revolution that took place in Kiev. When central authority declines, the risk of fragmentation of such divided states can be high. Such fragmentation does not always take place peacefully, either. Czechoslovakia was a benign exception. Yugoslavia was a more common example.

Even if Russia withdraws its forces from Crimea (while making clear that it will defend its naval base at Sevastopol against any efforts to dislodge it), putting Ukraine back together as a single country is not an assured outcome. Events may have run to far ahead to allow that to happen. Some kind of political arrangement of autonomous regions within a loose Ukrainian confederation might be feasible (though I have my doubts about that given the parties’ profound differences and mistrust).

Tragically, as has happened time and again over the past decade, the U.S. was caught flat-footed and quickly fell behind the curve of events. The vital “what if” questions concerning the political revolution were not asked, much less addressed. The underlying assumption was that the political revolution against a leader widely opposed in western Ukraine but widely supported in eastern Ukraine would magically lead to a stable and democratic Ukraine. Another underlying assumption was that Russia would ignore whatever its interests were, including its doctrine of a compatriot foreign policy where it has asserted itself as a protector of ethnic Russian peoples in its near abroad. Such idealistic assumptions have become a hallmark of recent American foreign policy. Examples include the misplaced notion that the Syrian revolt (as opposed to the street demonstrations that preceded it) has a democratic nature, the “Arab Spring” was about democracy and would lead to stability, etc.

This problem is not solely the responsibility of the Obama Administration. It extends at least as far back as the Bush Administration. The Bush Administration had a neoconservative doctrine, but that doctrine was based on the flawed assumption of a unilateral world and American preeminence. It invited overreach. The excesses of that overreach were increasingly negative perceptions of the U.S. abroad and loss of trust of U.S. intentions. By President Bush’s second term, that doctrine was in shambles and increasingly disregarded, but the damage was largely done. That doctrine was increasingly replaced by ad hoc decision making.

Consequently, U.S. foreign policy has been running on auto pilot for nearly a decade. There has been no clear and coherent doctrine to provide guidance. Absent such a doctrine, there is no strategic direction. Instead, decisions are made ad hoc, inconsistently, and often without much though given to the larger structural dynamics driving events. Resources (fiscal, economic, and military) are allocated inefficiently and outcomes fall far short of what might otherwise be attainable. Certain nations view the U.S. as a great power on the cusp of decline or early stages of decline in terms of its power and influence. That friendly leaders in Israel and Egypt were treated with relative indifference compared to past U.S. bilateral relations raised questions about American reliability.

IMO, Crimea is probably lost to Ukraine. Economic sanctions and expulsion of Russia from the G-8 won’t change that, even as some measures need to be undertaken to mitigate damage to American credibility, as the ethnic Russian majority there almost certainly wants out of Ukraine. Their success in separating from Ukraine might embolden other sections in eastern Ukraine to follow suit.

Going forward, either the current Administration or next one would do well to address the nation’s current foreign policy vacuum. Putting together a panel led by distinguished diplomats and national security authorities—examples might include Madeleine Albright, Henry Kissinger, Dennis Ross, Brent Scowcroft, etc.—to devise a coherent foreign policy doctrine would be a first step. The next step would involve aligning fiscal priorities (including research investments and space technology research) and the nation’s military posture with that doctrine. Alignment is crucial. The proposed reductions in U.S. manpower are inconsistent with the United States’ maintaining a capacity to help manage a balance of power compatible with the nation’s interests and those of its allies. Those planned reductions can only reduce American power vis-à-vis the rest of the world, especially as the conventional military technology gap is possibly narrowing courtesy of the information revolution and increasing military R&D overseas. The continued managed retreat of the U.S. from scientific research via real (after-inflation) research funding failing to keep pace with inflation could increase the risk that a qualitative breakthrough in some military technology could well occur overseas at some point in time.

Finally, neo-isolationism is not a viable solution. It is an “escapist” approach that amounts to abdication of American interests. It is an approach that would foster a power vacuum in the wake of a retreating U.S., and that vacuum won’t necessarily lead to a more secure world, much less greater respect for U.S. interests.

Where do you think Putin will get the money to run Russia once the Europeans sanction him? Russia is not the USSR which was autonomous of trade with other nations. Putin is not stupid and knows he will lose his office if he crashes the Russian economy which now depends on oil and gas exports to survive.
 
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The Ukraine is a part of Europe and Putin himself signed a pact guaranteeing their sovereignty. This cannot be allowed to stand either.

The Europeans wanted to pull Ukraine out of Russia's orbit. They messed it up.
 
Where do you think Putin will get the money to run Russia once the Europeans sanction him? Russia is not the USSR which was autonomous of trade with other nations.

When the Europeans sanction Russia? Why he will get the money from the Chinese. They have wanted the European natural gas allotment for years.
 
Where do you think Putin will get the money to run Russia once the Europeans sanction him? Russia is not the USSR which was autonomous of trade with other nations.

Trade with China

Russia exports raw materials, oil and gas being the prime money makers. It has added pipelines to export to China, to bypass Ukraine into northern and southern Europe

As Europe currently has no options to replace Russian gas, the sanctions will be limited, and easily bypassed. Russia to my knowledge only exports metals to the US (most important titanium) which can easily be exported to other markets, and as for US exports to Russia are primarily agricultural. US based companies of course export other goods to Russia, but they are made elsewhere (ie asia)
 
Where do you think Putin will get the money to run Russia once the Europeans sanction him? Russia is not the USSR which was autonomous of trade with other nations. Putin is not stupid and knows he will lose his office if he crashes the Russian economy which now depends on oil and gas exports to survive.

Russia is a big seller of crude oil and natural gas. Russia also has access to the global markets. The EU almost certainly won't sanction Russia's oil and natural gas sales, as it would have a large energy gap to fill. Russia's growing trade from China also won't be impacted.

Also, we agree that Putin is not stupid. I don't see him going beyond Crimea unless other events precipitated such a move. One example might be other sections in Ukraine trying to break away and Ukraine's using force to try to quash the separation. Another might involve some kind of Ukrainian military effort to try to reassert control over Crimea (a reckless gamble that would be certain to fail).
 
Trade with China

Russia exports raw materials, oil and gas being the prime money makers. It has added pipelines to export to China, to bypass Ukraine into northern and southern Europe

As Europe currently has no options to replace Russian gas, the sanctions will be limited, and easily bypassed. Russia to my knowledge only exports metals to the US (most important titanium) which can easily be exported to other markets, and as for US exports to Russia are primarily agricultural. US based companies of course export other goods to Russia, but they are made elsewhere (ie asia)

Energy is where it's at and yet the US is not exploring or exploiting energy sufficiently on its own continent and, until a new President is elected, probably won't. Obama wants a PC domestic policy and that will certainly override its international interests. He really is just a food stamp president.

It also seems that many Americans don't realize that an insecure world is not good for anyone's prosperity. Post WWII American leaders understood this and implemented the Marshall Plan. Now that is all forgotten. There are those want to be prosperous and yet remain isolationist, the last being an impossibility in today's world.
 
Russia is a big seller of crude oil and natural gas. Russia also has access to the global markets. The EU almost certainly won't sanction Russia's oil and natural gas sales, as it would have a large energy gap to fill. Russia's growing trade from China also won't be impacted.

Also, we agree that Putin is not stupid. I don't see him going beyond Crimea unless other events precipitated such a move. One example might be other sections in Ukraine trying to break away and Ukraine's using force to try to quash the separation. Another might involve some kind of Ukrainian military effort to try to reassert control over Crimea (a reckless gamble that would be certain to fail).

When Obama pulled missile Defense out of eastern Europe (allegedly to defend the area from Iran) everything changed. Poland, among other eastern European nations, were never concerned about Iran, as Obama repeatedly said, but Russia. And, apparently, they appear to be right. Who will stop Putin?
 
When Obama pulled missile Defense out of eastern Europe (allegedly to defend the area from Iran) everything changed. Poland, among other eastern European nations, were never concerned about Iran, as Obama repeatedly said, but Russia. And, apparently, they appear to be right. Who will stop Putin?

IMO, NATO needs to closely integrate all of its Eastern European members, who are now feeling unsettled. NATO should not expand beyond its existing membership, as an increasingly expansive alliance lacks credibility. It should focus on building sufficient deterrents among its Eastern European members to assure that they feel secure and any threats are, in fact, deterred.

On a separate note, I believe the proposed cuts in military manpower are rather reckless. Manpower is still crucial and technology is not a substitute for manpower, especially in a world where countries have available options to increase manpower and improve their technology/gain access to improved technology. The current proposal appears to be little more than a reincarnation of Secretary Rumsfeld's "go light" approach that discounted the value of manpower and proved badly off the mark when tested in Iraq. It could not lead to stability following the end of major combat and the security vacuum facilitated the rise of an insurgency.
 
On a separate note, I believe the proposed cuts in military manpower are rather reckless. .

It sent a very clear message to everyone from the Russians to the Iranians to Al Qaeda to the Chinese to North Korea to Somalian pirates. It is impossible to isolate from anyone.
 
CNN claiming that a Pentagon official has concluded that Russia now have full operational control of the region
 
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