Heya DS.....More good news then. Seems our politicians needed that ding to come in from the Saud and Israel. As today they were talking about how our politicians are at odds over funding Egypt.
Still at this time.....there is no reason that we need to be sending funds there. They have made up 12 Billion just from the Saud, Qatar, and the UAE. They are set to get a loan thru the IMF. Plus I do believe France stated they would give out money too. But that was going back to when Sarkosy was running things.
I believe the largest share of U.S. assistance is defense-related. However, IMO, the more important question is not whether Egypt can do without U.S. aid, but what a withdrawal of that aid signals to Egypt's embattled transitional government about U.S. reliability. If the transitional government concludes that the U.S. is unreliable, that would free it to tilt toward other partners. China might be one candidate. Russia might be another, especially as Egypt might afford it the first strategic opportunity to begin rebuilding Mideast influence since it lost most of its influence during the 1970s on account of skillful U.S. diplomacy and application of power.
Unfortunately, the U.S. is devoid of a foreign policy strategy. It appears to lack a big picture view of geopolitics (that extends to the White House and many in the GOP i.e. Senators McCain and Graham). As a result, its foreign policy is increasingly reactive, when a proactive policy is urgently needed. In the midst of chaos where U.S. major interests are at stake--Egypt is the real deal, Syria is not--a firm, organized response is essential. In contrast, vacillation, hesitation, or eratic seemingly impulsive oscillation is not.
During much of the 2000s, the neoconservative movement dismissed realists' seeming refusal to advocate democracy over stability in the Mideast. Events now have demonstrated that the realists were right. There was no real contest. And the outcome has occured at high cost to the U.S.
A careful reading of history would have avoided such an outcome. But history seems to have been displaced by the fad de jour. Whether one is dealing with Afghanistan or Iraq (both areas where the risk of insurgency was extremely high and for which planning should have been done beforehand, not after insurgencies erupted) or elsewhere in sectarian societies, a careful reading of history could have offered a sound foreign policy foundation. In other words, protests that the U.S. could only react to events in the Mideast ring hollow. The U.S. is only in a reactive position, because it failed to have the foresight to examine history, identify its key interests, and set forth a cohernt vision for advancing/sustaining those interests.
As far as the Mideast is concerned, a careful reading of history could only have led one to understand that the authoritarian regimes that populated much of the Mideast were no accident. They are the result of structural factors (cultural, historical, institutional, and sectarian rivalries). A "strong" government was the only kind that could gain long-term stability in the midst of ethnic and religious rivalries. Any move toward liberalization necessarily had to be gradual and cautious, allowing time for civil society to begin to emerge, institutions to develop, and experience in increasingly representative government to accumulate. Revolution would merely topple leaders. Absent a favorable structural environment, protodemocratic experiments would lurch toward illiberal outcomes. One witnessed that in Iraq with the emergence of a government that is largely of, by, and for the Shia at the expense of Iraq's ethnic and religious minorities (and increasingly tilting toward Iran). One witnessed it in Egypt where the Muslim Brotherhood tried to exploit its electoral outcome to disregard the judicial branch and accumulate a monopoly on power far beyond what the more moderate Egyptian populace would accept (forgetting, of course, that the military never abandoned its central role as a guarantor of sorts).
Stability, with gradual reform, is probably the most realistic course one could expect. The absence of a coherent foreign policy strategy has already eroded U.S. influence in Egypt, but the damage is not irreparable. But additional short-sighted moves to withhold on commitments can produce an outcome that would lead to long-term damage. Not surprisingly, both Israel and Saudi Arabia are trying to get the U.S. to apply the brakes on its runaway, reactive responses. Meanwhile, should long-term damage be inflicted, one should not be too surprised if others exploit that outcome for their own advantage.
