Oh . . . then it wasn't meant to be a joke. OK. One of these days, you may actually decide what you really meant. More likely, though, what you "meant" will vary according to the convenience of the moment.
And you keep using this word "clear," though you don't seem to be able or willing to come up with the goods when asked to show the clarity. (Like, say the "clarity" of the mandate being intended as a tax, both in the language of the statute, and in the record of legislative intent.) It's an old legal joke that any time you see the word "clear" you can bet that whatever follows will be anything but. I see you will carry on that tradition with pride.
Well, as I keep telling you, I obviously cannot question your superior understanding of how I intended this or that. It's obvious that you know better than I do what the thoughts are inside my head. Obviously there is no point in my simply telling you what I meant because you will only fire back with your devastating "I don't believe you" retort.
As far as what's clear, I don't recall you asking, but I've previously made reference to the Wickard case, where the Court held that an act of Congress could prevent a man from growing wheat on his own farm within a single state for his own consumption, subject to its power to regulate interstate commerce. The Court reasoned that, if he was growing wheat for his own use, that meant that he wasn't buying wheat from others that may have been sold through interstate commerce. In other words what they were saying was that Congress could force the farmer to buy wheat, as opposed to growing it himself. The issue, according to the Court, was not whether the farmer was participating in in interstate commerce, but rather, whether the activity he was engaged in "exert[ed] a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce".
Now substitute health care for wheat and that should start to "clear" things up for you. See, it doesn't matter if a free rider isn't engaged in commerce, because his or her failure to purchase insurance exerts a substantial effect on interstate commerce, e.g. it drives up insurance costs for non-free riders and it interferes with Congress' ability to regulate the insurance market.
Justice Scalia illustrated that point nicely in Raich when he wrote, "Unlike the power to regulate activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce, the power to enact laws enabling effective regulation of interstate commerce can only be exercised in conjunction with congressional regulation of an interstate market, and it extends only to those measures necessary to make the interstate regulation effective." In this case, taking away the mandate is necessary to regulate the health insurance market, and specifically it's necessary to the legitimate purpose of eliminating preexisting condition exclusions.
Raich, in case you don't know, was is a recent case that very much mirrors the 1938 Wickard case. The Court held that marijuana grown in California -- legally per California law -- by an individual for personal consumption, could be impounded by the federal government pursuant to its power to regulate interestate commerce.
To some up: was the farmer in Wickard engaged in commerce, let alone interstate commerce? No. Was the pot grower in Raich engaged in commerce, let alone interstate commerce? No. Could Congress still direct their actions pursuant to the interestate commerce clause? Yes, because Congress had a rational basis to think that the sort of purely local, non-commercial activities that they were engaged in could have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.
Can you distinguish the cases?
For such a contentious issue this thread has remained relatively civil and within the rules. Baiting comments like the above need to end, now, or one way tickets out of this thread will quickly be given