Again, these are not mutually exclusive. In my opinion the penalty clearly has the function of a tax, and the mandate also falls within Congress' power to regulate interestate commerce.Kinda like the insurance mandate is "clearly" meant to be a tax, then it's a "clearly" a regulation of interstate commerce. (Who knows how many times that's gone back and forth.) You latch on to whatever you think will help you most at the moment.
Wow, what an awesome bit of circular reasoning. The grower was only doing something illegal if Congress had the authority to regulate it under the interstate commerce clause.Sure. Easily. The fact patterns are nothing alike, especially in Raich, where the grower was doing something illegal.
These are distinctions without a difference. In Raich, the Court -- including Scalia -- held that Congress has the power to regulate activity that is not interstate OR commerce in order to effect it's broader power to regulate interstate commerce. In Wickard, the Court effectively held that a farmer had to purchase wheat, as opposed to growing it himself. Now, Congress didn't flat-out *say* that the farmer had to purchase wheat, but the end result of their regulation meant that he was forced to purchase wheat. In other words, Congress forced the farmer to engage in commerce and the Court said, "good on you, you have that power under the interstate commerce clause."Nor did either case involve a law which required the purchase of anything and fines if that item wasn't purchased (not to mention exempting a lot of people from it altogether). Not to mention that the congressional schemes involved were meant to address extremely different sets of circumstances and meant to effect very different outcomes from what we have today. The analysis of everything is different.
And again, the unelected Court is supposed to give DEFERENCE to legislation that was lawfully passed by our elected representatives and our elected President.