If you want to see the 28 page version, it's online ...
http://usiraq.procon.org/sourcefiles/2002 National Intelligence Estimate.pdf
... as far as my claim that the doubts contained in the full 96 page NIE were left out in the watered down 28 page "white paper" ...
The October weapons of mass destruction estimate, with its numerous errors and exaggerated key judgments, reached Congress days before the hurried vote authorizing the President to order an invasion of Iraq.
As the Committee report describes, the unclassified version of the Estimate, the so-called "white paper," that was released concurrently by the Intelligence Community to aid in the public debate further compounded the errors in the underlying classified analysis.
For reasons that have not been convincingly explained,
the Intelligence Community eliminated many of the analytical caveats that were contained in the classified estimate when releasing the white paper to the public. Dissenting opinions among agencies on key judgments were dropped from the unclassified document as well. Perhaps most astonishingly, a key judgment in the white paper on Iraq's potential to deliver biological weapons added a meaningful phrase - "including potentially against the US Homeland" - that was not part of the corresponding key judgment in the classified estimate. This addition, which the Intelligence Community has been unable to explain to the Committee, communicated to the American public a level of threat against the United States homeland that was inconsistent with the Intelligence Community's judgment.
Not only did the Intelligence Community produce a white paper that failed to accurately state its own analytical beliefs, and, in turn, misled the public, it selectively declassified information in a way that kept from the public important judgments central to the debate at the time, namely the likelihood that Baghdad would launch a terrorist attack against the United States or assist Islamic terrorists in launching such an attack, especially using weapons of mass destruction.
Only after members of the Committee requested further declassification of the key judgments contained in the October Estimate did the CIA agree to release its assessment that, given what was understood at the time, the likelihood of Iraq initiating a weapon of mass destruction attack in the foreseeable future was low. The likelihood of an attack was assessed to be high, however, under the scenario that Saddam Hussein feared a military attack against Iraq threatened the survival of his regime. This judgment was not in keeping with statements by Administration officials at the time describing Iraq as a looming threat to America.
REPORT ON THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY'S PREWAR INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS ON IRAQ
"We assess that Baghdad has begun renewed production of mustard, sarin, GF (cyclosarin), and VX."
Most of Congress was given the White Paper which omitted the "we assess":
"Baghdad has begun renewed production of chemical warfare agents, probably including mustard, sarin, cyclosarin, and VX."
More examples -->
REPORT ON THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY'S PREWAR INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS ON IRAQ
