This intraparty issue is probably the key factor that has tied Speaker Boehner's hands. The failure of Republicans to agree on a common goal has weakened Speaker Boehner's position. It is a problem that has festered for some time, in part, because Speaker Boehner is not sufficiently strong to bring the more uncompromising elements into reasonable compliance over a common goal. It is also a consequence of the intraparty rivalry between Speaker Boehner and Majority Leader Cantor.
That Cantor strongly backed the Speaker today doesn't mean that the corrosive dynamic can immediately be overcome. The reality is that a significant share of Republicans is probably not going to support a debt limit increase under virtually any circumstances. If, in the end, their instransigence is not met by some internal punishment e.g., concerning Committee assignments, the incentives for such intransigence could remain strong. Then, it is entirely plausible, that those holding the most extreme positions could exercise a sort of veto over Republican policy making. Such a situation would undermine Speaker Boehner's negotiating credibility and make it more difficult for the full House to forge bipartisan consensus. In turn, the absence of such consensus would promote further gridlock, leading to greater distrust among the two parties and growing frustration within each party.
IMO, it is imperative that the House Leadership make abundantly clear that Republicans must support the debt ceiling package on Wednesday and then any package that is reconciled with the Senate (the Senate version will differ) given the enormous stakes involved. Such a strong stand might be anti-democratic, but the consequences of a failure to raise the debt ceiling are sufficiently grave that Congressional leaders need to be willing to impose agreement, if necessary, to avert such an outcome. Occasionally, leaders need to take large risks and expend substantial political capital. This is one situation where such risktaking and expenditure of political capital is necessary.
Totally agree. Hence, I wonder if anyone else noticed Boehner tone when he said to members of his party that:
a) there were things in the debt limit proposal members of his party may not like but should support (or words to that effect); and,
b) he was hopeful that his Republican colleagues in the Senate could pass similar legislation the had spending cuts.
Boehner knows nothing he sends to the House will get passed w/o spending cuts, entitlement reform and the types of makeshift spending controls, i.e., balanced budget amendment, that the Tea Party wants.
I want to be clear here, folks: I understand the concerns the Tea Party has concerning our national debt and the deficit. However, issues such as entitlement reform and deficit reduction should never be made part of raising the debt limit. As this article from
ThinkProgressive clearly indicates, such matters should be deal with separate from the debt limit debate.
Republicans, when faced with the default of their country, are willing to vote to raise the debt ceiling; this indicates that it is perhaps unneccesary to strike any sort of deficit reduction deal at all to win their votes. If Republicans and Democrats want to strike a grand bargain on deficit reduction, they can certainly do that in the context of the budget appropriations process rather than holding the debt limit hostage.
Hence, if you really paid attention to the President's speech last night, you know he gave the GOP two-options:
1. $4T in cuts for $1T in revenue; or,
2. A near even $2.8T in cuts for about the same in a debt limit increase with no revenue.
So, if you're deficit hawks, you take Option 1.
If you just want to raise the debt limit as Congress has always done in the past but still be assured of off-setting spending cuts, you take Option 2.
Again, Boehner knows he can't get either passed in the House, so he's calling on the Senate to "bail him AND his party out". Listen and learn how to filter out the white noise of politics.
