The Georgia-Russia Mini-War: U.S. Policy Implications

donsutherland1 · 08-27-08, 10:57 AM

The recent Caucasus conflict resulted from a combination of long-simmering ethnic disputes, Russia’s history, a U.S. foreign policy framework that increasingly diverged from historically-established international policy realities, and repetition of a previous disastrous gambit by Georgia to resolve its ethnic disputes by force.

Both Abkhazia and South Ossetia have sizable populations that are ethnically distinct from the Georgians. In Abkhazia, the desire for secession was intensified by “Georgianization” campaigns attempted under Soviet and Georgian rule. Under the 1925 Soviet constitution, Abkhazia had been separate from Georgia. During the early 1990s, several rounds of bloody fighting occurred between the Abkhazians and Georgians.

In December 1990, Georgia stripped South Ossetia of its long-standing autonomous status. In turn, South Ossetia’s legislature pursued secession and Georgia’s military forces moved into South Ossetia. The resulting conflict in 1991 inflicted thousands of causualties. In August 2008, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili pursued a military solution to resolve South Ossetia’s status, much as President Zviad Gamsakhurdia had attempted in 1991.

Russia has historically felt insecure in spite of its military power and expansive frontiers. It has had a fear that the surrounding states could grow hostile and effectively strangle it. That fear drove what amounted to an expansionist policy, be it through territorial gain or expanded influence. NATO’s expansion into Russia’s Near Abroad, U.S. missile defense systems planned for Poland and the Czech Republic, and lingering resentment of Soviet domination in states along Russia’s expansive border have inflamed Russian concerns of encirclement.

Post-Cold War U.S. policy also contributed to the gradual buildup of tensions that culminated in the recent mini-war. Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, U.S. foreign policy increasingly rested on two flawed assumptions: (1) a unipolar world; and, (2) the permanent triumph of Western liberalism.

As articulated by Charles Krauthammer, the U.S. adopted the perspective of a new era in which “the center of world power” resided with an “unchallenged” U.S. “superpower.” Krauthammer proclaimed:

It has been assumed that the old bipolar world would beget a multipolar world with power dispersed to new centers in Japan, Germany (and/or “Europe”), China and a diminished Soviet Union/Russia… The immediate post-Cold War world is not multipolar. It is unipolar. The center of world power is the unchallenged superpower, the United States, attended by its Western allies… Perhaps it is more accurate to say the United States and behind it the West, because where the United Stats does not tread, the alliance does not follow.

Such a world perspective granted unilateral freedom of action to the United States. “Why it should matter to Americans that their actions get a Security Council nod from, say, Deng Xiaoping and the butchers of Tiananmen Square is beyond me,” Krauthammer stated. In borrowing from Wilsonian idealism’s quest to make the world “fit and safe to live in,” Krauthammer asserted, “If America wants stability, it will have to create it.” He even argued that only a unipolar world could be stable, writing, “The alternative to unipolarity is chaos.”

The problem with such a perspective is that unilateralism can only lead to overextension, inattention to other nations’ interests, and give rise to efforts by other states to “balance” the preeminent power. Such assertions of U.S. power and unilateral freedom of action renewed Russia’s historic fear of encirclement and fed increasing Russian efforts to counterbalance the U.S. In February 2007, then Russian President Vladimir Putin issued a ringing rejection of the Krauthammer thesis and U.S. unilateralist policies that flowed from it. Putin declared:

…what is a unipolar world? However one might embellish this term, at the end of the day it refers to one type of situation, namely one center of authority, one center of force, one center of decision-making.

It is a world in which there is one master, one sovereign. And at the end of the day this is pernicious not only for all those within this system, but also for he sovereign itself because it destroys itself from within.

I consider that he unipolar model is not only unacceptable but also impossible in today’s world… Unilateral and frequently illegitimate actions have not resolved any problems. Moreover, they have caused new human tragedies and created new centers of tension…

Today, we are witnessing an almost uncontained hyper use of force—military force—in international relations, force that is plunging the world into an abyss of permanent conflicts… We are seeing a greater and greater disdain for the basic principles of international law… One state and, of course, first and foremost the United States, has overstepped its national borders in every way… And of course this is extremely dangerous. It results in the fact that no one feels safe.

While one can disagree with President Putin’s position—and I believe it is little more than an overly blunt caricature—what is important is that the U.S. can ill-afford not to be cognizant of how other states perceive its role. Worse, a failure to accommodate the differing interests of other states can and does lead to the kind of situations one witnessed in the recent mini-conflict between Russia and Georgia.

The second foundation of U.S. foreign policy that proved inherently flawed was the post-Cold War assertion of historical determinism proclaimed by Francis Fukuyama. Fukuyama diagnosed the end of the Cold War as ushering in a permanent triumph of Western liberal institutions. “The triumph of the West, of the Western idea, is evident first of all in the total exhaustion of viable systematic alternatives to Western liberalism,” Fukuyama wrote, adding, “What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of postwar history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.”

The historic experience has provided a far more sobering assessment. Assumptions of historic end points have been frustrated time and again by events. Momentary pauses that seemed to mark a new era in foreign relations have yielded to the flow of events and the “new eras” have become mere markers on the road paved by time.

Historic determinism and the “new eras” that rest on such determinism are inherently flawed on account of the realities of human nature. Human nature is dualistic. It has changed very little since humanity first evolved into its modern form. There is aspect of human nature in which people seek to concentrate power in a small number of hands. As a result, the historic experience has witnessed an unebbing oscillation between authoritarianism and freedom, even as the particular form of governance through which this struggle has manifested itself has evolved. The proverbial pendulum has never fixed itself to one state or another. Barring a dramatic change in human nature, its oscillation will likely continue.

Considering the historic experience, it is perilous to assume that all states aspire to become liberal democracies, much less that they will, in fact, achieve such status. Under the Fukuyama hypothesis, one can readily define any state that carries out a plebiscite as a democracy. In reality, sustainable liberal democracy depends on the bedrock of economic, political, and legal institutions and traditions. In the absence of such a foundation, elections can merely accelerate illiberal outcomes. The Gaza Strip affords one example. Iran provides another.

In addition, it is also risky to assume all nations crave peace. The combination of leaders' ambition, nations' aspirations, historic grievances, and imbalances of power create situations in which leaders or states might well desire war to achieve their objectives and aspirations.

All said, the decisions and events of yesterday and today are the seeds of tomorrow’s events. Keeping in mind the historic experience, a pragmatic Realist foreign policy probably affords the U.S. its best opportunity to safeguard its critical interests, overcome present and future challenges, and realize its present and future opportunities. Such a policy would be constructed around principles such as:

• Recognition that the balance of power is a necessary foundation for reducing the risk of conflict. Moral consensus is helpful, but in the absence of power, it is hollow.

• Collective security is a flawed instrument for promoting international peace and stability. Nations’ interests are not universal. Their desire to run risks is not equal.

• Effective foreign policy recognizes differences of national interests and seeks a balancing of interests so as to accommodate the needs of the world’s nations.

• Foreign policy success depends on a combination of a strong economy, a powerful military, a credible energy policy and reliable access to energy supplies, and cooperation among key nations (for the U.S., that means NATO allies, strategic partners e.g., Israel, and great powers). Soft power tools such as diplomacy, foreign aid (humanitarian, economic, and technical), and trade can help a nation pursue its interests. Partnerships and alliances can augment a nation’s own soft- and hard-power capabilities.

With respect to bilateral U.S.-Russia relations, much work now remains to be done. Some principles that can facilitate the process include:

• The U.S. should offer Russia benefits for cooperation and restraint and impose penalties when Russian conduct undermines critical U.S. interests. Engagement and cooperation on shared interests would be hallmarks of such an approach.

• Russia will need to fully respect the sovereignty of America’s NATO partners and the freedom sovereignty affords them in aligning themselves with the West.

• The U.S. will need to respect Russia’s critical interests in its Near Abroad and its historic fears of encirclement.

Some specific arrangements that might evolve from such principles would include a compromise over the placement of missile defense systems e.g., reopening the Azerbaijan option. Such principles might lead to a trilateral agreement between the U.S., Russia, and Ukraine to satisfy Ukraine’s security needs and territorial integrity, without expanding NATO. Such an agreement could minimize Russian interference in the affairs of sovereign states in exchange for fixing NATO’s boundaries at their present extent. Such principles might lead to an agreement concerning general principles and political mechanisms for dealing with ethnic disputes so as to preclude future Kosovo-South Ossetia-Abkhazia-type situations, beginning with the world’s major powers, and preferably extending to broader consensus from subsequent United Nations approval or ratification of an international convention.