Explanations about what transpired and criticism of Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili are not the same thing as justifying Russia's actions. While I find it disheartening what has happened in Georgia and strongly desire that its territorial integrity will be restored, I also realize that the facts that have come to light show that there can be little doubt that Georgia's decision to launch a military operation in South Ossetia was reckless. Georgia had been warned that such a move would lead to Russian intervention. Moreover, it had been informed not to expect U.S./Western military assistance. It is not rational for a leader to embark on a military operation that is a purely a matter of choice--and President Saakashvili was not compelled by any means to launch such an operation--when it is all but certain that such an operation would result in failure.

Russia bears responsibility for the consequences of its military actions. Allegations from both sides about possible war crimes e.g., ethnic cleansing should be examined.

Nevertheless, one cannot escape the grim reality that President Saakashvili made a complex ethnic conflict far worse from his enormous blunder. Russia is not likely to agree to return to the status quo ante and the West does not have the leverage to compel Russia to do so. As a result, the separatist groups in South Ossetia and Abkhazia will almost certainly adopt much more implacable negotiating positions. A negotiating process coupled with a renunciation of force by all sides will likely be agreed upon in the near-term, but Georgia can no longer be assured that such negotiations will preserve its territorial integrity. More than likely, they won't do so anytime soon.

In the wake of the decision, it is also very unlikely that Georgia will have any opportunity to join NATO. NATO's leadership, though publicly supportive of the embattled Georgian leader, recognizes the enormous risks Georgia ran in choosing to embark on a military operation it could not win. NATO is not likely to accept partners who materially increase the large risks that already confront the alliance, especially as it needs Russia's cooperation to have a chance at peacefully resolving the situation concerning Iran's nuclear program (a prospect that is growing less likely given Iran's rigid position).

Instead, NATO will confine itself to addressing its present geopolitical challenges (namely terrorism and its role concerning Afghanistan) and assuring its Eastern European members (Poland, the Czech Republic, the Baltic States, etc.) that their security is a high NATO priority. NATO members will also need to develop mechanisms and approaches that assure that neither Russia nor NATO's members accidentally undermine one another's critical interests. That will require time and effort and resolution of some of the differences between the parties that have erupted in recent years.

But there is a larger geopolitical situation that is in flux, too. What Russia's military intervention has shown is that the Krauthammer thesis of a "unipolar moment" is as irrelevant today as it likely was flawed from the onset. The balance of power had never become irrelevant. Not even following the end of the Cold War. Arguably, it has now gained importance with the rise of additional prospective great powers such as China, along with the fresh example that the UN is not in any position to substitute for decisions of sovereign states in protecting their own interests.

In the years ahead, the U.S. will need to be quite prudent in balancing its ideals with its power in defining a sustainable foreign policy. Otherwise, Russia among other states, could be given opportunities to exploit the emerging contours of a shifting balance of power. The transition toward such a world, if it is allowed to happen could be quite messy, particularly where one or more of the following factors intersect: long-running ethnic rivalries, Islamist radicalism, energy resources, or power vaccuums/imbalances. The Balkans, including Kosovo, the Middle East, and areas along Russia's Central Asian periphery would be strong candidates for such risks to play out, perhaps in deadly fashion.

Having said that, a world in which the balance of power gains increased importance does not necessarily have to be an unstable world. The arrangement that followed the Congress of Vienna of 1815 was quite stable during most of the 19th century, interrupted by only one major war (Franco-Prussian War of 1870). Ultimately, as has been the case throughout the historic experience, the relationships among nation-states will likely offer the best mechanism by which international peace and stability can be pursued. The UN will probably play a marginally beneficial role, but the states will need to work out arrangements that safeguard their own security and interests.

Aside from geopolitics, Georgia is now viewed as politically and economically riskier following President Saakashvili's decision. Its credit rating has been downgraded. Further downgrades are possible. It is plausible that until the Russia-Georgia dispute is resolved with some degree of finality, Georgia will suffer from reduced foreign direct investment. If so, that will undermine the growth its economy has experienced in recent years.

There is no assurance that once Georgia's people digest the consequences of President Saakashvili's gambit that he will win re-election in 2012, if he retains office and chooses to seek a new mandate. Today's popular support in the face of challenge could quickly wither once the conflict cools off and Georgia's people assess the damage (lives lost, homes destroyed, economic opportunities foregone, etc.).

In conclusion, Georgia lies along the geopolitical faultline in which ethnic rivalries, energy resources, and a power imbalance reside. As a result, President Saakashvili not only made a reckless gamble from the perspective of Georgia's national interests, but he also fractured the proverbial geopolitical faultline, with an earthquake of Russian intervention resulting. His decision was anything but helpful for American or NATO nations' interests. It likely undermined their prospects for diplomatic success in dealing with the threat posed by Iran's nuclear program.

The U.S./West now need to try to repair the damage by working to restore as much of Georgia's territorial integrity as possible. At the same time, they will need to contain the far broader geopolitical fallout that resulted from President Saakashvili's horrific blunder and the Russian response that followed.

Originally Posted by MC.no.spin How do you perceive this will affect the allowance of Ukraine into NATO?

Originally Posted by donsutherland1 -- Ukraine has a large ethnic Russian population that has threatened to secede if Ukraine becomes a NATO member. --