Earlier today, radical Islamist terrorists carried out a suicide bomb attack at a rally by former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and a gunman assassinated her. These attacks constituted an unmistakable attack against Pakistan’s moderate center. Earlier in the day, four people were murdered ahead of a rally by former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. These events mark a watershed in a still rising radical Islamist revolution. In the wake of these attacks, it is clear that Pakistan is being Talibanized and is increasingly in danger of seeing its government toppled by radical Islamist elements.

Throughout the course of the year, Pakistan has been drifting steadily toward a decisive showdown with an evolving radical Islamist revolution. In fact, even after a period of emergency rule, several dynamics in Pakistan remain relatively unchanged from earlier this year when radicals attempted to leverage Islamabad’s Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) to foment a revolution by which Pakistan would put under Taliban-like Islamist rule. First, Pakistan’s moderate center, though arguably but not certainly a majority of the population, continues to shrink. Second, radical elements are increasing their attacks on leading moderates be they President Musharraf’s government or opposition leaders such as former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, who was assassinated today, or Nawaz Sharif in a continuing war of attrition against the moderate leadership class that forms the backbone of that nation’s governing society. Third, radical elements continue to target organs and personnel of state control, including the police and army. In short, Pakistan is in the midst of a low-level Islamist revolution not too much unlike that which preceded Ayatollah Khomenei’s dictatorship in Iran. Pakistan is not yet at the point where the success of a radical Islamist revolution is foreordained, but very difficult measures may well be required to preclude such an outcome.

In my opinion, in the near-term, President Musharraf is likely to reimpose tough restrictions on large gatherings and indefinitely postpone the upcoming January Parliamentary elections. Arrests of those who incite violence against the government are also likely. A number of Islamist parties could be barred from government. Even tougher emergency decrees targeting select Mosques and their Imams are possible.

There is still a small chance that President Musharraf would allow the election to go on as scheduled. However, given that the leading Opposition figure has been assassinated, arguments that the outcome would represent the will of Pakistan’s people had Ms. Bhutto been alive, would be weak. At the same time, inaction by President Musharraf would signal weakness and encourage the Islamist extremists to run even larger risks against what they would perceive as an eroding government. Furthermore, the radical Islamists see themselves in a life-and-death struggle against moderate society that they see as a barrier to the kind of harsh Islamist rule they seek to impose. Given the religious overtones of their pursuit of political power, they are not likely to compromise. Most definitely, the Islamists would not be inclined to negotiate away what they believe Pakistan’s government could not achieve through law enforcement and military means. Hence, I believe odds favor President Musharraf’s taking the former course.

If President Musharraf does, in fact, adopt a new period of emergency rule, it is in the U.S. national interest to fully support the embattled President and his moderate government. The risk of a nuclear armed state coming under the rule of Talibanist elements would substantially exacerbate U.S. national security risks and have a potentially far more damaging global impact that Iran’s Revolution had.

While some idealists within President Bush’s Administration are likely to oppose the emergency measures, President Musharraf still has a strong card to play that he held back during his earlier period of emergency rule: linking continued cooperation with the U.S. in its war on terrorism to U.S. support for his government against the radical elements that seek to topple it.

Foreign policy is a two-way street. There are no free lunches. No nation can reasonably be expected to serving another’s interests in the absence of reciprocity. Nations cooperate to pursue shared interests or address common risks. Each must have something to gain, if the relationship is to endure. If the U.S. is unwilling to offer President Musharraf full support at this critical juncture in Pakistan’s history, President Musharraf could make clear that he is no longer able to assist the U.S. with its ongoing war on radical Islamist terrorists. Instead, he could argue that his nation’s survival as a moderate state must take precedence over the objectives of his faraway critics whose criticism only weakens prospects for the survival of Pakistan’s moderate government and emboldens the extremist elements that seek to snuff out a moderate Pakistan.

Ultimately, when it comes to U.S. foreign policy, pragmatism will likely trump idealism. Whether the U.S. made decisions that promoted stability or encouraged chaos in a critical nuclear power will define the constraints under which U.S. decision making takes place. Confronted by the possibility of such a stark loss of Intelligence and military cooperation, not to mention the even worse scenario of Talibanist elements gaining control of a nuclear power and establishing an Iranian-style theocracy there, most rational policy makers would calculate that larger interests make it necessary for the U.S. to offer full support for President Musharraf. Hence, should President Musharraf declare emergency rule and cancel elections for an indefinite period of time, any U.S. criticism and intervention to bring an end to the emergency rule is likely to be far more muted than it was during the last episode. In short, the U.S. strategic interest against Pakistan’s coming under the control of Islamist extremists will outweigh any tactical disagreements concerning the reinstitution of harsh emergency rule in Pakistan.

A nice flippant dismissal with not even a shred of supporting evidence.

To imply that it is somehow in the U.S. national interest for the United States to stand indifferent to the possibility of Taliban loyalists (including those sympathetic to Al Qaeda) gaining power in a nuclear weapons-armed state, as such a sweeping rejection of a position of support for Pakistan's moderate center only can, is an extraordinary definition of the U.S. national interest. How chaos in such a state that could lead to proliferation or leakage of nuclear weapons or, worse, the rise in power of a hostile Talibanist regime that would be armed with such weapons would improve U.S. security in particular and world stability in general, is certainly a unique perspective. However, as distinct as it might be, it is even more flawed.

Very few, if any, policy makers in the U.S.--either Democrats or Republicans--define the national interest in such a novel and, in my opinion, reckless, fashion. For example, here's what former General Anthony Zinni (former commander in chief of U.S. Central Command) wrote in September when the embattled Pakistani President was coming under some criticism for his having temporarily imposed emergency rule:

At the time, I was commander of the U.S. Central Command, which is responsible for the Middle East. Senior State Department officials asked me to contact Pakistan's ruler, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, to see whether he would conduct operations to seize the leaders of an al-Qaeda cell in Pakistan who had been identified by the terrorists now in Jordanian hands. Musharraf agreed, and his forces captured the jihadists. I was asked to contact him again to inquire whether U.S. interrogators could have access to those arrested. He said yes. Three more requests were made, and each time he agreed.

I asked the U.S. officials using me as a conduit whether, as a result of Musharraf's cooperation, we could improve our ties with his government and military. The answer was a flat no. I told Musharraf that I felt bad about this lack of appreciation and lack of understanding of the strategic importance of our nations' relationship. "I don't want anything for this," he replied. "I did it because it was the right thing to do."

That story sticks out in my mind these days, as it becomes increasingly fashionable to bash the embattled Musharraf. There's no such thing as a perfect ally, of course. But he was steadfast during the millennium crisis, and after Sept. 11, 2001, the United States was fortunate to have a leader in Pakistan who was willing to take on the fight against terrorism. We may criticize some of his undemocratic governing decisions and his failure to prevent al-Qaeda's leadership from gaining a foothold in the volatile border area with Afghanistan. But we should acknowledge the price the Pakistani military has paid in this battle and recognize the political courage it took for Musharraf to wage it at all, despite its unpopularity with the many Pakistanis who think that the fight against terrorism is not their struggle and despite the vast array of political, social and security problems his government faces...

Allies are supposed to be partners, not paragons. We will find ourselves in trouble if we insist that our allies do everything we ask, measure up totally to our concepts of how their societies should function and make no demands of us. Look at the NATO forces in Afghanistan, just across the border from Pakistan; are all of those troops, from 37 countries, fighting with the same commitment as Pakistan's forces are? Has U.S. support for the Pakistani military truly been enough to help it operate in the extremely difficult border environment where U.S. politicians urge it to confront al-Qaeda? Has America's relationship with Pakistan yielded sufficient benefits to persuade the skeptical Pakistani public to support mutual efforts to counter Islamic extremists?

All of us could have been smarter in handling the conflict with Osama bin Laden and his ilk from the start, and we need to continuously review and improve our efforts. I recently visited Pakistan again and had an opportunity to discuss the threat with Musharraf. I was impressed with his focus on improving border-control methods, training border-security forces and improving border-security cooperation with Afghanistan. It was clear that he is committed to doing his part to control a notoriously leaky frontier. It was also clear that the United States needs to offer far more support and coordination to let Pakistan and Afghanistan make this all work.

Both nations should avoid attacking each other and learn to appreciate the efforts and sacrifices that each has made in the struggle against their common foe. Careless, irresponsible statements can damage fragile alliances and erode cooperation and trust. They serve only to encourage our mutual enemies in al-Qaeda and the Taliban, who will use them for their own gain. Pakistan and Afghanistan must embark upon a more constructive dialogue. And I could say something similar about the U.S. debate about Pakistan. Unless we do better, we will continue to lose allies as a result of reckless, alienating comments that amount to short-term domestic political posturing and hurt U.S. security interests in the long run.

Source: Anthony C. Zinni, "Stand by Our Man in Pakistan," The Washington Post, September 9, 2007, p. B4.

I defer to General Zinni's experience, as well as his knowledge of the region and its dynamics.

In the end, the U.S. can ill-afford to turn a blind eye to the events in Pakistan. One "Iranian Revolution" was more than enough. To this day, the fallout of horrendous U.S. foreign policy blunders continues to loom large over U.S. interests and key allies in the Middle East. In no way would U.S. interests, South Asian stability, nor international peace and security be served by a triumph of radical Islamists in Pakistan.

Bub,

It is only the radical Islamists who have been carrying out suicide terrorist attacks. MSNBC reported, "A party security adviser said Bhutto was shot in the neck and chest as she got into her vehicle, then the gunman blew himself up."

In fact, on the eve of her return to Pakistan, Haji Omar (the leader of Pakistan's Taliban) vowed to assassinate her. Other Islamist leaders also made similar threats. Intelligence also pointed to Islamist militants seeking to assassinate her.

All said, my confidence that it was radical Islamists who were behind her assassination is very high.

Bub,

On this fast-breaking story, there is now a report that Al Qaeda is claiming responsibility. AKI International reported:

A spokesperson for the al-Qaeda terrorist network has claimed responsibility for the death on Thursday of former Pakistani prime minister Benazir Bhutto.

“We terminated the most precious American asset which vowed to defeat [the] mujahadeen,” Al-Qaeda’s commander and main spokesperson Mustafa Abu Al-Yazid told Adnkronos International (AKI) in a phone call from an unknown location, speaking in faltering English. Al-Yazid is the main al-Qaeda commander in Afghanistan.

It is believed that the decision to kill Bhutto, who is the leader of the opposition Pakistan People's Party (PPP), was made by al-Qaeda No. 2, the Egyptian doctor, Ayman al-Zawahiri in October.

Right now, it is still too soon to know whether this claim is an act of opportunism by Al Qaeda to assert its relevance in Pakistan. Nonetheless, I remain highly confident that radical Islamists were behind Ms. Bhutto's assassination.

Originally Posted by donsutherland1 Bub, It is only the radical Islamists who have been carrying out suicide terrorist attacks. MSNBC reported, "A party security adviser said Bhutto was shot in the neck and chest as she got into her vehicle, then the gunman blew himself up." In fact, on the eve of her return to Pakistan, Haji Omar (the leader of Pakistan's Taliban) vowed to assassinate her. Other Islamist leaders also made similar threats. Intelligence also pointed to Islamist militants seeking to assassinate her. All said, my confidence that it was radical Islamists who were behind her assassination is very high.

Originally Posted by donsutherland1 Bub, On this fast-breaking story, there is now a report that Al Qaeda is claiming responsibility. AKI International reported: A spokesperson for the al-Qaeda terrorist network has claimed responsibility for the death on Thursday of former Pakistani prime minister Benazir Bhutto. “We terminated the most precious American asset which vowed to defeat [the] mujahadeen,” Al-Qaeda’s commander and main spokesperson Mustafa Abu Al-Yazid told Adnkronos International (AKI) in a phone call from an unknown location, speaking in faltering English. Al-Yazid is the main al-Qaeda commander in Afghanistan. It is believed that the decision to kill Bhutto, who is the leader of the opposition Pakistan People's Party (PPP), was made by al-Qaeda No. 2, the Egyptian doctor, Ayman al-Zawahiri in October. Right now, it is still too soon to know whether this claim is an act of opportunism by Al Qaeda to assert its relevance in Pakistan. Nonetheless, I remain highly confident that radical Islamists were behind Ms. Bhutto's assassination.

In a continuing bid to shed further light on this terrible tragedy in which one of Pakistan's most important political leaders was ruthlessly murdered, most likely by Islamist extremists, I note that the December 26 edition of Pakistan's Daily Times had a short piece quoting a radical Islamist leader accusing Ms. Bhutto of supporting "anti-Islam" policies.

The article stated:

Benazir Bhutto is supporting the anti-Islam policies of President Pervez Musharraf, Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam-Fazl (JUI-F) chief Maulana Fazlur Rehman said on Tuesday.

He was addressing a public gathering for JUI-F candidate for the National Assembly Maulana Attaur Rehman’s election campaign...

"Benazir is talking about abolishing madrassas. How can she dare to do this if her father Zulfikar Ali Bhutto could not take any action against madrassas?" he said.

For purposes of background, the JUI-F is a pro-Taliban political movement. It has called on Pakistan to dissociate from the U.S.-led war on terrorism. The JUI-F also has been operating illegal FM radio stations from within madrassas [Islamic religious schools] from which it has been disseminating the radical Islamist perspective and other anti-government propaganda.

It takes little imagination to understand how radical Islamists would take an accusation that Ms. Bhutto was "talking about abolishing madrassas." Moreover, as he leveled his charge against Ms. Bhutto, Rehman had been losing support from his radical Islamist base. Whether or not his deteriorating position contributed to his harsh allegations against Ms. Bhutto and possibly his organization's incitement of the assassination or role in it remain to be seen.

Prior to those events, on December 24, the Associated Press of Pakistan news agency reported that Bhutto had taken a decisive stance against suicide bomb terrorist attacks. The news agency announced, "Addressing a public gathering here during her visit in connection with the elections campaign, she condemned the terrorists and suicide bombings, and said the country is facing such acts for the last several years. She added that people should reject these elements who are promoting hatred and discourage them so that peaceful environment could prevail in the country. She said that PPP has a comprehensive programme to convert the country into public welfare state. 'We believe in the supremacy of judiciary and minimum interference of the army in the national affairs,' she said."

Finally, in another development that likely proved offensive to Islamist extremist elements, Pakistan's The News reported on December 8 that Ms. Bhutto disclosed to an Arab envoy that she had met former Israeli Prime Minister and current Israeli President Shimon Peres while abroad. Moreover, she added that she "was favourably disposed towards ties with Israel."

All said, odds that radical Islamist elements were behind the former Prime Minister's assassination are very high.

Originally Posted by Kandahar You have absolutely no idea what you are talking about.

For those who are interested, OpinionJournal.com has posted an October 23, 2007 commentary piece written by Benazir Bhutto in which she indicated that radical Islamists were seeking to assassinate her.

Briefly, Bhutto wrote:

Oct. 18 underscores the critical situation we confront in Pakistan today--trying to campaign for free, fair and transparent elections under the threat of terrorism. It demonstrates the logistical, strategic and moral challenge before us. How do we bring the election campaign to the people under the very real threat of assassination and mass casualties of the innocent?

The attack on me was not totally unexpected. I had received credible information that I was being targeted by elements that wanted to disrupt the democratic process--specifically that Baitul Masood (an Afghan who leads the Taliban forces in North Waziristan), Hamza bin Laden (an Arab), and a Red Mosque militant had been sent to kill me. I also feared that they were being used by their sympathizers, who have infiltrated the security and administration of my country, and who now fear that the return of democracy will thwart their plans...

Obviously I knew the risks. I had been targeted twice before by al Qaeda assassins, including the infamous Ramzi Yousef. Knowing the modus operandi of these terrorists, coming back to the same target again (i.e. the World Trade Center), certainly underscored the danger...