Originally Posted by donsutherland1 For those who are interested, OpinionJournal.com has posted an October 23, 2007 commentary piece written by Benazir Bhutto in which she indicated that radical Islamists were seeking to assassinate her. Briefly, Bhutto wrote: Oct. 18 underscores the critical situation we confront in Pakistan today--trying to campaign for free, fair and transparent elections under the threat of terrorism. It demonstrates the logistical, strategic and moral challenge before us. How do we bring the election campaign to the people under the very real threat of assassination and mass casualties of the innocent? The attack on me was not totally unexpected. I had received credible information that I was being targeted by elements that wanted to disrupt the democratic process--specifically that Baitul Masood (an Afghan who leads the Taliban forces in North Waziristan), Hamza bin Laden (an Arab), and a Red Mosque militant had been sent to kill me. I also feared that they were being used by their sympathizers, who have infiltrated the security and administration of my country, and who now fear that the return of democracy will thwart their plans... Obviously I knew the risks. I had been targeted twice before by al Qaeda assassins, including the infamous Ramzi Yousef. Knowing the modus operandi of these terrorists, coming back to the same target again (i.e. the World Trade Center), certainly underscored the danger...

Originally Posted by bub where did you read that those who killed her were Islamists?

I am encouraged that Pakistan's President has so far taken a course in the middle of the options I had outlined yesterday. He is not yet moving to impose full-scale restrictions. At the same time, he is not taking a business-as-usual approach. Instead, he is letting the situation determine what steps will be taken.

So far, the following measures have been announced or are being undertaken.

• The Army has been placed on high alert in sensitive areas (Geo TV, Dubai)
• Pakistani special forces were deployed in Mirpurkhas to deal with an "untoward situation" (Geo TV, Dubai)
• Curfews will be imposed, if necessary, in areas in which violence erupts (Geo TV, Dubai)
• Pakistan's Interior Ministry will initiate an "operation" against outlawed religious organizations and other extremist groups including Al Qaeda and the Taliban (Khabrain, Islamabad)
• Any decision to postpone the January 8 elections will be taken after the consultation of the political parties. The parties have been invited to review the situation (Associated Press of Pakistan news agency). The All Parties Conference would effectively make the decision whether to delay the election (Dawn)

As noted earlier in this thread, I believe the U.S. should wholly support whatever course President Musharraf takes. Otherwise, good intentions notwithstanding, the U.S. could undermine Pakistan's precarious moderate foundations.

With respect to the decisions that have been made and the process now underway, I am encouraged, because that strategy at least for now avoids the need for the kind of high-risk crackdown that could backfire. By that I mean, a harsh crackdown would be initiated, but then rapidly ended under pressure before accomplishing its major objectives. Such a turn could then lead to a worse situation than what had preceded the crackdown.

There is ample past precedent whereby governments under pressure from spiraling unrest and violence have initiated severe crackdowns that included some or all of the following elements: mass arrests, suspension of parliamentary/judicial functions, suspension of elections, bans on public meetings and gatherings, martial law, among others.

However, within months, on account of internal and external pressure, the embattled government rapidly changed course. Widespread amnesty, rushed liberalization, select resignations/firings, power sharing, and even appointment of a caretaker government followed. Unfortunately, as the short duration of the crackdown did not allow sufficient time for the gradual building of stronger political, legal, and law enforcement/security institutions and pent up pressures remained, the rushed easing tended to backfire. Outside pressures to accelerate liberalization could actually hasten the demise of opportunities for a more liberal form of government.

Anti-government elements saw the move as indicating the government's mortal weakness and expanded their efforts to bring about its collapse. Violence quickly increased. Public confidence in the nation's institutions and the ability of its government to survive dissipated. Moderate elements and the Middle Class, even as they had an enormous stake in the outcome, retreated to the sidelines leaving the "battlefield" to the government and more extreme elements. Religious clergy sometimes joined the extremist anti-government side. Military and security insubordination and sabotage began to proliferate.

Against that backdrop, the existing or caretaker government saw its ability to maintain order disintegrate. Afterward, such a government was swept away. More often than not, its successor proved even more illiberal than the government it toppled.

Given Pakistan's complexities and the feudal nature of the radical Islamist elements that are gathering influence in that nation, the collapse of President Musharraf's government would, more than likely, see the rise of a much harsher regime. Any brief democratic interlude that might be possible in the aftermath of a fall of President Musharraf would quite likely be targeted and more likely than not stamped out by the uncompromising radical Islamists who view any kind of relatively liberal, secular, and democratic government as antithetical to Islam.

On October 31, 1978, as the Shah of Iran embarked on a desperate bid to rapidly liberalize his government under heavy pressure from President Carter, The Washington Post opined, "Political liberalization involves...a great gamble. Who knows what really will work? The place is in many respects still feudal; it is not what you would call Thomas Jefferson country."

That description very closely fits Pakistan today. Prudence, not haste, will be key to helping that nation move onto a firmer foundation for a long, gradual democratic evolution. Reform needs to be undertaken at a pace that a country's institutions can evolve and its society can adapt. A much faster rate of change can only risk its political and institutional disintegration.

That is the course President Musharraf should pursue. The U.S. should offer him unqualified support in his bid to help his nation navigate the great hazards that lie ahead.

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Originally Posted by Kandahar I am utterly disgusted that anyone could advocate rewarding Musharraf for his intentional negligence in providing Bhutto with adequate security. He is one of the worst leaders in Pakistan's history...and that's really saying a lot. He has been an abysmal failure in combating terrorism, promoting stability, securing his country's nukes, promoting liberty, and just about every possible criteria. Bhutto's successor, or Nawaz Sharif, or even another military leader who overthrows Musharraf in a coup...anyone would be better than Musharraf.

Originally Posted by Tashah An old addage comes to mind... The devil you know may be better than the devil you know not.